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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In our time, it is not unusual for Islam to be portrayed as a political ideology. Constant 
references towards ―political Islam‖, ―Islamism‖ and ―Islamists‖ have become part of 
the intellectual language and are rarely challenged in terms of their foundational 
claims. This thesis investigates the fundamental premise that the Qur‘ān may contain 
a political theory. In doing so, a detailed investigation has been conducted in defining 
concepts of the ―political‖ from within the Muslim tradition by particularly locating 
these concepts within the Muslim intellectual tradition. The leading research question 
also seriously considers the hermeneutical issue about how scripture is read to yield a 
holistic understanding of the entirety of the message. The work of Toshihiko Izutsu 
(1914-1994) has been employed as one of the major methodological tools in analysing 
the Qur‘ān. Alongside Izutsu‘s semantic analysis, the thematic approach has also been 
utilised to provide a more holistic understanding of the Qur‘ān. Within this 
framework, this research has proposed that the Qur‘ān indeed contains a hierarchy of 
concepts that is indicative of the Qur‘ān itself prioritising concepts.  
 
With this in mind, a cluster of concepts emerges which forms the main analyses. 
Accordingly, the idea of a caliphate theory that is equated with an ―Islamic state‖ has 
been postulated to be non-Qur‘ānically based. In fact, it is found that the very 
proposition is contradictory in terms, as the modern state itself is a European 
invention, both in structure and form. This study also explored the concept of sharīʿa, 
arguing that there are two fundamental natures of sharīʿa, the first is that it has mainly 
been a force of challenge and opposition to power; the second is the emphasis upon 
individual free choice. One comes to the conclusion that the Qur‘ān is intentionally 
silent towards any political structure or system, yet at another level the Qur‘ān 
reinforces, justice, rights, accountability and apposes injustices of all kind.  
 
In an attempt to provide a potential readings of the Qur‘ān to render answers to the 
research questions, the inferences generated from the research are put together with 
other Qur‘ānic concepts such as taqwā and iḥsān with the goal of understanding the 
role of the individual and the community in the wider Qur‘ānic Weltanschauung. The 
nature of the individual is dynamic; his or her core nature is in constant turmoil but 
desires perfection. With the desire of perfection comes the drive towards bettering 
oneself and one‘s surroundings. There is a tension or paradox between being an 
individual and belonging to the collective and between living in the mundane but 
believing in the sacred. This tension (or paradox) could be solved by means of a 
constant relationship between refining oneself (looking inward) and projecting 
outward with the taqwā that is developed. 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The impression that Islam is best understood as a political ideology is evident 
throughout contemporary research into the increasingly popular field of ―political 
Islam‖. The strong scholarly emphasis upon the study of radicalism, fundamentalism, 
political Islam or modern Muslim
1
 political movements makes this clear.
2
 The belief 
that Islam is to be understood above all as a political ideology has reached a fever 
pitch since the 1979 revolution in Iran and continues to burn all the more acutely 
since the events of September 11 2001.
3
 The view within Western discourse that 
Islam to be understood primarily within a political framework is continually 
reinforced at a semantic level through the use of popular terms and phrases.  Such 
labels include ―Islamism‖, ―political Islam‖, ―Islamic activism‖, ―Islamic reformism‖, 
―Islamic revivalism‖ and ―Islamic fundamentalism‖. These labels unfortunately 
reduce the complexity of the matter into something overly simplistic. Even the single 
Western label ―Islamism‖ incorporates and merges a wide variety of meanings and 
encompasses a wide spectrum of Muslim thinkers and activists, reformers and 
traditionalists alike.
4
 It is clear, therefore, that addressing questions of definition, both 
by those inside and outside Muslim cultures, is critical to exploring the relationship 
between politics and Islam. 
  
Especially in the 20
th
 century Islam has been examined to determine how compatible 
it is with ―democratic values‖, ―science and rationality‖, ―human rights‖ and more 
                                                 
1
 The use of the word ―Muslim‖ rather than ―Islamic‖ is an intended distinction. For further discussion 
see the section on ‗Muslim and Islamic‘, p. 25.  
2
 The list of books and journals are in the thousands, the following list are but a few examples: N 
Lahoud, Political Thought in Islam: A Study in Intellectual Boundaries, Routledge, London, 2005; S 
Cronin, Reformers and revolutionaries in modern Iran: new perspectives on the Iranian left, 
Routledge Curzon, London, 2004; S A Arjomand, From nationalism to revolutionary Islam, State 
University of New York Press, Albany, 1984; M Ayoob, The politics of Islamic reassertion, St. 
Martin's Press, New York, 1981; N Ayubi, Political Islam: religion and politics in the Arab world, 
Routledge, London, 1991; S Zubaida, Islam, the people and the state: essays on political ideas and 
movements in the Middle East, Routledge, London, 1989; N Feldman, The fall and rise of the Islamic 
state, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2008; M E Marty & R S Appleby, The Fundamentalism 
project, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991; D F Eickelman & J P Piscatori, Muslim politics, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996; I Hamid, Modern Islamic political thought  the response 
of the Shī ī and Sunnī Muslims to the twentieth century. I.B. Tauris, London, 2005; J L Esposito, Islam 
and politics, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, N.Y., 1998. 
3
 The political development since the so called ‗Arab spring‘ further reinforces this view. 
4
 See V Nieuwenhuijze, ‗Islamism: A Defiant Utopianism‘, Die Welt des Islams, New Ser., Vol. 35, 
no.1, Apr.199, pp. 36. 
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generally ―modernity‖.
5
 Such comparisons however appear to make questionable 
assumptions regarding the nature of Islam and the nature of politics arising out of a 
Eurocentric understanding of religion and political science. The very parameters of 
these comparisons can be challenged. 
  
Hence, it is problematic to claim that within Islam, politics and religion are 
thoroughly interconnected. Such a claim is based upon a very specific understanding 
of how religion and politics are construed and a limited view of what exactly 
secularism means. This claim also begs the question of how one might be able to 
‗measure‘ the degree to which any kind of separation or association exists. As Ovamir 
Anjum notes, in place of the narrow Western discussion relating to the presence or the 
absence of ‗secularism‘ the self-understanding about politics observable through 
Muslim history possesses a ‗variety of complex and surprising attitudes toward the 
possibility of restraining political power‘.6 
  
In an attempt to demystify these issues Western and Muslim academics have debated 
and discussed the concept of ―political Islam‖ but to no avail.  Even the term 
―Islamism‖ defined as ‗the ideology advocating the creation of a society and state 
based on Islamic principles‘ remains hopelessly vague.
7
 After all, just about any 
religious, political, or cultural belief that offers truth claims about the nature of the 
world would have social and political implications. The definition, which says 
nothing about what the phrase ―Islamic principles‖ might actually mean or how these 
principles are put in practice, is at best a tautology and at worst so broad as to be 
meaningless. 
  
Another more common definition of ―Islamist‖ or ―political Islam‖, proposed by 
Sivan, is also ultimately unsatisfactory. For Sivan, political Islam constitutes the 
development of a state based on Islamic teachings (of God‘s laws) and the rejection of 
                                                 
5
 For example, J L Esposito     Fran ois, Modernizing Islam: religion in the public sphere in the 
Middle East and Europe, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, N.J., 2003; also see J Cooper, LR 
Nettler, & M Mahmoud, Islam and modernity: Muslim intellectuals respond, I.B. Tauris, London, 
1998. 
6
 O Anjum, Politics, law and community in Islamic thought: the Taymiyyan moment, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2012, p. xiv. 
7
 J Gunning, Re-thinking Western constructs of Islamism: pluralism, democracy and the theory and 
praxis of the Islamic movement in the Gaza Strip, Doctoral thesis, Durham University, 2000. Available 
at Durham e-Theses Online: <http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/1586/> , p.1. 
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or insurrection against any regime that does not govern through the use of such laws.
8
 
Such a definition unfortunately does not distinguish between several distinct ways in 
which different scholars have understood the application of God‘s laws. For instance 
Sivan‘s definition includes Abū al-Aʿlā Mawdūdī‘s (1903-1970) worldview that the 
state (either as a modern nation state or as a caliphate system) must comply with a 
specific structure in regards to punishment laws
9
 and the view that society be 
governed more generally by the Islamic principles of equality and justice, as in the 
case of Ghannouchi‘s ideas in Tunisia.10  
 
In both of these examples, the laws of the Qur‘ān and the sunna are both 
implemented, but they are implemented on the basis of very different hermeneutical 
approaches. This is because even though ―sharīʿa law‖ is viewed as divine, its 
jurisprudence (fiqh) is understood as a human endeavour. The implementation of 
sharīʿā itself that is called upon in reality is the implementation of jurisprudence 
formulated by the early jurists, extracted from a particular socio-political context. The 
point that is overlooked is that these jurisprudential inferences are human 
improvisations addressing particular contexts. Also overlooked is that the main body 
of the Sunnī orthodox jurisprudence related to politics is in reality a polemical 
response to competing sects such as Shīʿite and the Muʿtazilite.11 Consequently 
Sivan‘s definition that a Muslim is one who denounces contemporary society as 
corrupt and Godless, calling for the implementation of Qur‘ān and the sunna (even if 
by force) remains vague.
 12
 This is because some have understood it as democracy 
arguing for justice and equality yet the source of reference remains to be the Qur‘ān 
and the sunna.
13
 Furthermore, when defining ―political Islam‖, Sivan like many fails 
                                                 
8
 See E Sivan, Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics, Yale University Press, New 
Haven, 1985. 
9
 See Mawdūdī‘s work AA al-Mawdūdī, ‗Political Theory of Islam‘, in A Khurshid, (ed.) Islam: Its 
Meaning and Message, Islamic Council of Europe, London, 1976, pp. 159–61. Even Mawdūdī‘s earlier 
career shows a considerable amount of contextuality considering the formation of Pakistan and his 
attempt to participate in parliamentary government before denouncing it. Given this, the political 
movements that developed as an intellectual religious arguments must be read in their own context. 
The same could be said about Sayyid Quṭub‘s (1906-1966) slow radicalisation after Nasser‘s torture 
techniques in 1954. 
10
 See R Ghannouchi, ‗Participation in Non-Islamic Government‘ in C Kurzman (ed.), Liberal Islam a 
source book, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, pp. 89-95.   
11
 See Chapter Two p. 69.  
12
 See M Campanini, & C Higgitt, The Qur'an: Modern Muslim Interpretations, Routledge, London, 
2011, p. 91. 
13
 Examples include Jamāl al-Dīn Afghānī (1838-1897), Mohammed ʿAbduh and Mohammed Iqbāl 
(1877-1937) just to name a few.  
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to take into account the idea of ―bindingness‖ as a distinctive argument of ―Islamists‖, 
which adds yet a further layer of complexity when discussing Muslim worldview of 
politics and definition(s). The concept of ―bindingness‖ refers to the notion that a 
Muslim necessarily must actively pursue an action; otherwise her/his salvation is in 
jeopardy. Examples of such bindingness includes prayer and the belief in the Oneness 
of God.   
 
 
 1.2 IMPETUS OF STUDY 
 
 The Arabic phrase that states Islam is both a religion and a state (islām dīn wa dawla) 
sparked the research leading to this thesis. The key question that arose was whether 
the Qur‘ān has an overt prescription of a form of government that is binding to its 
adherers. A significant number of Western Muslim intellectuals have argued 
emphatically that the Qur‘ān has a clear prescribed political theory, a political theory 
that specifies structures and systems. The strong degree of certainty that the Qur‘ān 
contains such an overt prescription of a form of government that can be called 
Islamic struck this author as curious. The author also found it intriguing that Western 
non-Muslim academics were also quite certain on this point. This prompted the in-
depth study as to what the Qur‘ān actually says about the matter. 
  
Preliminary research revealed that the claim that the Qur'ān contains a clear 
prescribed political theory either in the form of Islamic state, government or 
administration has not been supported by solid scriptural analysis, neither by holistic 
nor systematic methodology. Furthermore, existing research does not possess any 
kind of comprehensive methodology in the way it addresses either the definition of 
political theory or the hermeneutical issues involved in reading scripture. 
Accordingly, the aim of this investigation is to explore and examine whether there in 
fact exist specific form(s), structure(s) and system(s) in the Qur‘ān that can 
definitively said to be prescribed and hence binding for all adherents of Islam.  
 
 
1.3 BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW   
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In the introduction to Khalid Harub‘s Political Islam: Context Versus Ideology, 
the development of contemporary ‗political Islam‘ is accounted for in three ways, 
none of which need be mutually exclusive.
14
 The first explanation, which views the 
emergence of ‗political Islam‘ or ‗Islamism‘ as a response to colonial or imperial 
hegemonies is found in the writings of Francois Burgat,
15
 Ali Mazrui
16
 
and Alastair Crooke.
17
 Here Islamism is understood as an expression of liberation 
against ‗direct Western military control over Muslims‘.18  
 
In support Munaz argues in her introduction that the ‗re-assertion of cultural identity 
is in fact one of the key issues for today‘s Islamist movement‘ referring to the colonial 
experiences of the Muslim world and the European domination.
19
 She further explains 
that  
Much of the Muslim world is undergoing a process of Islamic re-assertion which, far 
from being strictly religious, is closely linked to the need to find its own political and 
cultural language, cannot be divorced from either the experience of colonialism or the 
failure of modernization and secularization process set in motion by post-colonial 
elites during the 1960s and 1970s.20 
 
Following Munaz‘s description, the second explanation, featured in the writings of 
James Piscatori
21
 and John Esposito
22
, more specifically attributes the emergence of 
Islamism to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1924. In this view, the reaction 
that is termed ‗political Islam‘ arose in response to four factors:  (1) the abolition of 
the pan-Islamic caliphate system, (2) the pressures of modernity, (3) westernization 
and (4) the imposition of the modern nation-state. In this way the defunct ‗caliphate 
system‘ was transformed into a utopian dream of unity and a renewed golden age.23  
 
                                                 
14 K  arūb, Political Islam: Context Versus Ideology, Saqi, London, 2010. See the Introduction. 
15
 F Burgat, Face to face with political Islam, I.B. Tauris, London, 2005. 
16
 AA Mazrui, Islam: Between globalization and counter-terrorism, James Currey, Oxford, 2006. 
17
 A Crooke, Resistance: The essence of the Islamist revolution, Pluto Press, London, 2009. 
18  arūb, p. 15. Also see Z Badawi, The Reformers of Egypt, Croom Helm, London, 1978, p. ix. 
19
 GM Munaz, Islam, Modernism and the West: cultural and political relations at the end of the 
millennium, I.B. Tauris in association with the Eleni Nakou Foundation, London, 1999, p. 7. 
20
 Ibid.  
21
 JP Piscatori, Islam in a world of nation-states, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986. 
22
 JL Esposito, The Islamic threat: Myth or reality? Oxford University Press, New York, 1999. 
23
 See the work of O Roy, The failure of political Islam, Tauris, London, 2007.  
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This hope can be seen as early as 20
th
 century writings of  asan al- annā (1907-
1949) the founder of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
24, Abū Aʿlā Mawdūdī (1903-
1979) the founder of Jamāʿat Islāmī party in Indo-Pakistan25 and Taqiuddin al-
Nabhānī (1907-1977) the founder of  izb al-Taḥrīr in Palestine26 endeavoring to 
define Islam as primarily a political system.
27
 Put in another way, Islamic teachings 
and practices are only truly fulfilled within clear political boundaries. Later on, by the 
middle of the 20
th
 century, the vision of ―caliphate‖ system was compromised with 
the acceptance of the modern nation-state serving as the overall political model, with 
the exception of  izb al-Taḥrīr. This is seen in the writings of Mohammed Asad 
(1900-1992),
28
 Mohammed Iqbāl,29 Mawdūdī and even within the subsequent 
development of Ikhwani (Muslim Brotherhood) thought. The way these writers 
managed to legitimise the political aspect of Islam was by developing the theme of 
return, this is the idea of returning back to the ‗original inspiration of the first 
community of believers‘.30 
 
The modern ―Islamist‖ seeks to retrieve and reinstall a type of a religious state that 
arguably existed in the time of the Prophet. Therefore implicit in this argument is the 
view that Islam has a specific theory on politics and state. The historical authenticity 
is enforced by invoking religious and juridical text in an attempt to prove the 
‗obligatoriness‘ of an ―Islamic state‖ and therefore its bindingness.31 
 
The third explanation, seen for example in the works of Quintan Wiktorowiczis,
32
 
situates political Islam within the theory of social movement, arguing that Islamism 
                                                 
24
 H Al-Banna, The Message of Education and Guidance, Western Sunrise Press, New York, 1977. See 
the work of RL Euben, & MQ Zaman, Princeton readings in Islamist thought: texts and contexts from 
al-Banna to Bin Laden, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.  
25
 AA Mawdūdī, Political theory of Islam, Islamic Publications, Lahore, 1980. Also see AA 
Mawdūdī, The Islamic law and constitution, Islamic Publications, Lahore, 1960. And see the works 
of Nasr, S V Reza, Mawdudi and the making of Islamic revivalism, Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1996. 
26
 T Nabhānī, The Islamic State, al-Khilafah Publications, London, 1998. Also see his book Islams 
system  Niḍām ul-Islām, Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2004. 
27
 Roy, p.viii. 
28
 M Asad, The principles of state and government in Islam, University of California Press, Berkeley, 
1961. 
29
 M Iqbāl, The reconstruction of religious thought in Islam, Ashraf, Lahore, 1965. 
30
 Roy, p. xiii. 
31
 See NM Ayubi, Political Islam: religion and politics in the Arab world, Routledge, London, 1991, p. 
1. 
32
 Q Wiktorowicz, Islamic activism: A social movement theory approach, Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington, Ind, 2004. 
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developed as a response to a multiplicity of societal strains. These include the unjust 
distribution of wealth and the failure of the state apparatus in the form of despotic 
authoritative regimes. 
 
Thus, it is reasonable to argue that the notion of an ‗Islamic‘ state is a modern 
assertion by ideologues such as Sayyid Quṭub (1906-1966)33and Abū Al-Aʿlā 
Mawdūdī. However, what complicates this study in that the concept of ―Islamic state‖ 
and ―Islamic government‖ have been argued by many Islamists as having its roots and 
prescription as early as the first century in Muslim history, thus providing this concept 
with authenticity.
34
 Yet as Afsaruddin argues, according to the historiographical 
evidence available, that the early Muslim community were caught by surprise with the 
death of the Prophet; therefore, uncertainties arose regarding governship.
35
 She 
concludes that it is clear there was ‗no blueprint for an ―Islamic government‖‘.36  
 
In support of Afsaruddin, Ayubi argues that the original Islamic sources (that is the 
Qur‘ān and the sunna) have little to say about the state and government.37 Yet, one of 
the first challenges facing the early Muslims after the death of the Prophet was that of 
a political nature. Indeed, most likely the first disagreement that arose in the Muslim 
community was of a political nature, one which consequently developed into sectarian 
differences between Murjiʿites, Khārij‘ites and Shīʿites.  
 
The debate regarding political boundaries in Muslim theology, however, has rarely 
been articulated well. Khalid Abou El Fadl has an insightful formulation. The 
underlying question of any articulation that involves the merger of Islam and politics 
at any level involves the issue whether political boundaries are imperative to protect 
the moral community. Furthermore, there is the question as to whether such political 
boundaries are necessarily conducted in a particular structure and form. That is to say, 
whether its means, structure and particularity are binding. Asked in another way, the 
                                                 
33 S Quṭub, al- Adālah al-ijtimā īyah fī al-Islām, Dār al-Shurūq,  eirut, 1975; S Quṭb, Ma rakat al-
Islām wa-al-ra smālīyah, Dār al-Shurūq,  ayrūt, 1975; S Quṭb, Ma ālim fī al-ṭarīq, Dār al-Shurūq, 
Cairo, 1970. Also see the work of AS Mawsilili, Radical Islamic fundamentalism  the ideological and 
political discourse of Sayyid Quṭ , American university of Beirut, Beirut, 1992. 
34
 See A Afsaruddin, ‗The "Islamic State": Genealogy, Facts, and Myths‘, A Journal of Church and 
State. 48, no. 1: 153.  2006, p. 153. 
35
 Ibid. p. 155. 
36
 Ibid. p. 156. 
37
 Ibid. 
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crux of the question is whether ‗God‘s morality must necessarily be actualized 
through a political community dedicated to fulfilling this morality‘.38 If one 
understands God‘s morality in terms of a set of prescribed laws, then the question 
acutely becomes: does God‘s Law require a political community with clear political 
and territorial boundaries? 
 
Formulated in this way, different thinkers have answered the question differently, 
from a strict yes (such as Maudūdī,39 Quṭub and others) to yes with reservations (such 
as Mohammed ʿAbduh,40 Mohammed Asad, Mohammed Iqbāl to some extent, 
Mohammed Rashīd Riḍā41 and Rāshid al-Gannouchi42). These thinkers have pointed 
to  Qur‘ānic concepts of justice, the role of mankind as a deputy (khalīfa), problems 
of oppression, corruption, the umma (community) and its role to encourage good and 
forbid evil .
43
 The thought process of these thinkers also merges Islamic thought with 
the western concepts of democracy and political engagement. The camp that argued 
for an emphatically no also relies on the argument that the Qur‘ān speaks of general 
moral principles and not legal. Thinkers such as ʻAlī  Abd al-Rāziq (1888-
1966),
44
 Mohammed Khalaf-Allah (1906-1997), Jamāl al- annā (1920-2013)45 
Maḥmūd Mohammed Ṭāhā (1909-1985),46 Abdullahi An-Na‘im,47 Abdelwahab El-
Affendi
48
 and Khaled Abou El Fadl
49
 are a few of these contemporary scholars. 
 
Although each thinker may offer a distinct argument as to why a moral community 
does not necessitate a territorial boundary, each relies upon a hermeneutical tradition 
                                                 
38
 K Abou El Fadl, ‗The Unbounded Law of God and Territorial  oundaries‘ in AE Buchanan, & M 
Moore, (ed.),  States, nations, and borders: the ethics of making boundaries. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 214. 
39
 See unpublished thesis of R Ahmad, The concept of the Islamic State as found in the writings of Abul 
A' La Maududi, University of Durham, 1969. 
40
 M ʿAbduh, Tafsīr al-Manār, Dār al-Manār, Cairo, 1950. 
41
 MR Riḍā, Al-Khilāfah aw al-imāmah al- u m   ma āḥith shar īyah siyāsīyah ijtimā īyah iṣlāḥīyah, 
Maṭba at al-Manār, Egypt, 1922.  
42
 R Ghannūshī, Ḥuqūq al-muwāṭanah  waḍ īyat ghayr al-Muslim fī al-mujtama  al-Islāmī, Tunisia, 
1989.  
43
 K Abou El Fadl, ‗The Unbounded Law of God and Territorial  oundaries‘, pp.214-215. 
44 A  Abd al-Rāziq, Islam and the fundamentals of authority; a study of the caliphate and government 
in Islam, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1928. 
45
 J  annā, Al-Islām wa-al- aqlānīyah, Dār al-Fikr al-Islāmī, Cairo, 1991. 
46
 MM Ṭāhā, The second message of Islam, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, N.Y., 1987. 
47
 AA Na īm, Islam and the secular state  negotiating the future of Shari a, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass, 2008. 
48
 A El-Affendi, Who needs an Islamic state? Grey Seal, London, 1991. 
49
 See K Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and violence in Islamic law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2001. 
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that searches for the purpose behind a specific text (maqāṣid). Each also refers to 
the Qur‘ānic notion of earth being created by God undivided.50 What unites these 
authors is their definition of being islāmiyūn (Islamist), yet not in the conventional 
western understanding of an Islamist. This kind of diversity in thought is unaccounted 
for in any definition of Islamist. For instance, Abou El Fadl‘s conclusion seems 
convincing when he asserts that 
If one can imagine that moral communities are akin to an open text whose 
significance and meaning are constantly being explored and developed, then the risk 
is that political and territorial boundaries would be akin to artificial constrains that 
close the text and stun the evolvement of meaning.51 
   
He further quotes verse 49:13 arguing that ‗these political boundaries threaten to 
transform the moral community of Islam to political entities, and to transform the 
universality and transcendentalism of the Islamic Message into a closed determined 
and parochial reality‘.52  
 
Missing in any of the above writings is a systematic hermeneutical methodology that 
focuses upon scripture alone. Although many utilize Qur‘ānic verses, seldom if any of 
the research provides a clear methodology for analysing these verses other than by 
linguistic criteria.    
 
 
1.3.1 The Qur‟ān and Political Theory  
 
While there are many books on ‗political Islam‘, ‗Islam and Politics‘ and ‗Islamic 
political movements‘53, there has been little written in the field of political theory in 
the Qur‘ān alone. Hamid in his translated book from Arabic The Qur an and politics  
a study of the origins of political thought in the Makkan Qur an is one example.54 A 
major limitation to this work is his lack of systematic methodological approach and 
his unconvincing arguments.  
  
                                                 
50
 For example, K Abou El Fadl, ‗The Unbounded Law of God and Territorial  oundaries‘, p.215. 
51
 Ibid. p. 225. 
52
Ibid. p. 226. 
53
 See footnote 2. 
54
 EA Hamid, The Qur an and politics  a study of the origins of political thought in the Makkan 
Qur an, trans. A Lu‘lu‘a, The International institute of Islamic Thought, London, 2004. 
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According to Hamid the ‗political‘ is the ‗authoritative body which can issue certain 
rules of behavior‘.55 Political thought, therefore, is concerned with authority in 
general, that is to say how it should be practiced; how is it acquired; what is the 
relationship between the individual and authority; and political thought is also 
concerned with constitutional law.
56
Hamid claims that the Meccan verses have 
political principles that were not only abstract philosophical structures to be realised 
in Medina but also the revealed verses were connected to the Meccan historical 
realities.
57
 His last point is not disputed, what is contended is whether the verses‘ 
principles in Mecca are of a political or an ethical nature.   
  
Although one could agree with his definition of the political, there is a confusion in 
understanding the verses that Hamid has interpreted to be the foundation of Muslim 
political theory. For example, verses 6:133 and 165 God promises to raise whom He 
wishes.
58
 Here, there might be a merger between God‘s promise (outside human 
action) and human action. In other words, it is only God who could raise who He 
wishes and thus it is not in the hands of human beings. 
  
Arguably, the assertion that Islam is a ‗system of normative values, which acts as a 
criterion for identifying the major social objectives, evaluating institutions and 
justifying the claims of legitimacy‘ is an acceptable assertion.59However, it is 
problematic to claim that Islam ‗justifies political power as well as the use of force 
and the right to obedience‘.60 The idea that Islam ‗justifies political power‘ is a 
misreading of classical literature that in fact attempts to restrain power.
61
 Hamid‘s 
argument also assumes Islam has prescribed a particular acceptable political order that 
goes beyond the general category of justice and injustice. Finally, Hamid himself 
argues that ‗[r]ule and sovereignty are in the hands of God alone‘.62 This is because 
our understanding and implementation of that understanding remain human and 
constructed. 
                                                 
55
 Ibid. p. 1. 
56
 Ibid.  
57
 Ibid. p. 8. 
58
 Ibid. p. 20. 
59
 Hamid, The Quran and Politics, p. 15. 
60
 Ibid. 
61
 See Ovamir Anjum‘s valuable work Politics, Law and Community in Islamic Thought: The 
Taymiyyan Moment. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012. 
62
 Hamid, p. 15. 
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Hence, Hamid is right to suggest that it is impossible to approach the Qur‘ān with a 
purely blank mind.
 63
 That is to say, one is unable to be objective without any 
influence from one‘s own experience and culture. This is not to say that we are unable 
to understand the Qur‘ān but rather that our reading of it depends upon the question 
asked and upon our own experiences.
64
 As mentioned earlier, at best, Hamid‘s work 
lacks methodological strength and at worst, he fails to substantiate his argument 
effectively. 
 
In contrast, Manzooruddin Ahmed in an article entitled The Classical Muslim State 
maintains that not only there are confusions about concepts such as state, government 
and community, but that the primary aim of Islam is not to establish a state.
65
 Ahmed 
makes six main arguments to support his protestation: 
1) The caliphate should not be confused with modern nation state 
2) Prophet Mohammed did not set out to find a state in Medina; rather he aimed 
for a moral community that later assumed political characteristics in the form 
of territory.    
3) The caliphate developed as a social necessity rather than as anything Qur‘ānic. 
Hence, there is no defined theory of caliphate; it has developed through the 
course of Muslim history.    
4) There is no concept of modern political sovereignty in the historical caliphate. 
What does exist in classical literature is an attempt to restrain power rather 
than justify power.  
5) From the above, therefore, there is no obligation to bring back a caliphate 
system.  
6) In conclusion, the supremacy of the Qur‘ān and the sunna could be 
accommodated by means of a modern constitutional democracy.
66
  
 
                                                 
63
 Ibid. p. 25. 
64
 For further discussion see Chapter One p. 29. Other scholars of the Qur‘ān also make similar points. 
See the work of F Esack, Qur an, li eration & pluralism  an Islamic perspective of interreligious 
solidarity against oppression, Oneworld, Oxford, 1997. Also see A Saeed, Interpreting the Qur ān 
towards a contemporary approach, Routledge, Abingdon, 2006. And Y Muḥammad, Manṭiq fahm al-
naṣ  dirāsah manṭiqīyah tu n   i- aḥth ālīyāt fahm al-naṣṣ al-dīnī wa-qi alīyātih, al-Dār al- ayḍā  
Afrīqyā al-Sharq, Morocco, 2010.  
65
 See M Ahmed, ‗The Classical Muslim State‘, Islamic Studies, vol. 1, no. 3, 1962, pp. 83-104. 
66
 Ibid.  
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Some of the findings in this brief article are echoed in Chapters Three and Four. What 
is striking about Ahmed‘s argument is his affirmation that it is futile to construe any 
political theory in the Qur‘ān.67 The writings of the early Muslim jurists, 
consequently, attempt to fill this void by reading into verses such as 4:58 and 5:83.  
 
However, what is interesting in Ahmed‘s article is the time in which he published his 
work. It is reasonable to assume that the rise of the radical militant Muslims have 
shaped the kind of argument Ahmed is making, particularly given that he was 
involved in discussions on the nature of Pakistan‘s government.
68
 For this reason, one 
needs to be careful when reading his work as it might be a reaction against a particular 
ideology rather than a fully independent analysis of scripture. Notably, if the Qur‘ān 
is silent about all political institutions, why is democracy favoured? The same 
challenge might also be posed to most 20
th
 century scholars who advocate 
constitutional democracy. It is difficult, then, not to see their work as a reaction to 
Western imperial domination or at worst an intellectual bankruptcy.    
 
Another scholar who examines the Qur‘ān directly is Qamaruddin Khan in his 
work Political Concepts in the Quran.
69
 He postulates that the evidence suggesting 
that the Qur‘ān has a clear prescribed form of government and administration is 
questionable. He further argues that the Qur‘ān does not provide any ‗principle of 
constitutional law or political theory‘.70 The aim of Islam then is only in creating a 
moral order. Interestingly, Khan does not deny the political establishment in Medina, 
but argues that it was ‗incidental to historical situation, and not the essential aim of his 
Prophetic mission‘.71 His conclusions are the closest to those of this study, predicating 
that:  
i) Any political theory developed in Muslim history is the result of historical 
circumstances rather than anything in the Qur‘ān. 
ii) The state is seen as part of the function of society and not as an integral part. 
iii) Islam aims to establish a social order based on moral values, hence any 
structure of society that embodies these values is considered Islamic. This 
                                                 
67
 Ibid. pp. 90-91.  
68
 See his other work M Ahmed, Pakistan, the emerging Islamic state, Allies Book Corp, Karachi, 
1966. 
69
 Q Khan, Political concepts in the Quran, Islamic Book Foundation, Lahore, 1982. 
70
 Ibid. p. 73. 
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means, the emphasis is on values rather than upon the particular structure 
of any institutions. 
iv) Any discussion on ‗political Islam‘ must be seen as a contemporary debate 
that earlier Muslim discussions knew nothing about.
72
  
 
Although Khan‘s work reiterates the hypothesis of this enquiry, his research is limited 
because he does not provide a methodical way of analysing the Qur‘ān.  
 
Another noticeable work that supports the general arguments of this research is a 
short book published in 1925 entitled Islam and the Foundation of Governance by 
ʿAlī ʿAbdul Rāziq (1888-1966) which states clearly that Islam in its essence is a 
message of guidance; it does not contain any political theory or an indication of 
establishing an Islamic state.
73
 He substantiates his argument on two grounds. One, 
the Qur‘ān is silent about any clear institutional and systemic inferences. The second, 
the role of the Prophet has been described clearly in the Qur‘ān as a messenger and 
one who warns others rather than a political leader (contrary to many who see his role 
as both). He proclaims that:  
Muhammed…was a messenger of a religious call, full of religiosity, untainted by a 
tendency to kinship or a call for government, and that he did not have a government, 
nor did he rule, and that he, peace be upon him, did not establish a kingdom, in the 
political sense of the term or anything synonymous with it.74  
 
ʿAbdul Rāziq‘s work without a doubt was highly controversial due to the time in 
which it was published. He not only made the argument about the role of the Prophet 
in the Qur‘ān but further criticised how rulers historically claimed legitimacy by 
means of Islamisation of the caliphate theory. This is because, he contends, there is no 
consensus (ijmāʿ) amongst the scholars on the requisite of the caliphate as the Qur‘ān 
and the sunna is silent regarding the obligation of having a specific political system.
75
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 A ʿAbdul al-Rāziq, Al-Islām wa-uṣūl al-ḥukm, Al-Mu'assasa al-ʿarabī lil Dirāsāt wa al-nashr, Beirut, 
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74
 A ʿAbdul al-Rāziq, ‗Message Not Government, Religion Not State‘, in C Kurzman, (ed.) Liberal 
Islam: A Source Book, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, pp. 29-30.   
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He further asserts that ‗there was no governmental organization, nor were there 
trustees or judges [or] a seat of government‘ in the time of the prophet.76 In support, 
Manzooruddin Ahmed argues that the question of political leadership was not the 
concern of the early companions of the Prophet when he was alive.
77
 The question of 
any political establishment came after his death, therefore, any discussions on politics 
involves the problem of silence of the Prophet himself (and the interpretation of this 
silence). Although this is contested by Shīʿites who argue that the Prophet did in fact 
designate, one could reasonably hold the view that the fact that it is debatable 
suggests that the traditions that have been attributed to the Prophet Mohammed are at 
least unclear.    
 
ʿAbdul Rāziq‘s idea is also echoed by Mohammed Khalaf-Allah (1906-1997) when 
he equates shūrā (consultation) with institutional legislative authority.78 Combining 
several ideas together, he argues that the consultation must be in matters of worldly 
issues and that these matters necessarily are known by experts in the political not the 
religious sphere, quoting verses 5:101-2 and 4:83. His reference to these verses stems 
from the common assertion made by ‗Islamists‘ regarding the following verse 4:59 
that says 'Obey God and the Prophet and the people in authority'. Khalaf-Allah‘s 
definition of ‗people in authority‘ are those people who are trustworthy and have 
acquired the ‗know-how‘.79 Thus he has a much wider understanding of ‗people in 
authority‘. 
 
However, the same verse is also quoted by  asan al- annā arguing that ‗there are 
clear verses containing the most decisive evidence that it is our duty to rule by that 
which is in the  ook of God‘.80 Similar arguments are also made by Ghannouchi, 
although the interpretation and the application of ‗people in authority‘ is broader than 
the latter.
81
 The difficulty with this idea is not what God has sent down but rather 
                                                 
76
 A ʿAbdul al-Rāziq, ‗Message Not Government, Religion Not State‘, p. 36.  
77
 See M Ahmed, ‗The Classical Muslim State‘, pp. 83-104.  
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understanding what ‗God sent down‘ refers to.
82
  One must then figure out how to 
determine what exactly is the meaning(s) of these commands and then determine the 
precise actions.  
 
 oth ʿAbdul al-Rāziq and Khalaf-Allah tried to reconcile western democracy with 
Islam. Their ideas may have also been intended to undermine the caliphate claims of 
the Egyptian king in the wake of the repeal of the Ottoman Empire.
83
 They must also 
be read as an attempt to reconcile modernity with what they perceived to be the 
Islamic teachings.
84
  
 
In addition, although ‗Alī ‗Abdul al-Rāziq‘s work is interesting there are two major 
difficulties with it. The first is a technical issue of his own work being merely a short 
survey which needs to be developed more deeply with a clearer methodology. A more 
serious challenge, as mentioned earlier, is the time during which he wrote. For 
example, Rashīd Riḍā charged that ‗Alī ‗Abdul al-Rāziq wrote to encourage Ottoman 
Turkey to adopt the idea of the nation state; his work is thus reactionary and 
ideological.
85
 
  
Scholarly work written in English seems to follow the Islamists‘ assertions‘ without 
seriously examining their assumptions. For example the work of Watt, Islamic 
political thought: the basic concepts
86
 and later his book Islamic political thought
87
 
examines the development of Muslim political thought in history. Antony  lack‘s 
book The history of Islamic political thought: from the Prophet to the present;
88
 is 
another example of a historical survey of claims and debates taken place in Muslim 
history without an examination of the scripture. The work of Rosenthal Political 
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thought in medieval Islam: an introductory outline;
89
 adds a valuable contribution in 
examining political philosophers that have been influenced by Greek philosophies but 
does not examine the assumptions themselves.  
 
Both the work of Patricia Crone Islam and government: a history of medieval Islamic 
political thought 
90
 and Ann Lambton‘s work State and government in medieval 
Islam: an introduction to the study of Islamic political theory: The jurists are 
historical examinations of Muslim political thinking.
 91
  
 
The problem with the majority of the work noted above, such as Lambton's argument, 
is that the meaning of sharīʿa for instance is taken to denote the same as jurisprudence 
(fiqh) itself.
92
 Lambton goes on explaining that the ‗basis for the Islamic state was 
ideological...the primary purpose of government was to defend and protect the 
faith‘.93 The limitation of such arguments lies in the failure to recognise that these 
debates were taking place as a reaction to the silence of the Qur‘ān and arguably the 
Prophetic tradition.
94
 A general shortcoming of the western literature on Muslim 
political theology is the lack of exploration of the primary sources using a systematic 
methodology.  
 
Hence, there is a need for research that develops a systematic methodology in 
examining the Qur‘ānic verses and locating the development of political concepts in 
their historical context. It is this gap that this study aims to fill. 
 
 
1.4 THE AIM AND NATURE OF THIS RESEARCH   
  
This research explores and examines existing concepts that have been perceived to be 
political and aims to explore a Qur‘ānic based understanding of the individual and 
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community that reinforces a moral worldview that could have a political implication. 
In doing so this thesis is doing two things:  
 
1) Deconstructing and examining the existing Muslim political theology and  
2) Pointing towards a radically different emphasis in the Qur‘ān.  
 
This investigation fundamentally asks whether God intended for Muslims to establish 
a state (that is an explicit political boundary) and specifically, whether the Qur‘ān 
envisages a form of government that is binding (mulzim) for all adheres of Islam. In 
this way, the research fits into wider debates involving Muslim political theory.  With 
the Qur‘ān as the focal point of analysis, many complex issues arise in the course of 
the study. These include principles of hermeneutics, methods of semantic analysis, the 
ways in which the analysis may be situated within the wider history of scriptural 
interpretation, the interplay between the particular and the universal and the 
distinction between value systems and principles.
95
 Above all, this thesis is concerned 
with issues of interpretation, not in negotiating truth claims, focusing on the 
multilayered content of the Qur‘ān.
96
  Thus the study does not address as to whether 
the Qur‘ān records the true words of God, but rather what range of possible meanings 
does the Qur‘ān convey and whether it is possible to obtain a Qur‘ānic worldview. 
 
Hence, the task is complex, as the topic of Muslim political theology has overlapped 
both Muslim history and Qur'ānic hermeneutics.     
 
There are significant advantages to this exclusive focus on the potential meanings and 
worldview that the Qur‘ān presents. It has the potential to reduce the influence of 
dogmatic and sectarian thinking/discussions regarding the kind of framework one 
accepts as a form of reference. This, therefore, may aid in examining the Qur‘ān with 
fresher ‗eyes‘. In doing so, one may be able to read new and insightful meanings. This 
is particularly the case in Chapter Five The Theory of Law. Reading the Qur‘ānic 
injunctions prior to dwelling upon the jurisprudential discussions on fiqh (legal 
opinion) and sharīʿa (Muslim normative law) gives us the possibility of allowing new 
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interpretation(s). This is not to argue that the literature available is not valuable, but 
with the Qur‘ānic methodology employed one is automatically pushed into reading 
the scripture first.     
  
 
1.4.1 Problematising Definitions   
  
Defining ‗political theory‘ or ‗theory of politics‘ is not an easy task. The word siyāsa 
conceivably equates to the word 'politics' in English. Siyāsa comes from the root word 
s-w-s, the form sā is refers to the person that manages or tends horses or the like.97 
However, the concept does not occur in the Qur‘ān and finding an equivalent Arabic 
word of politics does little to define the concept itself. According to Ovamir Anjum 
the concept siyāsa was developed by the Umayyad to mean the rulers 'wise 
management of men and groups and distributing resources among them in a way that 
ensures stability, prosperity and other desired ends for the political community‘.98 
 
What is needed is a workable definition of political concepts that emerged from 
within Muslim tradition to avoid imposing a Eurocentric viewpoint that could distort 
that tradition. 
  
This is because for over the past 300 years, the field of political theory has been 
decidedly European, driven and influenced by Romanticism and Enlightenment 
ideals.
99
 Typically a survey in history of political thought begins with Plato and 
Aristotle and ends with Renaissance theorist Machiavelli.  The 1,800 years which 
separate Aristotle and Machiavelli are largely ignored, suggesting that there were no 
significant contributions to political thought during that time.
100
  As a result, the 
notion of political thought becomes synonymous with Western political 
                                                 
97
 See for example EW Lane & S Lane-Poole, Arabic-English lexicon, F. Ungar Pub. Co., New York, 
1955, p. 1466. 
98
 O Anjum, Reason and politics in Medieval Islamic thought the Taymiyyan moment. Thesis (Ph. D.)--
University of Wisconsin--Madison, 2008, p. 47. 
99
 KH  ullock, ‗Re-Telling the History of Political Thought‘, The American Journal of Islamic Social 
Sciences, vol. 19, no. 1, pp29-49. 
100
 Ibid. p.31. Also see RMJ Wolff & C McKinnon, Political Thought, Oxford University Press, 1999, 
Oxford. 
Introduction 
19 
 
thought.
101
 ―Western‖ intellectual tradition predominates, with all other traditions 
placed in the periphery. To begin with, such a framework neglects Muslim thinkers 
such as al-Farabī, Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd, to name a few, whose transmission of the 
better part of Greek philosophy was fundamental to the rise of the Renaissance.  As 
summarised by  ullock, ‗Islamic political philosophy, has had a role to play in the 
formation of the canon of western political theory itself‘.102 That is to say that ‗by 
erroneously claiming Plato and Aristotle as the founders of traditional western 
political philosophy, and by overlooking the intermediate role of Muslim intellectuals, 
the canon has been represented as a monocultural nature‘.
103
  
 
The claim that there was no contribution to the field within nearly 2,000 years (the 
years that separate Aristotle and Machiavelli) has dismissed the rich and highly 
sophisticated intellectual heritage of Muslim thinkers.
104
 Bias, not knowledge, has 
equated political thought solely with the Western canon and has not recognised 
Western political thought as merely one of many traditions.
105
  
  
Accordingly, this thesis will define political theory on internal grounds, or ‗within‘. 
The emphasis upon seeking to understand the tradition from ‗within‘ has been 
addressed most notably by Edward Said.
106
 Said, along with other thinkers, is 
concerned that when Westerners study Islam and the Middle East, they impose upon 
them a western Christian and European framework in a process he terms 
‗Orientalism,‘ with ‗Orient‘ a term referring to the Middle East and Far East.107 
Studying Islam based on its own terms has the advantage of allowing the people 
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studied to articulate, define and explain their history and traditions on their own terms 
rather than be defined by the European colonisers.
108
 
  
A pertinent example of Orientalist tendencies is seen in the way early writings of this 
kind speak of Muslims as Mohammedans rather than Muslims.
109
 The move to assign 
the followers of a religion a label based on the name of the founder of that religion is 
likely based upon the categories of Christianity.  The reasoning is thought to be that 
just as Jesus Christ was viewed as the revelation and those who follow him are called 
Christians, they assumed that Muslims viewed Mohammed as the revelation itself and 
hence his followers should be called ‗Mohammedans.‘ This reasoning, however, 
reflects a gross misunderstanding of Muslim theology. To Muslims, Mohammed is 
viewed only as a Prophet, not the revelation; followers of Islam are referred to as 
Muslims as described in the Qur‘ān.110 
  
The way followers of Islam have been called ‗Mohammedans‘ is but one example of 
how categories can be incorrectly imposed. It shows, however, how important it is to 
take into account an understanding of the socio-political and cultural realities that 
comes from ‗within‘ the tradition being studied rather than from other, external 
cultures. Naturally, this does not mean that one cannot compare and contrast the 
views of different cultures from different times or places as any intellectual heritage 
may be subject to the influence of another.  It does mean, however, as noted above, 
that if one neglects to take into account how the culture under study defines and 
understands itself, one risks seriously distorting and misinterpreting the intellectual 
heritage.
111
 
  
Consequently, the third chapter of this thesis, which will also contain the primary 
literature review, will trace political concepts as emerged within Muslim political 
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history as the Muslims themselves have understood them. As our enquiry is in the 
field of political theology, the worldview and the lens in which it is written will 
inevitably be different. Therefore as a guiding principle this study takes the meaning 
of political concepts as those concepts that have been seen to be an important 
structural tool in public sphere in relation to power. These concepts are studied on 
the basis of how they are deduced from the Qur‘ān. The way in which it is collected is 
through noting specific concepts attributed to the Qur‘ān, most notably arising from 
political events. What makes this task manageable, as discussed in Chapter Three, is 
the sheer repetition of these concepts.    
 
 
1.4.2 Research Question 
  
The research question may be in part delineated by sketching out what it is not 
investigating. For instance, the study does not debate the notion of whether there is 
political thought in Muslim tradition(s). For example, the work of Abū Nasr al-Fārābī 
(259-339 AH/ 870-950 AD)
112and Abū al-Walīd Mohammed Ibn Rushd (519-594 
/1126-1198)
113
are one of the classical works in political philosophy that were 
influenced by the Greek philosophers. Nor is it about Muslim political movements or 
activism. It is therefore not a research that examines Muslim political thought 
throughout history. 
  
Thus, the investigation is not concerned with whether there was any sort of political 
engagement in the time of the Prophet or any other time. The focus of this study is to 
see if there are any direct and clear commands in the Qur‘ān by God to conduct 
human affairs in a particular set of way(s) as opposed to other ways. In other words, 
as opposed to a command which can be seen as a religious duty set upon a Muslim in 
the Qur‘ān. 
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It is about investigating the assertion that there is a clear political expression 
evidenced in the scripture. The expression of this is based either upon political theory 
in the form of establishing a state, government, system or upon administration that is 
seen to have been prescribed as a command in the Qur‘ān and therefore binding. 
  
Since this investigation is looking into the Qur'ān, the term ―binding‖ has a specific 
meaning. It refers to the fact that the followers of Prophet Mohammed must pursue 
the teachings as prescribed command (rather than as something merely described). 
This prescribed command, therefore, becomes eternal, universal, non-temporal, and 
applies to all circumstances, in all places and at any time. Examples of binding 
commands would be that of prayer and fasting. 
  
In order to address the research question, this study has availed itself of a combination 
of methodologies in examining the Qur‘ānic concepts which have been argued to be 
politically oriented. A workable definition of political concepts may be found arising 
from Muslim history as political concepts emerge. Political concepts in turn are 
broadly defined in terms of understanding of governance. Therefore as a guiding 
principle this study takes the meaning of political concepts as those concepts that 
have been seen to be an important structural tool in public sphere in relation to 
power. 
  
 
1.5 METHODOLOGY  
 
Conceptually the fundamental premises in reading the text depend on the readers‘ 
conception of the nature of reality (ontology), their theory of knowledge 
(epistemology) and their philosophy of history.
114
 Due to time constraints the focus of 
this enquiry is epistemic in nature. To be able to answer the primary question of this 
research there are two challenges ahead of us. The first lies in defining political theory 
from within the Muslim tradition. The second consists of determining the 
hermeneutical tools used to interpret the Qur'ān. The latter is an epistemological 
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endeavour that would help address our question: can one speak of a Qur’ānic political 
theory? 
  
One possible way of tackling the former challenge is to identify political concepts in 
Muslim history that have been argued to be forms of political expression in the 
Qur'ān.      
  
The focus of the research is limited to the Qur‘ān as a starting point due to it being 
central focal point of the belief system of a Muslim worldview.  The methodology 
adopted here in terms of scriptural hermeneutics is a combination of approaches – the 
novelty of the work consists in using both the thematic approach (emphasising holistic 
synthesis of the message of the Qur'ān) and method of semantic field approach 
proposed by Toshihiko Izutsu‘s (1914-1994). Detailed discussions on both of these 
approaches are presented in the Methodology Chapter.  
  
It suffices here to say that the semantic and the thematic approaches examine the 
linguistic structure and the interconnectedness of concepts to each other. This is a 
major departure from the verse-by-verse (atomistic) exegesis (tafsīr) of the Qur‘ān by 
instead employing a concept-by-concept or theme-by-theme tafsīr. The themes in this 
research were selected by looking at terms used by both Muslim classical and modern 
literature on Muslim political thought as well as within historical accounts. Such 
themes were only later attributed to the Qur‘ān after the terms themselves became 
heavily used. 
 
  
1.5.1 Method and Focus of Research 
  
The study focuses on synchronic and lexical interrelations between terms and 
concepts as they appear in the Qur'ān. It is worth mentioning that the verses are 
searched by their root word and its derivatives creating a cluster of verses; each 
cluster of verses is considered as a theme and each theme will be analysed separately 
using the methodology. The hermeneutical research is also aided by commentaries 
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when necessary.
115
 Although the focus of this research on the Qur‘ān is limited due to 
practical time constraints, the major exegetical works for the Sunnī and Shīʿite 
schools of thought are also consulted. The website <www.altafsir.com> has been very 
useful in looking at the exegetical work. This website contains all the major exegetical 
works for the Sunnī and Shīʿite schools of thought. Furthermore, as the methodology 
adopted is detailed and time consuming, it would have not been possible to also 
analyse the ḥadīth genre as well. However, some narrations may be alluded to as 
supportive evidence. 
 
This study uses ʿAbdullah Yusuf ʿAli‘s translation of the Qur‘ānic text using the 
website <http://www.quranexplorer.com/quran/> unless stated otherwise. Finally, the 
Qur‘ānic dictionary of  adawi and Abdul Haleem has been essential in identifying the 
root word of each concept, how many times it has been mentioned, its forms, its 
derivatives and its meanings in English.
116
 The advantage of using this dictionary is 
that it shows the ‗inventory of the basic concepts covered by the root...in an attempt to 
show the range of semantic scatter it composes‘.117 In addition, the lexicographical 
genre referred to as al-Wujūh wa al-Na ā ir is also used.118 
  
These extra-Qur‘ānic sources are intended to add some measure of diachronic 
perspective to the research. The central aim of this research is to conceptualise the 
Qur‘ānic worldview via particular semantic and thematic hermeneutical approaches.  
  
 
1.5.2 Distinction in History 
  
There is an important distinction this thesis is making between the Qur‘ānic period 
and the post-Qur‘ānic period when looking at political concepts. This distinction is 
not new; using different language Askari offers a similar distinction between that of 
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the prophetic and the post- prophetic periods. He argues correctly that the political 
forms of the post-prophetic period are different from the prophetic ones, therefore this 
distinction is essential for the enquiry.
119
 The significance of the Qur‘ānic period is 
due to its binding (mulzim) nature.  
  
The approach of this thesis with respect to the prophetic and post-prophetic periods 
may be illustrated in the following thought experiment. We could undertake a thought 
experiment and propose to have a veil of ignorance regarding any discussions that 
occurred during the post-Qur'ānic period, but remained fully aware of the social-
economic and cultural situation of the 7th century  ijāz and the history before that. 
We could also fully embrace the spiritual journey of the soul, its strength, its 
weakness; and if we could manage to imagine ourselves in Mecca being with the 
Prophet and living its trials and tribulations; we could imagine the internalisation of 
true Oneness (tawḥīd) and the process of getting rid of our lower self‘s (nafs) 
attachment and associations to other gods. Then a verse descending from heaven for 
example with respect to a man's inheritance could be read as restricting the man rather 
than giving him more power. It is this veil of ignorance as a thought experiment that 
outlines the outlook of this thesis in reading the Qur‘ān, and sheds light upon the 
importance of the distinction between Qur‘ānic and post-Qur‘ānic period. 
  
 
1.5.2.1 Muslim and Islamic 
 
Further to the above distinction there is also another differentiation, conceptually and 
methodologically, between Islamic and Muslim. Within the current debate the 
majority of the literature writes as though the two concepts are synonymous to each 
other and therefore does not distinguish between the attempt to follow a faith and the 
faith itself. That is to say, when one mentions ‗Islamic‘ theory or ‗Islamic‘ history one 
refers to one particular meaning and when one is talking about Muslim history and 
Muslim thought one is referring to a different set of meaning(s). The former makes 
absolute truth claims that imply that it is epistemologically infallible, that is to say 
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that it is God‘s intended meaning with no possible misunderstanding; whereas, the 
latter has the possibility of constructed human understanding. 
  
Hence, although the majority of the writings refer to the field as ―Islamic‖ political 
thought, conceptually an accurate formulation should be Muslim political thought. 
This is reflected throughout this study. In addition, this applies to other fields, such as 
Muslim political system, Muslim political institutions, Muslim state and Muslim 
politics as terms that define the socio-historical element of Muslims on an epistemic 
level. 
 
This view is endorsed by Colin Turner in his differentiation between Islam and islām, 
giving one a capital ‗I‘ and the other a small ‗i‘. The latter is seen as the Qur‘ānic 
notion of ‗internal act of belief and submission‘ and the former as ‗the historical 
Muslim community with its objectification and systemization of beliefs and ritual 
practices‘.120 
 
  
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPLICATIONS  
  
The study is critical to our modern age, not merely because it clarifies numerous 
misconceptions, but because of the nature of the methodological approach 
employed.  To begin with, such an approach moves the debate away from such 
polarised camps as the so- called ―secularists‖ and ―Islamists‖ and shows a great deal 
of depth and complexities within the tradition of exegesis and Muslim political 
history. Hence, this research moves away from an ideological debate to a more 
analytical discourse in looking into the Qur‘ān. 
  
Furthermore, within western academic circles, there are few, if any, examinations of 
the Qur‘ān at the depth that this investigation hopes to achieve. Most research has 
been limited to surveys of historical account of events and prominent Muslim writers 
as mentioned earlier.  
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Although there has been a contemporary attempt to develop uniquely Muslim political 
theory and claims based on Qur‘ānic concepts such as  ayʿa (oath of allegiance), ulī 
al-amr (people in authority), khilāfa (vicegerent) and shūrā (consultation) the findings 
of this research has serious implications with respect to the meaning and application 
of these concepts.
121
 
  
Four major implications arise from conducting this study.  Firstly, the study‘s 
identification of the hierarchy of concepts in a wider Qur‘ānic framework has 
implications for issues of methodology. Secondly, one realises that medieval political 
thought cannot be separated from the sectarian polemical discussions between the 
groups that evolved from the first Muslim civil war. The third, and possibly the most 
serious implication –if the findings are substantial- would be the restructuring of the 
existing call for an establishment of an ―Islamic state‖.  Finally, the approach of 
relying on the Qur‘ānic worldview may conceivably bring about a paradigm shift; that 
is to say, when searching for a Qur‘ānic worldview, one is looking predominantly on 
the world behind the scriptural text that does not present itself in ‗systemic/structural‘ 
focus but is of a different emphasis. It is this distinct outlook that creates the paradigm 
shift.  
  
 
1.7 CONTRIBUTION AND ORIGINALITY  
  
This research makes a significant, original contribution by its use of an 
interdisciplinary approach as well as by its combination of two methodologies in the 
following ways: 
  
i) Due to the combination of methodologies adopted in this study, it attempts to 
construct, by using semantic and thematic approaches, a comprehensible 
view of the politico-religious concepts that many writers have alluded to 
but to which they have not applied a rigid, holistic and critical approach.  
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ii) Although this research is claiming that there is no prescribed political theory 
or a systematic political system in the Qur‘ān, it indicates a plausible 
Qur‘ānic worldview of the individual and the community. 
  
 
1.8 CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH  
  
One may see three challenges in conducting this kind of research. The first is the 
challenge of looking into scriptural text for a conception of political theory. That is to 
say that many see the two fields unrelated and may need different analytical tools. 
Another challenge of asking a question about political theory is the possibility of there 
being a Eurocentric element in the question itself. That is to say that the question is 
framed from the European perspective, experience and understanding of political 
theory and thought which may exclude the thought and the intellectual heritage of the 
―other‖. However, it is important to point out here that the Eurocentricity of the 
research lies not in the question itself but rather in the premises, the tools and the 
method adopted that could either be culturally biased or not. The constant attempt of 
the author to refer back to the primary sources of Muslim tradition and Muslim 
intellectual heritage will further reduce such bias in the research. 
  
A related point is that the question asked arises from contemporary issues and 
therefore one might be imposing a particular reading on the scripture that was not a 
concern at the time of revelation. However, the fact that references have been made to 
the Qur‘ān in relation to the question in hand allows us to investigate the 
substantiality of the claim itself. 
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1.9 OVERVIEW 
  
This thesis will break fresh ground.  Although there has been considerable research 
within the history of Muslim political thought, this work will examine political theory 
in the Qur‘ān by means of a fully rigorous methodological scrutiny. 
  
Building up to this task, this work will first demonstrate the Qur‘ānic methodology 
adopted in this study in Chapter Two. Then in Chapter Three it will outline the 
historical development of concepts currently attributed to the Qur‘ān and in most 
cases these concepts are in fact either not Qur‘ānic or improperly quoted out of  its 
contextual framework. Chapters Four and Five constitute an analytical study of 
political concepts that have been identified in Chapter Three. The final Chapter points 
towards a Qur‘ānic worldview of the individual and the community suggesting a 
paradigm shift.  
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The questions asked regarding how to understand the text, the context and how to 
distinguish the universality of it and its particular application needs a systematic 
methodology that moves away from the premise of seeing the Qur‘ān as purely a law 
book. Such a methodology has simply not been present in most studies of the Qur‘ān. 
Instead, writers typically analyse verses in isolation as part of an atomistic (tajzi’ī) 
verse-by-verse approach most likely inherited from the legal tradition.
1
  
 
This chapter provides an alternate methodology. With full awareness of the tentative 
nature of attributing meaning to a given passage in the Qur‘ān, especially with regard 
to political concepts, this chapter unites two methodologies: the semantic and the 
thematic. To establish the usefulness of this amalgamation, this chapter will also 
analyse the Qur‘ānic methodologies in classical, medieval and modern hermeneutical 
traditions. In doing so, this study identifies a combination of hermeneutical tools for 
analysing the Qur‘ān that should provide a more holistic understanding of the 
meanings the Qur‘ān may be conveying.  
 
As we will see as we analyse verses said to have political implications, both the 
juristic and the atomistic approach have impacted the readings of these concepts. This 
is particularly significant as many rightly observe that the Qur‘ān is not merely a book 
of law.
2
 In fact, the majority of the verses in the Qur‘ān could instead be described as 
ethico-theological in content and not legal.
3
  
 
This chapter will begin with a brief summary of exegetical inclinations followed by a 
critical evaluation of their limitations. It will examine the Qur‘ānic hermeneutical 
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tradition, outlining the theo-philosophical readings that arguably imposed 
understandings of these philosophical assumptions onto the Qur‘ān.  
 
Towards the end, this chapter will also explore the idea that within the Qur‘ān there 
exist a hierarchy of concepts. Significantly, this locates any Qur‘ānic concept within a 
wider Qur‘ānic worldview showing the concepts position in the hierarchy. 
Consequently, this chapter lays out the key methodological tools for Chapters Four, 
Five and Six.   
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2.2 QUR‟ĀNIC HERMENEUTICS   
 
Qur‘ānic hermeneutical tradition is a rich one, covering topics from linguistics all the 
way to historical understanding of the time of revelation. At a conceptual level, 
Qur‘ānic hermeneutical tradition has varied in its guiding principle of interpretation. 
Some scholars held the view that to interpret the Qur‘ān according to the Prophet‘s 
commentary, his companions (saḥā a) and their followers (tā iʿīn) was the best 
possible way of understanding the Qur‘ān; therefore, they rely predominantly on 
traditions attributed to them. Abdullah Saeed labels this approach traditional or 
textual.
4
 Examples of this sort of interpretation are present in the works of Ṭabarī, Ibn 
Kathīr and Ibn Taymiyya.5 By adopting this kind of premise as to the way in which 
the text is perceived, these writers have to some extent limited the framework with 
which the text can be interpreted.  
 
Some interpret a given Qur‘ānic verse by means of additional verses from elsewhere 
in the Qur‘ān.  Still others, adopting a third approach, have employed their own 
informed opinion or reasoning (ijtihād) in deducing meaning from text. More recently 
still, some have emphasised the importance of examining the context of revelation as 
a hermeneutical tool. This approach is what Saeed terms contextual.
6
  
 
The first documented exegeses of the Qur‘ān tended to consist of brief explanations of 
unclear, uncommon or ambiguous words or phrases.
7
 Gradually increasing until it 
covered the entire Qur‘ān, by the third/ninth century tafsīr had become a discipline in 
and of itself.
8
 The further away generations of Muslims were from the time of 
revelation, the more pressing became the need for the Qur‘ān to be explained. 
 
Later volumes of work became even more substantial, now also including theo-
                                                 
4
 Saeed, Interpreting the Qur an, pp. 42-56. 
5
 For more details see the section on ‗Tradition Oriented Exegesis‘ p. 34.   
6
 Saeed, Interpreting the Qur an, pp. 116-125.  
7
 For example as seen in the work of Muqātil, is one of the earliest exegesis (see p. 34). Also see the 
work of A Rippin, ‗Tafsir‘ in M Eliade & CJ Adams (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Religion, Macmillan, 
New York, 1987, pp. 236-244.  
8
 Saeed, Interpreting the Qur an, p. 10. 
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philosophical, legal and mystical tafāsīr.9 Saeed further highlights that ‗[w]hile we 
cannot speak about Sunnī, Shiʿī or Khārijī tafsīr in the first/seventh century, we can 
certainly use those terms in the third/ninth century‘.10  
 
The multitude of different types of texts within the Qur‘ān, including theistic, ethical, 
spiritual, legal and general lessons (wisdom), has naturally led to a wide variety of 
interpretation, with each reader gravitating to a different type of text and then using it 
as the basis of determining the predominant core message of the Qur‘ān. To be sure, 
pre-existent theo-philosophical convictions also affect interpretation as the Qur‘ānic 
text is then used to support particular belief systems (e.g. the philosophers, the Sufis, 
the Shīʿite and so on).11 Such pre-existent inclinations would also be linked to 
whether the reader had a theo-philosophical or juristic understanding of the text 
beforehand.
12
  
 
At present time, according to Rahman, Western literature on the Qur'ān falls into three 
main categories: (1) works that trace the influence of Judeo-Christian ideas on the 
Qur'ān, (2) works that reconstruct the chronological order of the revelation and  (3) 
works that describe the content of the Qur'ān (either as a whole or certain aspects of 
it).
13
 Muslim scholarship for their part, according to Rahman, have two problems: (1) 
the failure to relate the Qur‘ān to contemporary issues and (2) a fear of developing a 
contemporary understanding of the Qur'ān, proclaiming that any attempt would 
deviate from the traditional opinion.
14
 By highlighting the contemporary relevance of 
the Qur‘ān to Muslim life and providing a methodical reading(s) of scripture, this 
thesis will make considerable progress in addressing both of these pressing problems.  
 
                                                 
9
 For further details see the work of C Gilliot, ‗Exegesis of the Qurʾān: Classical and Medieval‘ in JD 
McAuliffe (ed.), Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, Brill, Georgetown University, Washington DC, 2002, 
Vol. II, pp. 99-124.  
10
 Saeed, Interpreting the Qur an, p. 10. 
11
 For more detail regarding this issue see Y Muhammed, Manṭiq fahm al-naṣṣ  dirāsa manṭiqīya tu nā 
 i- aḥth ālīyāt fahm al-naṣṣ al-dīnī wa-qi alīyātih, Afrīqyā al-Sharq, al-Dār al- ayḍā , 2010. Also by 
the same author see Y Muhhammed, Madkhal ilā fahm al-Islām  al-fikr al-Islāmī, nu umuh, adawātuh, 
uṣūluh, Mu assasat al-Intishār al- Arabī,  eirut, 1999.   
12
 See for example Y Muhammed, al-Falsafah wa al- irfān wa al-ishkālīyāt al-dīnīyah  dirāsah 
ma rifīyah tu naā  i-taḥlīl ni ām al-falsafah wa al- irfān wa-fahmih lil-ishkālīyāt al-dīnīyah, 
Mu assasat al-Intishār al- Arabī,  eirut, 2008.  
13
 Rahman, Major themes of the Qur'an, p. xii. 
14
 Ibid. p. xii. 
Methodology 
34 
 
Bearing this in mind, Qur‘ānic hermeneutics also developed linguistically based 
methodologies that are outlined below.  
 
 
2.2.1 The Sciences of the Qur‟ān  
 
The term ‗sciences of the Qur‘ān‘ (‘ulūm al-Qur ān) covers topics that will be of use 
in this study in terms of analysing the Qur‘ānic verses. For example, ‘ulūm al- Qur’ān 
explores the concept of as ā  al-nuzūl, which translates literally as ‗causes of 
revelation‘. A better translation, however, might be the ‗occasions of revelation‘, 
namely those occasions that inform us as to the events, incidents and circumstances to 
which the revelation was responding to.
15
 Sha'n al-nuzūl is also used to mean or to 
understand the wisdom or motives behind the revelation; this often includes longer 
passages or stories (for example, relating stories of previous Prophets), which were 
not revealed at the occurrence of specific incidents or events.
16
 
 
Revelation may also include the knowledge of the verses that were revealed in Mecca 
or Medina. It also explains verses that are abrogated (al-nāsikh wa al-mansūkh) and 
the classification of the type of the verse in question be it muḥkam (clear) or 
mutashā ih (allegorical).17  
 
Qur‘ānic hermeneutics also utilises linguistic considerations which include categories 
such as ʿām & khāṣ; muṭlaq & muqayad; ḥaqῑqῑ and majāzῑ.18 ʿĀm literally means 
general or universal, so in this case verse 3:185 is a general one speaking to all 
humanity. On the other hand, khāṣ is translated as a ‗specific‘ case in which the verses 
are addressing particular people or specific situations; it could also mean ‗limited‘ or 
‗conditioned‘, implying, therefore, the scope of application of the verse is limited.19 
                                                 
15
 See the work of A Rippin, ‗The Function of "Asbāb al-nuzūl" in qur'ānic Exegesis‘, Bulletin of the 
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, vol. 51, no. 1, 1988, pp. 1-20. Also see A 
Rippin, ‗The Exegetical Genre "asbāb al-nuzūl": A  ibliographical and Terminological Survey‘, 
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, vol.  48, no. 1, pp. 1-15. 
16
 See F Rahman, Islam and Modernity, p. 143. 
17
 See A Von Denffer, ʿUlūm al-Qur ān  An introduction to the Sciences of the Qur ān, Islamic 
Foundation, Leicester, 1994. Also see L Kinberg, Muḥkamāt and mutashā ihāt (Koran    )  
Implication of a Koranic pair of terms in medieval exegesis, S.I, 1988.  
18
 For further detail see al-Qādhi, An Introduction to the Sciences of the Qur’ān, Al-Hidāyah Publishing 
and Distribution, Birmingham, 1999, p. 228. Also see Von Denffer,  Ulūm al-Qur ān.     
19
 See the work Von Denffer,  Ulūm al-Qur ān.     
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There are cases where the verse is ‘ām in wording but gives a khāṣ meaning and in 
these cases it is important to consider as ā  al-nuzūl alongside sha’n al-nuzūl. The 
process by which it is decided which verse is general and which verse is specific 
depends almost entirely on the linguistic abilities of the mufasir (the exegete) and his 
own understanding as well as interpretation.  
 
Muṭlaq refers to verses that are unconditional in their meaning and absolute in their 
scope. This differs from ʿām verses in that it only applies to one possible meaning 
rather than to all possibilities without limitation (such as ‗God is aware of all things‘ 
is an ʿām verse). Muqayad is a qualified or conditioned verse.20 Ḥaqῑqῑ refers to 
words or verses that are used literally, according to their primary intent or original 
meaning. On the other hand, majāzῑ is used when the word or verse is used to convey 
a metaphor and not a literal meaning.
21
  
 
Finally, Qur‘ānic hermeneutical tradition also looks at the research into the 
interpretation or exegesis of the Qur‘ān which also deploys the linguistic criteria 
stated above.  
 
From the above discussion then, there may be said to be three main types of Qur‘ānic 
exegesis. The first is the traditional approach; the second is theo-philosophical and the 
third is part of a more modern trend that inclines toward thematic oriented exegesis.
22
  
 
In the following sections, the three orientations will be critically examined, pointing 
out that there remain a number of difficulties that need to be addressed when 
attempting to read the Qur‘ān from the existing exegesis.  
 
 
2.2.2 Tradition Oriented Exegesis  
 
Traditional exegesis (tafsīr; plur. tafāsir) takes as its foundational premise that the 
Prophet prohibited any interpretation using ra’y (personal opinion) as supported by a 
                                                 
20
 For more details see al-Qādhi p. 229.    
21
 Ibid. p. 224.    
22
 These categorizations are made by Saeed in his book Understanding the Qur’an.  
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tradition (ḥadīth) that is attributed to him. 23 This is often referred to as tafsīr  il 
ma’thūr.24 For example, Taqī al-Dīn Abū Al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyya in his 
Muqaddima fī uṣūl al-tafsīr argues that the interpreter always has to give priority in 
interpreting the Qur‘ān to the sunna, the companions, the immediate successors of the 
companions (tā iʿīn) and some would also include the immediate successors of the 
successors (tā iʿīn al- tā iʿīn). Therefore, the only valid form of interpretation is to 
use the Qur‘ān to explain other parts of it, or to refer to tradition attributed to the 
Prophet or if there was no such information then the first and second generation of 
Muslims.
25
   
 
In the classical period, there was an overwhelming use of ḥadῑths and the sayings of 
the companions of the Prophet, which makes these tafāsῑr tradition oriented. One of 
the earliest Sunnī exegeses is Tafsῑr Muqātil by Muqātil bin Sulaymān (d.150/767). 
His exegesis does not go into any great details in the meaning of the verses, but it is 
one of the earliest tafsῑr. A more detailed and widely-acknowledged tafsῑr is by 
Moḥammed bin Jarīr Al-Ṭabarῑ in his tafsῑr titled Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ‘an Ta’wῑl al-
Qur’ān (d. 310/922) which uses narrations and linguistic approaches to explain the 
Qur‘ān.  
 
The early Shīʿite tafāsῑr are somewhat different in their exegetical nature. Arguably 
one of the earliest is by the Shīʿite  asan bin ʿAlī Al-ʿAskarῑ (d. 260/873) but there is 
no record of the exegesis at hand; it is only a claim that the existing exegesis belongs 
to Al-ʿAskarī.26  
 
Another even earlier Shīʿite exegesis is one titled A ī Ḥamzah al-Thamālī by Abī al-
 amzah Thābit bin Dinār al-Thamālī (d. 148/765). What is common amongst these 
                                                 
23
 Ibn Taymiya, Muqaddima fī uṣūl al-tafsīr, Al-Turāth al-islāmī, Cairo, 1988. Also see the work of A 
Saeed, The Qur an  an introduction, Routledge, London, 2008; GR Hawting & AKA Shareef, 
Approaches to the Qur ān, Routledge, London, 1993, pp. 101-140. 
24
 A good introduction for science of Qur‘ān may be found in Ahmed Von Denffer referenced earlier. 
Also see M H Dhahabī, al-Tafsīr wa al-mufassirūn, Vol. 1-3, Dār al-Kutub al- adīthah, Cairo, 1990.  
25
 See for example the report by Ibn ‗Abbās: ‗the Messenger of God said: ―He who interprets the 
Qur‘an to his opinions (ra’y) should have his place prepared in the hell fire‖‘; another tradition 
attributed to the Prophet states ‗He who says something concerning the Qur‘an according to his opinion 
(even if it) is correct has erred‘. Cited in Saeed, The Qur an  an Introduction, p. 179. 
26
 See MM Bar-Asher, ‗The Quran Commentary Ascribed to Imam Hasan Al-Askari,‘ in Jerusalem 
Studies in Arabica and Islam, vol. 24, 2000, pp. 358-79. Also see MM Bar-Asher, Scripture and 
Exegesis in Early Imāmī-Shiism, Brill, Boston, 1999. 
Methodology 
37 
 
exegeses is the emphasis of the right of ahl al-bayt (the family of the Prophet) to 
rulership and the injustices that, it is claimed, occurred to them after the death of the 
Prophet. Therefore, most of the explanations of the verses are interpreted according to 
the twelver Shīʿite imāma theory. The discussions revolve around the sayings of the 
imāms and the explanations of the verses are mainly a way of proving that they are 
infallible and are mentioned in the Qur‘ān.27  
 
These early Shīʿite tafāsῑr have usually been seen to use far-fetched interpretations (or 
ta wῑl) sometimes of an otherwise unambiguous verse to support a sectarian 
argument.
28
 It could be said that Abī Jaʿfar Moḥammed bin al- asan al-Ṭūsῑ (d. 
460/1067) was the first Shīʿite scholar with his exegesis al-Ti yān fῑ Tafsῑr al-Qur’ān 
who moved away from explaining most verses in relation to the imāma theory and 
other Shīʿite doctrine.29 His work nonetheless displays the philosophical influences of 
the medieval period.       
 
Accordingly, the development of exegetical work that is encyclopaedic in nature arose 
due to the growing amount of time that had elapsed since the revelation. There was a 
genuine need to focus on the meanings of words and verses separately, particularly as 
Arabic dialects developed with time. There was, undeniably a genuine need for this 
approach. At the same time, however, this position consequently became the 
‗orthodox‘ way of looking at the Qur‘ān. 
 
 
2.2.2.1 Difficulties and Limitations  
 
One of the difficulties posed by relying solely upon ‗tradition‘ or tafsīr  il ma’thūr is 
that the Prophet did not leave a commentary on the Qur‘ān; accordingly, there is a 
                                                 
27
 See the work of Abῑ Nadhar Moḥammed bin Mas‘ῡd bin ‗Ayāsh al-Salami al-Samarqandῑ known as 
Al-‗Ayāshῑ retrieved 31 March 2011,  <http://www.yasoob.com/books/htm1/m016/20/no2005.html>; 
and Abi Al-Hasan ‗Alī bin Ibrāhīm al-Qummῑ (born 307/919) retrieved 31 March 2011 
<http://www.yasoob.com/books/htm1/m016/20/no2007.html>. 
28
 For example verses like 2:55, 7:172, 2:208 etc. have been improperly interpreted in such a way that 
they are given a ta’wῑl that is far from its apparent meaning. Some have even suggested that there has 
been the taḥrῑf (corruption) of some of the verses, for example, Al-Qummῑ. See Tafsῑr Al-Qummī, Vol. 
1, pp. 6-11 retrieved 2 January 2010   <http://www.yasoob.com>   
29
 See for example Bar-Asher, Meir M ‗ Shīʿism and the Qurʾān‘ in JD McAuliffe (ed.), Encyclopaedia 
of the Qurʾān, Brill Online , 2012, retrieved 07 July 2012 
<http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-the-quran/shiism-and-the-quran-
COM_00181> 
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limited number of ḥadīth upon which one can rely. Further to this, the Companions 
had not developed particular methodical systems of interpretation and at times 
different Companions interpreted the meaning of a particular verse differently. Even 
more significantly, however, there seem to be conflicting narrations regarding some 
of the occasions of revelation (as ā  al-nuzūl) for the same verse, making the 
reliability of the various accounts questionable.
30
 Even more strikingly, Saeed holds 
that Muslim exegetes and jurists often relied more upon linguistic criteria when 
determining the applicability of verses than the socio-historical context of their 
revelation. He is of the view that the ‗question of social and historical context in 
which the ruling was given at the time of the revelation of the Qur‘ān was seen as 
irrelevant or unimportant‘.31 One explanation for this is the possible view that 
everything in the Qur‘ān is universal, non-temporal and applicable to all times.32   
 
By the medieval period, with the development of theological schools, scholars such as 
al-Ghazālī recognised these challenges33 and some like Qurṭubī accepted the use of 
independent thinking.
34
 A further difficulty is the authority given to ‗tradition‘ to the 
point that it has almost become the primary text, replacing the Qur‘ān itself.35 Saeed 
makes the critical observation that unlike revelation, interpretation itself is human 
endeavour. He goes on to state that  
nothing sacred about the personal interpretation given to a verse even by a 
Companion of the Prophet, or by a Successor or by early imams. Their understanding, 
like ours, are limited by context and culture.
36
   
 
Further to this, Saeed points out rightly that we have no evidence that the Prophet 
‗held special sessions to explain and elaborate upon the meaning of the Qur‘ān‘.37  
 
                                                 
30
 See for example, the work of Ṭabarī narrating different as ā  al-nuzūl.   
31
 Saeed, Interpreting the Qur an, p. 1. 
32
 This could also explain why when compiling the Qur‘ān chronology was not one of the criteria.  
33
 Al-Ghazālī believed that the Prophet did not attempt a commentary on the Qur‘ān aside for some 
verses. For this reason, only in cases when one possesses a reliable account of a given tradition 
regarding a specific verse should that tradition be relied upon for interpretive purposes. Al-Ghazālī is 
also of the opinion that the differences that occur between tā ʿīn is an expression of their own opinion 
and therefore not binding for all Muslims. See Al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā’ ʿUlūm al-dīn, Vol. 1, Dār al-Khayr, 
Damascus, 1990, p. 385.  
34
 Cited in Saeed, The Qur an, p. 181.  
35
 Campanini & Higgitt, The Qur'an, p.34 
36
 Saeed, Interpreting the Qur an, p. 4.  
37
 Ibid. p. 44.  
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Having said that, earlier works like Ṭabarī remains useful for our enquiry in order to 
identify possible linguistic meanings of verses as well as knowing the occasion of 
revelation, even if several different ones have been recorded.  
 
 
21.2.3 Theo-Philosophical Oriented Exegeses  
 
The move from classical to medieval can be characterised by the mufasir employing 
several exegetical tools, including reason, as well as applying their own independent 
judgement. The dominant feature of such an exegesis is to prove the validity of a 
theo-philosophical interpretation of the Qur‘ān.38 Therefore, they consider not only 
the Qur‘ān, the ḥadīth and the views of the Companions, but also the views of later 
scholars, principles of jurisprudence and theo-philosophical writings.  
 
This is a major departure from the previous work of the mufasir, which reviewed 
several possible meanings of the verse solely by using ḥadῑths and linguistic tools. In 
the medieval period, however, the mufasir’s ijtihād (independent thinking) regarding 
what the verse might have meant was accepted to some extent independently of the 
ḥadῑth collections. The writings of Maḥmūd ibn  Umar al-Zamakhsharī,39 Fakhr al-
Dīn Muḥammad ibn  Umar al-Rāzī,40 Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Qurṭubī41 and Jalāl 
al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Suyūṭī42 are few instances. In some occasion, al-
Qurṭubī argued for ijtihād as an essential way of interpreting the Qur‘ān after 
considering the traditions, as well as exerting knowledge of the Islamic sciences.
43
  
 
Others, such as Ibn Rushd, made the case that certain Qur‘ānic texts and ḥadῑth may 
appear to be self-contradictory (even though, he argues, they do not). For this reason 
the text should be subjected to allegorical interpretation (ta’wīl) in cases of apparent 
contradiction.
44
 Therefore, seemingly anthropomorphic words such as ‗God‘s throne‘ 
are taken metaphorically and not literally. The theo-philosophers emphasize 
                                                 
38
 See Saeed, The Qur an, p. 207.  
39 Zamakhsharī, al-Kashāf  an ḥaqā iq ghawāmiḍ al-tanzīl wa  uyūn al-aqāwīl fī wujūh al-ta wīl, Dār 
al-Kitāb al- Arabi  , Beirut, 1947. 
40 Rāzī, Tafsīr al-ka īr  Mafātīh al-ghayb, Intishārāt-i Asāṭīr, Tehran, 1992. 
41 Qurṭubī, Al-Jāmi  li aḥkām al-Qur ān, al-Hay ah al-Miṣrīyah al- Ammah lil-Kitāb, Cairo, 1977. 
42 Suyūṭī, Tafsīr al-Jalālayn, Maktabat Lubnān Nāshirūn,  eirut, 2000. 
43
 Cited in Saeed, The Qur an, p. 181. 
44
 See Ibn Rushd , Kitā  faṣl al-maqa l, trans. G. Hourani, Brill, Leiden, 1959, p. 39. 
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rationalist, allegorical, interpretive and metaphorical nature of the Qur‘ānic language, 
particularly when addressing God.   
 
 
2.2.3.1 Difficulties and Limitations  
 
The acceptance of the use of reason, with the development of theo-philosophical 
schools had the consequence of reading the Qur‘ān through a priori knowledge of the 
nature of God and His attributes, independent of revelation, which subsequently 
brought about the development of highly philosophical discussions in commentaries 
that intended to reply to opposing theo-philosophical schools, rather than 
understanding the Qur‘ān independently of these convictions. This is not to say that 
they had the intention of imposing on to the Qur‘ān their convictions, but possibly 
that they thought the Qur‘ān supported their particular theo-philosophical arguments.  
 
Debates on the meaning of the unity of God, the nature of the word of God, His 
attributes, predestination, free will, the nature of paradise/hell, nature of evil and 
status of human beings are found particularly among such groups as the Muʿtazilites 
Ashʿarites, Sufīs and Shīʿites. To support their theological convictions, these groups 
typically would appeal to Qur‘ānic texts in their philosophical arguments.45 
 
As time went by, these discussions became increasingly abstract and occasionally 
verses were interpreted allegorically (ta’wīl) when it could have been equally possible 
to understand them without the use of ta’wīl, particularly in Sufī traditions.46 
Furthermore, exegetical works grew into encyclopaedic volumes, commenting on 
every single verse in the Qur‘ān from beginning to end. As a result, an entire 
hermeneutical tradition developed in which verses were explained from one to the 
next, at times, in complete isolation from the Qur‘ān as a whole and sometimes even 
from the chapter. Consequently, during the medieval period, this type of exegesis with 
its philosophical and theological polemics became atomistic, as noted by many 
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 Saeed, Interpreting the Qur an, pp. 66-67.  
46
 For example verses 6:17; 57:13.  
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modern scholars, including Amīn Aḥsan Iṣlāḥī (1906-1997). Iṣlāḥī maintained that the 
single common aspect all types of exegeses had was that of atomisation.
47
    
 
The Qur‘ān was also used as a law ―manual‖ in an attempt to bring about a 
comprehensive canonical system.
48
 This had the consequence of making legal 
inferences the primary intention of the Qur‘ān and any non-legal inferences (which 
are the majority) of secondary importance. Saeed stresses that this ‗emphasis on the 
legal context ignores the fact that the Qur‘ān actually says very little about strictly 
legal matters‘.49 Out of 6236 verses perhaps between 80 and 500 verses of the Qur‘ān 
are thought to be legal, with the differing assessments based upon how one defines 
what constitutes a legal verse.
50
 Subsequently, the Qur‘ān was seen as a legal text. 
Once the legal schools were established by the fourth/tenth – fifth/eleven centuries, 
the idea of taqlīd (following what the founders of the legal schools said) became a key 
practice for Muslims.
51
 As a result, Muslim interpreters could not conceive of 
examining the Qur‘ān in the absence of a legalistic or theo-philosophical lens.  
 
Thus, most Muslims were distanced from their own most sacred text, partly because it 
was now mediated only through an overwhelming number of interpretive volumes 
and partly because the Muslim world was predominantly illiterate by the 17
th
/18
th
 
century. Furthermore, a clear disconnection occurred between the clergymen 
(ʿulamā’) and the needs of the people. In addition, this disconnection from the Qur‘ān 
became accentuated by the experience of colonisation and the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire. Accordingly to Ali Shariati the Qur‘ān was no longer the source of ideas, but 
as depository for proving the interpreter‘s own ideas, noting that 
 [b]y preventing people from studying the Qur‘an and thinking about it, religious 
scholars made it into a book so that only its form remained for the people. Its spirit, 
purpose and aim remain unknown. They turned it into phrases and verses of secret 
words without their meaning being understood.
52
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 Cited in Campanini & Higgitt, The Qur'an, pp. 85-6. 
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 Saeed, Interpreting the Qur an, p. 16.  
49
 Ibid. 
50
 For more details see NJ Coulson, A History of Islamic Law, University Press, Edinburgh, 1964, p. 
12.  
51
 Saeed, Interpreting the Qur an, p. 16. 
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It would be fair to say, then, the study of Qur‘ānic hermeneutics was either polemic or 
jurisprudential in nature, with the jurisprudential aim being solely to determine 
whether an action was permissible or not. 
 
 
2.2.4 Modern Exegesis  
 
Exegetical works of the modern period generally were heavily influenced by the 
socio-political and economic circumstances of that time such as Modernism, scientific 
advancement, colonialism and so on.  It is significant to note that most contemporary 
issues and challenges seem to reflect the interpretation of verses.
53
 This includes 
views on such subjects as the relationship between society and religion, the 
compatibility of science and revelation, the applicability of reason and faith, and 
scientific and sociological reflections on verses.
54
  
 
Among the many examples of modern interpretations of the Qur‘ān one may include 
the works of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī in his ‘irwat al-withqā,55 Mohammed ʿAbduh 
and Rashid Riḍā in Al-Manār; Sayyid Quṭub in his Qur‘ānic commentary fi Ẓilāl al-
Qur’ān;56 Mawdūdī in Tafhīm al-Qur ān57 and Muḥammad al-Ṭāhir Ibn ‗Ashūr in his 
Tafsīr al-taḥrīr wa al-tanwīri. 58 There are also influential views of contemporary 
scholars that have not directly written an exegetical work but their views have been 
potent in reading the Qur‘ān. These scholars include Ali Shariati‘s general works,59 
Mohammed  . Ṣadr60 and Fazlur Rahman to name a few.61  
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The primary aim of these writers was to render the Qur‘ān more accessible to the 
common people. They moved away from those types of theo-philosophical debates 
that did not play a part in Muslim day-to-day life and instead emphasised the 
application of the Qur‘ānic message to the Muslims‘ day-to-day reality and indicating 
the relevance of various aspects of the Prophet‘s life.62 For example, ʿAbduh is 
critical both of the overemphasis upon philosophical and theological discussions in 
the work of previous scholars as well as of the approach of reading the Qur‘ān as 
purely a law book.
63
 Significantly, increasing number of intellectuals call for a 
thematic reading of the Qur‘ān.  
 
Furthermore, increasingly contemporary scholars recognized that the individual bias 
of a given interpreter could influence his or her readings of the Qur‘ān.  No longer is 
the interpreter seen to be coming from a fully objective position. This view is echoed 
by writers such as Fazlur Rahman, Amina Wadud
64
 and Yahya Mohammed. This is in 
marked contrast with earlier writings who considered the interpreter to be a neutral 
reader.   
 
There is thus a good case to be made that the Qur‘ānic studies in the 20th century 
witnessed a shift in Qur‘ānic exegesis. There was a movement away from the earlier 
atomistic verse-by-verse genre towards an acceptance of a combination of other 
approaches, chief of which was a holistic reading of the Qur‘ān that looked at verses 
and passages in the context of the wider themes expressed in the Qur‘ān itself. 
 
 
2.2.4.1 Difficulties and Limitations  
 
One of the potential drawbacks in attempting to connect the Muslim peoples more 
directly to the Qur‘ān‘s message is the risk of the simplification of that message. 
Unlike traditional scholars such as al-Ṭabarī who provided multiple possible 
interpretations for a given verse, modern exegetes such as Mawdūdī limit themselves 
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to but a single possible reading. Ironically, classical scholars who did not show any 
awareness of how an interpreter‘s socio-cultural environment can affect his or her 
reading of the text, in fact would offer multiple interpretations for a given verse. In 
contrast, in recent times, although it has been widely acknowledged that the 
interpreter also plays a role in interpretation, interpreters tend to be far more dogmatic 
about what the meanings assigned to verses.  
 
Limiting Qur‘ānic verses to a single meaning poses the danger of leading readers to 
assume a narrow, singular reading that was not necessarily present and to think no 
genuine disagreements existed amongst the scholars of the Qur‘ān.65 This 
phenomenon is particularly evident on English websites such as 
<http://www.Quranexplorer.com/>.      
 
This thesis is built around the view that the more one is aware of the effects of one‘s 
own prejudices, the more likely it is possible to determine the general intended 
meaning of any given verses from the Qur‘ān. Furthermore, the awareness that the 
reader‘s mind is not a tabula rasa will make it possible to account for the differences 
of interpretations that have occurred throughout the centuries.  
 
 
Another limitation associated with some modern exegetes is that unlike scholars from 
classical and medieval periods, modern scholars are not typically schooled in the 
classical traditions. This might not be a strong critique, however, depending on 
whether one considered the classical tradition of understanding the Qur‘ān the only 
authority.  
 
From the above short analysis one might be justified to argue that in order to have a 
holistic reading of the Qur‘ān one needs a combination of methodologies. The 
following section outlines such a combination used in this thesis.  
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2.3 TOWARDS AN IZUTSIAN SEMANTIC ANALYSIS   
 
Although defining the field of semantics is difficult, this field may be said to concern 
itself with the study of meaning in language and with a variety of theories pertaining 
to meaning.
66
  
 
This thesis adopts the definition of the late Japanese scholar Toshihiko Izutsu (1914-
1993) which views semantics as an ‗analytic study of the key-terms of a language 
with a view to arriving eventually at a conceptual grasp of the weltanschauung or 
world-view of the people who use that language as a tool‘.67 Izutsu defines 
weltanschauung as 
a study of the nature and structure of the world-view of a nation…conducted by 
means of a methodological analysis of the major cultural concepts the nation has 
produced for itself and crystallized into the key-words of its language.
68
 
 
Semantic analysis, therefore, involves the search for possible meanings within 
language. At the basic level, a word may be split into a number of well-defined 
constituents, such as root(s) and their derived forms.  The meaning of these elements 
is investigated and the word is then viewed in the context of semantically related 
words and its antithesis.  
 
Such a process is not new to Qur‘ānic hermeneutical traditions, as seen in the work of 
classical scholars such as  usayn ibn Muḥammad Dāmaghānī (d.478/1085),69 Abū al-
Qāsim al- usayn ibn Muḥammad Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (d.502/1108),70 Ibn al-Jawzī 
(d.597/1201),
71
 Muḥammad ibn Ya qūb al-Fayrūz‘ābādī (d.817/1414)72 and 
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Muḥammad ibn Mukarram Ibn Manẓur.73 They also examine the roots of words, their 
derivatives and their usage in pre-Qur‘ānic times.74  
 
Although, as noted above, the field of semantics has previously been applied to the 
Qur‘ān, Izutsu‘s position that language conveys an entire worldview and not merely 
the individual meaning of isolated words, is new to Qur‘ānic studies.75 The 
contribution of Izutsu in Qur‘ānic studies, then, is in seeing the Qur‘ānic language as 
a conceptual weltanschauung.
76
 This is searching the interconnected and 
interdependent concepts in an 'extremely complex and complicated network of 
conceptual associations'.
77
  
 
For this reason, this thesis is concerned not with isolated key words but with the 
nature of the conceptual system(s) contained in the Qur‘ān. As a result, the effort to 
comprehend the Qur‘ānic weltanschauung and to determine whether the Qur‘ān 
possesses an overtly prescribed political theory is a task that is far from easy. 
 
 
2.3.1 Izutsian Semantic Methodology  
 
Toshihiko Izutsu employs a variety of methods in his attempt to analyse the semantic 
structure of the ethical words in the Qur‘ān. He explains that his approach is 
especially critical for scriptural readings because, translations, being only partial 
equivalents of the original meaning, are unreliable.
78
  
 
The cultural and historically-based biases of the interpreter, not the language itself, 
has created the barrier towards understanding what the original intention of the 
Qur‘ānic passages might have been. Izutsu indicates that ‗word-to-word‘ translations 
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are not adequate by themselves for understanding any concepts in the Qur‘ān.79 Yet 
for him, it remains possible to understand Qur‘ānic verses, but this must be achieved 
by employing a rigorous semantic methodology that focuses upon a word‘s semantic 
construction and is not based upon ‗word-to-word‘ translation.80  
 
In light of Izutsu‘s observation, one can see that there is a great risk for 
misunderstanding, misconstruction, misrepresentation or sweeping conclusions when 
analysing the politico-religious terms present in the Qur‘ān. This equally applies to 
the readers for whom the Muslim tradition and culture is alien, as well as to the 
Muslim thinkers who are influenced by the modern western tradition. Such thinkers 
may read the Qur‘ān through a reactionary and ideological lens with an apologetic 
goal. 
 
Izutsu claims that by investigating the semantic field of the word or concept one may 
get closer to the ‗original‘ meaning.81 Such an approach, however, is extremely time 
consuming. For example, the concept of jihād is usually translated as ‗holy war‘, 
however, using Izutsian methodology one needs to look at the root word, its 
derivatives, its‘ semantic associations with other words and its usage in 7th century 
Arabia to be able to understand the actual meaning of jihād. As Izutsu puts it, the task 
is to move towards ‗word-thing‘ rather than ‗word-to-word‘ translations. 82 
 
Izutsu‘s methodology also carries the risk of breaking down when attempting to 
translate foreign words that have no equivalents. Fortunately, however, even though 
the semantic discrepancy between words may naturally increase when looking at 
words that have a ‗unique mode of vision‘,83 it is still possible to explain those unique 
modes of vision. In doing so, one escapes the problems of a simplistic ‗word-to-word‘ 
equivalence in which many meanings can be overlooked by not using ‗word-thing‘ 
definitions. Such a task is far from easy to be sure and has in fact never been 
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attempted before in connection to the concepts that will be identified in Chapter 
Three.  Izutsu himself suggests that this very necessary procedure is a process of trial 
and error.  
 
In Izutsu‘s understanding of semantics each word possesses primary and secondary 
meanings and basic and relational meanings. Words also have semantic fields and 
non-semantic associations which need to be considered when analysing possible 
meanings of any concepts. Below are definitions of these categories.    
 
 
2.3.1.1 Primary and Secondary Meanings  
 
Each word, according to Izutsu, possesses both a primary and a secondary meaning. 
Most of the time, particularly in translations, the secondary meaning can become 
confused with the primary. For example, kufr is usually translated as ‗unbelief‘. Izutsu 
strongly argues that this is not the primary meaning of the word although there is 
within the term kufr some connotation of the sense of unbelief. 
 
 
2.3.1.2 Basic and Relational Meanings 
 
Alongside primary and secondary meanings of words, concepts possess basic and 
relational meanings.
84
 This is to say, each word has a basic core meaning that is 
inherent in the word itself regardless of any kind of weltanschauung system. 
However, the relational meaning ‗is something connotative that comes to be attached 
and added to the former by the word's having taken a particular position in a particular 
field, standing in diverse relations to all other important words in that system‘.85  
 
This is an important point to understand and constantly keep in mind with all Qur'ānic 
concepts. Hence, one could argue that all concepts in the Qur‘ān possess a relational 
meaning and at times, the relational meaning becomes the primary meaning of the 
word. For example, the word taqwā has come to mean ‗to shield oneself from harm‘, 
however Qur‘ānic taqwā has acquired the meaning of ‗to protect oneself from sin, to 
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keep one‘s guard‘ (thinking consciously of God), to be aware of God and being God 
conscious.
86
 This suggests the concept of taqwā has undertaken a semantic shift.  
 
All the same, such an exercise is somewhat theoretical as it is likely that perhaps one 
will never find a pure ‗basic‘ meaning of a word in any system.  Such an analysis 
presumes, as Izutsu points out, that words possess basic (core) meanings so that 'in 
most cases the assumption facilitates our analytic procedure and makes our 
understanding of word-meanings more systematic and scientifically exact‘.87     
 
 
2.3.1.3 Semantic Field 
 
According to Izutsu each concept contains a semantic field. A semantic field 
encompasses a variety of different components. It contains the words, derivatives, its 
forms, its semantic synonymous(s), its parallel and words that have been associated 
with each other but are not linguistically connected (such as belief and good deeds -
imān & ʿamal al-ṣāliḥ)  
 
It is important to point out that the exercise of isolating and examining semantic fields 
is a necessary intellectual exercise in order to understand these concepts. However, in 
actuality, these concepts are interrelated and cannot be entirely separated.  
 
According to Izutsu, not all semantic fields carry the same significance within the 
core of the Qur‘ānic system. A hierarchy exists among the concepts with respect to 
their degree of importance. For example, the concepts of Oneness of God, the 
Resurrection, Judgement Day, and Prophecy exist at the top of the hierarchy, on the 
account of Izutsu, as they make up the core of the Qur'ānic weltanschauung. Creating 
such a hierarchy, however, is not without a serious methodological problem, as 
pointed out by Fazlur Rahman.  Rahman asks the critical question: How is it possible 
to determine which concepts make up the core of the Qur'ānic system? Clearly, 
concepts such as Oneness of God and the Judgement Day are easily seen as central to 
the Qur‘ān. For the remaining concepts, however, Rahman claims their positions in 
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the hierarchy of Izutsu are arbitrary.
88
  
 
There is considerable merit to Rahman‘s critique. It is worth noting that although he 
maintains that the specific hierarchy of Izutsu seems arbitrary, he does nonetheless 
agree with Izutsu that a hierarchy of values is present in the Qur‘ān. So it may be the 
case that if a specific criterion was used, such as by observing the frequency of 
particular concepts within the Qur‘ān, it might be possible to develop a hierarchy that 
is not arbitrary.
89
  
 
  
2.3.1.4 Non-semantic Fields 
 
The semantic fields of concepts also connect to what Izutsu calls non-semantic fields.  
These are defined as concepts that contribute to the meaning of words without having 
any semantic connections.
90
 Such concepts include the Oneness of God, Judgement 
Day, Responsibility and Accountability.  
 
The Izutsian method therefore arranges Qur‘ānic concepts ‗in a meaningful pattern 
representing a system of concepts ordered and structured in accordance with a 
principle of conceptual organisation‘ this is a system - a field - within a larger 
system.
91
  
 
 
2.3.2  The Complexity of Semantic Fields  
 
So it would seem that Qur‘ānic concepts are expressed within a cluster of related 
words possessing either a positive or negative fields. These clusters of words are 
identified on two bases: (1) by linguistic connectives through the root word (such as 
ḥukm and ḥikma) or through a semantic connection (such as khilāfa and wārithīin) 
and (2) by the re-occurrence of one concept with another i.e. concepts are paralleled. 
For example, the word iṣlāḥ has as one of its derivatives ṣāliḥāt (plural) which 
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constantly occurs with imān (belief). Therefore, ṣāliḥāt contributes to the meaning of 
imān within the Qur'ānic weltanschauung. That is to say that imān (or the mu'min) has 
the connotation of pro-active positive action (ṣāliḥāt). However these concepts do not 
share a common root; they are connected as part of a wider Qur'ānic system that 
outlines what it means to believe in One God.
92
  
 
Such a methodology very quickly becomes complicated when put into practice, 
increasing the risk of identifying some of the key-words in an arbitrary manner.  For 
each key-concept can have multiple relationships with various words and concepts 
that are not of equal importance. A single key-word could function as key-concept in 
one semantic field but in another field function merely in a supportive position. Izutsu 
recognizes this problem and comments that 
the complexity of the matter arises from the fact that each of the words appearing in a 
sub-system, whether focus-word or key-word, does not remain confined within the 
limits of the particular field, but normally has a multiple relationship to many other 
words that properly belong to other fields.
93
  
 
Most difficult for semanticists is the task of isolating key-concepts from the wider 
complex web of interconnected concepts.
94
 Yet more difficult still is the process of 
identifying the interconnectedness of key words to each other. It may involve a 
repetitive process of trial and error and constant re-evaluation. For this reason, even 
this thesis must itself remain a work in progress. Izutsu himself concedes that an 
element of arbitrariness is present as part of the process of identifying related words.
95
 
Identifying connections between words may not be due to pure chance and may be 
more than the use of common sense, but it is not fully ‗rigorous‘.  
 
This methodological problem may however be addressed. This thesis proposes that 
the process of identifying concepts in the Qur‘ān is not fully arbitrary; concepts are in 
fact selected on an inductive method based on the number of times a concept is 
mentioned. If the concept is mentioned with a high degree of frequency, than such a 
concept or word may be said to be central to the Qur‘ānic weltanschauung.96  
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2.3.3 Limitation of Izutsian Methodology 
 
Nonetheless, Izutsu‘s method is not without its limitations. For instance, Rahman 
asserts that when Izutsu examines the Qur‘ānic weltanschauung, he ignores the 
Meccan moral social order, making no distinction between the Meccan social order 
and that of the  edouins. Yet in order to fully understand the Qur‘ānic moral social 
order Rahman argues that it is essential to be aware of the historical distinctions 
between the Meccan and Bedouin socio-economic situations.
97
 Izutsu‘s method also 
ignores the chronology in which the Qur‘ān was revealed in. A semantic analysis 
alone is not sufficient to provide a full Qur‘ānic weltanschauung. To Rahman, the 
historical approach is superior to a purely semantic approach. In light of Rahman‘s 
critique, this thesis will make use of historical accounts (in the form of as ā  al-nuzūl 
and sha'n al-nuzūl).  
  
Although Izutsu emphasises that the Qur'ān needs to be examined without any pre-
conception based on developments in post-Qur‘ānic literature (e.g. jurisprudence, 
theology and philosophy) he himself errs in this respect by reading certain verses as if 
they were legal verses (fiqhī) concerned with social relations.98 
 
This type of semantic research, which focuses exclusively on the Qur'ān, and employs 
secondary sources solely to clarify the term, word, or context of the verse, has both 
advantages and disadvantages. As an advantage, it is easier to place a verse within the 
wider context of more general Qur'ānic theme and not be influenced by a pre-existent 
understanding found in theo-philosophical literature. To be sure, pure objectivity is 
not possible and the interpreter is always influenced by something.  In this case 
however, the influence of the theo-philosophical argument of the medieval scholars is 
much diminished. 
 
As a disadvantage, this type of research, although it can be potentially more original, 
may lack references. It is important to maintain a balance between freedom from the 
bias of past scholarship and not being aware of post-Qur‘ānic scholarship at all. 
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2.3.4 Departure From Izutsu  
 
This thesis departs from Izutsu‘s study of the meaning of concepts in the Qur'ān by 
using a methodology that addresses not only ontological questions (as the case with 
Izutsu) but as part of the search for determining meaning, moving towards 
epistemological questions. 
 
This thesis also departs from the work of Izutsu in another respect. It also provides a 
way of identifying the hierarchy of these concepts in combining a thematic approach 
as well.
99
 The following section outlines the thematic approach and its strength.   
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2.4 TOWARDS A THEMATIC APPROACH   
 
The notion that the Qur‘ān should be interpreted in a holistic manner is not new. The 
thematic method, for instance emphasizes the unity of the Qur‘ān, requiring that the 
interpreter identifies all the verses relating to a particular topic or theme in order to 
understand the overall meaning conveyed.
100
 Perhaps the earliest examples of this 
type of analysis may be found in the works of Ibn Taymiyya
101
 and Ghazālī,102 
although they also include other elements such as ḥadīth, in the case of Ibn Taymiyya 
and theo-philosophy in the case of Ghazālī as mentioned earlier. 
 
All the same, as noted above, the thematic approach could be seen primarily as a 
modern phenomenon, with scholars such as Mohammed al-Ghazālī (1916-1996),103  
Mohammed B. al-Ṣadr (1934-1980)104 and Fazlur Rahman (1919-1988)105 being but a 
few examples who address such themes as women, war/peace, commerce, inheritance, 
ethics, poverty, mercy and so on.
 106
     
 
 
2.4.1 Theme Based Exegesis  
 
A case could be made that theme based exegesis has the advantages of being coherent 
and possessing some degree of objectivity.
107
 Bearing in mind that absolute 
objectivity is likely unobtainable, the thematic approach nonetheless has the potential 
to achieve the comprehension of the entirety of the Qur‘ānic message. According to 
Muṣṭafā Muslim, thematic exegesis can refer to several types of methods: (1) 
Examining what the Qur‘ān has to say about one‘s own personal, social, or 
theological interest, and (2) Collecting separate verses related to each other by verbal 
root or theme and attempting to explain these verses by determining the Qur‘ānic 
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perspective.
108
 This latter type of exegesis invariably results in applying other verses 
to explain the verses under analysis, a process termed as tafsīr al-Qur’ān  il al-
Qur’ān, in an attempt to achieve a holistic reading.  
 
An exegesis of this kind was not incorporated within the ʿulūm al-Qur’ān in an overt 
way until the mid-19
th
 century in al-Azhar, where it was included in a section in 
books on the science of tafsīr.109 Thematic tafsīr is also present to some extent as part 
of books pertaining to jurisprudence, located under such sections as worship, purity, 
and transactions in which each section would have all the verses that related to the 
topic of fiqh according to their theme. As mentioned earlier, this kind of approach is 
limited by the interpreter‘s intention being solely to derive a ruling as opposed to 
determine the Qur‘ānic worldview as a whole.  
 
An examination of a Qur‘ānic theme independently of fiqh would require that the 
interpreter selects a concept present in the Qur‘ān and then gather all verses that refer 
to it, in the form of a theme or a word and its derivatives and from that understand the 
theme in general terms and determine as to whether the Qur‘ān itself provides a 
specific definition of the concept.  
 
This process of thematic interpretation has been described by Amina Wadud as that of 
‗holistic intra-Qur‘anic interpretation‘, being a process that requires the interpreter to 
construct priorities ‗based on universals rather than particulars‘. 110  
 
 
2.4.1.1 Advantages of Thematic Approach 
 
One potential advantage of employing the thematic approach is that it makes it 
possible to engage with contemporary concerns when reading the Qur‘ān. Fazlur 
Rahman criticises the way some have read Qur‘ānic verses in isolation without 
demonstrating any ‗insight into the cohesive outlook on the universe and life‘ present 
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in the text. For Rahman, the methodology behind such an approach is entirely 
inadequate.
 111
 
 
 
2.4.2.1 Example of Modern Works that Employ the Thematic Approach 
 
Of the scholars who strongly favour a thematic approach, Fazlur Rahman is of 
particular interest. Maintaining that an atomistic approach cannot supply one with a 
meaning of the Qur‘ān as a whole,112 he insists further that 
 
the Qur‘an must be so studied that its concrete unity will emerge in its fullness, and 
[…] to select certain verses from the Qur‘an to project a partial and subjective point 
of view may satisfy the subjective observer but it necessarily does violence to the 
Qur‘an itself and results in extremely dangerous abstractions.113 
 
Fazlur Rahman‘s ‗double movement theory‘ aims both to advance a way to 
understand the Qur‘ān as a whole and to serve as a means of utilising one part of the 
Qur‘ān to explain another. According to Rahman, the Qur‘ān must be first placed 
within its historical context when being interpreted.  This includes examining the 
context of revelation both in terms of the Prophet‘s own life and the socio-political/ 
socio-moral context in which he lived. With the aim of recovering the ‗original‘ 
meaning of revelation, this is the first movement.
114
 In doing so, it is possible to 
derive universal principles and Qur‘ānic objectives that would allow the reader to get 
to the Qur‘ānic normative injunctions and develop coherent systematic Qur‘ānic 
principles.
115
 
 
 The second movement, per Rahman, the interpreter needs to apply these general 
principles derived from a particular Qur‘ānic context to his or her contemporary 
context or what Rahman calls our ‗present concrete socio-historical context‘.116 Thus, 
the reader is constantly moving from the first movement to the second and again back 
to the first. 
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Rahman‘s method takes into account the relevance of the historical events 
surrounding revelation. At the same time, his ‗double movement theory‘ is limited by 
the fact that it can only be applied to verses that are obviously related to a historical 
event, and one which is known to us today. Therefore his theory cannot be applied to 
the entire Qur‘ān.  
 
Fazlur Rahman‘s approach to the Qur‘ān thus employs dialogue for the sake of 
interpretation (i.e. a ‗dialogic of hermeneutics‘) that combines an examination of both 
revelation and history (social context). 
 
Having said all this about Rahman‘s ―double movement theory‖, the work of 
Moḥammed  . al-Ṣadr (1935-1980) particularly stands out as a more successful 
attempt than Rahman‘s in moving away from the tajzi’ī (atomistic) approach by 
applying his method to the concept of history in the Qur‘ān. 
 
 
2.4.2 Ṣadrian Thematic Approach 
 
Ṣadr‘s thematic approach was articulated first in his lectures and was later collected as 
a book in Al-Madrasah al-Qur’āniya  Al-tafsῑr al-Mawḍū ῑ wa al-Tafsīr al-tajzī’ī fī 
al- Qur’ān al-Karīm by his students.117 
 
As described by Ṣadr, most Qur‘ānic exegesis proceeds from verse to verse and 
derives the meaning of Qur‘ānic passages by analysing a given verse, phrase or word 
rather than exploring its general concepts or themes. Ṣadr calls this method tajzi’ῑ 
which may be compared to a book that is read as composed of separate parts unrelated 
to the book as a whole. To be sure, this method still considers the context of the word 
and the verse(s), but only as part of a linear, sequential reading that starts at the 
beginning of the Qur‘ān and proceeds to the end.  
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2.4.2.1 The Application of the Ṣadrian Approach  
 
Ṣadr applied his thematic approach when examining the concept of history in the 
Qur‘ān. Stating that history, like the natural sciences, is governed by laws, using the 
term ‗sunan al-tārīkh‘,118 which could denote, ‗meaning, way, age, tradition, or 
method of doing something‘.119 Ṣadr‘s concept of laws pertaining to history is derived 
from specific verses in the Qur‘ān that could conceivably be interpreted to indicate 
that there are certain laws that govern the movement of history. 
 
For Ṣadr, however, these laws do not apply to a mere sequence of linear events in the 
past, but instead only apply when they fulfil a certain set of criteria, all of which must 
be present at the same time. For the sunan al-tārīkh to apply, history must first of all 
be seen as developments relating to society as a whole, not to an individual.  This is 
supported by the observation that the audience is addressed not in the singular but in 
the plural, for instance in verses. 3:137; 6:34; 12:109; 17:77; 22:120; 33:62; 35:43; 
47: 10; 89:23.
120
 Secondly, a society must necessarily be moving towards a purpose 
(evidenced in verses 2:214; 17:13; 45:28-9; 64:9). Lastly for sunan al-tārīkh to apply, 
the society needs to be moving in the direction of the future, not the past.
121     
 
For example, Ṣadr finds evidence of sunan al-tārīkh in verses that describe the 
societal connection between corruption and righteousness (such as in verses 17:16-17; 
5:66; 7:96; 43:22). Once the law that has an equilibrium is broken, when corruption 
pervades society, the society (umma as he calls it) is doomed to rapid downfall and 
will perish, rendering a circular dialectical historical movement.
122
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2.4.3 Limitations and Potential Problems  
 
Arguably, using the thematic approach one could risk the danger of losing the theme 
in a given chapter when comparing it to a similar theme in another chapter. However, 
the Qur‘ān was revealed gradually which could suggest that it is necessary to totalise 
the verses into one holistic theme in order to realise the core meaning of the theme 
itself.  
 
Another potential difficulty with the thematic approach, as Amina Wadud explains, is 
that the thematic exegesis requires that the interpreter thoroughly internalises within 
her or himself the spirit of the Qur‘ān itself.123   
 
Being aware of this challenge, the author suggests that one possible approach is to be 
aware of the Qur‘ānic worldview itself, which the author is. 
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2.5 BEYOND ṢADRIAN AND IZUTSIAN APPROACHES  
 
By combining the semantic and thematic approaches, one immediately realises that 
some themes are mentioned more frequently than another, which poses the question 
as to whether this repetition is significant. If the repetition of themes and concepts is 
significant then would one be justified to argue that the less frequent a concept is 
mentioned the more contextual it is? If this is the case, then if one manages to gather 
all the concepts on the basis of their frequency of occurrence, does one end with a 
hierarchy of concepts and eventually of values? 
 
This research suggests that the more frequently a given concept occurs, the more it is 
the centre of a paradigm in its universality, they are characterised as conceptual core. 
When a number of verses taken together become a theme and a number of themes 
together make an integrated whole, the result is no less consequential than a single 
verse. In the case of concepts that occur very frequently, the message they convey 
becomes both more universal (independent of time, place and culture) and carry 
greater weight, being binding to all Muslims under any circumstance.  
 
In contrast, words that appear less frequently are categorised as Qur‘ānic-terms. A 
Qur‘ānic-term can for the most part be interpreted by means of its context because its 
infrequent mention suggests that the term is specific to a given culture. This means 
that any attempt to apply the verses to everyday practice would require that the same 
circumstances of that verse also be relevant today.
124
   
 
In this way, Ṣadr‘s approach goes one step further by not only considering a single 
concept but also how several concepts interact together, thus making it possible to 
create a comprehensive worldview found in the Qur‘ān about such subjects as the 
individual and society. This process also makes use of the same kind of inductive 
analytical methodology Ṣadr himself favours. 
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2.5.1 Hierarchy of Concepts   
 
If the argument above is substantial and the frequency of themes is significant, then 
would one be justified in speaking of a hierarchy of concepts in the Qur‘ān?125 The 
idea of a hierarchy is not new in contemporary Muslim scholarship. For instance, 
Fazlur Rahman suggests that concepts can be placed into a hierarchy,
126
 postulating, 
for example, that justice possesses a greater value than any specific ruling given in the 
Qur‘ān. An example of this may be found in the case of marriage as Rahman argues. 
With regard to marriage, God states specifically men will not be able to be just when 
marrying more than one wife and therefore, Rahman suggests justice has a higher 
value than the permissibility of marrying more than one.
127
  
 
Rahman, however does not define his determination of greater or lesser values a 
hierarchy but instead speaks of ‗general principles‘.128 The hierarchy of Rahman is 
not between different values, but between principles and specific rulings. Within this 
scheme, one would presumably derive principles from specific rulings. But it is not 
clear how one would place said principles into a hierarchy, as Rahman does not 
supply any kind of method to do so. 
 
The concept of a hierarchy is also referred to by Ismāʿīl Fārūqī, who maintains that 
the Qur‘ān includes ‗only the principles of their identity, of their order of rank and 
hierarchy, of their implication of the real-existent realm in general‘.129 According to 
Fārūqī there are lower ethical values that deal with real-existent that are changeable, 
that is to say revelation in history. He states that  
[w]henever the Holy Qurān makes mention of lower ethico-religious values, or of 
values belonging to other realms, or of real-existents, it must do so, not for their own 
sake but for the sake of those higher ethico-religious values which are its prime 
object.
130
 
 
What the Qur‘ān gives us by presenting the real-existents is a yardstick that one is 
able to know the ‗axiological finality‘ of lower values.131 Fārūqī states further that the 
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higher value ‗lays a greater claim than the lower member of the hierarchy and where 
it conflicts with the lower, it legitimately demands the lower to be forsaken for the 
sake of the higher‘.132 
 
Fārūqī‘s view that lower values reflect values that are real-existent and that higher 
values reflect what is ideal-existent is critical for understanding the phenomenon of 
the abrogation of verses.  
 
A shortcoming with Fārūqī‘s analysis, however, is that it does not supply a method for 
determining the higher value of ideal-existent. Additionally, he makes it clear that 
interpreters should be analysing the Qur‘ān for the purposes of determining religious 
values and not the nature and scope of knowledge. Yet the same challenge lies in how 
one is able to understand axiological inferences in the Qur‘ān. In fact, questions of 
epistemology cannot be avoided.  
 
The placing of values within a hierarchy is also proposed by Abdullah Saeed in his 
book Interpreting the Qur an.133 Saeed considers ethico-legal verses as a way of 
determining what constitutes ‗right action‘ within a jurisprudential context. He claims 
that a careful reading that focuses upon the ‗concept of right action provides an 
extensive list of values that can be classified and prioritized in order to arrive at some 
form of hierarchy‘.134 Saeed identifies five fundamental values that relate to ethico-
legal verses and hence also relate to ‗right action‘. Listed in order of importance by 
Saeed they are: obligatory, fundamental, protectional, implementational and 
institutional.
135
 Saeed determined the relative importance of these values by 
employing ‗inductive corroboration‘ known to jurists,136 in which the more frequent a 
value occurs, the greater its significance.
137
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Although Saeed‘s five categories of Qur‘ānic values is useful in some ways, it has not 
been employed in this thesis for the reason that Saeed‘s thought is still tied to some 
degree with that of jurisprudence. Even his five categories carry an echo of the well-
known jurisprudential categories of obligatory, prohibited, reprehensible, 
recommended and permissible. Furthermore, it is possible to see the entire Qur‘ān as 
obligatory or fundamental, hence, such categories have their limitations.  
 
In contrast, the values this thesis considers are the actual concepts mentioned in the 
Qur‘ān, such as raḥma, taqwā, ḥikma, ʿadl, ḥaqq, jihād and so on. The concepts are 
assigned a place in a hierarchy on the basis of their frequency.     
 
  
2.5.1.1 Demonstration of the methodology  
 
The diagram below illustrates a sample of concepts selected from their root-words 
presented according to amount of times they are present in the Qur‘ān from most 
frequent to the least frequent. 
 
Diagram 1: The Hierarchy of Concepts 
 
 
The diagram below illustrates the way concepts are formed and interconnect: 
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The overlapping circles that join together in the centre of A represent concepts found 
in the Qur‘ān. They are said to be in the core because they are frequently mentioned. 
The different circles indicate separate concepts. For example, the root word r-h-m 
occurs 342 times in eleven different forms including raḥma raḥīm, raḥmān and it 
occurs many times with the concept of Allāh, from the root word ‘i-l-h occurring 
1,139 times with five different forms; and Allāh occurs with ghafūr many times, from 
the root word gh-f-r occurring 224 times in eleven different forms. The closer the 
concepts are to the centre, the more the concepts overlap with each other and are 
universal. Observe also that A and B overlap and share connections. Where A must 
remain a universal concept within certain selected verses, B may have a particular 
meaning that may derive from a specific socio-political situation at the time of 
revelation. For these reasons, B is placed further away from the core, being contingent 
to the context of revelation. The circles that are all labelled B represents different 
terms in the Qur‘ān that should be read as contextual in comparison to A.   
 
This is illustrated by the point labelled B. Note however that Diagram 2 is in no ways 
suggests that context-related terms are any less important so much as to suggest that 
such terms must be read within the context of the revelation and only its spirit or 
objective can be applicable.  
B 
B 
Context related 
concepts that are 
mentioned less than 
five times in the 
Quran 
B 
B 
A 
Core re-occurring 
concepts that make up 
the worldview of the 
Quran.  
B 
Diagram 2: Web of Interconnectedness and Formation of Core 
Concepts 
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It is easier to see how many interpreters have in fact confused A with B, rendering 
what is best seen as contextual as universal. This will be further illustrated in Chapter 
Four and Five relating to terms such as shūrā and ‘ulī al-amr. 
 
The idea of ―hierarchy of concepts‖ that is measured by the frequency of occurrence 
of concepts should not be seen as making the Qur‘ān as a statistical analysis. The aim 
is not to reduce the understanding of the Qur‘ān to a mere numbers. On the contrary, 
this is a mere indication that one needs to internalise all the values of the Qur‘ān. Yet 
at the same time be able to understand the scope of the application of some of the 
verses.     
 
To illustrate the contextual relation to the universal, the following diagram provides a 
visual appreciation suggesting that the less frequently a concept appears the more 
contextual it is and the more frequently it occurs the more universal the concept 
becomes. 
 
Diagram 3: Contextual relation to the Universal  
 
It might follow then, if the frequency of a concept is significant, what would silence 
in the Qur‘ān indicate? To be consistent with the thesis‘ methodology the silence of 
anything in the Qur‘ān is also significant. If the high frequency of a concept indicates 
its universality (kuliyāt), then the intended omission would indicate free choice. 
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2.5.2 Axiology  
 
An interpreter of the Qur‘ān not only receives meaning but also generates it. In 
agreement with Yahya Mohammed‘s argument that one cannot escape from one‘s life 
experiences at either the personal or social level, experiences that form an essential 
part of who the person is. Any person who encounters a text or situation views that 
text and situation does so through the lens of his or her experiences.
138
 The challenge 
to the interpreter is that the ultimate intended meaning of text cannot be said to have 
been reached. In Saeed's own words: 
an ultimate and 'final' meaning cannot be achieved...Therefore, the safest way to 
approach those texts is at the level of human communication, at the same time 
acknowledging the approximate nature of that understanding.
139
 
 
Having said that, this does not mean that one cannot perceive the general meaning of 
a text, as it has real implications to those who follow that teaching.
140
 
    
 
2.5.3 Difficulties and Limitations 
 
The task of examining frequency in the Qur‘ān is complicated because one is not only 
considering the semantic frequency of a word, but of its wide conceptual theme which 
include words that do not share a common root. A further difficulty is found in the 
fact that the frequency of a thematic concept must remain an estimate because, as 
Saeed himself concedes, ‗it is almost impossible to identify all possible associated 
terms relating to the value‘.141 This kind of complexity makes any analysis more time 
consuming and potentially less accurate, particularly with regard to concepts that are 
located close to each other in the hierarchy.  
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Another serious limitation to this approach may be that the use of statistical analysis 
alone may have the consequence of draining the Qur‘ān of its spiritual reflections. 
However, this is certainly not the intention of this kind of methodology, and indeed 
this research may be seen as a reaction against the simplification of reading the 
Qur‘ān. Internalising the holistic message of the Qur‘ān by constant connection to it is 
one way of avoiding the possibility of making the Qur‘ān a mere statistical 
argumentation.  
 
Additionally, some scholars, such as ʿĀ‘isha ʿAbd al-Raḥmān  int al-Shāṭi‘ (1913-
1998), Muhammed Aḥmed Khalafallāh (1916-1998), Muhammed Arkoun (1928-
2010), and Nāṣr  āmid Abū Zayd (1943-2010), in examining  the Qur‘ān in history, 
developed the idea that the Qur‘ān, like other books, can be subjected to literary 
criticism. They have argued this in relation to the contextuality of the Qur‘ān itself.142 
This author departs from their analysis in examining the Qur‘ān as a literary text. The 
hierarchy of value proposed here does not emphasise the contextuality of the Qur‘ān 
but rather provides a method for recognising possible contextual elements in some 
verses. Therefore the idea of the hierarchy of values is not that of historicisation of the 
Qur‘ān, but an effort to understand its application in today‘s world. 
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2.6 CONCLUSION 
 
As demonstrated above, the utilization of both semantic and thematic approaches will 
make it possible to examine text, context, co-text, intercontextuality and the issues of 
interpretation more fully in the Qur‘ān than by any other approach available.143 
Although none of the scholars presented in this chapter have provided a unique 
analysis, the methods they have used in their research have been shown here to be 
significant. 
 
By combining the two methods, one can ensure that the words analysed within their 
semantic field are viewed in light of the Qur‘ān as a whole. Such a method transcends 
a word‘s lexical definition and synthesizes a range of related meanings and their 
interconnections. In the course of investigating a worldview one moves from the 
study of the particular to the study of the whole, from words to concepts, from 
concepts to themes and from themes to paradigms. With such a combination of 
methods it becomes possible to sketch out large patterns, establish links between 
words, and approach the possible meanings of verses in their multi-layered 
complexity. 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORY VS HISTORY 
 
The Impact of Historical Events upon the Development of 
Muslim Political Theology 
 
 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
With the aim of defining ‗political theory‘ from within the Muslim tradition, this 
chapter will trace the development of Muslim political concepts in Muslim history. 
The emphasis upon Muslim perspectives provides a necessary corrective to the 
Eurocentric manner in which the concepts of the ‗political‘ and of ‗theory‘ have been 
understood, as noted in the Introduction. The chapter looks at the historical 
development of these concepts as a discursive tradition by examining a sample of 
scholars reflecting the discursive transformation of the tradition itself and not isolated 
authors.
1
 Emerging out of this somewhat lengthy and complex task is the surprising 
repetition of concepts that are connected in some way with the first Muslim fitna 
(civil war).
2
 It is clear, therefore, that the development of Muslim political theology is 
strongly influenced by the political events occurring at the time. The reference to 
Muslim political theology is a reference to the historical development of Muslim 
political thought that does not necessarily mean Qur‘ānic. In the course of its 
investigation, this chapter will in fact demonstrate that prior to experience with 
Western colonialism, particularly during the dismantlement of the Ottoman Empire, 
questions regarding the establishment of an ―Islamic State‖ had never been articulated 
in a serious manner within the early Muslim political traditions.  
 
                                                 
1
  The idea Islam is a discursive tradition is articulated by T Asad, The idea of an anthropology of 
Islam, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 1986. 
2
 The first Muslim civil war is dated from 35-40/656-661. It is also known as the big affliction (al-fitnat 
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Religious Thought‘, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 28, no. 2, 2001, pp. 151-164. 
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testing someone‘s endurance. See Badawi, M El-Said & M. A. Abdel Haleem, Arabic-English 
dictionary of Qur'anic usage, Brill, Leiden, 2008, p. 692.  
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Accordingly this chapter shall also demonstrate how the very nature of questions 
asked related to politics was shaped by actual political turmoil and that those 
questions that had developed into concepts in turn determined the lens through which 
the scripture was read. However, it is not a historical account of the development of 
Muslim political thought in the way, for example, of Anthony Black,
3
 Montgomery 
Watt,
4
 Ann Lambton
5
 and Patricia Crone.
6
 It is an attempt to trace the emergence of 
Muslim political concepts.  
 
In addition, it will take into account the difficulties posed for the historian in 
evaluating sources and their multiple perspectives showing the challenging periods of 
history.   
 
This chapter suggests that the development of Muslim political theology was shaped 
profoundly by the first Muslim civil war and to a lesser extent by the succession 
crisis. Key questions that arose under these circumstances concerned the basis of 
legitimate rulership, the characteristics of a leader and the obsession with boundaries 
of belief that later developed into distinct doctrinal borders. 
 
Even though the historicity of such events remains difficult to prove in full, it is still 
apparent that political theory developed in reaction to issues that are expressed in 
narratives about such events. Indeed political theology was affected to the point that 
textual support from the Qur‘ān was garnered to bolster those views. 
 
Next, the chapter will trace how this pattern continues by examining a sample of 
medieval scholars including Abū Al- asan al-Māwardī (364-450/974-1058), Abū 
 āmid Aḥmed al-Ghazālī (450-505/1058-1111) and Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya (661-
728/1263-1328). Questions that persisted throughout medieval times included the 
qualities of a legitimate leader, his characteristics and ‗conditions‘ of the caliphate, as 
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 W M Watt, Islamic political thought: the basic concepts, Edinburgh U.P, Edinburgh, 1968. By the 
same author Islamic political thought, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1998. 
5
 A K S Lambton, State and government in medieval Islam: an introduction to the study of Islamic 
political theory: the jurists, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981. 
6
 P Crone, Islam and government: a history of medieval Islamic political thought, Columbia University 
Press, New York, 2003. 
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well as the purpose of the caliphate as an institution. In a departure from the earlier 
formative period in Muslim history, political concepts during the medieval age was 
marked by discussions of obedience and rebellionism. These are discussions that later 
would be found in the majority of fiqh books of all sects. At this point, most of the 
historical writings of the early period developed into an orthodoxy. The discussions, 
therefore, became highly jurisprudential as well as polemical with the goal of 
falsifying any claims made by other sects regarding the right to rule.
7
 
 
Lastly, this chapter examines political theory as understood in contemporary times, 
which has arguably been shaped by the experiences of colonisation (and 
decolonisation), modernity and the imposition of the nation-state. The distinctive 
feature of this period is the move away from polemical argument towards a theory of 
compatibility with modernity, with Islam at its centre. Departing from the emphasis 
on questions relating to legitimacy of the early and medieval periods, contemporary 
Muslim thinkers instead explore the extent to which Islam is compatible with aspects 
of modernity, including but not limited to science, human rights and the nation-state. 
In addition, within contemporary Shīʿite thought in particular, a new kind of political 
theory develops which replaces the medieval ideas of muntaḍira (waiting for the 
reappearance of the Mehdī) with the guardianship of the jurist (wilāya al-faqīh) as a 
form of government that is religiously necessary. 
 
 
3.1.1 Primary Sources and Historiographical Difficulties 
 
Evaluating historical sources poses numerous difficulties, especially when (as is the 
case with this chapter), the sources significantly post-date the events they describe. 
Consequently, the thinking of historians and theologians that came after the event was 
shaped by these sources without serious critical examination. Further complication 
arises in the later sectarian formations that also rely on specific historical sources.  
Only later did periods of history become canonised into an ideal form. For example, 
                                                 
7 For details on the groups which developed see Ibn Tāhir al- aghdādī,  Abd al-Qāhir, Al Farq bayna 
al Firaq, Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadīda,  eirut, 1973. Also see Shahrastānī, Muḥammad ibn  Abd al-Karīm, 
Kitā  al-Milal wa-al-Niḥal, Mu assasat al- alabī, Cairo, 1968.   
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accounts of the khulafā’ al-rāshidūn era8 eventually only included the four 
companions
9
 and not Muʿāwiya or the other Umayyads.10 As orthodox perspectives 
arose and solidified further, their interpretation of what had happened as early as 
10/632 were interpreted in light of beliefs that developed after 40/661, such as 
whether or not the Prophet designated a successor.
11
 This is consistent with the 
proposed idea in this chapter that political events (history) have shaped political 
questions and hence shaped the way the scripture is read. 
 
It is important to mention this here in order to clarify that the purpose of this chapter 
is not to search for whose account is the truest but to acknowledge the problematic 
nature of the sources available, especially as we have no original manuscripts at hand. 
Nonetheless, primary sources are important for establishing some kind of narrative of 
events. Fortunately, certain significant events, such as the murder of ʿUthmān, are 
well established as fact, although various accounts may differ in specifics. The key 
issue here is that when general historical accounts are not disputed the author will not 
seek to differ.  
 
The most contested historical period relating to how and why two companions of the 
Prophet died at the hands of other Muslims took place between 10 and 40 (632-661). 
Historical records were initially written down to ensure that the Prophet‘s sayings 
were not being misused, given that many Muslims were citing sayings of the Prophet 
as evidence.
12
 Some of the earliest Sunnī extant accounts, upon which other works 
inevitably rely are those of Ibn Isḥāq (d.134/761) in his Sīrat al-Na ī;13 imām Mālik 
(d.179/796) in his al-Muwaṭṭa’;14 Moḥammad al- ukhārī (194-256/810-870) in his 
                                                 
8
 Literally means the ‗righteous successors‘; ‗rightly guided successors‘; ‗one who follows the correct 
path or one who is sensible‘. From here on it will be referred to as the rāshidūn period. 
9
 They include Abū  akir Al-Ṣiddiq (ruled from 10/632 to 12/634), ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (12-23/634-
644), ʿUthmān bin ʿAffān (23-35/644-656) and ʿAlī ibn abī Ṭālib (35-40/656-661).  
10
 The name came to denote the family of banū Umayya that Yazīd, Muʿāwiya and his father Abū 
Sufyān belonged to. See F M Donner, Narratives of Islamic origins: the beginnings of Islamic 
historical writing, Darwin Press, Princeton, 1998. Also see Van Ess ‗Political Ideas in Early Muslim 
Religious Thought‘, p. 153. 
11
 The historical records are in the form of ḥadīth collections or development of heterography in terms 
of the life of the Prophet.  
12
 For information on the development of ḥadīth see Y Muḥammad, Mushkilat al-Ḥadīth, Mu assasat 
al-Intishār al- Arabī,  eirut, 2007. 
13
 Ibn Isḥāq M,   Alfred Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad  A Translation of Isḥāq s Sīrat Rasū al-
Allāh, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1996.  
14
 This book is considered to be the first collections of the sayings that are attributed to the Prophet 
(ḥadīth). See Mālik ibn Anas, al-Muwaṭṭā , Dār Iḥyā  al-Kutub al- Arabīyah, Cairo, 1951.   
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Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī and Kitā  Tārīkh al-Ka īr;15 Muslim bin al- ajjāj (d.261/875) in 
his Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim;16 Ibn Māja (d.272/886) in his Sunan I n Mājah;17 Abū Dāwūd 
(d.274/888) in his Sunan I n Dāwūd;18 Al-Tirmidhī (d.278/892) in his Sunan al-
Tirmidhī;19 and Moḥammed ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (223-310/838-923) in his Tarikh al-
Rusul wa al-Muluk known as Tārīkh al-Ṭa arī.20 These accounts consist of 
collections of the sayings of the Prophet, his companions (ṣahā a) and the successors 
of the companions (ta iʿīn).  Some skip the first fitna or mention it only generally (for 
example see Tārīkh al-Ṭa arī). 
 
The Shīʿites have their own sources, including ḥadīth collections and polemical 
discussions regarding who has the right to rule.
21
 One of those sources is Nahj al-
Balāgha attributed to ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib compiled by Al-Sharīf al-Rāḍī (d.405/1015) 
which contains ʿAlī‘s sermons, letters, sayings and advice.22 However, there are some 
issues with its authenticity, particularly due to the time lapse between ʿAlī and al-
Rāḍī. In addition, the Shīʿite also have four main historiographical works that contain 
the sayings of the Prophet and the imāms: the work of al-Kulaynī (250-329/864-941) 
in his Kitā  al-Kāfī;23 Shaykh al-Ṣaduq (305-381/917-991) in his work Man lā 
yaḥḍuruhu al-faqīh;24 and two books by Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭūsī (385-460/995-1067) 
Tahdhī  al-Aḥkām25 and Al-Isti ṣār.26  oth Sunnī and Shīʿite sources are 
problematic; they present conflicting accounts, both were written long after the events 
took place, and some cases, have a clear ideological bias. 
                                                 
15  ukhārī, Muḥammad ibn Ismā īl, and Muhammad Muhsin Khan, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī  the translation 
of the meanings of Sahih al-Bukhari : Arabic-English, Darussalam Pub. & Distr, Saudi Arabia, 1997. 
Also see Kitā  Al-Tārīkh Al-Ka īr, vol.1-4,  aydarārābād al-Dakkan: Maṭba at Jam īyat Dā irat al-
Ma ārif al-Uthmānīyah, 1941. 
16 Muslim ibn  ajjāj al-Qushayrī, and Nawawī, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, Dār al-Kutub al- Ilmīyah, Beirut, 2000. 
17 Ibn Mājah, Muḥammad ibn Yazīd, Sunan ibn Majah, vol.1-5, Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmīya,  eirut, 1998. 
18 Abū Dā ūd Sulaymān ibn al-Ash ath al-Sijistānī, Sunan A ī Dāwūd, Dār Iḥyā  al-Sunnah al-
Nabawīyah, 1970. 
19 Tirmidhī, Muḥammad ibn  Isā, Sunan al-Tirmidhī, al-Maktabah al-Salafīyah, Saudi Arabia, 1965. 
20 Tabarī, Muhammad ibn Jarīr, Tārīk h  al-Ta arī  tārīk h  al-rusul wa al-mulūk, Dār  al-Ma ārif, Cairo, 
1960. 
21
 For further discussion see the section on the First fitna in this chapter p. 78. 
22 Sharīf al-Raḍī, Muḥammad ibn al- usayn, and Mohammad Askari Jafery, Nahjul Balagha, Tahrike 
Tarsile Quran, Elmhurst, 1984. 
23 Kulaynī, Muḥammad ibn Ya qūb, and Muḥammad Riḍā Ja farī, Al-Kāfī, Group of Muslim Brothers, 
Iran, 1978. 
24 Ibn  ābawayh al-Qummī, Muḥammad ibn  Alī, and  āsim Mūsawī, Man lā yaḥḍuruhu al-faqīh lil-
Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, al-Majma , Iran, 1988. 
25 Ṭūsī, Muḥammad ibn al- asan, Tahdhī  al-aḥkām, Dār al-Aḍwā ,  eirut, 1992. 
26 Ṭūsī, Muḥammad ibn al- asan, and  asan al-Mūsawī Kharsān, al-Isti ṣār fi mā ikhtalafa min al-
akh ār, Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmīyah, Iraq, 1956. 
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From the dates above it becomes clear that the collection of ḥadīth began within the 
Sunnī tradition. The emphasis that Muslim scholars placed on determining whether a 
given ḥadīth was authentic (‗sound‘ – ṣaḥīḥ) or ‗weak‘ (ḍaʿīf) suggests a full 
awareness of the existence of fabricated ḥadīths.27 Consequently, the examination of 
the sayings of the Prophet within a narrative chain developed into a type of 
‗biographical studies‘ (ʿilm al-rijāl) and later became a full science of ḥadīth (ʿilm al-
ḥadīth). 28 The very existence of this science shows that historiographical records 
were acknowledged within Muslim scholarly tradition to be problematic. Even with 
such a science there were limitations because early sources were scarce and could 
have a questionable authenticity, which meant that particular claims and accounts 
could not be verified.
29
 Given this situation, this chapter will speak of historical 
accounts in general terms and not in detail, in keeping with the purpose of tracing the 
development of political concepts rather than of verifying the historical truth of the 
claims.   
 
   
                                                 
27 See Y Muḥammad, Mushkilat al-ḥadīth. 
28
 It is also translated as ―biographical evaluation‖, ―the study of the transmitters of hadith‖, ―study of 
the narrators‖, also ―science of the transmitters of ḥadīth‖ 
29
 See the work of M H Kamali, A text ook of Ḥadīth studies  authenticity, compilation, classification 
and criticism of Ḥadīth, The Islamic Foundation, England, 2005. 
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3.2 EARLY POLITICAL THEOLOGY 
 
It is disputed as to whether the Prophet explicitly designated a leader to succeed him. 
The Qur‘ān never speaks of a successor.30 The extant historical accounts consist of 
two contradictory chains of transmission (ḥadīths), each with a different claim as to 
what happened.
31
 Some Muslim thinkers have deduced from the reports that the 
Prophet did not leave any kind of instructions or will but made an implicit case for 
Abū  akr‘s succession because within those narratives he was asked to lead the 
prayer when the Prophet was ill.
32
 This account is adopted by Majority Sunnī 
traditions. The Shīʿite tradition, in contrast, adopts those ḥadīth reports that state that 
the Prophet had actually designated a successor, Alī ibn abī Ṭālib, his son-in-law and 
cousin.
33
 These two traditions became obsessed with arguments and counter 
arguments to supporting their conflicting accounts of what the Prophet had said. The 
theological debate on imāma amongst Shīʿites and Sunnīs reflects the disagreements 
on the reports regarding the last accounts of the Prophet. As a result the first concept 
to emerge within Muslim political thought concerned the nature of Muslim leadership 
and the idea of an imām. 
 
Abū  akr became the first successor after the Prophet's death. This decision arose out 
of negotiations by different tribes at Saqīfa, 34 with historical records suggesting that 
frictions emerged between the Anṣār and Muhājirūn.35 Because written accounts of 
the event took place much later, one finds that there are major contradictions between 
narratives regarding important details. This event constituted the first genuine 
disagreement in Muslim history and as the Shīʿite emphasise this period as the start of 
their alliance with ʿAlī, it is often seen as the beginning of the sectarian differences. 36 
Nonetheless, there are no written accounts of any recorded war or blood feud in 
                                                 
30
 This idea has been argued by many including Q Khan, Political concepts in the Quran, Islamic Book 
Foundation, Lahore, 1982; also see the authors in C Kurzman, Liberal Islam: a source book. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1998. W Madelung, The succession to Muḥammad  a history of the 
early Caliphate, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1997. 
31
 M Ahmed, ‗The Classical Muslim State‘, Islamic Studies, vol. 1, no. 3, 1962, pp. 83-104. p. 86. 
32
 Ibid. Another noted evidence is that the Prophet was Married to Abū  akr‘s daughter ʿĀ‘isha. 
33
 Also see A Afsaruddin, Excellence and precedence: medieval Islamic discourse on legitimate 
leadership, Brill, Leiden, 2002, p. 150.  
34
 A Goldschmidt, & L Davidson, A concise history of the Middle East, Westview Press, Boulder, 
2006, p. 60. 
35
 See Madelung, The succession to Muḥammad, pp. 28-56. 
36
 See for example the works of S H Nasr, H Dabashi, & S V R Nasr, Expectation of the millennium 
Shi ism in history, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1989. 
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connection with this disagreement over leadership, in contrast with what would be the 
case with the first fitna. Such an absence of violent conflict might indicate that ʿAlī in 
fact accepted the arrangement that took place. To be sure, the Shīʿite maintain that 
ʿAlī merely tolerated this situation for the sake of the Muslim unity as his bayʿa (oath 
of allegiance) to Abū  akr came many months after the disagreement about who 
should lead.
37
 However, the Shīʿite argument about Alī‘s tolerance would also mean 
that ʿAlī tolerated the years of rulership of Abū  akr, ʿUmar and ʿUthmān, yet not 
Muʿāwiya or the Khārij‘ite. Considering both the character of ʿAlī and the weighty 
claim by the Shīʿite that it was the Prophet‘s decision (therefore also God‘s decision) 
that ʿAlī should have been the successor this explanation seems less plausible. After 
all, when ʿAlī did rule, the sermon attributed to him suggests that it was not what he 
wanted.
38
  
 
Abū  akr, for his part, ruled for only two years. Close to his death he appointed 
ʿUmar as his successor, requesting that the people give  ayʿa to him.39 ʿUmar on his 
part set up an advisory/consultative group (shūrā) made up of six companions40 to 
advise him on various matters and to choose a leader following his death.
41
  
 
ʿUmar was assassinated by Abū Lu‘lu‘a, a Zoroastrian from Persia, and the next 
leader was chosen by the council ʿUmar had set up.42 ʿUthman Ibn ‗Affān was 
consequently elected by the council. He ruled for 12 years before he was also 
assassinated by a Muslim for allegedly corrupt conduct; this was the first time a 
Muslim leader was killed by a fellow Muslim. In the resulting power vacuum, the 
                                                 
37
 Bayʿa is thought to be a non-Arabic word, its origin maybe Persian, of its roots four forms occur 14 
times in the Qur‘an: Bāyaʿa occurs six times, it comes to mean to pledge allegiance, to swear fealty, 
declare oneself a loyal subject to a ruler (for example in verse 48:10). See EM Badawi & MA Abdel 
Haleem, Arabic-English dictionary of Qur'anic usage, Brill, Leiden, 2008, p. 122. 
38
 See Nahj al-Balāgha, Sermons 92, 137, and 205. Also see Tārīkh Ṭa arī, vol.3, p. 457.  
39
 See for example the work of A Afsaruddin, The first Muslims: history and memory, Oneworld, 
Oxford, 2008. 
40
 They are Saʿd Ibn Abī Waqqās, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn ʿAwf, Zubayr ibn al-Awwām, Ṭalḥa ibn 
ʿUbayd Allāh, ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib and ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān.  
41
 Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭa arī. vol. 3, pp. 294-295. 
42
 C F Robinson, & M A Cook, The New Cambridge History of Islam: Sixth to Eleventh Centuries, vol. 
1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010. Also see S A Arjomand, ‗Legitimacy and political 
organisation: caliphs, kings and regimes‘, in Irwin, Robert Islamic cultures and societies to the end of 
the eighteenth century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 225-273. 
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Muslims turned to ʿAlī.43 With the above short account of four rulers (Abū  akr, 
ʿUmar, ʿUthmān and ʿAlī) what is outlined is the four different ways in which 
governorship was passed down suggesting the circumstantial political structures in 
place.
44
  
 
Given that each of these four companions of the Prophet acquired power differently 
strongly suggests an absence of any definite political blueprint that could be binding. 
More likely and in line with the silence of the Qur‘ān, the early Muslim community 
fell back into their traditional way of selecting a leader. Stated differently, it was only 
within the power vacuum after the death of the Prophet that the tradition of  ayʿa and 
choosing the eldest and the closest to the Prophet emerged. In fact, the very existence 
of a power vacuum following the Prophet‘s death points further to the absence of any 
kind of clearly prescribed political theory. As Askari explains: 
From the very first day after the death of the Prophet, the issue of the succession to 
the Prophet into factions that later took clear forms of division first between the 
disciples, then between the houses of Umayyads and Hashimites, and as most 
political factions took the shape of theological divisions and expressions of sects and 
sub-sects.
45
 
 
Not only did the political situation enter theological discussions in the form of Sunnī 
and Shīʿite schisms as well as involving smaller groups but they also coloured the 
absolute declaration of Islamic creed (ʿaqida) itself.46      
 
The best way to illustrate and summarise the different accounts that developed is 
found in the table below. The accounts ranged between the Prophet clearly designated 
ʿAlī as a successor; the Prophet had preferred Abū  akr, governship is necessary by 
reason or tradition; and finally the actions of the early companions are binding in 
terms of governship. There are, of course, challenges with the last assertion as the 
companions actions was diverse. In all cases the concept of succession and imām 
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 W M Watt, The majesty that was Islam: the Islamic world, 661-1100, Sidgwick & Jackson, London, 
1974, pp. 35-37. Also see M A Shaban, Islamic History a new Interpretation AD 750-1055, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1976. 
44
 F M Donner ‗Muhammad and the Caliphate: Political History of the Islamic Empire up to the 
Mongol Conquest‘, in J L Esposito (ed.) The Oxford history of Islam, Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1999, pp. 1-62. 
45
 H Askari, Society and State in Islam: An Introduction, Islam and the Modern Age Society, New 
Delhi, 1978, p. 75. 
46
 For further information see the work of Yāsīn,  Abd al-Jawād Al-Sulṭah fī al-Islām  al- aql al-fiqhī 
al-salafī  ayna al-naṣṣ wa-al-tārīkh, Al-Markaz al-Thaqāfī al- Arabī,  eirut, 1998. 
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came to be central to the Muslim political theology. 
  
 
Diagram 4: Differences between Sects in Perceiving Succession of the Prophet 
 
 A B C D E F 
Some Sunnī  X X Abū 
Bakr 
 X X 
Some Shīʿite 
(Ismāʿīlis) 
X      
Khāraji‘ite  X     
Muʿtazilite    X   
Zaydis   X ʿAlī    
Ibn 
Taymiyya  
    X X 
 
A: The Prophet clearly designated ʿAlī as a successor. 
B: The Prophet did not designate ʿAlī as a successor. 
C: The Prophet had preferred Abū  akr/ʿAlī. 
D: The Prophet did not designate anyone. Governorship is necessary by reason.  
E: The Prophet did not designate anyone but governorship is necessary by tradition. 
F: The Prophet did not designate anyone but the companions actions are binding. 
 
It was the civil war that would particularly lead to questions of boundaries of belief 
and who has the right to rule and consequently leading to the start of  Muslim political 
theology.  A brief summary of the historical development of these concepts are 
discussed in the succeeding section. 
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3.2.1 The First Fitna and the Beginning of Muslim Political Theology  
 
As shown above, the events surrounding the period between the death of ʿUthmān ibn 
‗Affān (48/661) and the assassination of ʿAlī ibn abū Ṭālib (35/656) are inconclusive. 
As Watt points out, it is the most obscure and ‗controversial period in the whole of 
Islamic history‘.47 The sheer amount of disagreement and confusion about the 
designation of a leader offers strong evidence that the Prophet did not leave any clear 
indication of a particular form of government. As important as the succession crisis 
was for the development of a Muslim political theory, the rising against ʿUthmān until 
the death of ʿAlī was also of particular importance.  
 
At its heart, the dispute that arose during the time of ʿUthmān bin ʿAffān posed some 
basic questions about rulership, including: (1) what constitutes good governorship, (2) 
how a leader should rule and (3) whose example should the ruler follow and how 
should that example be followed. These important questions would shape how 
Muslim theological language was crafted, how Qur‘ānic verses would be interpreted 
and ultimately, and in later centuries, how Muslim political theory would develop. 
 
By most accounts, the first fitna is thought to have taken place when ʿUthmān was 
besieged in his house by apparent rebels dissatisfied that their leader had been 
appointing members from his family as governors in key provinces, including 
Muʿāwiya in Damascus.48  
 
 Charged with misrule and with being a ‗caliph of nepotism‘ the rebels assassinated 
him around 35/656.
49
 Although the identities of ʿUthmān‘s killers were unknown, it is 
thought that they based their accusation upon issues of justice. It is at this point that 
the first fitna is thought to have started. With the unexpected death of ʿUthmān, 
Muslims (including the rebels) turned towards ʿAlī  for guidance, as he was a member 
of the shūrā council and amongst the very few companions of the Prophet remaining. 
After the Muslims gave their oath of alliance, and ʿAlī accepted the responsibility (the 
details are disputed here) he asked Muʿāwiya to leave his office in Damascus hoping 
                                                 
47
  W M Watt, The formative period of Islamic thought, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1973, 
p. 9. 
48
 Muʿāwiya was the nephew of ʿUthmān bin ʿAffān.  
49 A Amīn,  uḥā al-Islām, Maktabat al-Nahḍah al-Miṣrīyah, Cairo, 1961. 
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to calm down the rebels. Muʿāwiya, however, refused to give his oath on the basis 
that ʿAlī must bring justice to the killers of his uncle.50 It is at this point that different 
narrations of history contradict, with many attempting to fill in the gaps. The Shīʿite 
account claims that Muʿāwiya untruthfully charged ʿAlī with either collaborating in 
the killing of ʿUthmān or knowing the killers but not bringing them to justice. 
According to the Shīʿite account, ʿAlī asked his two sons,  asan and  ussayn to 
defend ʿUthmān. In any case, it is agreed that, Muʿāwiya managed to convince both 
ʿĀ‘isha bint Abū  akr (the wife of the Prophet), two companions of the Prophet, 
Ṭalḥa and Zubayr to go to war with ʿAlī. In 35/656 the  attle of the Camel took place 
in which, for the first time in Muslim history, not only were Muslims at war with each 
other, companions of the Prophet were also involved. It remains unclear who killed 
ʿUthmān and whether ʿAlī knew the killers, but he did win the battle, yet  his sermon 
indicates he remained bitter regarding the killings, which he had felt were 
unnecessary.
51
  
 
After the battle of the Camel, ʿAlī again asked Muʿāwiya for his oath and requested 
that he leaves his office, but Muʿāwiya refused and mobilised an army from the 
Levant. This led to the battle of Ṣiffīn in 36/657, which took place over a week of 
fighting. It is reported that as ʿAlī was winning the battle, one of Muʿāwiya‘s advisors 
ʿAmr bin al-ʿĀṣ suggested that their soldiers should hold the Qur‘ān on the 
spearheads and call for it to judge (lā ḥukma ilā li-lāh)52 between the two parties, thus 
creating doubt in ʿAlī‘s army. The doubt was based on upholding the sacredness of 
the scripture and hence the possibility of reconciliation. This came to be known as 
rafʿ al-maṣāḥif. As predicted, there was a serious disagreement amongst the followers 
of ʿAlī.  Some rejected the idea of arbitration, maintaining that Muʿāwiya and his 
camp were using this as a military strategy because they were losing. Others were in 
favour of it, feeling that God‘s word should not be ignored. At this point historical 
accounts again are in conflict. It is believed that around these heated debates, a new 
group emerged which departed (kharajū) from ʿAlī‘s authority (and the Army); they 
                                                 
50
 Calling for justice, what later became to be known as qamīṣ ʿUthmān (the shirt of ʿUthmān).  
51
 See his sermons and letters in Nahj al-Balāgha (sermons 8, 31,171 and 173), also see his letters to 
Muʿāwiya. I M Lapidus, A history of Islamic societies, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, 
p. 47.  
52
 Using a Qur‘ānic verse Q 6:57.  
Theory vs History 
81 
 
came to be known as Khawārij (Khāriji‘ites).53 To the Khāriji‘ites, ʿAlī committed a 
grave sin (dhan  ka īr) in accepting the arbitration and not fighting for justice.54 It is 
from here that the idea of ḥukm came about, as expressed in the political theology of 
the Muslims.
55
 The questions were centred on the meaning(s) of ḥukm, its application 
and its consequences. 
 
The arbitration seems to have been a ‗set-up‘ and neither camp won the war, leaving a 
great division in ʿAlī‘s army. As a result, renewed fighting took place at the Battle of 
Nahrawān, which pitted the group later known as the Khāriji‘ites against ʿAlī. As 
noted above, this group felt that ʿAlī was no longer fit to rule because he had sinned 
greatly in accepting the arbitration and even felt he had transgressed the boundaries of 
Islam and thus was deserving of death (quoting verses 5:44, 45, 49). Although the 
Khāriji‘ites lost the  attle of Nahrawān, the first Muslim fitna is believed to have 
ended in 40/661with the assassination of ʿAlī. It is narrated that ʿAlī was praying 
when he was killed by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān bin Muljim.56 To this day, however, little is 
known about who exactly ʿUthmān‘s killers were and who exactly rejected the 
arbitration.
57
Although the ideas about rulership that arose out of these political events 
were not initially stated as doctrine, they later would become the basis of the central 
schisms throughout Muslim history. Serious discussions about what determined a 
legitimate ruler took place in the form of leadership/rule (imāma), governship (ḥukm) 
and obedience to rulers (ṭāʿa)  incorporating both religious and political aspects.58 
 
The struggles with Muʿāwiya and the resulting war brought about fresh debates on 
such fundamental issues as: (1) what constitutes a leader, (2) to whom the leadership 
of the Muslim community did or should belong, (3) who is a Muslim (and 
                                                 
53
 As the Khawārij also consolidated into a specific doctrinal group, they did not call themselves 
Khāraji‘ite, but rather Muḥakkima see T Izutsu, The Concept of Belief in Islamic Theology, Books for 
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consequently who is a kāfir) and (4) when it was permissible to rebel against an unjust 
leader.
59
  
 
After the assassination of ʿAlī, Muslim leadership was passed down in a manner 
similar to hereditary monarchy until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. For this 
reason most Islamists focus solely upon the four leaders of the rāshidūn period, whom 
they felt predominantly were examples of non-heretical rulership. Thus, as Mortimer 
correctly asserts, the ‗political rulers of Islam lost their religious aura. It came to be 
considered that only the first four caliphs after Mohammad had been truly 
orthodox‘.60  
 
It is important to note, as emphasized by Joseph van Ess, that terminology used to 
refer to the so-called rāshidūn period was only adopted into a canonical form much 
later.
61
 The promulgation of this concept was due to the efforts of Ibn  anbal towards 
the end of his life, who among others aimed to address the shock associated with the 
great schisms that developed after the first fitna.
62
  
 
It is quite likely that these bloody events, combined with the fact that various groups 
were narrating different (and conflicting) Prophetic traditions, led to a desire to trace 
back to what the Prophet might have said employing some kind of consistent method. 
It was at this time that the birth of ḥadīth literature also began. And out of these key 
questions, the question of what belief might mean led to the birth of Muslim theology 
itself (ʿilm al-kalām). 
 
These questions, therefore, were not the result of theological thinking per se but rather 
were issues that emerged within the framework of political events involving the use of  
both scripture (as seen with the Khāriji‘ites) and the sunna (tradition) of the Prophet. 
 
Therefore, the early bloody wars and the rise of the Khāriji‘ites shaped the kind of 
questions Muslim thinkers asked and led to a strong emphasis placed on obedience 
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and leadership. Moreover, the historical accounts of the first fitna that framed 
discussions about obedience and leadership, were written after the fitna, and 
consequently have been coloured with theo-political lenses in reading into these 
historical events. Furthermore, these ideas later became doctrinal and articulated in a 
language that is called principles of belief (‘uṣūl al-dīn) contained within every 
denomination. Anyone who does not adhere to these principles is seen to be rejecting 
faith itself.
63
 
 
Within this context, four main groups arose with competing claims. It is important to 
note that, in the early days, these groups had not yet developed into coherent 
theological divisions. They have come to be known as the Khāriji‘ites, the Murjiʿites, 
the Muʿtazilites and the Shīʿites. Each group will be analysed to show that their 
discussions had real consequences on the psyche of the Muslim in the years to come. 
This chapter will also show how the original historical context of political events that 
facilitated the theological discussions were detached and no longer in the 
consciousness of Muslim thinkers, as they framed their theological arguments at a 
more abstract level.
64
  
 
 
3.2.1.1 Khāriji‟ite political theology and the questions of „boundaries‟ 
 
The Khāriji‘ites were possibly the first to pose the question regarding who has the 
right to rule.
65
  y opposing both ʿUthmān and eventually ʿAlī, they used religious 
arguments to support their claim. According to Lambton, the Khāriji‘ites could have 
been the first to make the distinction between understanding the imām as religious 
leader and as a political one.
66
 As was discussed in the previous section, the group 
that came to be known as the Khāriji‘ites originated from specific political events, not 
from abstract theological discussions. 
67
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Theory vs History 
84 
 
 asic to the doctrine of the Khāriji‘ites was that a person who commits a grave sin 
and does not repent ceases to be a Muslim and is thereafter a kāfir, a status bearing 
serious jurisprudential consequences.
 68
  Later on, the Khāriji‘ites were the first group 
to apply the notion of unbelief (kufr) to Muslims themselves, creating a new and 
narrow definition of the ‗boundaries‘ of belief (imān).  In addition, for the 
Khāriji‘ites, faith had to be necessarily accompanied by righteous deeds.   
The second principle arose from their idea of boundaries, the notion of ‗enjoining the 
good and forbidding the evil‘, if necessary by force, as one of the fundamental duties 
of a believer. This made the early Khāriji‘ites fanatical and intolerant to the point that 
they even denounced some of the Prophet‘s companions such as ʿUthmān, ʿAlī, 
ʿĀ‘isha, Ṭalḥa and Zubayr as kufār (sing. kāfir), basing their denunciation up on 
verses about judgement (verses such as 5:44, 45, 49).
 69
 They believed it was their 
right to kill whoever they defined as an unbeliever so that only the true believers 
would be practicing the true Islam. Such narrow mindedness on their part contributed 
to their being in an ongoing state of war with the rest of the Muslim community.  
 
Although the Khāriji‘ites were only of political and religious importance in the first 
two centuries, their impact was felt strongly in their raids and killings.
70
 Their ideas 
on how Muslims should be ruled made an even greater impression. They postulated 
that the only criterion for rulership should be righteousness (or piety - taqwā) and 
nothing else, irrespective of colour, race, ethnicity and even gender. It is important to 
notice that Khāriji‘ites were the only school to accept women in the leadership 
position of imām. They also believed that governorship was unnecessary and it would 
be possible to have a community of believers without any leaders, thus encompassing 
a vision that could equally include the notions of egalitarian society
71
 and 
‗anarchism‘.72 They supported their view that a ruler was not necessary as long as the 
community of believers adhered to God‘s law on the basis that the Qur‘ān is silent on 
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this matter and that the Prophet did not designate a successor.
73
 Another important 
concept they promulgated was that one absolutely must apply God‘s law - ḥukm allāh 
- or otherwise he/she will be a kāfir. 
 
In addition to this, the Khāriji‘ites held that a fundamental criterion for rulership was 
concerned with enforcing justice.
74
 As will be discussed below, the Shīʿites held that 
the ruler should have been ʿAlī (and consequently the ahl al-bayt) and the Sunnīs held 
that the ruler should be of the same tribe as the Prophet, and thus be of Qurayshī 
descent. For both of these groups, the ruler could only be male. Both sects would 
henceforth base their claims on ḥadīths, although the Shīʿites would argue that the 
Quraysh portion of the ḥadīth was in reference to ʿAlī and his progeny and not merely 
to tribal leadership.  
 
The main challenge to the early Khāriji‘ites is their emphasis on the ‗sincerity, 
truthfulness and faith of the companions and their commitment‘.75 By the end of the 
second generation of Muslims, the companions were not categorised but instead seen 
under one umbrella that of a ṣaḥā ī (companion). Saeed points out that  
[h]ad the young Muslim community opted to divide the Companions into good and 
bad, believers and unbelievers, honest and dishonest, and knowledgeable and 
ignorant, the bridge between the prophetic period and the new generation would have 
been placed in jeopardy.
76
  
 
To reject the transmitted accounts of some of the companions based  a supposed lack 
of integrity would in effect mean that the ḥadīth itself would also be questionable; as 
a result any religious knowledge passed through ḥadīth would also been considered 
questionable.
77
  
 
In response to this serious theological problem, a level of sanctity was given to the 
companions as a whole. As a result, later generations adopted the view that the 
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companions as a group reflected the truthfulness, honesty, sincerity and knowledge in 
religious matters of the Prophet himself.
78
  
 
With belief and piety as the only conditions for governorship, it followed that the 
Khāriji‘ites would develop an entire theology centering on belief and unbelief which 
became an obsession with how to determine what did and did not constitute ‗belief‘. 
Their position became so extreme that they felt justified in waging war against 
whoever disagreed with them, considering them as having committed a grave sin.
79
 
Furthermore, their uncompromising attitude in battles was even more extreme with 
the position of kill or be killed, which may have included killing women and 
children.
80
  In all likelihood, the majority of Muslims rejected this notion of takfīr 
especially its narrow definition of a believer as well the judgement of takfīr passed on 
to ʿAlī and ʿUthmān. An opposing position in fact emerged that asserted that it is not 
for humans to make these kinds of judgements, as true belief is only knowable by 
God. This group that took this as their view came to be known as the Murjiʿites.     
 
 
3.2.1.2 Murjiʿites notion of „boundaries‟ and justice 
 
 The Murjiʿa or Murjiʿites emerged as a group towards the end of the first century, 
taking the name from their concept of irjāʿ, that is, to postpone the verdict or 
‗suspending judgement‘ about whether ‗Uthmān or ʿAlī was a sinner, and later 
applied to any Muslim.
81
 This group, which represented the majority of Muslims, 
became part of the general theological orthodoxy called the Ashʿarites.82 Parvez 
Manzoor argues that what came to characterise the early Muslim attitude towards 
politics and governance in general was quietist and marked by retreat rather than 
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participation.
83
 Lambton also observes that for the Murjiʿites, power is legitimised by 
the fact of its possession.
84
   
 
In particular, the Murjiʿites arose in response to the Khāriji‘ites who exercised the 
concept of takfīr indiscriminately.  According to van Ess, irjāʿ was in its initial stage 
‗a plea for political moderation; only later was it generalized into the purely 
theological doctrine of abstaining from making statements about other Muslims‘ 
belief‘.85  Moreover, Izutsu agrees that the concept of irjāʿ (and hence the early 
Murji‘ite view) was more political than ‗purely theological‘.86  
 
Departing greatly from the Khāriji‘ite position, they argued that it was not the 
presence of grave sin that determined whether one was a believer or a non-believer, 
but rather what lay within the person‘s heart. According to this view, belief was 
independent of righteous action to the point that it would be possible to be a believer 
without committing any righteous deeds.  Holding that no one can really know what 
lies in another person‘s heart, they concluded that no one can determine whether 
someone is or is not a believer. They also maintained that actions are predestined by 
God, which would allow them to finesse the problem of determining whether it was 
ʿAlī or Muʿāwiya who was in the right. Early Murjiʿites accordingly were of the 
opinion that one needed to defer any judgment regarding any of the companions until  
judgment day, maintaining that it was necessary to cultivate instead a practice of 
‗postponement of judgement on sinners, the postponement of  judgement on ʿAlī with 
respect of merit, the postponement of  judgement of works with respect to faith‘.87 
 
Out of these initial discussions came serious disputes about what constituted belief, 
what was the nature of revelation, the nature of God‘s justice and even the nature of 
God‘s attributes. With the coming of the Muʿtazilites, these disputes led to theological 
discussions about doctrine that extended away from the political arena into the ʿilm 
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al-kalām with dialectical discussions against the Murjiʿites especially on the subject 
of free will.
88
  
 
3.2.1.3 The Muʿtazilī notion of „boundaries‟ and „in-betweeness‟   
 
The debate as to whether good deeds were integral to imān, or were independent of it , 
as proposed by the Khāriji‘ites, raised an even more fundamental question as to 
whether human actions result from free will or are  predestined by God.  In terms of 
political theology, this question was important because it was followed by the 
consequent question: should the blame be on ʿAlī or Muʿāwiya? These questions were 
central to the thinking of the Muʿtazilite, a theological group that may have not risen 
as fully distinct until the third civil war with the rise of the ‗Abbāsids (ruled from 132-
655/750-1258), but whose articles of faith included discussions that were rooted in the 
first fitna.
 89
  
 
According to the Muʿtazilites, a Muslim should hold five fundamental beliefs: 1) 
belief in one God, 2) belief in justice is knowable and objective; 3) encouraging what 
is good and forbidding what is evil (amr  il maʿrūf wa al-nahī ‘an al-munkar); 4) 
belief in a possibility of a situation between belief and un-belief (al-manzila bayna al-
manzilatayn); and 5) the belief in the judgement day.
90
  Of these five categories the 
fourth is of the greatest importance pertaining to the influence of political events upon 
the development of theology. Similar in some ways to the Murjiʿa position of 
suspending judgement, this Muʿtazilite category was seen as something of 
compromise between the state of kufr and imān.91 This is to say that rather than giving 
the verdict on any of the companions (or indeed any Muslim) as kāfir because of what 
had happened, there is another category that exists in between those two verdicts.  
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The ‗boundaries‘ as articulated by the Muʿtazilites were arguably also an attempt to 
broaden the narrow definition of belief set by the Khāriji‘ites. Although they believed 
that the Prophet did not designate a successor, they considered that rulership was an 
obligation by reason.
92
 In support, Murad, like Watt,
93
 also makes a similar 
observation regarding the early discussions and questions asked on predestination 
(jabr & qadar) and free will which emerged from political events.
94
 They, support the 
proposition that historical events shaped political questions that in turn shaped the 
way scripture was understood. Perhaps the group that equally was formulated by these 
political events was the Shīʿites. 
 
 
3.2.1.4 The Shīʿite notion of justice and leadership  
 
In contrast, the Shīʿites argued that the Prophet indeed indicated that ʿAlī should be 
the successor as a leader of the Muslims and not Abū  akr.95 Subsequently, Shīʿites 
views would include the idea that leadership is bestowed first by the Prophet (and in 
effect by God) to the first imām (‗Alī) then by the first imām to the next. Although 
some branches among the Shīʿites dispute how many imāms there were, the majority 
are Twelvers, who believe in twelve imāms, including a final living imām 
(Mohammed Ibn Al- assan - also known as Al-Mehdī) who is to arise in the state of 
the so-called ‗great occultation‘ (al-ghayba al-ku rā).96 For the Twelver Shīʿites, 
inspiration derived by God has been employed for determining all imāms including 
the twelfth imām. And until he reappears, true justice is not possible. For a very long 
time, therefore, the Shīʿites have been awaiting the twelfth imām, hence the name 
‗waiters‘ (munta ira).97  
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Evidently, early Shīʿite political theologies were mainly focused upon polemic debate 
and upon proving the right of ʿAlī and his family to be the appointed ones.98 What 
followed together with the seemingly political writing was the development of fiqh 
(jurisprudence), uṣūl al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence), science of ḥadīth and tafsīr 
but with the same sectarian lenses interpreting verses in line with their theory of 
imāma.  
 
At this point, it is crucial to note that the process by which the Shīʿites became a  
theological group fully distinct from the majority of the Muslim community was a 
very slow and incremental one, consolidating in the periods of lesser and greater 
occultation (260-329/874-940).
99
 In support, many of the traditions on fiqh and 
ʿaqīda, taken from the fifth and sixth imāms. Allegedly, since the greater occultation 
of Mohammed Ibn al- assan the political theology of the Twelver Shīʿites in its 
active form can be characterised as having withdrawn ‗emotionally and physically 
from overt participation‘ in their contemporary politics focussing on waiting for the 
Mehdī as a saviour.100  
 
 y the end of the third century, the views of the Sunnīs and Shīʿites had crystallised, 
with firmly established polemical arguments on the necessity of an imām regarding 
the issue of governorship. For the Shīʿites, the concept of imāma developed as an 
independent doctrine alongside justice. The Shīʿite article of belief consisted of the 
concepts of the oneness of God, necessary belief in objectivity of justice, 
Prophethood, imāma and day of judgement & resurrection.101 The meaning of imāma 
became all inclusive, holistic, divinely inspired and later writings included 
infallibility.
102
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For the Murjiʿa and later the Ashʿarites the imām rules the Muslims and a state of 
anarchy in the absence of an authority is not permitted. From this premise, the Shīʿites 
maintain that imāma is an obligation (farḍ) as shown by the designation of ʿAlī as the 
Prophet‘s successor.103 This makes the line of imām infallible with the sole 
responsibility of protecting the sharīʿa and is therefore the only legitimate interpreter 
of scripture. Note however that the idea of infallibility of the imām was established 
only after the third and fourth century hijra (approximately sometime after the 
occultation). For example, one of the major teachers of Shaykh al-Mufīd, Ibn al-
Junayd did not believe in the imām as infallible.104 
 
As a result, for a long time Shīʿite political theology consisted of waiting for the imām 
al-Mahdī to bring about the idea of an ideal rulership as the manifestation of this 
utopia that would only be possible with the presence of al-Mahdī. Nonetheless, this 
ideal did not stop the Shīʿites from engaging in politics where the opportunity arose, 
examples being the  ūyids and the Safavids. However, the Iranian revolution in 1979 
signified a turning point for the idea of rulership as per the role of the faqīh as the 
direct appointee of al-Mahdī, a subject that will be returned later in this thesis‘s 
analysis of modern Muslim political thought.   
 
 
3.2.2 Summary: The Impact of Historical Events Upon the Development of 
Muslim Political Theory  
 
 
As discussed above, two broad opposing camps arose in the early days: rebellionism 
and political pacifism. Although it was only later that the two camps developed clear 
ideologies, their emergence can be traced back to the first fitna period. It was the 
development of the Khawārijī movement and the reactions towards their conception 
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of political leadership (and violence) that led to the consolidation of most early Sunnī 
political views. As Rahman observes, the majority of traditional Sunnī jurists 
developed ‗political pacifism‘.105 This doctrine of submissiveness to the de facto 
authority gained further impact as the idea that any rule is better than lawlessness and 
chaos became predominant. 
 
According to Lapidus the early rāshidūn model period expressed the ideals in the 
same way as the Prophet practised them in his religious and political authority. This 
model clearly became flawed after the question of legitimacy that arose following the 
assassination of ‗Uthmān and the consequent rise of the Khārij‘ites. The Umayyad 
dynasty consequently took the role of solidifying their legitimacy to rule as opposed 
to the Khārij‘ite claim or the party of ‗Alī. These developments, according to Lapidus, 
created the split between the religious scholars (the ‗ulamā) and the temporal 
authority, a situation that had not been present during the years of early rulership.
106
           
 
Lapidus has further stated the plausible view that the idea of a restoration of the 
golden age of the ṣaḥā a was a direct result of this split. Note also given that the 
Sunnī political theology developed as an alternative to both the Khārij‘ite and Shīʿite 
imāma theory, therefore there is an added polemical layer that one might be justified 
to argue that the a Sunnī political theology has not fully developed in its own right. 
Therein, any discussion of early and medieval political concepts is rendered even 
more complex. A key example of this will be discussed in the following sections, 
where the works of al-Māwardī, al-Ghazālī and Ibn Taymiyya were as much polemic 
works as developments of a Sunnī political theology.   
 
Suffice it to say, the events that occurred during the first fitna shaped the key views 
and questions about such doctrinal matters as the nature of justice, amr  il maʿrūf, 
imāma, legitimate ruler, obedience, ḥukm and  ayʿa that would developed into 
matters of political theology.    
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It is also important to note that the development and the emphasis on historiographical 
collections also came about around this time. As van Ess observes ‗historiography, 
theology and political thought, appeared at the same time and so early that they 
became incorporated into the search for identity which preoccupied the early 
community‘.107  
 
It is also apparent that one cannot separate the development of political concepts from 
the series of historical events that inspired them. Furthermore, the contradictory 
accounts of said events make it even more difficult to trace the history of those 
concepts. Fortunately, as discussed above, this chapter focuses upon pointing out the 
emergence and development of these concepts rather than sifting through the 
competing truth claims of accounts of historical events. 
 
Further complexity is introduced into the search for a Muslim political theory in that 
historical events later become divided into distinct periods, each with its own 
characterization, such as the golden age of the rāshidūn. When this occurs, this 
interpretation of history in turns becomes an ideal theoretical lens by which history as 
a whole is to be interpreted.   
 
Similarly, Lambton explains that the question ‗who is the caliph‘ arose out of the first 
civil war, whereas the questions of ‗who is a Muslim‘ and ‗what constitutes political 
responsibility‘ came with the rise of the Khārijiʿites. Lastly, the question of ‗what is 
the nature of the state‘ arose in connection with the fall of the Umayyads and the rise 
of the ʿAbbāsids.108 
 
 
3.3 MEDIEVAL SUNNĪ POLITICAL THEOLOGY   
 
 y the time the ʿAbbāsids were in power there developed a tradition of including a 
section on imāma within the kalāmī discussions in response to claims of opposing 
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groups such as the Shīʿites, Khāriji‘ites, Ashʿarites and the Muʿtazilites. 109 It is 
thought that the first person willing to engage in polemical argument with both the 
Shīʿite and the Muʿtazilite was Abū al- asan al-Ashʿarī (270-330/883-942) in his 
work Kitā  al-Lumaʿ fī al-radd  alā ahl al-zaygh wa al- idaʿ. 110 A more 
comprehensive discussion on the imāma however is said to be by  āqillānī 
(d.403/1013) in his work al-Tamhīd fī al-rad  alā al-mulḥida al-mu aṭṭila wa al-
rāfida wa al-khawārij wa al-mu tazila.111  
 
Although  āqillānī is considered to be the first to have systematised Ashʿarite 
thought, it was  aghdādī who in his kitā  uṣūl al-dīn first developed the imāma 
argument in a coherent and organized manner.
112
  The headings of his chapters can be 
clearly seen as a summary of political theory from both the classical and medieval 
periods: 
 The necessity of imāma  
 The circumstances of appointment  
 The means by which the imām comes to office  
 The number of imāms at any given time 
 Race and tribe of imām 
 The qualification required for an imām  
 The infallibility of the imām113 
 
It is these topics that are addressed by scholars such as Māwardī, al-Ghazālī and Ibn 
Taymiyya. For this and other reasons, these scholars will be examined as case studies 
to determine which political concepts were reinforced during the medieval period.  
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Māwardī has been considered to be the earliest Muslim political thinker. Although his 
general work did not develop a posthumous following as much as al-Ghazālī or Ibn 
Taymiyya, in modern times contemporary scholars have considered him the originator 
of caliphate theory.
114
  
 
Ghazālī‘s influence upon the Muslim world cannot be underestimated, but on the 
basis of his outlook on spirituality not for his political views.  This latter point is 
significant as one traces the emergence of political concepts, in particular with 
Ghazālī‘s emphasis upon sharīʿa.  In addition, the discussions of Ghazālī as well as of 
Ibn Taymiyya, reflect the polemic nature of political theology of the Muslim world. 
Ibn Taymiyya‘s writings have been even more pertinent in the Muslim world, to his 
followers and their critics alike, even though it is entirely possible that his writings 
have been misunderstood and taken out of context by both parties.
115
  
 
 
3.3.1 Al-Māwardī (364-450/974-1058) 
 
Abū Al- asan ʿAlī bin Muḥammed bin  abīb al-Māwardī is characterized as the 
earliest Muslim political theorist on account of his book Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniya 
(Ordinance of Government). Arguably, this was the first writing of its kind that 
exhibited a distinctly Muslim form of political thought.
116
  A jurist from the Shāfiʿī 
legal school, al-Māwardī was later appointed as chief judge (qāḍī al-quḍāt) of 
 aghdād by ʿAbbāsid caliph al-Qā‘im (1031-1075). At this time the ʿAbbāsids were 
facing numerous challenges, including an uprising calling for independence from a 
group of Shīʿites from Iran and Iraq of the  ūyid family.117 Another threat came from 
a group based in Egypt called the Fāṭimids. The Fāṭimids were a non-Twelver Shīʿite 
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group called the Severners, but best known as Ismāʿīlis. At the time, the Caliphs were 
puppets in the hands of soldiers with little power of their own. These weaknesses led 
to turmoil in  aghdād and further instabilities.118    
 
Appointed as a diplomat in negotiations with the  ūyid emirs, it is thought al-
Māwardī was said to be commissioned by the ʿAbbāsid caliph to write his book to 
clarify what constituted legitimate governorship as a way of demonstrating that  the 
‗right‘ to governorship belonged to the ʿAbbāsids and not to the  ūyids or the 
Fāṭimids.119 It is possible that al-Qā‘im commissioned the book in the hope of 
weakening support for the  ūyids and the Fāṭimids as well and preventing further 
fragmentation of the caliphate itself. Accordingly, the book was most likely written 
during the decline of the ʿAbbāsids dynasty. It is thus better seen not as concerned 
with the development of a comprehensive political theory, but rather with saving the 
dynasty.
120
  This suggests, according to Lambton, that Māwardī‘s aim was to 
strengthen the position of the sultan against the erosion and the ‗usurpation of his 
position‘.121   
 
Indeed Māwardī‘s Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniya is more of a description of the function of 
administration than a political theory. For example, he sketches out: (1) the role and 
responsibilities of the caliph, (2) the appointment of the imām, (3) the responsibilities 
of ministers, (4) the appointment of provincial governors, army commanders and 
judges, prayer leaders and the hierarchy of these positions, (5) the syndics of the 
nobility and (6) the administration of alms, land taxes, water supply, land grants and 
concessions and market supervision.
122
 In fact Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniya could very well be 
seen as a detailed administrative manual for government, more of description of the 
function of government than a normative proposition or conceptual principles derived 
from Qur‘ānic concepts. 
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Furthermore, as one reads his work carefully, Māwardī‘s jurisprudential background 
becomes apparent as he provides a detailed account of administrative duties as a 
jurist.
123
 According to Hanna Mikhail, Māwardī is the first legal jurist (faqīh) to 
attempt to ‗spell out systematically the requirements of the shari'a in regard to 
government‘.124  A good case could be made here that the ʿAbbāsids utilized religious 
ideology (Muʿtazilites) as the basis of their legitimisation of their rule against the 
Murjiʿites.125  
  
In all likelihood, Māwardī could have been the first thinker to shift discussions 
regarding the notion of the imāma/caliphate from being doctrinal in nature to being 
jurisprudential, although it is unclear as to whether he did so intentionally. A major 
consequence that could have potentially emerged out of his work was that the Shīʿite 
claim of imāma would no longer be a matter of doctrine but would become one of 
jurisprudence, therefore challenging the core beliefs of Shīʿites indirectly. In support, 
Ovamir Anjum maintains that Māwardī shifted from the field of theology to 
jurisprudence in his arguments supporting the caliphate discussion over Shīʿite imāma 
theory. Quite possibly, by removing normative political thinking from the discussion, 
he was in a better position to sustain the Sunnī argument.126 Thus one should not fail 
to stress how polemic in nature Māwardī‘s work is. Anjum asserts that Māwardī 
appears to be defending the Sunnī Orthodoxy against the Shīʿite  ūyids, not however 
through theological polemics but rather by strengthening the centrality of the 
ʿAbbāsid‘s caliph.127 Māwardī of course has been criticised for his attempt to 
legitimise usurpation, which would support the view that he aimed to save the 
ʿAbbāsids rather than provide a political theory.  
 
According to al-Māwardī, it is absolutely vital to obey those in authority, a position he 
supports by quoting verse 4:59 of the Qur‘ān as the basis of obeying the caliph. True 
to the descriptive nature of his work, al-Māwardī offers a greatly detailed account 
regarding the characteristics of the ruler both in terms of his physical appearance and 
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his lineage. Al-Māwardī also details how the ruler should be appointed, how 
obedience to the ruler is obligatory as well the rights and prerogative of the caliph.
128
 
For all his detail regarding the ruler, al-Māwardī pays but little attention to the rights 
of the people being governed.  
 
According to Māwardī, the role of the caliph is to safeguard and implement sharīʿa as 
well as to collect taxes and provide for the organisation of the general populace 
(raʿiya). Although al-Māwardī acknowledges that the Qur‘ān has nothing to say about 
the institution of the caliphate, he nevertheless points out the importance of the 
practice of the companions and their followers as well as the consensus of the jurists 
(ijmāʿ al-‘ulamā). Consequently, like the Ashʿarites before him, he maintains that it is 
according to tradition that the caliphate is both necessary and obligatory.    
 
Al-Māwardī was of the opinion that a new caliph should be selected by nominations 
decided by ahl al-ḥal wa al-‘aqd (literally translates as ‗people who tie and loosen‘ 
meaning people in the position of authority).
129
 Unfortunately, al-Māwardī does not 
specify who these people are and exactly how they are to provide the nomination. 
Indeed the actual practice throughout history was that the caliphate was passed down 
in a hereditary manner. Furthermore, Māwardī has little to say about rebellions 
against a despotic ruler or tyrant; instead he quotes a tradition attributed to the Prophet 
by Abū Hurayra with the Prophet saying that: 
after me there will be appointed rulers over you, and both the good as well as bad 
deeds will go by them; but you must obey the orders from them that is based upon 
righteousness; for if they rule with fairness the good of it will occur to them and to 
you both, if they rule with inequality you will get the benefit of it and they, the evil 
consequences thereof.
130
 
 
By referring to this ḥadīth, he seems to be promoting a quietist tradition in being 
patient with the tyrant rulers by emphasising the eschatological aspect of belief.  
 
As we have seen, concepts related to Muslim political theory as previously noted have 
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become even more prominent. These include: (1) sharīʿa, (2) obedience to people in 
authority ulī al-amr and ṭāʿa, (3) the obligation of caliphate, (4) the characteristics of 
a leader, (5) and the prerequisites of leadership.  
 
 
3.3.2 Al-Ghazālī (450-505/1058-1111) 
 
Abū  amid Mohammed bin Mohammed bin Aḥmed al-Ghazālī is known as one of 
the greatest philosophers and theologians the Muslim world has produced. After 
studying jurisprudence and the related fields of theology and philosophy, al-Ghazālī 
was appointed as a teacher in Baghdād in one of the Nizām al-Mulk colleges and 
became both well-known and highly respected.
131
  
 
Al-Ghazālī however is probably best remembered for the spiritual crisis that he 
underwent during the prime of his life when living in  aghdād. This crisis was 
sparked by the question of how one could attain certainty of knowledge, and therefore 
which path would lead one to that certainty. Eventually Ghazālī lost the ability to 
speak as a result of his crisis and in 487/1095 he ceased his work in  aghdād. His 
major writings include Munqi  min al- alāl (Deliverance from Error), Iḥyā’ ʿUlūm 
al-Dīn (Reviving Religious Knowledge) and Iqtiṣad fī al-Iʿtiqād (Median of Belief). 
Also of some importance is his Kitā  Fa ā’iḥ Al-Bāṭiniyya wa faḍā’il al-
Musta hariya (The Infamies of the Bāṭiniyya and Virtues of the Musta iriya, usually 
abbreviated as Kitab al-Musta hir) which was commissioned by the ʿAbbāsid caliph 
al-Mustaẓhir (487/1094).132 Ghazālī‘s goals in this book are twofold: (1) to refute the 
Ismāʿilis imāma theory which at this point persisted in Egypt and (2) to establish 
beyond a doubt the legitimacy of the ‗Abbāsid caliph Al-Mustaẓhir, as suggested by 
the book‘s title. 
 
Ghazālī‘s work above can be viewed predominantly as a polemic against the 
Ismāʿilis. He argues that al-Mustaẓhir‘s caliphate is in accordance with sharīʿa and 
therefore obedience to him is obligatory (farḍ). Ghazālī deduces that the existence of 
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a caliph as the head of the community is an obligation based on sharīʿa.133  Viewed in 
this way, for al-Ghazālī, the removal of a caliph would result in the suspension of the 
sharīʿa itself.134 It appears that Ghazālī had the challenge of dealing with a seemingly 
weak ‗Abbāsid caliph in  aghdād during a time in which the Fāṭimids in Egypt 
allegedly allied with the Crusaders in an unsuccessful bid for power. 
 
Ghazālī demonstrates that the legitimate right to rule proceeds from the imām on the 
basis of three conditions: (1) the consensus of the community (ijmāʿ), (2) a unanimous 
agreement for the necessity of an imām– this stands  even if there is a debate on the 
method (al-Ghazālī is referring to the historical events of the companions after the 
death of the prophet), and (3) the necessity of an authority being implemented by one 
person to prevent disunity and disorder.
135
 He categorically argues that there is no 
revealed text by God which states how the imām obtains authority, concluding that 
opinion by consensus (ijmāʿ) is the proper procedure. Since, however ijmāʿ on the 
part of the entire Muslim community is not possible, he states that the  ayʿa (oath of 
alliance) of one person possessing ample power –shawka- is sufficient.136 This means 
that in the absence of universal consensus, all that is needed is that a single person 
would give their oath of alliance and choose the imām. Note here that the concept of 
an imām here is not the same as understood by the Shīʿites. This person is selected on 
the basis of his shawka (unsurpassed military power).  
 
According to Rosenthal, Ghazālī‘s work testifies to an emphasis upon political 
realism.
137
 This is especially the case given that there are no references to the 
Crusaders in his work.
138
 One could even claim that Ghazālī‘s primary aim was to 
refute the Ismāʿīlis‘ claim of divine imāma, leading Ghazālī to speak of a caliph 
selected by human beings. In all likelihood in writing kitā  al-Musta harī, al-Ghazālī 
was thus not so much concerned with establishing political theory as determined to 
further his polemic regarding power. After all, the only way to refute the Shīʿite 
doctrine of imāma is to show that it has no basis in scripture and to demonstrate that 
there is a clear system that exists to apply the sharīʿa itself.   
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It is also very likely, as argued by Carole Hillenbrand, that Ghazālī was motivated by 
‗Sunni zeal‘.139 Hillenbrand observes further that Ghazālī‘s ideas are ‗motivated by an 
overriding desire for stability and unity within the Sunnī world‘.140 Such a need for 
stability and unity was evident given that Ghazālī lived during a period of crisis. The 
crisis was twofold. It was political due to weakness of the ʿAbbāsids power, the 
general fragmentation of the caliphate, and the rise of the Turks in the East. It was 
theological due to the Ismāʿīli claims of legitimacy. At least in part Ghazālī‘s 
argument could have been a pragmatic proposition to prevent further corruption. For 
example, in his iḥyā’ he advises keeping away from oppressive amirs and rulers.141  
 
Ghazālī‘s second most important book is kitā  al-Iqtiṣād fī al-iʿtiqād. For Ghazālī, 
imāma is a matter of jurisprudence (fiqh) and not rational or theological speculation. 
In particular he sees the question of imāma not as part of the article of faith (ʿaqīda) 
but as a matter of jurisprudence. For example, in kitā  al-iqtiṣād he states that the 
issue of imāma should be discussed as part of jurisprudence and not of ‗aqīda. When 
he himself includes a discussion of imāma in the ‗aqīda section, explains that he only 
does so to conform with the tradition of the scholars who preceded him.
142
 If the issue 
of imāma is not an article of faith, as Ghazālī maintains, this means that Muslims are 
obliged neither to believe nor to follow him.  They are not even obligated to have an 
imām, a point that cannot be overemphasized. Furthermore, it is also important to 
stress that Ghazālī holds that the institution of imāma is not a rational necessity as the 
Muʿtazilite would argue, but a legal necessity.143     
 
The book of iqtiṣād makes the following three main points: (1) It was the aim of the 
Prophet to establish a good ordering of religion; (2) this good order is to be 
established by an imām who is obeyed; and (3) for this reason the appointment of an 
imām is a necessity.144 
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Nevertheless kitā  al-Iqtiṣād is more concerned with articles of faith than with being 
a treatise on government; in fact, the word khalīfa does not even occur once in his 
work.
145
 In his later works, such as Iḥyā’, written in the period of his spiritual journey 
and retreat from public life (489-495/1096-1102) Ghazālī  argues that in the case of an 
unjust ruler who has a military force and one whom it would be difficult to remove 
without violence and fitna, obedience is necessary.
146
 Ghazālī is of this opinion 
because he still adheres to his first assertion that caliphate is a legal farḍ, most likely 
because the alternative would have been the Shīʿite claim of imāma or the 
Khāriji‘ites‘ claim that governorship is unnecessary. As a jurist he remains convinced 
of the centrality of Sunnī understanding of imāma in safeguarding the sharīʿa.  
 
As a result, Ghazālī makes two important points: First, he stresses that the imām he is 
referring to is not of the type that the ʿAbbāsid rulers were. Rather he assumes the 
imām to be of good character and intending to do good like the revered rāshidūn. 
Second, even should the ruler be greedy of power, as rulers tend to be, the condition 
of holding and implementing sharīʿa would at least ensure minimum rights for the 
people. Here one can clearly see that Ghazālī‘s emphasises sharīʿa as being the sole 
purpose of an imām, based on the premise that sharīʿa is good through and through 
and exists to build a good community.  
 
To sum up, in all likelihood, as Hillenbrad maintains, Ghazālī adopted a quietist 
approach in his later life in reaction to the political upheaval of his time in which he 
stresses the temporal nature of this life and the importance of the afterlife.
147
  
 
 
3.3.3 Ibn Taymiyya (661-728/1263-1328) 
 
Taqī al-Dīn Abū Al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyya is considered one of the most 
influential Muslim thinkers. Regrettably, contemporary research on Ibn Taymiyya 
appears more concerned with finding within his writings the beginnings of 
contemporary fundamental Muslim political movements rather than examining him 
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on his own terms. This thesis shows that Taymiyya‘s theory of legitimacy arose out of 
the actual historical circumstances in which the political arena was deeply 
fragmented. Within Taymiyya‘s work one also can see further development of such 
concepts as tāʿa (obedience), sharīʿa and imāma.  
 
Ibn Taymiyya was born in the Memluk Empire, which was composed of present-day 
Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. To the East, all Muslim lands were occupied by 
the Mongols. Indeed Ibn Taymiyya was about six years old living in Harrān, when the 
Mongols entered  aghdād forcing him to flee with his family to Damascus. Like al-
Māwardī and al-Ghazālī, he lived in a time of turmoil, chaos, disunity and 
fragmentation. Although by the time the Mongols had embraced Islam Ibn Taymiyya 
was an adult, he insisted they were Muslims in name only and set out to fight them. 
At this time the empire was divided into small rulers and continually engaged in 
fighting. In terms of his character Ibn Taymiyya was famed for his ascetic abstinence 
from worldly things, as well as for his sharp mind and harsh tongue.
148
 He also 
practiced a strong self-discipline which put him in good stead through his many 
imprisonments.  His strong sense of faith is evident in his remarks as follows: 
what can my enemies do to me? My Garden is in my heart; wherever I go, it goes 
with me. My imprisonment is solitary (worship of God)! My death is martyrdom! My 
banishment is a journey (across God‘s earth).149  
 
In terms of his political situation, Ibn Taymiyya faced four imminent threats that 
shaped him: (1) the Mongol threat, (2) the internal disintegration of the empire, (3) the 
advance of the Crusaders (as mentioned earlier a matter Ghazālī remains silent about) 
and (4) theological challenges originating from philosophers, some Sufī orders and 
the Shīʿites. The unstable combination of despotic rulers and fragile political regimes 
engaged in conflicts over territory persisted throughout Ibn Taymiyya‘s time. Anjum 
rightly observes that 
[t]he rise of the fatimids in North Africa (297/910) and the Buyids having taken over 
at  aghdad (334/947) and their open support to Shi‘ism spurred the Sunni Kalam 
scholars to not only consolidate and defend Sunni orthodoxy but also provide 
theoretical basis for the Sunni Caliphate.
150
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His political ideas can be found in his three main works, Minhāj al-Sunnah al-
Na awiyah fī naqḍ kalām al-Shīʿah wa al-Qadarīya; al-Siyāsah al-Sharʿiyah; and al-
Ḥis ah fī al-Islām. As the first title indicates, Ibn Taymiyya‘s work is a polemic  
against Shīʿites and particularly against Ibn al-Muṭahar al- illī‘s work Minhāj al-
Karāmah fī Maʿrifat al-Imāmah. As with Māwardī and Ghazālī, Ibn Taymiyya shows 
clearly just how reactionary the development of his political theology had been. His 
work does not merely serve as a counter argument to the imāma theory but also attests 
to the fragmentation of Muslim political society.  
 
In his writings detailing his political theology, he emphasizes the concepts of sharīʿa 
and umma. His similarities and differences with the other groups and the other two 
scholars may be best seen in connection with medieval debates about the caliphate, 
obligation, sharī’a and umma.    
 
 
3.4 COMPARING AND CONTRASTING MEDIEVAL THOUGHT: 
CALIPHATE/IMĀMATE THEORY  
 
With the exception of the Khārij‘ites151 and some Muʿtazila from  aghdād,152 all 
Muslim groups maintained that it was necessary to have an imām. Most Muʿtazilites 
considered imāma necessary by arguments based on reason, whereas most Ashʿarites 
and Shīʿites considered it necessary by arguments based on tradition (or naṣ) or based 
on the notion of obligation, albeit that imāma would mean something different for 
each group. Questions of what the institution entails, how it is to be manifested and 
who is the imām is the basis of the polemical arguments both between as well as 
within these groups.  
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It is plausible to see how in responding to the Shīʿites, the Ashʿarites developed the 
theory of imāma and more specifically Ibn Taymiyya‘s community-centred vision as 
Anjum puts it. According to Anjum the community-centred vision was that the caliph-
imām was not the interpreter but rather the fulfiller of a necessary function of keeping 
the administration.
153
 He further argues that the development of the state: 
no longer tied to the will of the Community, drew its legitimacy from the sole fact 
that it presumably guarded the Community external and internal threats and prevented 
social order…They were generally violent, illegitimate, unintegrated into the society 
they governed, often wasted in succession or border disputes, and often incapable of 
securing peace and order within the society or even defending their borders.
154
 
 
Although the difference between Shīʿite and Sunnī thought stems from disagreements 
concerning historical events that took place shortly after the death of the Prophet, the 
essence of the disagreement pertains to the idea and role of political leadership.  
 
Some of the Shīʿite argument is based upon reason and tradition as well, their 
argument goes as follows: Although God has required humans to rule justly, God 
knows that humans are fallible and being merciful, He will provide the best leader 
after the Prophet who would be able to be just and take on the heavy responsibility.
155
 
The Shīʿite view of imāma is seen to be within the ambit of Prophethood, in fact a sort 
of extension of the latter. Prophets and Messengers introduce the message of God, and 
imāms maintain it, interpret and preserve the message of God after the passing of 
Prophethood; this ties in with the concept of a ḥujjah on which the Shīʿites centre 
their thoughts on imāma. That is, the imām is the ‗proof of God‘ on Earth, the living 
example of Prophetic teaching and the maintainer and preserver of religion. It is for 
this reason as well as the evidence noting Prophet Mohammed to have had voiced his 
successor, the Shīʿites consider imāma as an article of faith rather than just a legal 
matter to the point that the imāma became central to Shī‘ism theologically and was no 
longer read within the political events of the formative years. Thus, Shīʿite theology 
and political thought focused upon the teachings and figure of the imām and his 
characteristics and functions.
156
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As opposed to the Shīʿites who made the belief in imāma a matter of creed, both Ibn 
Taymiyya and Ghazālī agree that there is no definition of a state in the Qur‘ān. They 
go further in making it clear that there are no political principles in ‗aqīda that bring 
about a political boundary.
157
 
 
This is significant in a religious sense. For, in other words, Ibn Taymiyya argues that 
the sunna was silent about a specific form of rulership, which to him explains how the 
early companions of the Prophet adopted different ways of political organisation. 
There are, in Ibn Taymiyya‘s thought, profound subtleties in his seeing the imāma of 
the salaf al-ṣālih (righteous forefathers/the pious forefathers, usually referring to the 
first three generations of Muslims)
158
 as obligatory by both reason and tradition but at 
the same time making a distinction with regards to the role of the imām as the leader 
of a community (religious) and as a political authority (mulk). The latter is a necessary 
evil, whereas the former is praised because of its role in encouraging the good and 
forbidding the evil.  This could explain why some, such as Qamruddin Khan, have 
read Ibn Taymiyya‘s work as similar to the Khāriji‘ites with respect to the way it 
considers the imāma as a possibly unnecessary political authority.159  
 
It appears, however, that Qamaruddin Khan‘s reading of Ibn Taymiyya overlooks the 
fact that Ibn Taymiyya sees the actions of the salaf as binding and that one 
necessarily needs to follow the sunna of the Prophet. It is binding because they are 
closer to the Prophet; this is what Ibn Taymiyya means by tradition. Furthermore, 
arguably, one possible explanation, is the need to make sure the integrity and 
trustworthiness of the companions and their followers are not questioned and are safe 
from the accusations of the Shīʿites and the Khāriji‘ites. This has serious 
consequences for issues of authenticity and authoritativeness, especially where the 
ḥadīth is concerned.    
 
In addition, the reason why scholars like Qamaruddin Khan regard Ibn Taymiyya as 
having a similar concept of an imām to the Khāriji‘ites is Ibn Taymiyya‘s zeal in 
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encouraging the good and forbidding the evil. As discussed earlier, the Khāriji‘ites 
had this principle as part of their ʿaqīda. Like the Khāriji‘ites, Ibn Taymiyya believed 
that the fundamental aim of the umma was to encourage the good and forbid the evil 
(al nahī ‘an al-munkar wa al-amr  il maʿrūf), which is the chief purpose of faith. 
Therefore, it is the duty of the umma and not the imām to reinforce sharīʿa. However, 
if there were an imām then he would have to enforce sharīʿa. Thus, Ibn Taymiyya is 
not interested in state per se but in the supremacy of the faith, which he argues could 
only be realised fully by the government authority.
160
  
 
Ibn Taymiyya differs from both Ghazālī and Māwardī by having a more sophisticated 
argument. Although he counters the Shīʿite claim of imāma, he seems to also 
recognise the absence of any prescribed naṣ in the Qur‘ān, and to see the role of the 
Prophet as that of a guide and reminder and not a sovereign (mālik). He thus argues 
that the Prophet did not establish a state in Medina but a social order. Therefore the 
acceptance of the caliphate is not doctrinal but a practical necessity (this is what is 
meant when he tries to prove both tradition and reason as farḍ). That is to say, it is a 
means to an end; if the end is reached, one (theoretically) does not need the caliphate. 
Again, this is why Khan argues that Ibn Taymiyya has similar ideas to those of the 
Khāriji‘ites.  
 
As pointed out earlier with Māwardī and Ghazālī (and arguably even the scholars 
before them) the question posed by the first civil war remains at the present time due 
to the consolidation of the groups which developed, post-fitna, into comprehensive 
theological arguments.  
 
It is difficult not to think that the definition of imām and caliph was understood 
differently by these scholars. Ibn Taymiyya, when talking about the imām, sees it as a 
necessary notion, but when he talks about caliphate in his own time, he possibly sees 
it as a means to an end. His aim was to consider the rulership of Abū  akir and 
ʿUmar, whose governance was that of an imām grounded in ethics and having 
temporal power. 
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3.4.1 Obligation (F rḍ) of Im m /Caliphate: Confusion of Terms   
 
It is difficult not to postulate that when reading the sources, the concept of imāma and 
caliphate have been inadequately defined, particularly by the Sunnī scholars. This 
confusion reaches its height in modern assertion and articulations. The debate on 
imāma and rulership that arose as early as the development of the Khāriji‘ites was 
also based on whether it is an obligation to have an imām. This idea of obligation fell 
into the domain of both articles of faith and jurisprudence (ʿaqīda and fiqh). The 
articles of faith were defined by theology proposed by the Shīʿites as their imāma 
theory; later contemporary movements such as  izb al-Taḥrīr held it to be necessarily 
obligatory.
161
 As the discussion develops from (or reacts to) the Shīʿites belief in the 
infallible imām being an article of faith, the discussion about the question of 
obligation again becomes polemical. 
 
Furthermore, it is difficult to differentiate between the idea of the caliphate/imāma 
being an obligation or a necessity. Presumably an obligation would require a Muslim 
to bring about such an institution, whereas the argument that imāma is necessary does 
not place the burden of fulfilment on the community but rather allows it to actuate 
itself ‗organically‘.  
 
Moreover, the concept of caliphate in early assertions were focused on issues of 
succession; only later did the concept of caliphate take on an institutional meaning.
162
 
This also meant that the early conception of caliphate merged the meaning of imāma 
with the rāshidūn era, thus combining the two; that is to say that they succeeded the 
Prophet and that they were the leaders (imām) of the Muslim community. The 
caliphate/imāma has usually been discussed within the Sunnī jurists as an obligation 
(farḍ) that is contingent upon sufficiency (farḍ kifāya) referring to an obligation that 
can be fulfilled (or the responsibility of fulfilment) by some and not all Muslims, as 
long as it is fulfilled. For example, this could apply to people in authority ahl al-ḥal 
wa al-ʿaqd.163 This could also mean that there is a need for governorship that acts to 
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safeguard the sharīʿa. Later, however, groups like  izb al-Taḥrīr defined the 
obligation as farḍ al-ʿayn (an obligation upon every Muslim to work to bring about 
governship that consequently made the ‗caliphate‘ as an institution by itself).164 In this 
sense, the Khāriji‘ites differed considerably from the rest in arguing only for the 
necessity of an imām if needed to elevate the community to a higher level of belief.  
 
The response to the discourse about obligation within Sunnī political theology varied 
amongst the Muʿtazilites, the Ashʿarites and the Khāriji‘ites.165 Even amongst the 
various Ashʿarites the response was different. Some, like Māwardī (for reasons 
discussed above), equated imāma with caliphate and made the argument that it is an 
obligation.  
 
Ibn Taymiyya has a more sophisticated answer to the question of obligation of imāma. 
He asserts that the caliphate is an instrument to serve the faith.
166
 According to him, 
both reason and tradition would testify to this. Tradition, because of the rāshidūn era, 
shows that one cannot have a community without a leader. One may argue that he 
sees the state authority in practical terms, wondering to what extent it is able to fulfil 
one‘s spiritual and temporal need, which would then give the political authority the 
legitimacy to rule.
167
    
 
 
3.4.2 Sh rīʿ  
 
The farḍ argument is rooted in the implementation and necessity of sharīʿa. Although 
from the outset the schools differ on who should have the responsibility of protecting 
(and to some extent enforcing) the sharīʿa and how they should do so, nevertheless 
they all agree that the sharīʿa needs to be protected, interpreted and applied in 
society.
168
 In the debate regarding who has the responsibility of protecting the sharīʿa, 
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the Shīʿite argue that this is the infallible imām (later articulation also proposed in the 
absence of an imām that it is possibly the jurist). Māwardī, on the other hand, 
proposes the caliph as discussed above and Ghazālī holds it should be the ʿulamā. In 
contrast, Ibn Taymiyya thinks it is the umma; this is why the centre of his argument is 
the encouraging the good and forbidding the evil).
169
 These differences in emphasis 
also highlight the concept of who has more authority, the ʿulamā, the imām or the 
umma. 
 
    
3.4.3 The Role of The Umma and Consensus   
 
Another concept that emerges in the discussion of medieval political theology is the 
role of the umma (the community) and the idea of ijmāʿ (consensus that came from 
uṣūl al-fiqh). The emphasis on umma as a process of decision making by scholars like 
Ibn Taymiyya is not arbitrary. Both concepts (umma and ijmāʿ) are conceptual tools 
in the polemical arguments to counter the divine imāma theory. Ibn Taymiyya 
asserted that it is the umma that safeguards the sharīʿa (if it is not the infallible imām) 
as they would not agree on falsehood.
170
  
 
According to Anjum, the Muslim vision of political theory is a community-centred 
vision of rulership based on shūrā as opposed to a caliphate-centred idea that 
developed in its peak during the miḥna period (the inquisition period).171 He points to 
both the cynicism towards the Muʿtazilite rationalism caused by the miḥna and the 
elitism of the ‗ulamā and their theological discussions as reasons for the 
disappearance of the community (or the centrality of the community vision) from the 
political sphere. This in turn accounts for the detachment of the ideal from the 
development of the caliphate discourse.
172
 He further argues that Ibn Taymiyya aimed 
to bring about what he believed to be the community-centred vision.  
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Therefore, according to Anjum, the contribution of Ibn Taymiyya is his emphasis 
upon this command as well as his bringing it to the political sphere as the defining 
mission of the umma.  
 
 
3.4.4 Polemics  
 
Ibn Taymiyya, like al-Ghazālī, set out to counter the Shīʿite assertion. Unlike al-
Ghazālī, however, Ibn Taymiyya argues there is nothing in the tradition regarding the 
way the caliphate has developed. The only instances of righteous rulership found 
within tradition pertain to the four pious companions. This refers to the tradition 
attributed to the Prophet that after his death there would be 30 years of just 
rulership.
173
 Having said that, he recognises the need for a social order and therefore a 
state arises out of necessity:  
The good of mankind cannot be realised except in a social order, because everyone is 
dependent on others, and society requires indispensably someone to direct it.
174
 
 
Therefore, Ibn Taymiyya endeavours to provide some sort of solution for the silence 
of the Qur‘ān and the Prophetic tradition, as well as a counter argument against the 
Shīʿites. What makes Ibn Taymiyya stand out is his assertion that God helps a just 
government even if it is not Muslim and does not help a tyrannical government even 
if it is Muslim, which underlines his understanding of the importance of justice.
175
  
 
In summary then, Ibn Taymiyya aims to refute the divine theory of imāma just like his 
predecessors ( āqillānī,  aghdādī, Māwardī and Ghazālī), which supports the 
assertion this chapter is making, namely that classical and medieval Sunnī political 
theory is basically a polemical argument against the Shīʿite and the Khāriji‘ites 
claims.  
 
What is at stake here is that if the Sunnī political theology denounces the caliphate 
theory in effect they are denouncing religious authority – as per the obligation theory. 
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This consequently would mean the legitimacy of the companions of the Prophet after 
his death, as well as what the community (the majority of the Sunnī tradition) has 
embraced to be legitimate authority. To challenge the legitimacy or the obligation 
theory, one would implicitly agree with the Khāriji‘ite claims of an egalitarian 
community-centred vision. This complex situation could explain the quietest tradition 
that developed amongst the Murjiʿites (who later became the Ashʿarites) which chose 
to say nothing on the question of legitimate authority and to pass no judgment (as 
discussed above) as to who had justification to rule.
176
 
 
 
3.4.5 Summary  
 
The idea that rulers are corrupt was carried further during the inquisition period 
(miḥna) in which scholars like Aḥmed bin  anbel177 were jailed and tortured for 
holding beliefs contrary to the ʿAbbāsid caliph (al-Ma‘mūn 169-217/786-833).178 It 
was during this period that the schools of both theology and jurisprudence 
consolidated into traditionalist (people of ḥadīth) and rationalist (such as the 
Muʿtazilite) and it is to these schools that modern Sunnī political scholars belong.179  
 
Hence, the scholars of this period that write about political theology are not primarily 
political thinkers but are instead theologians and/or jurists concerned with 
understanding revelation and are reacting to their specific environment. This, as was 
discussed in the previous sections, stimulated questions of boundaries of faith, God‘s 
law and notions of justice, in most cases expressed violently. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the majority of scholars felt, to some extent, that a close relationship 
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with the political elite is corrupting to the soul; this can be seen as early as the 
Umayyad period.
180
  
 
It is most likely that the rise of the Sufī tradition was another reaction to what 
appeared to be a rise of despotic and corrupt rulers in the Umayyad period. However, 
this idea needs to be investigated further in order to be substantiated.   
 
The point about context is that the ideas of these thinkers are interpreted as trans-
historical. The Sunnī consolidation of caliphate theory by end of the First World War 
suggests that the context of these writers have been neglected. In fact, it was 
utopianised and ideologised to the extent that the Sunnī thought of political theory is 
equated with the idea of caliphate, which in turn is confused with the concepts of 
imām and khilāfa referred to in the Qur‘ān.181  
 
The discussion of political concepts in this chapter is complicated by the fusion of 
politico-historical events with theo-jurisprudence that developed after complex 
historical events. Also contributing to the complexity was the development of 
different groups each with their own particular interpretation of these events.  
Therefore, the complex theological polemics applied scripture primarily through the 
lens of these polemic motives. Anjum argues that kalām theologians did not turn to 
the Qur‘ān and the tradition of the Prophet to find answers for their question on 
authority but ‗almost invariably began with the discursive parameters set by the 
historical development of the institution, scanning the Qur‘anic or hadith literature 
only to support their contentions‘.182  
 
Moreover, Anjum makes similar conclusion as this chapter is making, that: 
 
[t]he rise of Shiʿite dynasties that ruled over a Sunni majority and their open support 
for Shiʿī political theology spurred Sunni  kalām scholars to consolidate and defend 
Sunni orthodoxy and to provide a theoretical basis for the Sunni caliphate. The 
challenge for Sunni theologians now was to theorize the caliphate while attempting to 
defend the historical legitimacy of the early caliphate against attacks by the Shīʿa and 
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the Khārījis on the one hand and the Sunni compromise that required a limited 
caliphate on the other.
183
 
 
The concepts are crystallised further in their emergence since the first fitna, which 
includes: imāma, khilāfa, ʿadl (justice) shūrā, ulī al-amr (relating also to ṭāʿa), ḥukm, 
amr  il maʿrūf and sharīʿa.  This trend has not changed even in modern times as we 
shall see.  
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3.5 MODERN SUNNĪ POLITICAL THOUGHT  
 
The trend calling for restoring the rāshidūn period appears in contemporary Muslim 
intellectual thought in the works of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1838-1897) in his work 
al-ʿirwat al-Withqā; Muhammed ʿAbduh (1849-1905) in his works fī al-Shūrā wa al-
Isti dād, sunan allāh fī al-Umam and Uṣūl al-Islām; Muhammed Rashīd Riḍā (1865-
1935) in his works al-Khilāfah aw al-Imāmah al-ʿuḍmā; and Hasan al- annā (1906-
1949) in his work Mushkilātinā al-Dākhiliya fī ḍaw’ al-Niḍām al-Islāmī lihay’at al-
Ikhwān al-Muslimīn al-ʿāmah.  
 
This section is not a survey of all the modern Muslim thinkers as much as a 
demonstration that the search for the political ideal in Muslim thought remains a 
reaction toward the political events of the writer‘s time. Without understanding the 
writer‘s own circumstances, their ideas have been largely decontextualised and 
generalised. Contextualizing these ideas helps us to understand their circumstances as 
well as the lens through which they read scripture. The works below are just a few 
examples.  
 
Although the above writers crystallised in their writings the idea that there is a need 
for an ‗Islamic state‘, some, like Afghānī, ʿAbduh and to some extent Riḍā argued for 
the compatibility of ‗western‘ systems (such as democracy, voting and freedom of 
thought) with Islamic ideals or purposes (maqāṣid); others, on the other hand, like 
Mawdūdī, Nabhānī and  annā, called for an exclusive Islamic system. 
On the Shīʿite intellectual side, scholars such as Rūḥ Allāh al-Khomeinī (1902-1989) 
in his work Distūr al-Jumhūriya al-Islāmiya moved away from inti ār (waiting) to 
accepting a form of deputyship of jurists. Scholars like Mohammed  āqir al-Ṣadr 
(1935-1980), founder of the Islamic Daʿwa Party, in his works Al-Islam Yaqud al-
Hayā (Islam Directive to Life), Al-Madrasah al-Islamiyyah (Islamic School) and 
Risalatuna (Our Mission) believed in role of the umma; and Ali Shariati (1933-1977) 
al-Niḍām al-Ijtimāʿī have been influential in resisting colonization and providing 
propositions for Shīʿite political theology.  It is worth mentioning here that this might 
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have been the first time the Shīʿite and Sunnī models of politics manage to bridge the 
split between them despite the schism.
 184
   
It was not only the experience of colonialism, decolonisation, the official breakup of 
the pan-Islamic caliphate and fragmentation,
185
 that allowed for a wave of scholars to 
call for the return of the caliphate, but many of these scholars, such as Moḥammed 
Rashīd Riḍā,  asan Al- annā, Taqī al-Dīn al-Nabhānī and Abū al-Aʿlā al-Mawdūdī, 
had a living memory of the Ottoman rule. This period also saw a rise in ideas of Arab 
unity and nationalism, socialism and secular ideals.
186
 Therefore, this period could be 
characterized as a response to modernity in general and to the modern nation-state in 
particular. 
This section reviews the ideas of four Sunnī scholars: Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī 
(1838-1897); Mohammed ʿAbduh (1849-1905); Mohammed Rashīd Riḍā (1865-
1935); and  asan al- annā (1907-1949) to show the continuing trend of the core 
arguments in the classical and medieval ideas on caliphate theory, including concepts 
such as shūrā and  ayʿa, which held that the past became an utopian ideal to be 
achieved.  
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3.5.1 Late 19th and Early 20th Century Political Concepts  
 
Modern Sunnī activism is usually said to have begun with Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, 
who succeeded in influencing both Sunnī and Shīʿite intellectual thought. What is 
interesting about Afghānī‘s life is his mysterious past that includes his ethnicity and 
his position in the schism. Yet, what were known about Afghānī was his restless 
personality, sharp intelligence and violent temperament.
187
 According to  adawī, al-
Afghānī was like Socrates in that he ‗wrote little but inspired a great deal‘.188 
Although initially Afghānī managed to present himself as a Sunnī born in 
Afghanistan, only later the suspicion was that he might be Iranian.
189
  adawī explains 
that the reason he hid this was because his ideas would not have been accepted 
amongst the Sunnī scholarship if they had known he had a Shīʿite background.190  
 
Although he did not witness the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire, Afghānī 
addressed the real issues that Muslims were facing. His main concern was 
colonialism, foreign domination and the Muslim intellectual ‗backwardness‘ that was 
prevalent in his time. He was possibly amongst the very first western-educated 
Muslims who moved the debate of politics from theology into intellectual public 
debate in his magazine ʿIrwat al-Withqā. Afghānī appears to have had three main 
targets: (1) to reinforce the idea of Muslim unity against Western domination, (2) to 
reform the despotic Muslim rulers and finally (3) to reform the orthodox ‗ulamā in 
taking on board rational sciences.
191
 According to him, Islam declined because:  
[o]f the weakening of the solidarity among Muslims and the division of the Islamic 
territories into different kingdoms, each being ruled by a despot who was interested in 
fulfilling only his own desires.
192
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Therefore, Afghānī argued that the Muslim peoples should reunite and learn from 
other nations.
193
 In his time, Muslims faced modernity not in a slow gradual way but 
in a fast rapid form with little time to adjust. It is against this backdrop that thinkers 
like Afghānī emerged.194        
 
Afghānī, as a reformer, was deeply concerned with the compatibility of Islam and 
Western ideals to such an extent that he came to equate shūrā with parliamentary 
democracy,  ayʿa with elections/voting, ijmāʿ with public opinion and the 
constitution of Medina with constitutional rule.
195
 To achieve this compatibility, 
therefore, it was vital to do so through internal reform. This means that Afghānī‘s 
main concern was the position of Islam itself in the modern world.
196
 The most 
important means to achieving this end, he argued, was to abandon blind following 
(taqlīd) and engage in freethinking (Ijtihād). Most likely, unintentionally, the reform 
movement of Afghānī and of those before him like Kawākibī, articulated Islam to as a 
―civilisation‖ of religion and not a faith that incorporates eschatological aspects, but 
that of material ―progress‖. Ultimately Islam was defined and measured on the ideals 
(and standards) of Enlightenment.
197
 Subsequently, this had the result of politicising 
Islam to an extent that now it is seen as a civilizational religion more than a faith.
198
              
 
It is also difficult to differentiate between ʿAbduh‘s and Afghānī‗s thoughts, beyond 
the fact that Afghānī influenced ʿAbduh. The intertwined relationship between 
ʿAbduh and Riḍā is even more complex. Clearly, the revival and reform that Afghānī 
called for aimed to bring back the golden age, but even more importantly made 
concepts such as shūrā compatible with Western concepts.   
 
Against the early orientalists who understood the classical caliphate in the form of a 
puppet, ʿAbduh asserted that the caliph was only the political leader of the community 
and not its Pope.
199
 The caliph did not have the executive right to interpret the will of 
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God. According to  adawī, ʿAbduh‘s fame comes through his incorporation of 
western institutions into the body politic of Islam to try to prove the compatibility of 
Islam with Modernity.
200
 This compatibility is based not only upon technological 
advancement but also upon much deeper challenges. ʿAbduh asserts: 
We complain of lack of ambition, laziness, disunity…[t]echnology cannot offer us 
remedies to such complaints. What we need to learn, therefore, is something beyond 
such a discipline, that is the discipline which touches upon the soul and this is the 
science of human life.
201
  
        
From this standpoint, ʿAbduh emphasised a particular kind of education that touches 
the soul. More importantly, the connection to the historical utopian past of the golden 
age is vital.  
 
The call for the practice of the salaf al-ṣāliḥ over-simplifies the historical complexity 
mentioned in this chapter that led to some groups holding a simplistic naive 
understanding of early Muslim history and thus radicalising in the mid 20
th 
century. 
There seems no real departure from the old themes discussed in earlier sections with 
the possible intensification of these concepts into a utopian past. One can identify the 
steady acceptance of the modern nation-state structures. Thus, one of the 
consequences of the compatibility attempt (or reformism) was to accept the modern 
nation-state apparatus with its potential nationalism and territorial borders between 
different Muslim states, which was different from the classical and medieval caliphate 
system.
202
 The themes of shūrā,  ayʿa and ijmāʿ remained evident in the late 19th 
early 20
th
 century regarding Muslim political thought.
203
  
 
For example, according to Riḍā, ijmāʿ of the first epoch companions of the Prophet is 
binding upon all whereas the political decisions of the first four caliphs should not be 
considered binding/obligatory but rather as an opinion and an indicator as to what 
Muslim government should be like. The concept of ulī al-amr also appears in modern 
writings. Although some have interpreted it as addressing people of knowledge, as 
Riḍā does, and others read it as addressing people in authority, thus giving it a 
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political angle, as does Taqī al-Dīn al-Nabhānī (1907-1977) in his Mafāhīm Ḥiz  al-
Taḥrīr and Niḍām al-Islām, or Mawdūdī in his Political Theory of Islam. 
 
What made the departure even sharper was the decision by Mustafa Kamal Ataturk to 
dismantle the Ottoman Empire, which consequently led to a very intense debate about 
the caliphate. This later came to be known as the khilāfa movement, which instigated 
several conferences, for example, in Bombay in 1919 and 1920 and in Jerusalem in 
1931. However, it seems that the movement had little success in reaching any kind of 
consensus on the practical steps needed to bring back the caliphate.
204
  Arguably, one 
unintended result of the discussion to bring back the caliphate by utopianising the 
rāshidūn era was a shift in the semantic meaning of the term imām/caliphate. Initially 
the imām was seen as a spiritual and temporal leader for public order, but this changed 
with the idea of caliphate as an instrumental systemic one.  That is to say, the 
caliphate is now seen as a system and institution as a whole rather than as in the 
discussions that occurred in classical and medieval period, as this chapter shows.
205
 
 
 
3.5.2 Post-Ottoman Empire: Emergence of Contemporary Sunnī Caliphate 
Theory  
 
A series of writers emerged in order to respond to the fall of the Ottoman Empire. 
One example is Riḍā who probably wrote his book khilāfa aw imāma in response to 
three events. The first event was the separation of the sultanate from the main 
Ottoman Empire, a decision made by the National Assembly in Turkey in 1922 as 
proposed by Ataturk. The second was the setting up of a republic in the then Ottoman 
state which separated religion from state. The third event was the shift of the caliphate 
into a symbol that no longer had any political power.
206
     
 
Having witnessed the Ottoman caliphate‘s abolishment and the growing 
fragmentation, Riḍā, for example, thought it best to explain the question that was 
often asked in his time, that is ‗what is the place of caliphate‘? 
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Like the classical and medieval scholars discussed in this chapter, he tackles this 
question as a theologian and as a jurist. Moreover, like his predecessors, he argues 
that the ideal period of the caliphate was the rāshidūn period (when the tradition of 
the Prophet was followed as it should have). In addition, like the Ashʿarites, he 
mentions the theory of obligation.
207
 He further elaborates that Islam, being the 
middle way, provides a just law and a consultative (shūrā)208 state, chosen by election 
( ayʿa). Therefore, if the person in authority is responsible for unifying the 
community in justice this means everyone will be equal under the law and thus under 
God, including both the ruler and the ruled.
209
       
 
Riḍā‘s writings could clearly be seen as an attempt to reconcile the modern 
conception of government (that is elections, democracy, notions of accountability and 
justice) with the rāshidūn period. This is not to say that the rāshidūn period had a 
different set of principles but that the attempt to create a ‗compatibility of concepts‘ 
by decontextualising the early Muslim experience as well as by ignoring the first 
Muslim fitna could be argued to be a ‗modern‘ attempt to adjust to the identity crisis 
magnified by the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Riḍā attempted to account for the fitna 
by arguing that it was instigated by ʿAbdullah ibn Saba‘, who conspired in and 
planned the killing of ʿUthmān. 210 Therefore, the resulting wars and assassination of 
ʿAlī must be viewed primarily as a consequence of this conspiracy. He alludes to the 
idea that the real fitna was a foreign one.
211
 Associating the fitna of foreign 
occupation and reinforcing the perception of unity of Muslims, Rashīd Riḍā points out 
that the reason for the decline of the Muslims lay in their hunger for power and 
worldly things. 
 
In the end, Riḍā claims that questions concerning the caliphate should be left to the 
Muslim peoples yet at the same time he sees the institution of caliphate as both 
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temporal and religious as did his teacher, Mohammed ʿAbduh.  As many scholars 
before them who agreed on the necessity of the caliphate/imāma, so did these 
scholars, with the addition that they accepted the possibility of having separate 
Muslim political entities. Again, like his predecessors, Riḍā answered the question of 
who should establish the caliphate by pointing towards ‘ahl al ḥal wa al ʿaqd.212 Riḍā, 
like many before him, gives a circular argument on how a leader should be elected or 
known by the umma. The umma should elect the leader, the leader is known by the 
umma and so on. This is one of the fundamental challenges that Sunnī political 
theology has not yet managed to solve: how does the caliph get nominated and how 
does he arrive at power in a way that is not hereditary, even when the idea of ahl al-
ḥal wa al-‘aqd, the discussion does not make it entirely clear who they are. 
 
Overall, Riḍā engages his audience with issues that concerned Egyptian society as 
well as Muslim society in the early 20
th
 Century, using minimal theological jargon to 
do so. Moreover, according to  adawī, Riḍā was less concerned with ‗legitimization 
and regularization of the institutions…and [concerned] more with outlining the ideal 
political organization‘.213 What is interesting in his discussion is his assertion that the 
Ottoman caliphate was not a legitimate one because it did not correspond to the 
Qurayshī principle as discussed in the medieval section. Riḍā was not the first to 
make this point, Kawākibī made a similar point before him, consequently calling for 
Arab rule. However, he might have said this for political reasons with the rise of Arab 
nationalism and the discontent with the Ottomans especially after the First World 
War.     
 
Another example is the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood (al-ikhwān al-muslimīn) 
thought founded in 1941 by  asan al- annā (1907-1949), a school teacher, who was 
also reacting against the extreme westernisation of Egyptian society, which convinced 
him of the ideas concerning revival.
214
 He managed to combine instruments of 
modern institutionalization by being more systematic in his approach to ideas of 
revival, which meant he upheld the religious values that the modern organization was 
hoping to achieve. This makes the ikhwānī movement amongst the first examples of a 
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mass modern political Muslim movement. The concept of an ―Islamic state‖ became 
central to its ideology aiming to bring back the caliphate system. Al- annā, like his 
predecessors, reinforced the concept of a political entity in the form of caliphate 
whose role is to implement and safeguard the sharīʿa.  
 
Looking at the characteristics of modern Muslim political thought, which differs from 
the classical and medieval period, there are arguably two issues. One is the obsession 
with discussions of compatibility between Islam and western form of political 
ideologies such as democracy, which underlie many reformist movements and the 
second is the rise of public intellectuals rather than jurists or theologians discussing 
issues of governance. Thus, the writings of contemporary scholars manage to have a 
wider public appeal, further enhanced by technological advancement such as printing 
and newspapers, radio and TV. Examples include magazines such as ʿirwat al-
Wuthqā and al-Manār and tape recordings as used by Khomeini. This made the 
discussion much simpler with less theological jargon and less historical connection to 
the old schismatic debates about the caliphate/imāma.  
 
This raises the question as to the difference between the idea of an ―Islamic state‖ and 
a caliphate theory. One possible observation from the outline above is that the 
classical theory that emphasises Quryashī descent has changed since the Ottoman 
rule; although Riḍā thought it important, not many considered this condition to be 
essential. It is also possible to argue that the call for an ―Islamic state‖ is more modern 
in its acceptance of the apparatus of state structure (and the nation-state) with Islamic 
elements, while also incorporating some Muslim law.
215
 The concepts that emerge 
again are caliphate, sharīʿa, ḥukm, ulī al-amr, shūrā and the idealisation of the 
rāshidūn period as a golden age.       
 
 
3.6 MODERN SHĪʿITE POLITICAL THOUGHT 
 
Generally, for Shīʿites, the question of the caliphate relates inseparably to the question 
of succession, as it did for the majority of the classical and medieval Sunnī Ashʿarite 
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scholars who replied to the Shīʿites claims of succession, as discussed earlier in the 
chapter.
216
 Therefore, the writing of the Sunnī jurist on this subject during the 
classical and medieval period is a polemical reply. In contemporary times, the debate 
about the caliphate has made it an institution in itself, as much a symbol of Muslim 
glory as a system, just like the idea of the imāma system for Shīʿites.217  
 
However, modern Shīʿite political thought is interesting for two reasons; first it 
departs from the classical and medievalist scholarship concerned with waiting for the 
Mahdī. The second, arguably, is its relative success in the Twentieth Century in 
comparison to its Sunnī counterpart with the Iranian revolution in 1979. This political 
event is notable in that arose from the idea of wilāyat al-faqīh that had been proposed 
earlier but was made into a reality by Ayatullah Khomeini.  
 
 
3.6.1 Wil yat Al-Faqih  
 
Wilāyat al-Faqīh is often translated as ‗guardianship‘; in this case it refers to the 
guardianship of the jurist in the absence of the imām.218 The debate amongst the 
Shīʿite is whether this guardianship is general or limited, that is whether it includes all 
aspects of Muslim life or just the necessary jurisprudential guardianship which only 
relates to religion and not politics.
219
 Aḥmed Al-Narāqī (1771-1829) is often cited as 
the first Shīʿite scholar to change the Shīʿite quietist tradition in his proposition by 
postulating the concept of the wilāyat al-faqīh (deputy of the imām) in his book 
ʿAwāʿid al-Ayām220 and later put in practice by Khomeini in his book Al-Hukumah Al-
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Islamiyah (The Islamic Government).
221
 However, before him the idea of a jurist 
holding deputyship or guardianship on behalf of the imām was possibly also alluded 
to by al-Muḥaddith Faydh al-Kāshānī (d.1090/1679). In his book Mafātiḥ al-sharīʿa, a 
legitimate government has three kinds of guardianship (wilāya): the guardianship of 
the Prophet, the infallible imām, and finally the guardianship of the jurist.222 Although 
this was an idea proposed after al-Kāshānī, it was al-Waḥīd al- ahbahānī 
(d.1206/1791) who dedicated a section on the question of the guardianship of the 
jurist in al-Fawā’id al-Ḥā’iriya. Again it is unclear as to whether this work is political 
or religious.   
 
In any case, Khomeini's work was first delivered as a series of seminars to students of 
theology in a seminary in Najaf (Iraq) arguing for clerical rule in the absence of the 
imām.223 Willāyat al-Faqīh theory argues that the infallible imām, in his absence, 
designates a deputy imām who is responsible for the umma and its affairs. The deputy 
imām should be the most knowledgeable, pious and wise scolar. It is obvious from 
this explanation that al-Narāqī was attempting to break away from the Shīʿite tradition 
of quietism in which one had the attitude of waiting rather than taking action. This 
does not, however, provide a coherent political theory. In practice, Iran's theocratic 
state has been a mix of its culture and religion. There is a regular voting system in 
place, a parliament and a constitution. Yet no one can go against the deputy imām. 
This is where other Shīʿite thinkers have disagreed with this theory.224  
 
It is interesting that when wilāyat al-faqīh as outlined, it is similar to the Sunnī idea of 
political theory. In fact,  adawi observes that the ‗restricted concept of the imāmat 
prevalent among the Shī‘ite may be more logical than the halfway house position of 
the Sunnis‘.225 He goes on to assert that the problematic nature of the Sunnī classical 
theory of caliphate is its ‗lack of specific description of these powers of the Umma 
                                                 
221
 See the full text of Na‘ini and Khomeini's books in <www.alwelayah.net>. Also see A Vaezi, Shia 
political thought, Islamic Centre of England, London, 2004. 
222
 Al-Kashani, F. Mafatihul Sharai, vol.2, p. 50.  
223
 See R Khomeini, ‗Program for the Establishment of an Islamic Government‘, in P Luft & C Turner 
(ed.) Shi'ism: Critical Concepts in Islamic Studies, Routledge, London, 2008, pp. 17-38. Also see S 
Akhavi, ‗Islam, politics and society the thought of ayatullah khomeini‘ in Saed A (ed.) Islamic 
Political Thought and Governance, vol. iv, 2011, p. 329. 
224
 A very good discussion on this is seen in Abbas Amanat article A Amanat ‗From Ijtihād to Wilāyat-
I Faqīh: The Evolution of the Shi‘ite Legal Authority to Political Power‘, Shari'a : Islamic Law in the 
Contemporary Context, 2007, pp. 120-136.  
225
  adawī, The Reformers of Egypt, p. 65.  
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relating to the choice of the Caliph‘.226 Terms such as ahl al-ḥal wa al-ʿaqd, ulī al-
āmr (those in authority), ahl al-shūrā and ahl al-Ijmāʿ (jurists whose consensus is 
binding according to Sunnī legal theory) have no clear definitions by which they 
could be identified nor do they have clear mechanisms.  
 
3.6.2 Summary  
 
It is interesting to observe the similarities between the modern Sunnī political 
theology and the consequent Shīʿite development of willāyat al-faqīh. Diagram 5 and 
6 bellow shows these similarities.  
 
Diagram 5: The Circular Argument 
 
The diagram shows the modern Shīʿite political argumentation for an ‗Islamic state‘.  
 
The Shīʿite view: 
- Humans are social in nature. 
                                                 
226
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- Rule belongs only to God the Sovereign the Law maker.  
- God wants us to live according to his Laws, which includes political government 
that is necessary part of society.  
- It is therefore necessary to implement a leader to implement the divine law - in the 
form of an infallible imām.  
- In the absence of an imām (the era of occultation) it is not permissible to suspend the 
Divine Law. 
-Hence the necessity of the general guardianship of the jurist.
227
 
 
The same argumentation is also true of the Sunnī caliphate theory in the following 
diagram:  
 
Diagram 6: The Sunnī -Shīʿite Similarities 
 
 
 
The Sunnī view:  
- Humans are social in nature. 
- Rule belongs only to God the Sovereign the Law maker.  
                                                 
227
 Evidence for this is also taken from the Qur'ān 3:103-4; 4:59, and Nahj al-Balāgha Sermon 3. 
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- God wants us to live according to his Laws, which includes political government 
that is necessary part of society.  
- It is therefore necessary to have a leader to implement the divine law like the 
Prophet.   
- In the absence of Prophecy it is not permissible to suspend the Divine Law. 
- Hence the necessity of an ―Islamic state‖.     
 
With the exception of an imām as a necessary leader, both modern Shīʿite and Sunnī 
political theory propose similar premises in arguing for the necessary establishment of 
an ―Islamic state‖.  
 
 
3.7 CONCLUSION  
 
The early Muslim concerns of state and power were not about an ―Islamic state‖ but 
about who has the right to rule. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the three 
conceptual periods could be summarised as follows:  
 
i) The early period was concerned with legitimacy and boundaries of belief 
which led to concepts of ‘adl (justice) encompassed in article of faith and 
hence in the theology of Khāriji‘ites, Murjiʿites, Shīʿites and the Muʿtazila.  
 
ii) The medieval period went through the crisis of political fragmentation, chaos 
and decline, which in its attempt emphasised the caliphate/imāma concepts as 
well as the turning back to the salaf al-ṣāliḥ in looking for the ideal model. 
Concepts such as sharīʿa, umma, ulī al-amr,  ayʿa and shūrā became the 
Sunnī political theology as a polemic argument against the Shīʿites assertion 
of imāma. These debates usually took place at a theological level, addressing 
questions of the necessity of the imāma and the obligation of the caliphate; the 
circumstances of appointment; the means by which the imām comes to office; 
the number of imāms at any given time; race and tribe of the imām; the 
qualification required for an imām; and the infallibility of the imām. 
 
iii) In contemporary times, the key characteristic of the debate is its obsession 
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with ‗compatibility‘ and modernism, again referring back to the golden age of 
the companions and in doing so interpreting particular concepts in modern 
western political language (or arguing for a distinctive ‗Islamic‘ political 
theory). It is during this period that a vivid articulation of ‗Islamic state‘ 
emerges as a reaction to both western imperialism and the end of the Ottoman 
Empire. What marks this period is the detachment from the polemics of the 
imāma/caliphate debate and a bridge between Sunnīs and Shīʿites arguing for 
establishing a state that is called ‗Islamic‘.    
 
What is astonishing, as we have seen, is that the competing schisms do not depart 
much from each other‘s main arguments, but rather help to consolidate a political 
theology that opposes each other: that is the Muʿtazilite, the Khāraji‘ite and the Shīʿite 
claims of governorship. Furthermore, all the writers we have discussed lived in times 
of crisis, and they attempted to articulate a political theology in response to these 
crises.  
 
It is the belief of this author that the essence of their disagreement is not based on the 
end vision of a Muslim society but is rather a polemic one, by emphasising the 
necessity of the institution of the caliphate, which came about in the classical and 
medieval Sunnī thought and which was merely a reply to the Shīʿite proclamation of 
the necessity of the institution of imāma. Furthermore, what makes the polemic 
debates bitter is not so much the belief of the Shīʿite of the infallibility of the imām 
(as the early Shīʿite did not believe in the infallibility) but the practical consequence 
of allegedly going against their belief that the Prophet designated ʿAlī as a successor 
and hence indicating that the majority of the Muslims are disobeying God. What made 
this discussion even more complicated were the implications for the status of the, 
belief of the closest companions of the Prophet such as Abū  akr and ʿUmar.     
 
In addition, as discussed above, what made the discussion on the political concepts 
complex in this chapter was its fusion of politico-historical events with the ideas 
related to theology and jurisprudence, which developed after complex historical 
events.  
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The intensity of the argument in which the works like Māwardī, al-Ghazālī and Ibn 
Taymiyya have been written serves as an indication of how the issues of the 
relationship between political rule and the ideals of justice and religious commitments 
have been unresolved since the death of the Prophet. Earlier polemical works still 
exist concerning who has the right to rule. Therefore, when one reads the term  ayʿa, 
the sovereignty of the caliph and the role of the umma, it is difficult to read them  
without reference to the polemical discussions by the Shīʿites about the imāma -  a 
discussion which has been developed to refer to the principles of divine 
designation.
228
  
 
The concepts that will be discussed in Chapters Four and Five are: khilāfa, imāma, 
ʿadl (justice); shūrā, ulī al-amr (relating also to ṭāʿa), ḥukm, amr  il maʿrūf, umma 
and sharīʿa. The concept of  ayʿa will not be examined as a Qur‘ānic concept as it is 
originates from the Arabian tradition.  
 
When categorising these concepts, it becomes clear that they must be thematically and 
semantically clustered together. Such clustering is also organised on the basis of 
frequency of occurrence in the Qur‘ān, thus rendering these concepts a hierarchy. 
Less attention is given to shūrā and ulī al-amr, as they are mentioned only a few 
times.  
 
In Chapter Four the following Qur‘ānic concepts will be analysed: 
i) Khilāfa, Imām and  shūrā.  
In Chapter Five the following concepts will be analysed: 
ii) ḥukm; ulī al-amr, ṭāʿa, sharīʿa, and ʿadl.  
The concept of umma and Amr  il maʿrūf wa nahī ʿan al-munkar will be discussed in 
Chapter Six when looking at notions of self and community in outlining possible 
understanding of the individual and society.     
 
As stated in the previous chapter, this study seeks to address how the different 
conceptualisation of ḥukm, khilāfa, and shūrā relate to each other within the wider 
Qur'ānic worldview, by pointing out the several meanings that exist in the Qur'ān. 
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 See H Mikhail, Politics and revelation  Māwardī and after, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 
1995, p. 21. 
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Thus, this study has a synchronic focus and examines the interrelationship between 
lexical concepts in the Qur'ān. Alongside this hermeneutical endeavour, this research 
is also informed by insights from major works found within commentaries as well as 
works belonging to the lexicographical genre.   
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CHAPTER 4: THEORY OF STATE 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION   
 
Most contemporary Muslim thinkers have taken it for granted that there is an Islamic 
political system and by default, a theory of politics which has actually been prescribed 
in the Qur‘ān.1 The western intellectual tradition which analyses Muslim political 
theory has understandably been unconcerned with analysing the Qur‘ānic verses, but 
has rather focused upon analysing the politico-historical developments of Muslim 
affairs.
2
 Western analysis also examines the Islamist claim that there is indeed a 
political theory. For this reason, Western writings have as a whole been historical 
analyses of the Muslim intellectual tradition itself.
3
  As Chapter Three demonstrated, 
the idea of the caliphate/imāma linked the Qur‘ānic khalīfa with the historical 
caliphate system intensified since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Thinkers such as 
Rashīd Riḍā and  asan al- annā, as discussed earlier, considered the caliphate 
system as an ―Islamic political‖ entity; in doing so they brought forth the idea of an 
―Islamic state‖.  
 
Those who read the verses in the Qur‘ān as having a clear political theory in the form 
of an Islamic state, such as Haroon Khan Sherwani, see the oath of allegiance ( ayʿa), 
shūrā, and the historical caliphate system amongst others as clearly indicating a set of 
formalised instructions on how to establish an Islamic state.
4
 In agreement with other 
thinkers, Sharwani outlines the Qur‘ānic political theology as follows:  
                                                 
1
 See Introduction  
2
 Such as the work of Watt, Black, and Lambton as mentioned in the introduction. 
3
For example  HAR Gibb, Studies on the civilization of Islam, Beacon Press, Boston, 1962. AK 
Lambton, State and government in medieval Islam: an introduction to the study of Islamic political 
theory: the jurists, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981. P Crone, Islam and government: a history 
of medieval Islamic political thought, Columbia University Press, New York, 2003. EIJ Rosenthal, 
Political thought in medieval Islam: an introductory outline, University Press, Cambridge,1958. A 
Black, The history of Islamic political thought: from the Prophet to the present, Routledge, New York, 
2001. WM Watt, Islamic political thought, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1998. Just to list a 
few.  
4
 HK Sherwani, Studies in Muslim political thought and administration, Porcupine Press, Philadelphia, 
1977, p. 18. Other examples include AA Kurdi, The Islamic state: a study based on the Islamic Holy 
Constitution, Mansell, London, 1984. A Abū Sulaymān, Towards an Islamic theory of international 
relations: new directions for Islamic methodology and though, International Institute of Islamic 
Thought, Herndon, 1993. MS  Awwā, On the political system of the Islamic state, American Trust 
Publications, Indianapolis, 1980. 
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- God is the Sovereign over all creation, including human beings. 
- There is a principle of order and obedience that God wants from humans (linking it 
to Qur‘ānic khalīfa and how disorder (fitnah) is worse than murder quoting verse 
2:217), hence, there is a divine command for structure.  
- Muslims should turn to the Divine Law and the Prophetic teachings. 
- Justice and law are vital for society (because of the need for order) and hence there 
is a need for an Islamic state to implement both justice and God‘s law.5 
 
The view expressed above supports the argument that religion and politics are 
inherently part of Islam. Initially, Askari, in his critique of views such as Sharwani, 
argued that there are three ways in which this is expressed. The first idiom is the 
perception that the state is the vehicle to implement sharīʿa and to ‗preserve the 
historical continuation of community‘. The second sees the state as the ‗higher 
expression of community in its act of obedience to the authority of Qur‘ān and sunna 
of the Prophet with which the authority of the state is normatively associated‘.6 The 
third sees the ‗Islamic state‘ as a fulfilment of the Islamic mission, as the 
establishment of the authority of God and as the ‗abolition of the lordship of man over 
man‘.7 According to Askari, the first expresses a legal approach, the second expresses 
a political approach and the third in seeing Islam and politics as one expresses an 
ideological approach. These kinds of formulations reinforced the assumption that the 
unification of religion and state ‗was as fundamental to Islam as its creed of one God 
and Muhammed‘ as the last Prophet.8 One is justified to assert that the contemporary 
discussions are primarily based on the political and ideological approach, whereas the 
classical discussions were predominantly based on the first approach, namely the legal 
one.  
 
In this Chapter the views of both the political and the ideological expressions are 
challenged through an examination of the multi-layered Qur‘ānic expression of 
khalīfa and imāma. The idea that caliphate system or the concept of an ―Islamic state‖ 
is inherently part of the Qur‘ānic message is therefore challenged right at its core. 
                                                 
5
 See his work Sherwani, Studies in Muslim political thought, pp. 23-31 
6
 H Askari, Society and state in Islam: an introduction, Islam and the Modern Age Society, New Delhi, 
1978, p. 176. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Ibid. p. 177. 
Theory of State 
134 
 
 
This study also suggests that the concept of ―political Islam‖ has complex 
interconnections with other concepts in a hierarchy of concepts which comprise the 
entire Qur‘ānic worldview. The complexity is due to several factors: the perception of 
politics, the historical-polemical discussions amongst the Muslim sects, the ways in 
which scripture is understood and lastly whether the notion of political theory entails 
a prescribed application of politics or instead a more generally expressed ethico-
political principles. This research calls into question the assumption that there is a 
conclusive understanding of these interconnected issues.  
 
The problem with accounts like Sharwani's is that the Qur‘ānic verses can infer 
numerous possible meanings.  Eggen rightly points out this is due to the multi-layered 
content of the Qur‘ān.9   
 
In this Chapter the Qur‘ānic concepts of khilāfa, imāma and shūrā will be analysed. 
However, shūrā will be discussed briefly as it has been mentioned only twice in the 
Qur‘ān rendering it only a term according to the methodology explained in Chapter 
Two.   
 
These concepts are thematically and semantically clustered together as discussed in 
the Introduction and in Chapter Two. Each concept is examined by its roots and their 
derivatives using Izutsian methodology.  
 
 
4.2 THE MORPHOLOGY OF KHALĪFA USING IZUTSIAN APPROACH  
 
Etymologically the words khilāfa and khalīfa derive from the same trilateral root kh-l-
f. From this root, there are twenty-three forms used in the Qur‘ān, of which 127 verses 
include the derivatives.
10
 Khullifa is mentioned once, yukhālif twice, ‘akhllafa 13 
times, tukhlaf once, yatakhallaf once, ‘ikhtalafa 33 times, ‘ikhtulif twice, istakhlafa 
five times, khalf twice, khālifūn once, khilāf six times, khilfah once, khawālif twice, 
                                                 
9
 NS Eggen, ‗Conceptions of Trust in the Qur'an‘, Journal of Qur'anic Studies, vol. 13 no. 2, 2011, p. 
56 
10
 E Badawi & M Abdel Haleem, Arabic-English Dictionary of Qur’anic Usage, Brill, Leiden, 2008, p. 
279. 
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mukhallfūn four times, mukhlif once, ikhtilāf seven times, mukhtalif eight times, 
mukhtalifūn twice and mustakhlafūn 11 times.  Khalīfa occurs twice, khalafa occurs 
five times, khalā’if four times and khulafā’ three times.11 The discussion in this 
chapter is focused mainly on the four last concepts (khalīfa, khalafa, khalā’if, 
khulafā’) as they are directly linguistically related to khilāfa.  
 
The above derivatives denote several connected meanings including: ‗successor‘; ‗to 
inhabit‘ or to ‗cultivate‘, ‗to take over another person‘s place‘; ‗to substitute‘; ‗to 
inherit something from a predecessor‘; ‗to be behind‘; ‗to follow‘; and ‗to be 
corrupt‘.12 It also comes to mean ‗to delay‘; ‗to differ‘; ‗to be contrary‘; ‗to be 
different‘, ‗to fail to keep a promise‘; ‗to let down‘; and ‗to alternate‘.13  
 
There are interconnected semantic fields that relate directly to the verses, which make 
mention of kh-l-f in its root form; Diagram 7 and 8 below clarify these semantic 
fields. Their themes revolve around concepts such as wārithῑn (‗to inherit) imām, arḍ 
(‗earth‘) as well as sakana (‗to live‘) and ʿammara (‗to build‘, ‗to fix‘, and ‗to bring 
about construction‘). 14  Furthermore, the concept of arḍ also has its own connected 
semantic fields such as fasād, iṣlāḥ, iʿmār, khalq, nās etc. These terms also connect 
and contribute to the meaning of kh-l-f even if they are not directly connected. 
                                                 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 AA Al-Iṣfahānῑ, Mufradāt al-alfāḍ al-Qur’ān, vol. 1 & 2, Dar Al-Qalam, Damascus. 
13
 Badawi & Abdel Haleem, Arabic-English Dictionary of Qur’anic Usage, pp. 278-282. 
14 W Al-Qādī, ‗The Term "Khalīfa" in Early Exegetical Literature‘, Die Welt Des Islams, Vol. 28 no. 4, 
1988, p.402. This is also demonistrated in Diagram 8. 
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Diagram 7: The Morphology of Kh-l-f 
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4.2.1 The Morphology of Kh-l-f 
 
The word khalafa occurs five times (in 7:169; 7:142, 150; and 19:59) denoting ‗to 
succeed‘, ‗to follow‘, and ‗to come after‘.15 The meaning of ‗successor‘, ‗heir‘, 
‗representative‘ or ‗replacement‘ also comes twice in the form of khalīfa as in verses 
2:30 and 7:74. As discussed earlier the root word of kh-l-f is the verb meaning ‗to 
come after‘ and ‗to take the place of‘. It should therefore come as no surprise that the 
meaning of ‗replacing‘ someone and ‗succeeding‘ someone would be merged into 
one, such that the meaning of khilāfa carries the idea of replacing ‗in some form of 
succession‘.16 This form, however, does not occur in the Qur‘ān. The form khalā if is 
mentioned four times (6:165; 10:14; 10:73; 35:39) and khulafā  mentioned three times 
in the Qur‘ān (7:69 and 74; 27:62) both as a plural form of khalīfa.17 Istakhlafa, which 
occurs five times, means ‗to follow‘ or ‗to appoint as a successor‘, as in verse 24:55.18 
Mustakhlafūn is mentioned eleven times, it can denote: ‗inheritors‘, ‗trustees‘ and 
‗appointed as successors‘, for example in verse 57:7.  
 
The passive form khullifa occurs only once in 9:118 denoting ‗to being left behind‘.19 
Yatakhallaf is also only used once and also means ‗to stay behind‘, ‗to hold back‘ and 
‗to be absent‘, as in verse 9:120. Yukhālif occurs twice and means ‗to do something 
contrary‘ or ‗to act contrarily‘ and ‗to go back on‘, for example in the verse 11:88. 
Akhlafa has a similar meaning in that it refers to someone who fails to keep a promise, 
such as in verses 24:63 and 20:87. This form occurs thirteen times. It can also mean 
‗to compensate‘ or ‗to replace‘ as in verse 34:39. Tukhlaf occurs once, meaning ‗to be 
denied‘ or ‗to be broken‘, as in verse 20:97.20  
 
The root word kh-l-f also can take the form of ikhtalafa, meaning ‗to differ‘, ‗to vary‘, 
‗to be different‘ and ‗to disagree‘, occurring 33 times, for example, in verse 42:10. 
khilāf also means ‗being behind‘, ‗being contrary‘, ‗being in disagreement‘ and ‗being 
in opposition‘, as in verse 9:81. This form is mentioned six times in the Qur‘ān. In 
addition, mukhlif, is mentioned once referring to ‗one who does not keep a promise‘, 
                                                 
15
 Badawi & Abdel Haleem, Arabic-English Dictionary of Qur’anic Usage, p. 279. 
16
 Al-Qādῑ, ‗The Term "Khalīfa" in Early Exegetical Literature; p. 406. 
17
 Badawi & Abdel Haleem, Arabic-English Dictionary of Qur’anic Usage, p. 281. 
18
 Ibid. p. 280. 
19
 Ibid. p. 279. 
20
 Ibid. p. 280. 
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as in verse 14:47.
21
  
 
Ikhtilāf, also with the meaning of ‗difference‘, ‗diversity‘ and ‗contradiction in 
consistency‘, is mentioned seven times (such as 10:6 and 4:82). Furthermore, 
mukhtalif (which occurs eight times) is usually used to mean ‗disputing‘, ‗difference‘, 
‗varying‘ and ‗diverse‘, as in verses 16:69 and 51:8; the plural is mukhtalifūn, 
occurring twice.
22
  Another form, ikhtulifa denotes ‗to be disputed‘ as in verse 11:110 
occurring twice.
23
  
 
Khalf also has similar meanings as both ‗successor‘ and ‗to be at the back‘, ‗to be in 
the rear‘, ‗to be behind‘ as in verses 7:169 and 41:42, and appears twice in the Qur‘ān. 
Khālifūn is mentioned once in the Qur‘ān in verse 9:83 with the meaning of ‗those 
who go against‘ and ‗those who stay behind‘. Furthermore, khawālif, which is 
mentioned twice in the Qur‘ān, also has the meaning of ‗staying behind‘ and ‗going 
against‘, as in verse 9:93. Mukhallafūn according to Badawi and Abdel Haleem 
(hereon Badawi et al) denotes ‗left behind‘ as a form of punishment, as in verse 
48:16. This form occurs four times in the Qur‘ān.24  
 
Diagram 8 shows the interconnectedness of each concept and by following this 
pattern one can eventually perceive a complex web of interconnectedness of concepts 
within the whole framework of the Qur‘ān itself. Due to constraints of time, this 
chapter will examine only the direct semantic fields that connect to kh-l-f. The other 
connections to arḍ are included in Diagram 8 to illustrate how it can be expanded if 
one continues to move from one concept to another, eventually arriving at a very 
complex web of interconnectedness of the Qur‘ānic weltanschauung. 
 
                                                 
21
 Ibid. p. 281. 
22
 Ibid. pp. 281-2. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Ibid. pp. 280-1.  
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Diagram 8: Semantic and Thematic Field of Kh-l-f 
 
 
4.2.2 The Semantic Connection of Kh  īf  and Im m 
 
The term imām is also connected to concepts that emerged in early Muslim history.25 
The singular form is imām, which the Qur‘ān mentions seven times (2:124; 11:17; 
                                                 
25
 See Chapter Two p. 68.  
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15:79; 17:71; 25:74; 36:12; 46:12), and the plural form a’imah five times (9:12; 
21:73; 28:5/41; 32:24). It can mean ‗a leader‘; ‗a guide‘; ‗creed‘, ‗conviction‘; ‗an 
example,‘ ‗a model‘; ‗a highway‘ or ‗in front‘.26 What is interesting about the root 
word of imām is that i-m-m signifies two interconnected concepts, of which one 
branches out to mean ‗mother‘, ‗race‘, ‗roots‘, and ‗groups‘; the other branches out to 
denote ‗front‘, ‗main road‘, ‗leader‘, ‗example‘ and ‗direction‘.27  
 
Therefore, the word imām and the word umma share the same root word.28 Their 
interconnection could connote the encompassing character of the concept of a mother 
and of a leader. Umma occurs fifty-one times in the Qur‘ān.29 In verses 2:124, 11:17, 
25:74, 46:12, 21:73, 28:5 and 32:24 both imām and a’imah are referring to leaders as 
‗those who are put into a position of leading people‘ or ‗those put into leadership 
situations.‘30    
 
Verses 28:41 and 9:12 show the meaning of the a’imah in greater depth. Approaching 
the meaning of ‗those people who lead‘, the term seems again to describe the leaders‘ 
position rather than prescribe a particular institution or political structure that has to 
be brought about. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that although imām as a concept 
may have a political element in its position as a leader, it is descriptive rather than 
prescriptive of any institutional framework.  
  
According to Khan the concept of imām as the defenders of the faith was given much 
publicity by the ʿAbbāsids for ideological reasons.31 If the ʿAbbāsids use the word 
imāma, while the Shīʿites are claiming the right to rule, then the ʿAbbāsids have 
created enough confusion about the concept of imāma in which the Shīʿites are not the 
sole claimers of legitimacy. He further argues that the meaning of imām in the Qur'ān 
was never used to mean a political leader or a person leading people in worship.
32
 Its 
                                                 
26
 Ibid. p. 49. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid. p. 47. 
29
 See FM Denny, ‗The Meaning of "ummah" in the Quran‘, History of Religions, vol. 15, no. 1, 1975, 
pp. 34-70. Also see another article by the same author ‗Ummah in the Constitution of Medina‘, Journal 
of Near Eastern Studies, vol.  36, no. 1, 1977, pp. 39-47.   
30
 See the work of Rāghib al-Iṣfahāni. 
31
 Q Khan, Political concepts of the Qur'an, p. 19. 
32
 Ibid. 
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meaning, he asserts that it merely refers to a religious leadership, for instance in 
31:73; 28:5; 17:71; and 32:24.    
 
Furthermore, according to Manzooruddin Ahmed, imāma is interchangeably used for 
khilāfa, however, this could only be the case according to Sunnī political theology.33 
Etymologically, the word imāma means ‗one who is in front‘, indicating a leader, later 
this word also developed to mean the man who leads congregational prayers. For this 
reason, the Sunnī political theology used imām interchangeably with caliph to mean 
the same person.
34
 
 
The multi-layered meaning of kh-l-f hence has the meaning of ‗replacement‘, 
‗disagreement‘, ‗differences‘ and ‗heirs‘. From the above observation, the idea of a 
leadership in the Qur‘ān seems to possess a general rather than any specific meaning.  
 
 
4.2.3  The Connection of Kh-l-f with W r thīn  
 
W-r-th, when connected with a few forms of kh-l-f refers to ‗heirloom‘, ‗to inherit‘, 
‗to leave a legacy‘, ‗an inheritor‘, ‗to cause someone to acquire something,‘ and ‗to 
bring life (cultivate) to land‘. From this root word, eight different forms occur 35 
times in the Qur‘ān. Waritha (‗to inherit‘ and ‗to come into the possession of‘) occurs 
12 times and in the passive imperfect form once –yūrath; awratha (‗to cause to 
inherit‘) occurs nine times and in the passive form ‗ūritha three times.35  
 
What concerns us with respect to the root word w-r-th is the form of wārithūn (sing. 
wārith), denoting ‗heir‘, ‗inheritor‘ and ‗the one who is the possessor‘.36 The most 
significant verse, and one that is particularly interesting to analyse, is verse 28:5: 
‗And We wished to be gracious to those who were being depressed in the land to 
make them leaders (in faith) and make them heirs‘.  
Within this verse, two notable concepts are mentioned: wārithīn and a’imah. In this 
context, it is God, who as a favour, elevates the status of the people and not man, with 
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the condition that man upholds righteousness. Thus, the meaning of the verse refers to 
God out of his Grace elevating those people who have been oppressed as inheritors or 
heirs and leaders. Again, the particular form in which this might happen is not 
mentioned, thus the idea remains vague and possibly pertaining to the in the 
metaphysical realm of God‘s actions and not to the human realm.   
 
 
4.2.4  The Thematic Connection of Kh-l-f to Am n  
 
There have been a few interpreters, such as Mohammed ʿAbduh, Rashīd Riḍā and 
Ṣadr, who associate the verse of khalīfa (2:30) with the verse of amāna (33:72) which 
is interpreted to refer to trusteeship, such as when the Qur‘ān says: 
We did indeed offer the Trust to the Heavens and the Earth and the Mountains: but 
they refused to undertake it, being afraid thereof: but man undertook it― he was 
indeed unjust and foolish (33:72)  
  
Afzalur Rahman (not to be confused with the late Fazlur Rahman) also makes a 
connection between three verses: (1) the covenant verse that Cragg discusses in 
length
37
, (2) the khalīfa verse and (3) the amāna verse. He asserts that the:  
Covenant taken by Allah from Adam and his progeny at the time of their creation 
was, in fact, a promise from them faithfully to fulfil the obligations of the Trust 
(amanat) that was being placed in their hands by their Sovereign in the form of being 
the khalifah of the earth for an appointed term.
38
 
 
According to Afzalur Rahman, the idea of khilāfa of Adam (which he translates as 
‗vicegerent‘) suggests that man is entrusted with certain powers and that he is to be 
given the freedom of action.
39
 In support, Shaltut suggests that the khalīfa verse refers 
to ‗man's Promethean ability both to understand the essence of all things and to be 
prepared to proclaim what is good and to distinguish it from evil‘.40 
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One difficulty with Afzalur Rahman‘s discussion on the concept of khilāfa is that his 
definition specifies Messengers whereas the Qur‘ānic concept seems to include 
humanity in general. A bigger problem, however, with Afzalur Rahman and Shaltut is 
that they fail to discuss in depth the second section of the khalīfa and amāna verses. 
This second section characterises the actions of spreading bloodshed and corruption in 
the khalīfa verse and injustice and ignorance in the amāna verse.41   
 
Furthermore, there is an on-going debate regarding what the amāna refers to.42 Even 
if one interprets the meaning as ‗a trusteeship to mankind‘, what is the nature of that 
trust? Some have said it relates to rationality, responsibility, reason, free choice and, 
possibly, the prayer and other religious duties that God has demanded.
43
  
 
In any case, semantically, amāna denotes ‗trust‘, as in verse 4:58. The root word of 
amāna is a-m-n and 19 forms occur in the Qur‘ān referring to ‗guard‘, ‗keeper‘, ‗to 
trust‘ and ‗to be trusted‘.44 This amāna of course would seem to be a huge 
responsibility as the heavens, the earth and the mountains all felt ill-equipped to 
accept it. It must be a heavy responsibility for humankind to take care of the earth and 
reach towards man‘s highest moral ability. Like the khalīfa verse (2:30) which 
describes the situation of mankind as spreading corruption and shedding blood (man 
yafsidū fihā wa yasfikū al-dimā’). The second part of the ‗amāna verse (33:72) 
describes humans as tyrant/unjust and ignorant (inahū kāna  alūman jahūlā). Each 
verse seems to have been balanced by describing human tendencies and human states 
of affairs. This gives a balance to the human being both as khalīfa and as holder of the 
‗amāna.  
 
The only reasonable explanation in linking the khalīfa verse with amāna is the view 
that human beings were created with pressing responsibilities and expectations. This 
begs the question as to whether this in fact refers to a political vicegerency or not. In 
terms of khalīfa verse whether the vicegerence is of God on earth or of humans 
succeeding other species. We will return to this question later.    
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4.2.5 The Thematic Connection of Kh-l-f with Arḍ   
 
When looking at the inter-contextuality (siyāq) of the verses which mention 
yastakhlif, khalā’if, yastakhlifakum, khalῑfa, eight of these verses (out of 13) contain 
the word ‗earth‘ right after yastakhlif, khalā’if, yastakhlifakum and khalῑfa, without 
specifying who is actually the khalῑfa.  
 
From the 13 verses also it is possible to find a number of interesting patterns.  When 
the root word kh-l-f is accompanied or followed by the word arḍ (earth) the meaning 
of kh-l-f seems to convey an ʿām meaning.45 However, when the word occurs without 
the word arḍ it seems to demonstrate a condition in which a group of people replace 
another people or nations, therefore the khiṭᾱ  (the address of the Qur‘ān to the 
reader) is more specific.
46
 
 
From this, we may infer two things; that the concept of khalīfa is a general kind of 
terminology addressing humanity as a whole, as opposed to other creations of God. 
The second is that the role of this khalῑfa on earth is to be tested, as the verses 
indicate.
47
 Of course, part of khalῑfa includes an element of justice, but the terms and 
the expressions used to express these elements are very general. Furthermore, the 
word of the aforementioned verses seems closer to a statement and a warning than a 
command by God to create a political system.  
 
The Qur'an speaks of 'arḍ' constantly; and in these verses, it does not seem to 
recognise any formal boundaries. In fact, the Qur'ān is constant in referring to travel 
and that other parts of earth are a refuge, for instance in verse 4:97. This is consistent 
with the idea that goodness as well as the process of cultivation of earth needs to be 
encouraged regardless of any boundaries (see for example, 3:110; 3:104 and 114; 9:67 
and 71; 22:41). This concept is associated with earth, warath and kh-l-f as shown 
below.    
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4.2.6 The Thematic Connection of Kh-l-f with ‘Amm r  and W-r-th  
 
ʿAmmara also includes the meanings ‗to populate‘, ‗to cultivate‘, ‗to make habitable‘ 
and ‗to maintain‘, occurring four times.48  In this context, verse 30:9 is particularly 
interesting as it looks at the interconnectedness of ‗to cultivate‘ the earth, including 
the sense of making it habitable and maintaining it. This is connected to the concept 
of earth and hence to the concept of kh-l-f. Istaʿamara also means ‗to cause to settle‘, 
‗to cause to inhabit‘ or ‗to cause to populate‘ and occurs once in the Qur‘ān.49 In its 
thematic connection then, it is possible to connote that the Adamic persons that are on 
earth are there with the task to cultivate and to maintain it.  
 
4.2.7 Non-linguistic Connection to Kh-l-f  
 
From the outset, there is an important non-linguistic connection within the term kh-l-f 
(and all concepts in the Qur‘ān) which needs to be pointed out and acknowledged. 
This is the idea of tawḥῑd – Oneness of God, connecting all concepts into a 
metaphysical relationship and evoking eschatological beliefs.  
 
 
4.2.8 The Antithesis of W-r-th 
 
f-s-d carries a range of meanings: ‗to corrupt‘, ‗to spoil‘, ‗to decay‘, ‗to fall into 
disorder‘, ‗to be perverted‘, ‗to make trouble‘ and ‗to be wicked‘. Five different forms 
occur from the root word f-s-d and it is mentioned 50 times in the Qur‘ān.50 These 
forms include fasada, ‗to become corrupt‘ and ‗to fall into disorder‘; afsada ‗to act 
corruptly‘, ‗to play havoc‘ and ‗to cause damage‘. Fasād‘s associated meanings 
include ‗mischief‘, ‗destruction‘ and ‗causing corruption‘. Mufsid  refers to the person 
who causes or spreads ‗mischief‘, ‗disruption‘ and ‗destruction‘.51 From the above 
meanings the verses that denote f-s-d refer to those people who spread corruption and 
mischief and therefore will not be the heirs of the earth.  
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The concept of fasād is connected to the concepts of both khalīfa and wārithīn even 
though they do not share a common root. In this way, those who inherit the earth are 
linked to those who do not spread corruption and those who were replaced are equated 
with those who spread corruption; arguably for this reason they were replaced by 
God. Again, these concepts relate to God‘s promise rather than a prescribed command 
by God to establish any kind of political system. 
 
It will be useful, then, for our research to relate the word khilāfa to Qur‘ānic verses 
and to relate the word caliphate to the early political system that developed. As al-
Qādī rightly suggests, ‗one should dismiss the initial relation between the Qur‘ānic 
term khilāfa and the historical reality of the caliphate‘.52 
 
In the following section, it will be further demonstrated that the Qur‘ānic khalīfa has 
no connection to the political caliphate system developed in the Umayyad period; the 
description in the Qur'ān is indeed Adamic and hence applicable to for humanity as a 
whole. The early exegetical traditions are useful in showing the kind of concern the 
early Muslims were engaged with in relation to the khilāfa/imāma debate.  
 
 
4.3 THE VIEWS OF THE EXEGETICAL TRADITION  OF THE CONCEPT 
OF KH-L-F  
 
 
One of the earliest Sunnī exegeses is Tafsῑr Muqātil by Muqātil bin Sulaymān 
(d.150/767).
53
 Muqātil spends two short paragraphs explaining verse 2:30 by alluding 
to the view that the verse is addressing Adam and his offspring to replace the Jinn (a 
name of another creation alongside human beings and animals) on earth.
54
 He does 
not go into detail about the meaning of khalῑfa or whether there are different views 
about who the khalῑfa is or whom the khalῑfa is replacing. In contrast, later exegetical 
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works do spend a considerable amount of time discussing the nature of angels,
55
 
whereas Muqātil does not discuss the nature of angels and their abilities of replying to 
God.   
 
A more detailed and widely-acknowledged tafsῑr is by Moḥammed bin Jarīr Al-Ṭabarῑ 
in his tafsῑr titled Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ‘an Ta’wῑl al-Qur’ān (d. 310/922) which uses 
narrations and linguistic approaches to explain the Qur‘ān.56 In contrast, although 
Ṭabarī wrote at a later time, his book is nonetheless considered one of the 
authoritative works in the field of Qur‘ānic exegesis. Ṭabarī speaks of the meaning of 
khalīfa as someone taking over or replacing the one who came before; he spends a 
considerable amount of time quoting different narrations. He suggests that the word 
khulafā’ indicates that human beings will keep on overtaking each other throughout 
time (possibly by violent means); this, Ṭabarī explains, is what the angels meant in 
verse 2:30 when they ask God whether he intends to create a being that will engage in 
corruption on Earth.
57
  
 
Ṭabarῑ‘s exegetical emphases is primarily concerned with the with theological debate 
as to whether the angels were actually questioning God or whether they were merely 
asking for information and not objecting to the creation of humanity. This is 
understandable as during his time, theological discussions on God‘s nature, the nature 
of angels and human beings had become a serious debate with clearly delineated 
positions. Nevertheless, Ṭabarῑ‘s explanation does not discuss in any detail the term 
khalῑfa as having a political meaning other than as a vicegerent in a most general 
sense.
58
 Ṭabarī‘s exegesis on the verse 6:133 is interesting. He suggests that the 
meaning of wa yastakhlif is a the replacement of a human by means of a new creation 
rather than referring to any kind of political governance. His interpretation of 6:165 is 
the same. Therefore, he is consistent in his explanation of khulafā , khalῑfa and 
khalā’if as God replacing people in terms of societies rather than by a single 
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individual or by a divinely-appointed political structure. His understanding of 19:59 is 
also congruent with his other interpretation of the terms as referring to people 
replacing other people.    
 
 oth Ṭusῑ59 and Ṭabarsῑ60 provide three different accounts of what 2:30 could infer, 
particularly regarding the word khalῑfa. Ṭusῑ narrates a tradition that Adam was called 
khalῑfa because he replaced the Jinn on earth, quoting Ibn ‗Abbās as saying that 
Adam was replacing the Jinn (as Ṭabarī also narrated) who shed blood and spread 
corruption and it is the people of Adam who will replace the Jinn. In this case the 
meaning of khalīfa is taken to refer to ‗replacing‘ and not vicegerency.   
 
In contrast, both Ṭūsī and Ṭabarsῑ, al- asan al- aṣrī thought the verse was addressing 
the sons of Adam who replaced and succeeded their father (Adam).
61
 Al-Ṭusῑ also 
brings forward Ibn Masʿūd‘s interpretation that 2:30 indicate that Adam and his sons 
will rule the earth. Although he does not go into detail as to which view he thinks is 
the most correct, he does say that the meaning of khalῑfa is ‗to replace‘ or ‗to succeed‘ 
rather than ‗to rule‘. His interpretation of 6:133, 6:165 etc. again takes the word to 
mean replacing or succeeding people or nations.
62
 This is also true of Ṭabarsῑ‘s tafsῑr 
as he narrates similar traditions to those which both Ṭusῑ and Ṭabarῑ narrated. In 
contrast to the rest, Ṭabarῑ‘s exegesis provides the full chain of narrations with his 
explanations.  
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Qurṭubī, on the other hand, is the first mufasir (exegete) who equates verse 2:30 with 
the Muslim caliphate system right after the death of the Prophet.
63
 He also equates 
this khilāfa with the idea of imāma in an attempt to answer those people he calls the 
al-rāfiḍah (‗the rejecters‘, referring to the Shīʿite).64 He goes into detail responding to 
the Shīʿite understanding of imāma and the rule of the rāshidūn. However, regarding 
the rest of the verses he gives a brief explanation of yastakhlifanahum as replacing the 
previous peoples. Interestingly, Qurṭubī narrates one as ā  al-nuzῡl for 24:55 as 
addressing the Muslims before their migration to Medina, stating that God promised 
safety for the believers and a promise of taking over – yastakhlif- the earth.65 Looking 
at the inter-contextuality of the verse 24:55, it seems that it is in support of Qurṭubῑ‘s 
interpretation that in light of the fear the Muslims were facing before migrating to 
Medina from Mecca, God was promising the people a safe place for them to replace 
Mecca. However, this does not appear in any of Ṭabarῑ or Ṭūsῑ‘s works. In fact, 
according to Ṭusῑ this verse is alluding to the coming of Mahdī.66 In any case, the 
early and medieval exegetical traditions seem to reinforce the idea that, with the 
exception of the Shīʿite, the word khalīfa comes to mean ‗replacing‘. 
 
Intriguingly, in modern times, scholars such as Ṭabāṭabā'ī (1892-1981) in his al-
Mizān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān claim that this verse was a Medinan one, which means that 
Qurṭubῑ‘s account of as ā  al-nuzῡl is questionable, as the verse came when the 
Muslims were already in Medina.
67
 In verse 38:26, like Ṭabarsῑ, he argues that David 
was replacing other Prophets as a khalῑfa to condemn evil-doing and encourage good. 
Nonetheless, all interpreters seem to agree implicitly that this verse is only addressing 
David as both khalῑfa and as a king, as compared to the other verse in which no 
relation has been made between the meaning of khalῑfa and the state of being a king 
or any political figure in power.   
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The concept of ‗khalīfatuallah‘ comes in one example by Ṭabāṭabā'ῑ. Although he 
rejects the idea that in verse 2:30 the khalῑfa (Adam) is not replacing anyone before 
him (Jinn or angels), he believes Adam to be khalῑfatullāh not in person but as a 
representative or symbol of mankind and as a kind of society that would replace other 
societies to come.
68
 Nevertheless, Ṭabāṭabā‘ī spends more time analysing such topics 
as the names of all things that God taught Adam, and the ways the angels were able to 
ask God the question about the creation of humanity, given that in their nature they 
are unable to disobey or challenge God. In terms of examining all the kh-l-f verses, 
Ṭabāṭabā'ῑ elucidates to the meaning of replacing and succeeding the people before.69    
 
Moreover, Mohammed ʿAbduh and Rashīd Riḍā in Tafsīr al-Manār see verse 2:30 as 
a mutashā ih (unclear) verse and that one cannot read this verse literally but only 
metaphorically (or allegorically). Compared to classical and medieval exegetes, 
modern works like ʿAbduh are one of the first to see this verse as metaphorical.70 For 
ʿAbduh, the verse might also be indicating that there was a kind of creature similar to 
man, one who shed blood and spread corruption and whom the people of Adam were 
going to replace; this would explain the question that was raised by the angels. What 
made the people of Adam different was that they knew the names of all things, 
something the angels themselves did not know.
71
 Therefore, it might be reasonable to 
infer that the verse may refer to the replacement of the creatures before Adam. Once 
more, attention is given to the sense of being a replacement and not being God‘s 
vicegerent.  
 
It is noteworthy that the classical and medieval works were engaged in interpreting the 
names God had taught Adam much more than asking the question of the nature of this 
khilāfa. It is the modern works that speak at length with respect to the discussion of 
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khalīfa amāna; this increased debate highlights the modern preoccupation with the 
notion of an ―Islamic state‖. 
 
 
4.4 QUR‟ĀNIC WELTANSCHAUUNG OF KHALĪFA  
 
From the above section, then, there are two references to the form khalῑfa in the 
Qur‘ān, one when addressing Adam: 
 ehold, thy Lord said to the angels: "I will create a khalīfa on earth." They said: 
"Wilt Thou place therein one who will make mischief therein and shed blood? - 
whilst we do celebrate Thy praises and glorify Thy holy (name)?" He said: "I know 
what ye know not." (2:30) 
 and another in verse 38:26 addressing David: 
O David! We have indeed made you a khalīfa on the earth; so judge justly between 
people and do not follow desire that it then lead you astray from the way of God. 
Truly those who go astray from the way of God — for them there will be a severe 
chastisement because of their forgetting the Day of Reckoning 
Although in verse 2:30 the addressee is thought to be Adam, because of the verse 
immediately following it, the verse as a whole indicates that it is meant to address 
humankind.
72
 However, the verse addressing David, inter-textually, seems to be only 
talking about David as both a Prophet and as a khalīfa. Of course, later in Muslim 
history, those two verses are quoted as the primary evidence for the link between 
Qur‘ānic khalīfa and the caliphate system.73 Taking verses 2:30 and 38:26 to reflect a 
political theory reveals a narrow interpretation of the word khalῑfa, particularly when 
examining the use of derivatives in several different verses and especially when at the 
generality (‗umūm) of the verse 2:30.  
Consequently, verse 2:30 could refer to humanity‘s responsibility on earth rather than 
denote mankind as political vicegerent of God on earth, as has been commonly 
interpreted. This idea of supremacy is also suggested by Mohammed Asad. In his 
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book The Message of the Qur ān, he argues that the word 'khalifah denotes man's 
rightful supremacy and authority on earth, which is clearly expressed by the words ‗he 
shall inherit the earth‘.74 The supremacy is supported by scholars like Afzalur 
Rahman, suggesting that it exists because Adam possessed the ability to name things 
whilst the angels did not.
75
  
 
Given that God created human beings and honoured them above all other creatures 
(wa karamnā  anī Ādam), thus giving them responsibility on earth, the question then 
arises as to whether being a vicegerent on earth would consequently entail being a 
vicegerent of God on earth. Even if it were to be taken that human beings are to be 
taken as khalῑfa tullāh (vicegerents of God), as does the interpretation just noted, one 
still needs to explain the last part of the verse as to what kind of khalῑfa would shed 
blood and spread corruption. 
 
This supremacy might then be seen in that God taught Adam the ability to know the 
‗names of all things‘; the verse that immediately follows 2:30 reads: 
And He taught Adam the names of all things; then He placed them before the angels 
and said: "Tell Me the names of these if ye are right."  
 
There is an ambiguity about what the ‗names‘ refer to, but the text makes it clear that 
the angels did not know them and Adam did. It also implies that if Adam knew these 
names (asmā’) so would his descendants on earth. This seemingly supreme status 
would then entail great responsibility.
76
  
 
As Cragg suggests, the term khalā if always conveys a general sense of temporal 
successiveness and therefore replacement, ‗taking the room of‘. 77 For this reason the 
Qur'ān‘s consistently presents the concept of kh-l-f  as referring to generational 
change and replacement and a sequence of historical accountability if corruption 
becomes widespread (as in verses 6:133 and 165; 7:69, 129, and 169, 10:14 etc.). We 
may agree with Cragg in part that Qur‘ānic khalīfa (and in extension khilāfa) ‗is not 
                                                 
74
 M Asad & A Moustafa, The message of the Qur an  the full account of the revealed Ara ic text 
accompanied by parallel transliteration, Book Foundation, 2003, Bitton, p. 8. 
75
 Rahman, Readings in Islamic political philosophy, p. 2.   
76
 See verses 2:38-39 and 33:72. 
77
 K Cragg, The Privilege of Man, A Theme in Judaism, Islam and Christianity, The Athlone Press, 
London, 1968, p. 32. 
Theory of State 
153 
 
the political institution later developed to serve the continuity of Mohammed's 
achievement after his death‘.78 However, as it is argued here the term khalīfa might 
not refer to the dominion of Adam over the world in a political sense but rather refer 
to a replacement or dominion of Adam  as compared with God‘s other creations but 
not as custodian of God on earth. 
 
In support, Manzooruddin Ahmed convincingly argues that it is futile to examine the 
Qur‘ān for any concepts related to political sovereignty. Although concepts such as 
malik (owner), mulk (kingship), and sultan (sovereign) are mentioned in the Qur‘ān, 
they are mentioned in reference to God with one exception, David.
79
 Ahmed further 
argues that it is even difficult to claim that the term khalīfa be viewed as a political 
theory.
80
  
 
As mentioned earlier scholars such as Moḥammed ʿAbduh and Ṣadr, have linked the 
khilāfa verse with the amāna verse, yet both verses challenge the reader in the end of 
the two verses.
81
 This is the case even though God‘s answer to the angels in the 
khalīfa verse is ‗and I know what you do not!‘ there is a wisdom that the angels are 
not aware of in Adam being made the khalīfa, even though his progeny will be 
spreading bloodshed and corruption.  
 
It is notable that Afzalur Rahman, despite interpreting khilāfa as man‘s supremacy on 
earth, later seems to see khilāfa as meaning ‗messenger‘.82 At first, the picture he 
draws seems convincing when talking about amāna and khilāfa. Verse 2:33 (and other 
verses that touch on the dialogue between God and the angels) refers to God asking 
the angels to bow down to Adam, thus emphasising the supremacy of His creation on 
earth. This entails three things. Firstly, that Adam is given a responsibility (a trust) 
referring to the amāna verse due to man having khilāfa – that is deputyship on earth.  
Secondly, that God will judge man on what he does with this trusteeship in the 
hereafter and hence, thirdly that God gave man free will (the same ability to disobey 
God‘s command as the Iblis- the devil- had). This is the relationship between God and 
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man. What is contested is whether this khilāfa is interpreted to mean Prophethood or 
God sending messengers as khalῑfs as stated by Afzalur Rahman - ‗these Messengers 
(khalifahs) receive Decrees and Messages direct from Allah and then establish them 
on earth‘.83 In another passage he argues that:  
this chain of Divine Messengers who were directly appointed as khalifahs by Allah 
and directly received Messages and Decrees from Him ended with the arrival of the 
Last Prophet and Messenger of Allah on earth. As his khilafat had to remain on earth 
forever, till the Day of Judgment, it possessed certain special characteristics which 
distinguished it from that of other Messengers of Allah.
84
  
 
From this passage, one wonders how the concepts of khalῑfa, khulafā , yastakhlif are 
used to mean ‗message‘ or ‗messenger‘, especially as there are several verses that use 
the term ‗messenger‘ to mean ‗a reminder‘, ‗a guidance‘ and a ‗call‘.85  
 
It is very difficult to interpret the word khilāfa as ‗a messenger‘ or ‗a message‘ to 
guide mankind. From all the verses examined from the root word kh-l-f, it seems the 
word refers to either a group of people taking over previous people (by being the 
dominant one, well established and grounded), or a general supremacy on earth. As in 
verse 2:30 describes humanity as a whole as khalīfa on earth (and on earth alone).  
 
Accordingly, for Qamruddin Khan the term khilāfa in all the verses discussed above 
refers to different nations having the opportunity to inherit the earth; these nations 
will be judged on their actions and how they would fulfil their covenant to God.
86
 
Khan further argues that ‗the Qur‘an is not a treatise on political science; it is a moral 
history of mankind. It does not believe that political authority can rule or shape the 
conscience of man‘.87       
 
Qamruddin Khan maintains that the concept of khilāfa in the Qur'ān philologically, 
does not have the slightest meaning of representation of God or delegation.
88
 He 
further argues that the correct word would have been niyā a and not khilāfa. The term 
of khilāfa, Khan maintains, has been imposed on by later jurists and theologians out 
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of necessity.
89
 In support, the concept of God's vicegerency was a notion that was 
infiltrated via the Persian and Hellenistic of Divine kingship.
90
 Furthermore, 
according to Asma Afsaruddin, the early Muslim community only recognised 
differences according to piety and moral excellence.
91
  
 
Khan holds strongly that the mission of all the Prophets including Mohammed has not 
been to establish any kind of political power on earth but rather to invite people to 
worship One God.
92
 Khan further supports his argument by noting that the Prophet 
Mohammed's mission in Mecca was not to establish a political order on the Quraysh 
but that to repudiate their faith of idolatry.
93
 His thoughts are also echoed by ʿAlī 
ʿAbdul al-Rāziq, Fazlur Rahman, Asma Afsaruddin, Manzooruddin Ahmed, An-
Na'im, Abdelwahab El-Affendi and Abou el-Fadl to mention a few.   
 
For example, Abdullahi An-Na'im argues that the historical experience in Medina was 
not critical to the characteristics of Islam.
94
 An-Na'im utilises the same argument as 
Khan in that the experiences of Medina was dictated by particular historical 
circumstances, thus these historical circumstances should not be given a normative 
weight.
95
    
 
Where Khan diverges from the rest is his indifference to 'democracy'. Many scholars 
who have argued for the absence of any overtly political institution or theory have 
argued for democracy. In fact those Islamists that have argued for compatibility of 
values and principles (for example, ʿAlī ʿAbdul Rāziq, Khalaf-Allah, even 
Mohammed ʿAbduh and Rashid al-Ghannouchi) used concepts such as shūrā arguing 
for institutional democracy with in conditions.  
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Even Fazlur Rahman makes the same assertion, arguing that the Qur'ān has laid down 
that Muslims must decide their affairs through mutual consultation, quoting verses 
42:38 and 9:199. Like many, he sees shūrā as part of the egalitarian vision of Islamic 
body-social and body-political.
96
 He goes on to explain the meaning of 9:199, stating 
that ‗the gap between the average members of the community and their religio-moral 
leadership must be minimized in the interests of Islamic egalitarianism‘.97 He thus 
suggests from the very start that Muslims have not managed to internalise this 
egalitarian nature of shūrā and have been ruled by political autocrats. Thus, the 
Qur‘ānic shūrā was not institutionalized.98 The view that Islam is egalitarian is shared 
by this author; however, whether the shūrā verse is the only indication of this is 
questionable. What is more questionable is whether the shūrā should be 
institutionalised, as Rahman suggests or internalised as an attitude, as this study 
suggests.       
 
Qamaruddin Khan‘s explanation of the shūrā verse challenges most scholars that 
claim any association of shūrā to democracy. He proposes that as ā  al-nuzūl for 
3:159 directly relates to the Prophet's lost battle in ‗Uḥud. Khan suggests that the 
‗Prophet was instructed by God to consult with his men about the course of action to 
be taken after the recent disaster‘, indicating the contextual nature of the verse.99 His 
inference therefore is that neither does the shūrā have any principle of popular 
representation nor does consultation indicate election.
100
 This study would support 
Khan's argument that shūrā has been mentioned only twice in the Qur‘ān, thus 
rendering it contextual and not universal. At best, it must be seen as a recommended 
attitude.   
 
This is because Khan postulates that if the concept of state were entirely absent, it 
indicates the indifference of the Qur'ān itself to this question. Khan's conclusions 
reiterate the conclusions of this chapter as well. This raises the question as to why the 
Qur‘ān is silent. The answer to this question seems much more complex, especially if 
one takes a holistic approach of the Qur'ān, nevertheless Chapter Six attempts to 
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investigate the Qur'ānic worldview, to determine as to whether the Qur‘ān is 
apolitical.  
 
As discussed previously, in the Qur'ān, the meaning of khilāfa is not bound to any 
institution or system. This makes it abundantly clear that the institution of the 
caliphate, so vigorously spoken of in contemporary times, must be seen as a reaction 
to the fall of the Ottoman Empire, not arising out of sacred scripture. Additionally, the 
intertextuality seems to be related to humanity as a whole, taking God‘s response to 
the angels particularly regarding Adam's capacity to know the names of all things 
whereas the angels did not.
101
 What is questionable, however, is the idea that man is 
God's political vicegerent on earth and that he exercises this dominion on behalf of 
God in a political sense.
102
 
 
Thus, for the verse that talks about Adam being a vicegerent on earth there are two 
components: one, who is replaced and, two, who does the replacing. It is unknown 
whom Adam is replacing, if anyone at all, although the question the angels ask may 
imply that there were a kind of people who spread corruption and shed blood who 
preceded him. It is clear, however, that it is God who assigns Adam as the khalīfa. 
The question is whether Adam represents God – the vicegerent of God on earth. If this 
were so, could this verse be political? Or is the verse more general in referring to the 
responsibility of mankind on earth?  
 
Keeping this in mind, kh-l-f as a concept understood from all the forms and exegesis  
discussed above has two general meanings: one referring to people filling in as a 
replacement to a position or to other people who were previously in the position; the 
other meaning either ‗build the place‘ or ‗be placed on earth‘. The association of 
replacing and building in ‘ammara has the connotation of having a good intention: 
building, spreading good and fixing or bringing about iṣlāḥ. Furthermore, as seen in 
Diagram 8 the same khalīfa is also able to spread corruption. This interpretation is 
consistent both with some of the verses themselves and with the forms of kh-l-f which 
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were discussed above, namely ‗that which is in disagreement‘. It is a way of balancing 
both the honour and the responsibility with which human beings are bestowed.
103
 
 
The connected semantic fields in Diagram 8 give the root kh-l-f an interesting polar 
opposite which reflects humankind generally. On the one hand, this khalīfa has a 
relation with ‗to build‘ (iʿmār), ‗to be a witness‘ (shahādah), ‗to make upright‘ (iṣlāḥ)  
and has the sense of  connecting to a community in the act of  replacing or succeeding 
a geographical place or people. On the other hand, the khalῑfa also can convey the 
sense of spreading corruption and being fearful (khawf), weak (istidhʿaf) and 
ungrateful (kufr). In fact one could take this argument further to point to other 
derivatives of khalīfa which includes mukhlif and yukhālif ‗to do something contrary‘, 
yatakhallaf ‗to hold back, to be absent‘ and akhlafa ‗to fail to keep a promis‘. In this 
sense, and with this overview, one can conclude that it is possible that God is talking 
about a human being who is both able to spread corruption widely and is equally able 
to uphold and build the earth. This, of course, is consistent with the Qur‘ānic 
viewpoint of man as examined in Chapter Six with regard to the notion of self-
governance.   
 
The contemporary debates which seem to formulate Islam as inherently political tend 
to ignore the metaphysical element of this discussion.
104
 When singling out Islam as 
having a political vision as its all-encompassing worldview, some contemporary 
Muslim thinkers forget that any meta-narrative is in fact all-encompassing. Thus, 
characterising only Islam as a ‗way of life‘ is a redundant distinction.105  
 
We can conclude therefore that none of the verses mentioned above indicate any kind 
of political system. Taking the verses as a whole or thematically, it might be safe to 
say that they refer to a form of description of succeeding or replacing some people or 
taking over other people or a place—mainly a geographical dwelling place, rather 
than an institution or of being a vicegerent of God on earth. It is rather an address to 
particular people; it is a concept that is used to describe something rather than provide 
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a system of governance. This idea that the khalīfa khulafā’ in the Qur‘ān is the same 
as the historical caliphate system crystallised in the modern times but often referenced 
by appeal to its early historical roots. The section bellow provides an explanation of 
such association.   
 
 
4.5 THE EMERGENCE OF SUNNĪ CALIPHATE THEORY WITH 
QUR‟ĀNIC KHILĀFA    
 
The meaning of khalīfa as ‗to govern, to rule, to be king‘ al-Qādῑ postulates, was 
adopted only later in the exegetical work of Sufyān al-Thawrī before the end of the 
Umayyad period with reference to only one verse (38:26).
106
 Therefore, the concept 
that man is khalῑfah tu-allāh (God‘s representative) on earth came later in Muslim 
history. The first time a political figure used this term was at the start of the Umayyad 
dynasty by Walῑd II in 125/742. It was then for the first time in Muslim history that a 
leader was called khalīfatuallāh using verse 2:30 to proclaim himself as a khalῑfa.107 
 
In the period immediately after the death of the Prophet, it was Abū  akr who was 
known as khalīfaturasūlallāh (successor of the Prophet of God)108 as a natural 
semantic term used for whoever takes over from another person. In other words, Abū 
 akr was described as the one who directly succeeded the Prophet. ʿUmar was called 
amir al-mu’minῑn, as ʿUthmān and ʿAlī were called amir al-mu’minῑn (commander of 
the faithful) rather than khalīfatuallāh.109 
 
This shows the usage of the word according to its linguistic form and not as a concept 
which enshrines any political theory.  Afsaruddin also supports Qādī's point that Abū 
Bakr took the title khalīfaturasulīallāh and not khalīfatuallāh. This further supports 
the argument that refers khilāfa as a successor and not as a vicegerent. The title that 
was commonly used for all four companions was amir al-mu minīn 
(leader/commander of the faithful) and not khaīfatuallāh. According to Afsaruddin 
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the Umayyads ‗who came to power…initiated dynastic rule and had no compunctions 
about adopting the title "God's deputy" to signal their enhanced status‘.110 Again, 
Ovamir Anjum makes a similar observation that when God‘s caliph (khalīfatuallāh) 
came about as a concept, it was in the time of Ummayad‘s and only later crystallised 
in Māwardī‘s time.111 
 
This view is opposed to that shared by Crone and Hinds in their accounts regarding 
the title of God's caliph.
112
 They argue that it was used to address the early Muslim 
rulers. Although Hakim also supports Crone and Hinds‘ accounts, it has been 
suggested that this viewpoint is incorrect.
 113
  It has been maintained that the title was 
only used by the Umayyads and later by the ʿAbbāsids, particularly when one looks at 
early traditions attributed to the early companions of the Prophet in the likes of Nahj 
al-Balāgha.114 
 
It is possible from the start, especially when speeches such as ‗Umar‘s are taken into 
consideration, that the caliph (the person in authority) never had absolute authority.
115
 
In support, the actual attempt to challenge ʿUthmān‘s decisions which led to his death 
(as discussed in Chapter Three) suggests that people at their time did not see the rulers 
as having absolute authority and certainly not God‘s authority on earth. Even with this 
concept, no one actually thought the caliph was representing God on earth and 
therefore the caliph lacked both absolute religious and political authority. Were the 
caliph to possess such authority, there would be no need for him to reinforce his 
authority by commissioning, for example, Māwardī or Ghazālī to write about this 
matter. Furthermore, the occurrence of the first Muslim civil war does not support the 
view of Crone and Hind that the companions possessed absolute authority.    
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Again, the fact that writings were commissioned to reinforce the caliph‘s authority 
may suffice to demonstrate that his authority was constantly questioned being as it 
was in the absence of clear and overt political designation from the Prophet.
116
 Very 
likely most of the classical, medieval and modern political theology came about as a 
reaction towards an absence of a clear political structure in the Qur‘ān and the Prophet 
tradition and not as a proposal for a clearly prescribed political system.
117
   
 
The ʿAbbāsid for their part continued to employ the term khalīfa as a concept 
referring to a political institution, possibly to delegitimize the Shīʿite claims. 
Furthermore, Persian ideas of social hierarchy gained dominance from eighth century 
onwards
118
 and in all likelihood were undermining the radical egalitarianism of early 
Islam.
119
 Afsaruddin further asserts that with the imported ‗ancient foreign 
formulations of political authoritarianism progressively conferred on the Abbasid 
caliph an unmistakable mystique, reflected in the adoption of honorific such as ―God's 
shadow on Earth‖‘.120 The use of the Sasanians and Persian concepts of political and 
religious authority (the idea that there can be no rule without religion, and no religion 
without rule) conceivably also were of high importance in justifying rulership.
121
 The 
role of the Umayyad, and those who came after until the Ottomans was the state-
sponsored genre literature that combined previous philosophies with the Qur‘ānic 
worldview in such a way that the two have been read to imply a self-evident political 
theory in Islam.  
 
Lambton also suggests that there has been Persian influence upon the development of 
Muslim political theory, especially with the idea of philosopher king, which was also 
drawn from Plato‘s writings in his Republic. She observes that a treatise found in the 
Testament of Ardashir states:  
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Religion and kingship are two brothers, and neither can dispense with the other. 
Religion is the foundation of kingship, and kingship protects religion. For whatever 
lacks a foundation must perish, and whatever lacks a protector disappears.
122
  
 
She is referring to the adoption of this system in Islam. In addition, this author 
strongly holds that even if one takes the meaning of verse 2:30 to mean that any 
political leader is a representative of God on earth, the last part of the verse still needs 
to be explained. How is it possible then, that a khalῑfa on earth would also spread 
corruption and bloodshed? Therefore, the verse is far from clear, highlighting further 
that there is no clear prescribed political theory in the Qur‘ān in the form of particular 
kind of institution or system.  
 
In modern times, considering the ‗Islamic state‘ as referring to the modern nation-
state, Hallaq asserts, is both an impossible proposition and a contradictory in terms.
123
 
According to Hallaq, the Islamist thinkers take the modern state for granted, thinking 
it has been a timeless and neutral phenomenon. He goes on further to argue that the 
Islamist form of government is unsustainable giving the conditions of our modern 
world. These conditions include ‗increasing collapse of organic social unit, the rise of 
oppressive economic forms, and…the havoc wrought against the natural habitat and 
the environment‘.124 It is impossible and contradictory because the very state‘s 
genealogy is exclusively European inherited, both structurally and by its form, and 
therefore cannot be adopted as ―Islamic‖.       
 
 
4.6 CONCLUSION  
 
In conclusion, this chapter has argued that there is a significant distance between 
Qur‘ānic khilāfa and the caliphate system developed in Muslim history. Based upon 
the analysis laid out in this chapter, it is possible to argue that the formulation of a 
caliphate system as it is known does not derive clearly from scripture. This means that 
the caliphate system was based on ‗social necessity rather than on any Qur'ānic 
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injunction or Prophetic instructions‘.125 This would also mean that the structure in 
Medina was not aimed to set a state but a religious community, concluding that the 
caliphate system is not obligatory.
126
 
 
Additionally, due to the polemical debates, even the word khalīfa became a concept 
which lost its original Qur‘ānic disposition of succession, but undertook a semantic 
shift to now refer to an institution, a system of government; it even became elevated 
into a theory. This explains how the early jurists treated the imāma and caliphate as 
synonymous.
127
 This might be because the meaning of imām came about in early 
Muslim period to refer to a religious leader. The religiosity of the Companions 
learned from the Prophet meant that they also become in charge of the affairs of the 
people (the concept of khalīfat rasūliallāh). As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
claims of the Shīʿites for ʿAlī and the first civil war canonized the earlier formative 
period a utopian ideal. This resulted in making the institutionalisation of the 
‗caliphate‘ into a system in which the ruler is labeled as the caliph, to delegitimise the 
Shīʿites, some Muʿtazilites and the Khāriji‘ite. Arguably, the ‗Umayyads also 
managed to gather enough traditions that were attributed to the Prophet regarding 
obedience to the ruler.
128
   
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, these kinds of discussions and questions concerning 
the obligatory nature of caliphate were a reaction against the Shīʿite doctrine of 
imāma.129 The modern formulation, instead, has been formulated by Orientalist 
writers. These writers in turn, already possessed a straightforward conceptual 
framework for the existence of a political theory when in fact, such a theory was the 
subject to much ambiguity. The early Orientalists were also ambivalent to the heated 
polemical discussions that occurred early in Muslim history.
130
 One possible example 
is found in the writings of Gibb when he speaks of the caliphate system.
131
 Gibb is not 
the only one; Western literature as a whole seems to have underestimated the 
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 Ahmed, ‗The classical Muslim State‘, p. 101. 
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 For example the work of  āqillānī. See the previous Chapter p. 68. 
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 See the previous Chapter  p. 68.  
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 Ibid. 
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 Gibb, Studies on the civilization of Islam.  Also see HAR Gibb, Mohammedanism; an historical 
survey, Oxford University Press, London, 1953. 
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polemical discussions of the classical and medieval period. For once the theological 
schools formalised their doctrine of belief, such discussions shaped the kind of 
question asked about leadership as well about the reading of scripture.  
 
Contemporary Muslim thinkers have understood the idea of a form of institution that 
is called the caliphate in late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century as a reaction to the Western 
colonialism. At the same time, they nevertheless take the Orientalist argument on 
board. The early discussion of Ibn Taymiyya, Māwardī and Ghazālī was read 
predominantly outside their polemical theological discussions, resulting in a narrative 
that suggests that there is a clearly indicated ―Islamic‖ political system.132  
 
Furthermore, Muslim history was written and understood by western academics, who 
framed the discourse as they understood it. This goes hand in hand with Edward 
Said's critique of the European Orientalists of the colonial age as they have been 
unable to ‗forsake the conceptual framework they had created in order to grasp -and 
dominate- the other‘.133  
      
As a whole, all the exegetical works are very similar in their explanation of the 
concept of khilāfa. It seems that many early exegetical works took the word kh-l-f for 
granted and usually did not examine it in detail, in comparison with their analysis of 
other words such as rahmān. Furthermore, verse 2:30 seems the most puzzling for 
exegesis as it begs the question of who is Adam (i.e. humanity) replacing? And if the 
Qur‘ān were addressing Adam as the khalῑfa in that verse then how could a khalῑfa act 
corruptly and shed blood? If the human being were God‘s representative, how then is 
this possible? 
 
Most of the classical and medieval works of exegesis end up trying to understand the 
angels‘ apparent questioning of God. As a consequence, many early works do not 
equate the Qur‘ānic concept of khilāfa with the caliphate system. Those that did, 
relied on narrations known to us as isrā’iliyāt.134  Certainly none of the early exegetes 
                                                 
132
 See Chapter Two p. 68.  
133
 See J Van Ess, ‗Text and Context: A Few Causal Remarks on the Topic‘, in IA  ierman (ed.), Text 
and Context in Islamic Societies, Ithaca Press, Reading, 2004, p. 3. 
134
 Body of ḥadῑth generated by Judo-Christian traditions rather than sources collected by Muslim 
traditions.  
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used the term khalῑfatullāh in their interpretation.135 The discussions in these periods 
reflect the evolution of schools of theology and their attempt to understand the nature 
of reality. The modern exegetic works reflect an attempt to accommodate pressing 
questions pertaining to the position of Islam in the modern world.  
 
As shown, the concept of kh-l-f at its highest levels connotes succession and 
guardianship of mankind in comparison with other creatures on earth. In its lowest 
form, it describes replacing or being replaced, being in dispute or disagreement as a 
descriptive language rather than a proposition for a political blueprint for governance.      
 
As Fazlur Rahman asserts, amongst all the creation, humankind is bestowed with 
morality, self-awareness, free will and a rational capacity that gives him/her heavy 
responsibility (amāna verse) and great potential (in knowing the names).136 
 
According to him, Muslim political thought has usually rationalised the existing status 
quo with an exeption of very few scholars. Of course here Rahman is refering to 
Sunnī political thinking.137 Further to this, Kerr also holds that the ‗constitutional 
theory of the caliphate‘ was utopian and later became ideological in modernist 
reformers such as ‗Abduh and Rashīd Riḍā.138  
 
Considering the conclusion of this chapter, the findings are in strong contrast to those 
of contemporary Muslim ideologies such as  izb al-Taḥrīr and to some extent the 
Muslim Brotherhood. 
 
However, the Qur‘ān and by extension the Prophetic tradition has no prescribed 
political system that is overtly clear. This comes as an uncomfortable and unsetteling 
conclusion for proponents of Muslim political theory. Although some Muslims would 
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 Al-Qādī, ‗The Term ‗Khilafa‘‘, p. 411. 
136
 See F. Rahman, ‗The Qur'ānic Concept of God, the Universe and Man‘ in BS Turner (ed.) Islam: 
Critical Concepts in Sociology, vol. 1, Routledge, London, 2003, pp. 48-62. 
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claim there is a clearly defined political system, the existing sectarian differences 
suggests otherwise.
139
      
 
The findings of this chapter thus beg two important questions. First, even if there has 
been no clearly prescribed de facto political structure to implement God‘s law, one 
inevitably needs a system (in the form of an Islamic state). This is the proposition that 
in order to have a functioning moral community one needs a territorial boundary to 
facilitate the needs of the community. In this case, this kind of proposition defines the 
moral community in terms of legal inferences and therefore implicitly requires a 
political system.  
 
This question is dealt with in the next chapter discussing concepts of ḥukm and its 
conceptual association(s). The second question that arises is: if there is no clear 
political prescription in the Qur‘ān, what then does exist? It is not possible to argue 
that the Qur‘ān has an apolitical worldview; as will be seen in the Chapter to come, 
there are many references to corruption (fasād) and injustices (ẓulm). In this case, 
would it be concievable to argue for a paradigm shift that takes its reference point 
away from the ‗systemic/structural‘ outlook into a fundamentally different lens? The 
study will examine this assertion in Chapter Six.  
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CHAPTER 5: THEORY OF LAW  
 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Often the early Muslim jurists saw the purpose of any government as to establish 
sharīʿa, which entails reinforcing justice and security.1 This kind of argumentation 
and perception of government is not independent of the kind found in the early 
political experiences of Muslims, particularly in the development of sectarian groups 
claiming particular rights over rulership.  
 
As the rise of the Khāriji‘ite brought with it the theo-political discussions on the 
governorship, the notion of ḥukm was one of the central concepts they called for lā 
ḥukma illā lilāh.2 This is the idea that any form of government or judgement 
necessarily must be based on what was sent down by God in the form of sharīʿa. 
Those that implement this form were seen as the people in authority (ulī al-amr) and 
obedience (ṭāʿa) therefore is an obligation for believers. A modern call for ḥukmu-
allāh contends that to establish God‘s law on earth, one also necessarily needs to 
establish an ―Islamic‖ state. In other words, the goal of establishing an ‗Islamic‘ state 
is to implement sharῑʿa. This debate has been referred to as the hākimiya assertion.3 
Yet as mentioned earlier, the contemporary concept of ―Islamic‖ state is contradictory 
in terms as the foundation of the state is a modern European conception both in 
structure and in form.
4
  
 
The task of this chapter is to understand the possible meaning(s) of ḥukm, sharīʿa and 
ulī al-amr; as articulated in the Qur‘ān. This chapter will first examine the root word 
ḥ-k-m and its derivatives, again using both the semantic and the thematic approaches, 
drawing an interesting Qur‘ānic weltanschauung in understanding ḥukm from an 
epistemological point of view. This chapter will also point out the link between the 
                                                 
1
 Sharīʿa Commonly translated as ―Islamic law‖, however this chapter will show the mistranslation of 
this concept looking at it from the Qur‘ānic perspective.  
2
 See Chapter Three p. 68.  
3
 See p. 183. 
4
 This argument is formulated by Wael Hallaq in his recent book The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, 
and Modernity's Moral Predicament, Columbia University Press, New York, 2013. 
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word ḥukm and other concepts, namely ʿadl, qiṣṭ, qiṣāṣ, ṭāʿa, ṣāliḥīn, and muḥsinīn, as 
well as the antithesis of ḥukm. These connections include fisq, fasād, and ẓulm. These 
concepts will also be examined to draw a holistic picture of the term ḥukm. 
Furthermore, exegesis will be used to shed further light on the concept of ḥukm with 
respect to particular verses that have been quoted as the most politically-oriented.  
 
 
5.2 THE MORPHOLOGY OF ḤUKM USING AN IZUTSIAN APPROACH     
 
According to Badawi et al, ḥukm indicates several meanings including: ‗to curb‘, ‗to 
restrain‘, ‗to govern‘, ‗to control‘, ‗to judge between‘, ‗to express an opinion‘, ‗to 
arbitrate‘, ‗to fortify‘, and ‗to recognise‘; it could also denote ‗wisdom‘ and 
‗knowledge‘.5 The root word could also denote ‗to tighten‘. There are 14 forms in the 
Qur‘ān, which occur 209 times. They include ḥakama, yuḥakkimūn, yuḥkim, uḥkima, 
yataḥākamū, ḥukm, ḥikmah, ḥakīm, aḥkam, muḥkamah, muḥkamāt, ḥakam ḥākimīn 
and ḥukkām.6  
 
Ḥakama usually means ‗to pass judgement‘, ‗to judge between‘, ‗to command‘, ‗to 
ordain‘, ‗to find a solution‘, ‗to decide‘ and ‗to conclude‘, as described in verses 4:58; 
68:36; 5:1; and 12:80. This form occurs 45 times in the Qur‘ān. Yuḥakkimūn denotes 
‗to make someone judge‘, ‗to choose someone to arbitrate‘, ‗to ask someone to 
arbitrate‘ and ‗to entrust someone with judgement‘. This form occurs twice such as in 
verse 4:65. Badawi et al state that yuḥkim signifies ‗to affirm‘ and ‗to protect‘, 
occurring once in verse 22:52. 
 
Badawi et al indicate further that when the trilateral root ḥ-k-m occurs in the form of 
uḥkima it then means ‗to be perfected‘, ‗to affirm‘, as in verse 11:1. This form appears 
once when God describes the scripture whose verses are perfected and affirmed. 
Furthermore, the same root word is found once in the form of yataḥākamū also 
meaning ‗to agree to bring dispute before a judge‘, as in verse 4:60.  
 
                                                 
5
 E Badawi & M Abdel Haleem, Arabic-English Dictionary of Qur’anic Usage, Brill, Leiden, 2008, p. 
226. 
6
 Ibid. pp. 226-229. 
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Ḥukm occurs 30 times in the Qur‘ān and has many interconnected meanings. It can 
denote ‗wisdom‘ or ‗sound judgement‘, as in verse 3:79 and verse 68:48.  adawi et al 
also suggest ḥukm denotes ‗ordinance‘, as in verse 13:37; ‗practices‘, ‗customs‘ and 
‗norm‘, for instance in verse 5:50. Ḥukm could also mean ‗verdict‘ and ‗decision‘, for 
example in verse 13:41. Alongside ḥukm denoting ‗God‘s Will‘, ‗scheme of things‘, 
‗realm‘, ‗kingdom‘ and ‗domain‘, it also denotes ‗article of law‘, ‗legal judgement‘ 
(such as in verse 5:43); ‗rule‘, ‗judgement between right and wrong‘ and 
‗responsibility‘ (for example in verse 12:40) The many meanings for this form 
suggest that the concept cannot only mean ‗law‘. Debatably then, no attention has 
been given to explaining the connections and the significance of the other meaning(s) 
of the concepts arising from ḥukm.  
 
Likewise, the meaning of ‗arbitrator‘ or ‗judge‘ in the form of ḥakam occurs only 
three times in the Qur‘ān. The same meaning in the plural form also occurs four times 
in the form of ḥākimīn. In Arabic, ḥukkām in the plural could mean ‗judges‘ or 
‗rulers‘. In the Qur‘ān, however, it occurs only once in verse 2:188 with the meaning 
of judges.  
 
The forms and their semantic connections discussed above can be better understood 
from Diagram 9 below, which shows the derivative words and their occurrences.
7
 
Diagram 10 shows the root word ḥ-k-m with its connected semantic and thematic 
fields such as ʿadl, qiṣṭ, qiṣāṣ, ḥaq, mu’minūn, shuhadā’, takhshaw, ʿilm, ṭāʿa, ṣāliḥīn, 
muḥsinīn and taqwā. These interconnected words are selected by their reoccurrences 
with the root word ḥ-k-m. These concepts can be used to establish a holistic 
understanding of ḥ-k-m. The concept of ḥukm does not stand alone in a web of 
complex interconnection to other concepts that make up the Qur‘ānic worldview.8 
Furthermore, there are non-linguistic fields that surround these concepts, namely 
tawḥīd (oneness of God) and ākhirah (accountability to God by knowing there is a 
judgement day in the hereafter) which need to be in the mind of the reader when 
looking for the Qur‘ānic weltanschauung. 
 
                                                 
7
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8
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To make this analysis easier, this study has focused on verses that were historically 
noted as a direct order to follow God‘s ḥukm (especially in verses 5:44, 5:45, 5:47, 
5:48 and 13:37). These verses, depending on their hermeneutical understanding, are 
significant implication in understanding ḥukm, its application and even the definition 
and boundaries of belief. After looking at the exegesis, this chapter will bring together 
the thematic meaning(s) of ḥukm. 
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Diagram 9: The Morphology of Ḥ-k-m 
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5.2.1 The Connection of Ḥukm with other Concepts  
 
Diagram 10 shows the thematic connection of ḥukm with other concepts such as fisq, 
khu th, jāhiliyah,  ulm, ʿadl, qiṣṭ, mīzān, iḥsān, ṣidq and imān. Due to time restraints, 
only a sample of the meanings of these concepts are explained in detail below:   
  
Diagram 10: Semantic and Thematic Fields of Ḥ-k-m 
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5.2.1.1 The Connection of Ḥukm with Ḥikma  
 
Interestingly, one of the derivatives of ḥ-k-m also means ‗wisdom‘ or ‗prudence‘ in 
the form of ḥikma, which occurs 20 times and ḥakīm 97 times (referring at times to 
God being all wise).
9
 The interconnection of ḥukm and ḥikma is very important, 
connoting that the one who judges needs also to be wise. The former relates 
judgement, authority, deliverance, verdict, and decision. The latter relates to general 
knowledge, wisdom and to having foresight. Hence, one possible inter-relational 
connection between the two concepts is that in order to judge one needs to also have 
foresight in judgement and possess wisdom.  
 
Again, a related linguistic form which sheds further light on the root word under 
discussion is aḥkam, occurring twice, referring to the most wise; another form is 
muḥkamah, occurring once, and its plural form muḥkamāt (also once), referring to a 
single interpretation,  something that free of ambiguity, decisive and clear.
10
 
 
 
5.2.1.2 The Connection between Ḥukm and Khalīfa 
 
Verse 38:26 also mentions both ḥukm and khalīfa together when addressing David: 
O David! We did indeed make thee a khalīfa on earth: so judge [fa-ḥkum] thou 
between men in truth (and justice): nor follow thou the lusts, (of thy heart), for they 
will mislead thee from the Path of Allah: for those who wander astray from the Path 
of Allah, is a Penalty Grievous, for that they forget the Day of Account. 
 
God describes him as a khalīfa and orders him to judge in a just manner. In this verse 
the term khalīfa can be understood as a king or a ruler.11 It is also worth mentioning 
that, as we will see, none of the exegetes took this verse to apply to all Prophets being 
khulafā’, nor do they infer that David‘s ḥukm is evidence for a Muslim political 
system. The siyāq (inter-textuality) of the verse in second part also emphasises the 
gravity of following one‘s desires that might make David err from God‘s path; hence 
the weighty responsibility of being in David‘s position.  
                                                 
9
 See Abū Al-Qāsim Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, Mufradāt alfāḍ al-Qur’ān, vol. 1  2, Dār Al-Qalam, 
Damascus, 1997.  
10
 Badawi & Abdel Haleem, Arabic-English Dictionary of Qur‘anic Usage, pp. 226-229. 
11
 W Al-Qādī, ‗The Term ‗Khalifa‘ in Early Exegetical Literature‘, in A Rippin (ed.), The Quran: 
Formative Interpretation, Ashgate, USA, 1999, pp. 404-408. Also refer to Chapter Three p. 133 on the 
meaning of khalīfa. 
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For that reason, the siyāq of the verse is vital in determining the verse‘s meaning. For 
example, when the Prophet Yaḥyā (John) is described as been given ḥukm when 
young (in verse 19:12), we know from historical accounts that John was neither a king 
nor had any political authority. Here the word ḥukm could mean that God granted 
John knowledge and wisdom from a young age, which prompted people to come to 
him for advice. John was able to judge between people as part of his wisdom and not 
as part of any ‗political‘ position. This has important implication as the discussion 
more often than not refers to the role of the Prophets as both a Prophet and a 
statesman, and particularly relates it to Prophet Mohammed.
12
 
 
Even in situations where the majority of scholars see the Prophet as having acted as a 
law maker, Rahman is of the opinion that there is strong evidence in the Qur‘ān 
suggesting that the Prophet was a moral reformist. Apart from occasional decisions 
(which were ad hoc cases) he seldom set down legislations in the Qur‘ān.13 
 
 
5.2.1.3 The Connection between Ḥukm and ‘Adl 
 
Within the semantic field of ḥukm, the only other concept that is connected strongly is 
ʿadl. The Qur‘ān mentions only two forms of this root word, ʿadālah referring to 
acting equitably, judging justly, compensating, making straight, making upright, and 
causing to be well–proportioned.14 
  
ʿAdl occurs 14 times, connoting ‗justice‘, ‗fairness‘, ‗equity‘ and ‗uprightness‘.15 One 
example is in verse 16:90, which states:  
 
Verily God commands justice and well-doing and giving to kindred; and He prohibits 
lewdness and wickedness and oppression; He exhorts you that haply ye may be 
admonished. 
 
                                                 
12
 See for example W. M. Watt, Muhammad: prophet and statesman, Oxford University Press, London, 
1961. 
13
 F. Rahman, Islamic Methodology in History, Central Institute of Islamic Research, Karachi, 1965, 
p.10. 
14
 Badawi & Abdel Haleem, Arabic-English Dictionary of Qur’anic Usage, p. 605. 
15
 Ibid. 
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Semantically then, ʿadl points towards the meaning ‗to put something in its 
right/proper way or order‘, ‗to be equal to‘, ‗to be straight‘ and ‗to be upright‘ 
connoting ‗to be of impeccable character‘.16 In this case, it is the balancing of an act 
or judgement that needs to be put in the right place and given it its due. Failing to do 
so is the unbalancing of an act, which would lead to the state of injustice. One can 
also see an interconnectedness between ʿadl and ḥikmah. If ʿadl is putting everything 
in its proper place then ḥikmah is acting properly in every situation. As mentioned 
earlier then, ḥikmah and ḥukm are also connected to the concept of judgement as 
putting things in their right place. To act justly is to give things their true value and 
put them in their appropriate place. The meaning of ḥukm, ḥikma and ʿadl seem to 
convey an ʿām (general) connotation, as is demonstrated in the sections below.   
 
 
5.2.1.3.1 The Connection between ‘Ad  and Qisṭ 
 
It is true to say that ʿadl connotes many interrelated meanings including ‗equity‘. 
‗fairness‘ and ‗proportion‘ as well as ‗ransom‘ and ‗compensation‘.17 Another concept 
that is connected to ʿadl is qisṭ. From the root word q-s-ṭ there are five different forms 
in the Qur‘ān which occur 25 times. The root word means ‗justice‘, ‗equity‘, 
‗balance‘, ‗measure‘ and ‗instalment‘.18 The form qisṭ is connected to mīzān (plu. 
mawāzīn) in five verses (6:152, 11:85, 21:47, 55:9 and 57:25) and to ḥaq in two 
verses (7:8 and 42:17). The root word of mīzān is w-z-n referring to ‗balance‘, ‗scale 
weight‘, ‗to estimate‘, ‗to compare‘; ‗justice‘; ‗to be wise‘; ‗to be parallel with‘ and 
‗to be equal or equivalent to‘.19 It is not surprising then that mīzān is associated with 
qisṭ and ḥukm, as they convey similar meanings. In reference to ḥukm, denoting when 
one is put in the position of ḥukm, one should be balanced, fair, equal and within 
scale. Again these verses seem to indicate general meaning(s). It is undeniable that 
qisṭ, qiṣāṣ, mīzān and ʿadl are all thematically interlinked.  
 
                                                 
16
 Ibid.  
17
 C. P. Turner ‗ ediuzzaman and the concept of 'Adl: Towards a nursian ontology of divine 
justice‘, Asian Journal of Social Science, vol. 38, no. 4, 2010, p. 560. 
18
 Badawi & Abdel Haleem, Arabic-English Dictionary of Qur’anic Usage, p. 756. 
19
 Ibid. p. 1024.  
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5.2.1.4 The Connection between Ḥukm with Q    , I   ḥ and Ḥ q 
 
As for qiṣāṣ the trilateral root is q-ṣ-ṣ. This form occurs four times in the Qur‘ān 
referring to ‗just or fair retribution‘ and ‗retribution equal to the crime‘.20 These two 
concepts are both connected to ḥukm, ḥikma, ḥaq and ʿadl, which in turn are 
connected to iṣlāḥ. That is ‗to be or to become good‘; ‗uncorrupted‘, ‗right‘, ‗just‘, 
‗virtuous‘, ‗righteous‘, ‗honest‘, ‗to be in a good state‘ (proper state); ‗reconciliation‘ 
and ‗peace‘.21 The trilateral root ṣ-l-ḥ has ten forms in the Qur‘ān occurring 240 
times.
22
  
 
In addition to the above, ḥaq is usually translated as ‗truth‘, but it also means ‗centre‘, 
‗to be sure‘, ‗to verify‘, ‗to give someone his or her dues‘, ‗to deserve‘, ‗to give 
someone their rights‘ and ‗to prove a point, an argument.‘23 Of this root eight forms 
occur 268 times, connecting the meaning of ‗judging in truth‘ when addressing 
Prophets or giving general commands. The above concepts all encompass and 
enhance the meaning of ḥukm, that is judgement in justice and giving someone their 
proper due. The state which iṣlāḥ aims to achieve is to struggle against the state of 
fisq, khubth, and  ulm, which are also connected to fasād.  
 
 
5.2.3 The Antithesis of Ḥukm 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, fasād means ‗to corrupt‘, ‗to spoil‘, ‗to decay‘, 
‗to fall into disorder‘, ‗to be perverted‘, ‗to make trouble‘ and ‗to be wicked‘.24 Five 
different forms occur from the trilateral root f-s-d and it is mentioned 50 times in the 
Qur‘ān.25  
 
Fisq refers to something coming out from another in a corrupt and wicked manner. 
Within the Qur‘ānic context, fisq usually either describes a characteristic of the 
individual or society that is acting in deviation, which also entails going against God‘s 
                                                 
20
 Ibid. p. 761. 
21
 Ibid. p. 531. 
22
 Ibid.  
23
 Ibid. p. 224.  
24
 Ibid. p. 709. 
25
Ibid. pp. 709-710. 
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commands.
26
 The root word is f-s-q, which has five forms in the Qur‘ān and occurs 54 
times.
27
 The connection between ḥukm and fisq is made in verses 5:47 and 5:49. 
Izutsu would argue that fisq is one aspect of kufr, which relates to ingratitude, 
indicating some sort of depravity.
28
  
 
In addition to fasād and fisq, khubth also has the sense of ‗wickedness‘, ‗corruption‘, 
‗evil‘, ‗impurities‘ and denotes ‗to be bad‘. The root word kh-b-th occurs 16 times in 
six forms.
29
 Verse 21:74 suggests this connection between the spread of corruption in 
society and the connection of ḥikma and ḥukm as a way of overcoming societal 
disorders.           
 
Furthermore, verse 5:50 might also be significant in acknowledging that the state of 
ignorance, foolishness and being rash has been the state of a kind of ḥukm that is 
undesirable and to some extent irrational by the virtue of asking the question ‗Do they 
then seek after a judgment of (the Days of) Ignorance? But who, for a people whose 
faith is assured, can give better judgment than God?‘(5:50). This is the task for those 
who are in the position of judgement to be sufficiently aware not to take the path of 
foolishness, quick temper and peevishness.  
 
Simply put, if one‘s judgement is harsh, foolish, unfair and unjust, the spread of 
corruption and fasād is expected. For this reason, these concepts are seen as negative, 
thematic connections to the concept of ḥukm, which shed further light on the complex 
web of interconnection of the Qur‘ānic weltanschauung of ḥukm.  
 
 
5.2.3.1 The Connection of Ḥukm with Ẓu m 
 
The emphases of ḥukm as judgment that is necessarily just, fair and proportionate 
connotes that a judgment of unproportionality is an act of injustice or  ulm. Another 
important concept which is strongly connected to both ḥukm and ʿadl is  ulm, which 
is often translated as injustice. The trilateral root  -l-m also means ‗darkness‘, ‗to 
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descend‘, ‗to put something in the wrong place‘, ‗to act improperly‘; ‗to cause 
someone to suffer a loss‘; ‗to wrong someone‘; ‗to act unjustly‘, ‗to be subjected to 
injustice‘, ‗tyranny‘ and ‗oppression‘.30 Of the root word, 14 forms occur a total of 
315 times in the Qur‘ān.31 As mentioned earlier, one in the position to judge has the 
primary aim of reducing the spread of fasād, khu th,  ulm and fisq. This comes with 
the active aim of iṣlāḥ as well as having the mindset of taqwā.32     
 
These concepts assume a deep understanding by the reader of what exactly fisq, 
khubth and even taqwā actually mean other than their semantic meanings; the Qur‘ān 
does not define the concepts but it does use them. It is almost as if the assumption is 
that the concepts are already known, which consequently has a major implication on 
what or how virtue, principles and concepts are generally understood. As Reinhart 
asserts, the Qur‘ān‘s message seems to be exhorting Muslims to perform the right act 
rather than defining right and wrong.
33
 One can even go so far as to claim that the 
epistemological foundations of these terms (or principles) are assumed to be rooted 
within us. The same can be said of the concept of justice, or of the concept of good 
society. Rather than describing the exact details, it is reinforcing the concept as it is 
understood by the receiver.   
 
The ambiguity or rather the absence of detailed instructions for the meanings of ḥukm 
and ʿadl and the way in which to achieve this ḥukm is thought by this author as 
intentional. It is the belief of this author that these details were left out intentionally to 
preserve the universality of these principles as principles. It is not a political theory in 
the instrumental sense but rather a moral imperative or a higher goal in the sense of 
principles (this will be discussed further in Chapter Six). One of the main pieces of 
evidence for this claim is the Qur‘ān‘s silence on how to apply such principles and the 
detailed prescriptive meanings of these principles.
34
 This brings us to the question of 
how do all these concepts bring about the Qur‘ānic weltanschauung of ḥukm? What 
are these aḥkām (plur. ḥukm) that the Qur‘ān speaks of? The next section attempts to 
answer this question.  
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5.3 THE EXEGETICAL VIEWS OF Ḥ-K-M  
 
Viewing the possible meanings of ḥukm lexically is one angle in understanding the 
depth of these verses. The views of the exegeses are equally valuable in understanding 
the concept of ḥukm. For example, the Khāriji‘ites call for lā ḥukma illā lilāh refers to 
three verses between 5:44-47, ending in the following manner:  
…and whosoever judgeth not by that which God hath sent down - those then they are 
the unbelievers (ungrateful/ingratitude). (5:44)  
…and whosoever judgeth not by that which God hath sent down - those then! they are 
the wrong-doers. (5:45)  
…and whosoever judgeth not by that which God hath sent down, then those! - they 
are the transgressors. (5:47)  
 
These verses signify that those who do not apply God‘s ‗ḥukm‘ are the disbelievers 
(kufār), the wrong-doers ( ālimūn) and the transgressors (fāsiqūn). Of course, the 
immediate question is what does this ḥukm mean? Is there as ā  al-nuzῡl for the 
revelation of these verses? What are the inter-textuality (siyāq) of these verses? And 
are the verses universal or addressing a particular people in a particular situation? 
Many exegetes have argued that the sharῑʿa is what God is referring to in these verses 
of ḥukmu-allāh, which is narrowly defined by some as jurisprudence derived through 
some of the laws revealed in the Qur‘ān.35  
 
However, a closer examination shows that these verses were not addressing the 
Muslims at the time but rather the people of the book. According to Ṭabarī the last 
part of 5:44 is a statement towards those people who knowingly judge differently 
from what has been demanded by God.
36
  Furthermore, Ṭabarī points out verses 5:44, 
5:45 and 5:47 are not related to Muslims but to the unbelievers or the people of the 
book.
37
  oth Ṭabarī and Muqātil look at the as ā  al-nuzῡl of these verses and 
suggest that they were addressing the people of the book who did not obey their own 
religious laws. This ḥukm is understood by Ṭabarī as religious laws and not as a 
political law. It is obvious however, that Ṭabarī does not go into detail regarding the 
meaning of ḥukm, especially verse 13:37. 
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Qurṭubī, like Ṭabarī, shows that some have taken these verses to address the kufār and 
not the Muslims.
38
 Others argued that the word ‗disbelievers‘ was addressing the Jews 
of the time, ‗the wrong doers‘ addressing the Muslims and ‗the transgressors‘ the 
Christians of the time.
39
 However, from the siyāq it seems that all of these verses are 
actually addressing the people of Moses.  
 
Whatever the case, it is clear that there are several possibilities for interpreting these 
verses, none of which indicate that ḥukm refers to political governance or a direct 
command for an ―Islamic state‖. This is to say that the description given in previous 
verses (5:42-3) suggests that a group of Jews have asked the Prophet Mohammed to 
arbitrate between them, inferring that his arbitration is just. These verses state:  
Listeners for the sake of falsehood! Greedy for illicit gain! If then they have recourse 
unto thee (Muhammad) judge between them or disclaim jurisdiction. If thou 
disclaimest jurisdiction, then they cannot harm thee at all. But if thou judgest, judge 
between them with equity. Lo! Allah loveth the equitable. (42)  
How come they unto thee for judgment when they have the Torah, wherein Allah 
hath delivered judgment (for them)? Yet even after that they turn away. Such (folk) 
are not believers. (43) 
 
Having said that, historically the three verses (5:44-7) were used by the Khāriji‘ites, 
as discussed earlier, designating ʿAlī as a disbeliever for agreeing to negotiate with 
Muʿāwiya, which meant that ʿAlī did not rule according to God‘s laws and that gave 
the Khāriji‘ite the right to draw a boundary of belief in which killing would be 
justified.
40
 As discussed earlier, the discourse on who is a believer and who is not, 
with its obsession of boundaries, started with the Khāriji‘ites quoting these verses. 
The boundary debate is essential because there were consequences when one is 
declared as being outside the faith.  
 
The problem that lies with the Khāriji‘ites‘ claim is their conclusive assertion that 
they have both understood what God has intended to mean regarding ḥukmu-allāh, 
and that they have the absolute right to implement it. Contrary to the Khāriji‘ite view, 
there is a majority consensus by the classical and medieval mufasirῡn that the verses 
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relate to the Jews.
41
 In these verses the meaning of ḥukm is seen to be religious and 
not political. Therefore, there is a distinction to be made between political power, 
judicial rulings and religious legal rulings.   
 
Ṭūsī also narrates accounts regarding the above verses similar to Ṭabarī and Qurṭubī, 
suggesting that 5:42-49 addresses the Jews first and the Christians just after. 
However, he does emphasise that Muslims should abide by the sharῑʿa including the 
law against the adulteress. This is because one of the as ā  al-nuzῡl suggests that one 
of the Jewish tribes came to the Prophet asking for his judgement hoping for an easier 
law, arguably to avoid the Torah.
42
 In support, Ṭabarsī suggests, these verses were 
addressed to the Jews when they came to ask the Prophet to judge on the issue of 
adultery. According to Ṭabarsī, in the verses that follow (5:43-47), God questions the 
Jews (at the time of the Prophet) for asking the Prophet to judge between them even 
though they do not acknowledge his Prophecy. At the same time, they are not obeying 
the regulations of the Torah, as they hope instead to get a more lenient judgment from 
Mohammed.
43
  
 
Hence, the specific verses from 5:42-45 continue to speak of the Jews asking the 
Prophet to judge between them without acknowledging his Prophecy. This is 
particularly seen in verses 5:43 and 5:44 when God emphasises that the Torah also 
contains God‘s laws which they could have returned to but instead knowingly decided 
not to, fearing people and not God: 
It was We who revealed the Torah (to Moses); therein was guidance and light. By its 
standard have been judged the Jews, by the Prophet who bowed (as in Islam) to 
Allah's will, by the Rabbis and the Doctors of Law: for to them was entrusted the 
protection of Allah's Book, and they were witnesses thereto: therefore fear not men, 
but fear Me, and sell not My Signs for a miserable price. If any do fail to judge by 
(the light of) what Allah hath revealed, they are (no better than) Unbelievers.   
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These verses have led to two kinds of interpretation. One group saw these verses as 
particular (khāṣ and muqayad) addressing only the Christians and the Jews.  The 
second group saw these verses as general and universal (ʿām and muṭlaq) addressing 
everyone, including Muslims.       
 
Ṭabāṭabā‘ī belongs to the latter group in seeing these verses as both general and 
universal, even though he narrates the same as ā  al-nuzῡl. That is, a group of Jews 
asking the Prophet regarding the law against the adulteress and wanting him to give 
his judgement which would be different to what is in the Torah.
44
 In concordance with 
the rest, Ibn ʿᾹshūr also narrates the same sabab al-nuzῡl and goes into depth on 
whether these verses were actually meant to be muqayad, which would mean that they 
are only addressing the people of the book, or muṭlaq, which consequently would 
mean that they would also apply to Muslims.
45
   
 
Nevertheless, all the exegetes are in agreement that the ḥukm is referring to religious 
laws that were sent down to all of the Prophets. In this case, ḥukm is used in two 
ways: one is that these verses are addressing the Prophet - to judge justly; and the 
second is that this judgement is addressing the people of the book.
46
  
 
Accordingly, this is significant in two ways; firstly the meaning of ḥukm seems to be 
inclined towards judging (including religious laws) rather than anything overtly 
political. Secondly, these rulings are addressing the Prophet only, and the khiṭā  
(addressee) is not addressing the Muslims, although one can infer that it also applies 
to Muslims. Perhaps the Qur‘ānic point for Muslims is the ‗attitude‘ of asking for 
arbitration from a Prophet and then choosing not to take what the Prophet said. 
Especially in the verses that follow (5:4:48-50) and the ones before (5:40-3). The 
exegetes above support the notion that ḥukm was understood as religiously and not 
politically although there are political implications if one takes the wider meaning of 
political.     
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However, it can be said that the general point behind the verse(s) -sha’n al-nuzῡl 
(situational circumstances) still applies to the Muslims, in that they should obey 
God‘s law. What is noteworthy here is that when looking at the severity of the 
language used in these verses helps one to understand the sha’n al-nuzῡl. In other 
words, saying that those people who avoid God‘s laws are the disbelievers, the 
wrongdoers and the transgressors emphasises the gravity of knowingly hiding 
knowledge and deceiving people, rather stating the need to establish a political system 
in order to implement ḥukmu-allāh. Therefore, one could argue that what is meant in 
these verses is the actual mind-set involved in avoiding what one knows and 
attempting to deceive the Prophet knowingly. Here one is not denying God‘s laws or 
saying that they should be followed, but merely pointing out that these verses do not 
assert any form of an overtly political structure or system.  
 
Yet, in modern times, ḥukmu-allāh has been formulated as the ḥākimiya argument by 
many political Islamists such as Māwdūdī.47 Semantically, the word ḥākimiya comes 
from the word ḥukm. The following section examines this ḥākimiya argument in even 
more detail.  
 
 
5.3.1 The Modern Development of Ḥ k m y  Theory 
 
The argument for ḥākimiya is articulated on the basis of a dichotomy between God's 
divine sovereignty and ―western‖ notions of human sovereignty. Popular sovereignty 
consists of people deciding on laws for themselves and freely obeying them, 
therefore, the assumption is that people are not subjected to any other power or 
authority.
48
  
 
Although there is a disagreement between ‗Islamists‘ as to what it means to obey 
God's sovereignty, the same verse 4:59 is often quoted in support for that argument. 
For example, according to Ghannouchi, this verse established ‗the basis of the Islamic 
                                                 
47
 A. A. Mawdūdī, Political theory of Islam, Islamic Publications, Lahore, 1980.  
48
 See Raja  ahlul article ‗People vs God The logic of 'divine sovereignty'‘ in A Saeed (ed.) Islamic 
political thought and governance, vol. 4, Routledge, London, 2011, pp. 268-269. 
Theory of Law 
184 
 
social, political, and religious system. It is the legal cornerstone of the Islamic state 
and constitution‘.49  
   
Expressed in another way, the dichotomy has been articulated as either government 
by people who govern themselves by laws of their own making, or government by 
God according to divine law. However, what is missing in this dichotomy, and 
arguably is a simplistic distinction, is both the assumption that people in reality have a 
genuine choice, and that there is a manual of divine law to be applied. It is not within 
the scope of this research to discuss the former, however the latter point will be 
explained further.  
 
One of the definitions of sovereignty is the ultimate authority that established values, 
rights and obligations.
50
 In terms of ontology of sovereignty, in the theist 
weltanschauung, it could be seen as God or a transcendent reality. This is also divided 
into first order and second order. First order can be seen as the natural Divine law, in 
the second order it is the interpretation of these values, rights and obligation. The 
second order is the epistemology of the first order (the ontology). In this sense, the 
revealed law needs to be understood and hence interpreted. Where most of the debate 
and dispute occurs might present itself in the confusion of the first order with the 
second order, concluding that the second order is itself divine sovereignty.     
 
In his argument relating to the idea of God‘s sovereignty, Kerr contends the same 
point suggested earlier. Taking the above assertion, Kerr argues that Islam as a 
‗theocracy‘ is only true if one follows the first order of sovereignty (in the ultimate 
sense), explaining that such an idea is: 
meaningless in the practical sense, for in the later ―theocracy‖ signifies the rule of a 
priestly or other supposedly divinely inspired individual or class, which is absent in 
Islam. An effort to apply the initial premise of divine sovereignty to temporal affairs 
must inevitably come to grips with the question of interpretation and deal with what 
have been called ―the procedural test of Islamicity‖.51  
 
Although Kerr points out this difficulty, it has been taken for granted that theocracy 
might still be part of Islam. Fundamentally, this thesis shows, as does Kerr, that the 
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question of governance and government lies in the heart of interpretation and 
therefore also questions of the second order. This thesis also shows that in the Qur‘ān 
there is an overwhelming silence about government, a fact which has significant 
implications. 
 
Paradoxically, Asad himself notes that Islamic teachings do not only circumscribe 
man‘s relation with God ‗but also lay down a definite scheme of social behaviour to 
be adopted in result of that relation‘.52 The ultimate purpose is for the creation to 
comply with the will of the Creator. The Qur‘ān, therefore, outlines how one should 
live according to God‘s Law. At an ontological level the existence of this cannot be 
disputed (and is not in this thesis). For what is at stake here is not an ontological 
argument but rather an epistemological one. According to the Qur‘ān, although God 
has ordained how humans should behave, the question remaining is how to 
understand these laws and how to apply them.  
 
The paradox in Asad‘s argument is in his following statements:  
As is well known, not all the laws which form the subject matter of conventional 
Muslim jurisprudence (fiqh) rest on injunctions expressed in clear-cut terms of 
command and prohibition in Qur‘ān and Sunnah.  y far the larger part of fiqhī rulings 
are the outcome of various deductive methods of reasoning, among which qiyās 
(deduction through analogy) figure most prominently.
53
  
 
Of course, these rulings become enshrined in most people‘s mind as the core 
component of sharīʿa rather than as ijtihādī matter derived by the mujtahid. 
Therefore, as Asad himself argues, one can conclude that nothing is ordained by God 
in the Qur‘ān and the sunna to avoid rigidity.    
 
His conclusion however is paradoxical in that for Asad there is an ordained political 
theory that manifests itself in the shape of an ―Islamic state‖ even if nothing is 
mentioned in the Qur‘ān. From another perspective, the silence could easily have been 
interpreted as a moral requirement rather than a political one; as a moral vision rather 
than a political vision; whereas Asad does not allow for this possibility. To answer 
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this question, Asad, as well as many other scholars, argue that there are clear 
undoubted nuṣūṣ that make up the sharīʿa which cannot be interpreted differently: 
By their very nature, they are not subject to conflicting interpretations; in fact, they 
are in no need for any ―interpretation‖ whatsoever, being absolutely self contained 
and unambiguous in their wording.
54
         
 
Again, this is true on an ontological level while the problem of interpretation and 
understanding context and meanings are at the epistemic level. Many writers have 
failed to make a clear distinction.  
 
It is true that Asad argues strongly that ‗the outward forms and functions of an Islamic 
state need not necessarily correspond to any ―historical precedent‖.55 Although he also 
includes the outright clear-cut and unambiguous ordinances of Islam as he puts it, it is 
not that clear-cut when one carefully examines the understanding of the spirit of the 
law on the part of the rāshidūn. Using the evidence of rāshidūn by arguing that each 
one had created his own style of governance suggest that the structure does not need 
to be the same as long as the sharīʿa is applied.56 What begs the question here is what 
sharīʿa in the Qur‘ān is if it is not fiqh?    
 
Although for Muslims it is true that God is the ultimate sovereign ontologically (as 
mentioned above), some have confused its epistemological implications. That is to 
say, unavoidably, the divine message is subject to interpretation by human beings. 
Thus, there are two very important points made here. One is this ḥākimiya is true 
ontologically to God at the level of all creation and the entire cosmos. If ḥākimiya 
were interpreted to be legal (law) based rules to govern human beings then these 
inferences in the Qur'ān are very few in number.57 The second point is that the sheer 
number of ―Islamic laws‖ have developed discursively post-Qur‘ānic era with actual 
human involvement in interpreting and deriving law.       
 
Afsaruddin makes a similar observation as this thesis. She argues that the greatest 
contention is in the Islamist concept of ‗divine sovereignty‘ or ‗divine governance‘. 
She further maintains that the idea of ḥākimiya is not discussed in any of the classical 
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or medieval works but rather it appears in modern works articulated mainly in the 
20th century.
58
 Thus, as Afsaruddin observes correctly, the concept used in the Qur'ān 
to refer to God's domain and sovereignty is mulk, mālik and malakūt.59  
 
Interestingly, Afsaruddin postulates that the understanding of ḥukm in classical terms 
had no political genealogy but rather the early commentators on the Qur'ān 
understood the concept to refer only to God's judgement of human beings.
60
 
Consequently, the concept of ḥukm had no political significance.61 She raises an 
important question to be answered by those that advocate ḥākimiya: why do writers 
like Mawdūdī choose to refer to God's sovereignty as ḥākimiya and not mulukiyya or 
sulṭāniyya? In particular, Afsaruddin further maintains that the concept of ḥukm is not 
used in the sense of sovereignty or dominion (like verses 6:57; 12:40). Rather it refers 
to God's judgment of human beings, especially in its eschatological terms.
62
 Further to 
this, the concept of sulṭān is referred to as God's Sovereignty.63  
 
Again, Afsaruddin rightly observes, as this thesis pointed out, that the first use of the 
concept of ḥukm as denoting a political imperative was by the Khāriji'ites as they 
argued for God's judgment.
64
 The mistake they made as discussed is associating their 
own actions to be the true actions of God and confusing the truth of the statement with 
their understanding of it. They in effect put themselves in God's place. The same 
seems to be argued when the word ḥākimiya is used in the modern times. The actions 
and ideology of the Khāriji‘ites seem not too far from some modern movements such 
as al-Qāʿida in Afghanistan or the hijra wa al-takfīr in Egypt.   
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In addition, Fazlur Rahman suggests that the idea of ḥākimiya in the Qur'ān is a very 
different conception from what writers such as Mawdūdī have made it to be. He 
maintains that the idea of ḥākimiya does not directly refer to legal or political 
sovereignty, but refers rather to the idea that 'God has bestowed a certain constitution 
both to this universe and to man‘.65  
 
Additionally, the idea that one must obey God is also linked to the verse lā ḥukm ilā 
lillāh (wa man lam yaḥkum  imā anzal allāh fa ulā'ik hum al-kāfirūn 5:44-48). 
Hence, due to the hermeneutical tendency of the modern Qur'ānic interpretations to 
simplify the message of the Qur‘ān, writers like Quṭub and Mawdūdī have imposed a 
single meaning to the verse.
66
 Concepts such as ḥukm, mā anzal allāh and kāfir are 
taken to be reflecting just one meaning, in this case, ḥukm is interpreted to refer to 
rule, what has God sent is seen ―Islamic law‖, and kāfirūn are understood as 
unbelievers, ignoring both as ā  al-nuzūl and sha’n al-nuzāl. Further to this, as 
explained in Chapter Two, the semantic meanings of these concepts are much more 
complex. The context in which the verse was revealed has been ignored. Furthermore, 
as has been demonstrated, the meaning of ḥukm, although interpreted in modern times 
to refer to political rule, also has come to mean ‗to judge‘.67 Missing in the discussion 
is how this ruling or judgement is to be carried out and at what level, that is whether 
by the individual or the state; is this ḥukm in the domain of God or the Prophet or is it 
generally in the domain of the ʿulamā or political leaders?68 
 
Ḥākimiya is also connected to concepts of ―obedience‖ (ṭāʿa) and ―people in 
authority‖ (ulī al-amr). These two concepts also emerged in Chapter Three. The next 
section suggests the diverse meanings of this verse.   
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5.3.2 The Concept of Obedience (Ṭ ʿ ) and People of Authority (U ī   -Amr)  
 
The idea of ulī al-amr and obedience (ṭāʿa) is also linked in the verses stating that one 
should obey those in authority. This concept also emerged in Muslim history as 
discussed in Chapter Three. Lambton states that it was the later jurists that were 
demanding absolute obedience to the caliph ‗as a religious obligation defined in terms 
of the sharīʿa and justified by the Qur'ānic obligation Obey God, Obey the Prophet 
and those in authority among you‘.69 One of the core elements of Muslim political 
theology hinges, to a large degree, on a fundamental verse 4:59 that states:  
O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the messenger and those of you who are in 
authority; and if ye have a dispute concerning any matter, refer it to Allah and the 
messenger if ye are (in truth) believers in Allah and the Last Day. That is better and 
more seemly in the end. 
 
The Qur‘ānic term amr means ‗matter‘, ‗affair‘, ‗order‘ and ‗authority‘. Afsaruddin 
further suggests that in:  
Qur‘anic usage (4:59), amr, as in the collocation ulī ‘l-amr (―those possessing 
authority‖), refers broadly to moral and social authority, while ḥukm, particularly in 
relation to God (6:57; 12:40, etc.), refers to ―judgment‖ and ―arbitration.‖  y the 
ninth century of the common era, amr would acquire the additional meaning of 
―political authority‖ while ḥukm continued to be used in its polyvalent significations 
of ―arbitration,‖ ―legal ruling‖, and ―moral judgment‖. 70  
 
The phrase ulī al-amr has given rise to multiple interpretations. Some have found the 
basis of political authority in this verse.
71
 However, there remains the questions as to 
whom is it addressing and as to what is the function of ulī al-amr. It is noteworthy 
that this phrase occurs in another place in the same chapter 4:83, stating: 
 
And when there comes to them information about [public] security or fear, they 
spread it around. But if they had referred it back to the Messenger or to those of 
authority among them, then the ones who [can] draw correct conclusions from it 
would have known about it. And if not for the favour of Allah upon you and His 
mercy, you would have followed Satan, except for a few.  
 
Our focus is on 4:59 as most of the literature highlights this verse as critical evidence 
for an overtly political theory in the Qur'ān. There are, however, occasions of 
revelation which the early exegetes narrate that provides a context for this verse. The 
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early exegetical interpretations had a broader understanding of ulī al-amr. For 
instance, Mujāhid in his tafsīr interprets the ulī al-amr as those who possess critical 
insight into religion and reason.
72
 The distinctive characteristic of the ulī al-amr, it 
has been argued, is knowledge, independent reasoning and critical discernment.
73
 In 
support, Muqātil, another early exegete, notes that this phrase was revealed in 
reference to a specific case in the context of a particular historical context. In his 
proclamation, he notes that two companions Khālid bin Walīd and ʿAmmār bin Yāsir 
had a disagreement regarding the status of a prisoner of war to whom ʿAmmār had 
given protection. The disagreement lay in Khālid's refusal to recognise ʿAmmār's 
protection. It is stated that the Prophet notes ʿAmmār's action but at the same time 
requested ʿAmmār not to disobey Khālid as he (Khālid) was the military commander. 
It was in the context of this incident that this verse came.
74
  
 
What is interesting is that Muqātil sees 4:59 as prescribing the obedience of God and 
his messenger, excluding ulī al-amr by considering 24:51-2 as an analogy to it.75 This 
phrase was also interpreted to mean ‗learned people‘, i.e. the ulamā.76 Hence, 
according to Afsaruddin, the first two centuries of Muslims understood the ulī al-amr 
as insightful and learned people in general and the Prophet's designated military 
commanders in particular,
77
 with no indication that this phrase took on any political 
meaning. It is Ṭabarī who shows us the semantic evolution of this phrase by noting 
the several interpretations.
78
 For example, according to Ṭabarī, Mujāhid was inclined 
to interpret ulī al-amr as referring to all companions of the Prophet. The thesis‘s 
analysis is in concordance with their views.   
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By the medieval period, as theo-philosophy developed, the meaning of this phrase 
was also interpreted to denote the scholars. According to al-Rāzī, ulī al-amr refers to 
those scholars that engage in ijtihād in regards to legal matters. Those scholars are the 
people who loosen and bind (ahl al-ḥal wa al-ʿaqd as referred to in fiqh literature).79 
It seems that Rāzī interprets it to refer to jurists influenced by their own circles. 
According to Afsaruddin, the word amr became associated with political authority 
only by the 9
th
 century AD, whereby the term is understood as exhorting the people to 
obey their rulers and advocating for political quietism, as there were many 
rebellions.
80
  
 
In contemporary times, the accumulation of the meanings developed throughout the 
exegetical historical evolution is also evident. In his influential exegetical volumes of 
Tafsīr al-Manār, Riḍā concurs with al-Rāzī in seeing ulī al-amr as ahl al-ḥal wa al-
ʿaqd, however he expands upon the kind of people that have such authority. He 
suggests it would also include judges, the ʿulamā, the chief of army and the rest of 
rulers and leaders.
81
 With this in mind, Riḍā still emphasized that obedience is 
binding only to God and His messenger, quoting the remainder of the verse that ‗if 
you have a dispute concerning any matter, refer it to God and the messenger...That is 
better and more seemly in the end‘. Riḍā is echoing Muqātil's point on the binding 
nature of obeying God and His messenger and not the ulī al-amr as well as 
broadening the definition of ulī al-amr. This highlights the possible non-political 
nature of the verse, as this research is pointing out.   
 
Interestingly Abu al-Aʿlā Mawdūdī in his tafhīm al-Qur ān reiterates Riḍā's broad 
interpretation of this phrase. He asserts that it includes ‗intellectual and political 
leaders of the community, as well as to administrative officials, judges of the courts, 
tribal chiefs and regional representative‘.82 Where Mawdūdī departs from Riḍā is in 
his analysis of those ulī al-amr who have been ordered to establish the prayer. His 
interpretation of establishing prayer by definition hangs on the interpretation of the 
concept of aqimū (the Arabic verb aqāma), meaning to establish something. Mawdūdī 
associates prayer with public acts and argues that this is a clear evidence for 
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establishing an ―Islamic state‖, equating ‗establishing‘ a state with ‗establishing‘ 
prayer.
83
 However, as Afsaruddin rightly points out that aqāma could also come to 
mean to ‗perform‘ or ‗to carry out‘. Furthermore, even if one infers this meaning, she 
suggests that ‗it still would not a priori convey the meaning of ―to establish something 
publically‖‘.84 In agreement with Afsaruddin, even if the interpretation of the verses is 
taken to mean political authority, it is difficult to construct an entire political theory.
85
  
   
In contrast to many speculations, Quṭub does not spend much time on this phrase ulī 
al-amr. Like Riḍā, for Quṭub, the binding of obedience is only towards God and His 
messenger.
86
 It might be safe to conclude, like Afsaruddin, that the phrase ulī al-amr 
underwent a transformation and evolution in meaning. This general disposition is 
reflected in the early exegetical work which refers to the people of knowledge, 
especially when as ā  al-nuzūl is consulted, and that obedience is only binding to 
God and His messenger.  
 
This point that obedience is necessarily made only by choice, as verse 5:92 for 
example suggests, is also connected to 5:91. In 5:91, the drinking of alcohol and the 
act of gambling are clearly stated to be Satan‘s plan. In 5:92 it continues, ‗Obey God 
and obey the messenger, and beware! But if ye turn away, then know that the duty of 
Our messenger is only plain conveyance (of the message).‘ 
 
What is significant here is the final description of the role of the Prophet, which is 
only to convey the message in clear, eloquent and precise way.
87
  This means that 
even when the Prophet is present, his role is to warn and to guide; his message is a 
clear call, but is not imposed forcibly. The following of God‘s guidance is an 
individual act of conviction even in issues that relate to public sphere. ʿAlī ʿAbd al-
Rāziq is one of the scholars that argued for this, emphatically concluding that there is 
no political theory in the Qur‘ān, similar to the conclusion of this research.88 The idea 
that there is an absolute individual freedom in accepting a worldview of the Qur‘ān is 
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also articulated by Maḥmūd Moḥammed Ṭāhā. In contrast to many, Ṭāhā suggests 
that the message of the Qur'ān lies between imān and islām, with the former revealed 
in Medina and the latter in Mecca.
89
 The aim of the message is al-islām, and through 
imān one can arrive at al-islām. The difference between the Meccan and the Medinan 
verses, Ṭāhā argued, lies not in style but in audience, as the Meccan verses address 
humankind in general.
90
 
 
This means that people were invited to adopt al-islām (in the ultimate sense) in Mecca 
for 13 years; after they failed and ‗demonstrated they were below its standard, they 
were addressed in accordance with their abilities‘ in Medina with laws that would 
eventually elevate them to absolute humanity.
91
  He suggests that once the 
individual as well as collective human capacities are sufficiently mature, the original 
precept shall be restored. This is the reason why the original precepts of religion were 
postponed, and the subsidiary precepts were implemented.
92
   
 
Although Ṭāhā is seen as controversial, his notion of individual freedom remains 
substantial and is echoed in Chapter Six.  
 
5.3.3  Summary  
 
It seems consistent in both Sunnī and Shīʿite tafāsir in the classical and medieval 
periods that their exegesis does not consider that God is ordering a formation of a 
Muslim political system. Questions as to whether God has prescribed a particular 
political system arose as a modern phenomenon or at least the level of detailed 
attention to this issue in modern literature is not observed in the medieval writings.
93
 
This research is examining whether such a political system is prescribed and ordered 
in the Qur‘ān and therefore binding. As we have shown, no single verse directly talks 
about a political theory or system, although there are general verses asking the 
Prophet and the people in authority to be just and good. The structure and 
methodology through which this is to be applied is not expressed in the Qur‘ān. 
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Although it is clear that the idea of ḥukm seems to have evolved gradually throughout 
the exegeses mentioned above, the underlying theme seems the same; that is, if 
anyone is in place to judge, then they should be just. Thus, there is nothing overtly 
political in the modern sense of the word. The verses seem to acknowledge an already 
existing phenomenon - individuals or groups of people who are in a position to judge, 
and the emphasis is that they should judge in a just manner. This in no way suggests a 
particular form of political governance. From the apparent meaning it seems they are 
describing a specific situation and emphasising the justice element of ḥukm between 
the people. 
 
Furthermore, a distinction needs to be made between ḥukm as laws that God 
commands and general understandings of ḥukm as ‗to rule‘ or ‗to govern‘, as seen in 
the verse when God addresses David in 38:26 as a Prophet. Taking these verses on 
ḥukm holistically, it means that the person who is in a position to judge should bear in 
mind ʿadl and should aim for peace and reconciliation (ṣāliḥīn). The person should 
also be honest and righteous and should have ʿilm and imān, concepts that re-occurred 
with ḥukm. 94 Arguably, the Qur‘ānic vision of ḥukm is to avoid or aim to abolish fisq, 
khu th, jāhiliyah and ẓulm, by the process of ʿadl, qiṣṭ, mīzān, iḥsān, ṣidq, and imān, 
ultimately aiming in creating a ṣāliḥ community.95 
 
Nevertheless, one could still maintain that regardless of the understanding of ḥukm, 
there is still a need for a system in which these laws need to be applied. This question 
has two components to it: One is ontological in nature. It asks if the state itself 
believes in the Islamic worldview; i.e. if the revelation itself is in fact true, a question 
with which this theses is not concerned. The questions being asked here are: (1) How 
should ḥukm be understood? (2) What would it look like? (3) What are the principles? 
and (4) How does it manifest itself? It is hoped that part of the answer to these 
questions has been given above. The following section conceptualises the Qur‘ānic 
weltanschauung of prescribed law and sharīʿa. 
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5.4  THE QUR‟ĀNIC WELTANSCHAUUNG OF ḤUKM  
 
So far we have looked at the semantic and thematic connection of ḥukm, its purpose 
and what it has come to achieve. Begging the question is whether these are laws or 
judgments. How can ḥukm be applied? Is there a difference between ḥukm as a 
religious and political law? Another issue is the notion that even if there is no explicit 
mention in the Qur‘ān of any form of political theory or organisation, in order to 
establish God‘s law one inevitably will need an institution.   
 
To answer these fundamental questions and from the above semantic analysis, when 
God is talking about ḥukm, it is important to recognise three categories of the concept 
of ḥukm: The first category is ḥukmu-allāh, which entails God's Law on earth, the 
cosmos and life after death. This category, on both the ontological and the 
epistemological level, is unattainable by human beings. It is purely God‘s sphere. This 
includes verses such as 6:57, 62; 12:40, 67; 13:41; 18:26; 27:78; 28:70, 88; 40:12; 
42:10; and 52:48. In the sense of understanding the wisdom or having any influence 
on it, for the purpose of distinction from here on, it will be written with capital L for 
Law. The second category, ḥukmu al-insān, entails an open, unspecified command by 
God to human beings to judge justly, as shown above, with the ambiguity of how to 
judge; it is only possible on the epistemic level. Concepts such as ḥukm, mizān, qisṭ 
and ʿadl are used in their general meaning without any specific form. It is on 
epistemic level because it ultimately relies on human understanding of justice and 
‗putting things in their proper place‘. This includes verses such as 4:58; 5:42; 5:48; 
5:95; 13:37; and 38:26.  
  
The third category is prescribed punishment but unlike the former, has a specific 
prescription that falls either into a private act or a public act, each of which may also 
be seen as ḥukmu al-insān. It is worth noting here that the content of verses dealing 
with specific command also uses ḥudūdu-allāh as a form of a reminder. To illustrate 
these three categories, Diagram 11 shows this hierarchy.  
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Our investigation here disentangles these three categories that in the past have been 
confused with each other, just as much as the enquiry has confused between 
epistemology and ontology. 
 
Diagram 11: The Categorisation of Ḥukm 
 
In both the second and the third categories (ḥukmu al-insān and prescribed 
punishment), there is an important non-linguistic field attached to ḥukm - that is the 
awareness of two things- tawḥīd and ‗ākhira. Both of these reinforce human 
accountability to God directly, an accountability that will be manifested in either the 
life in which they are living or in the hereafter. Human accountability is 
eschatologically emphasised in references made in the private sphere of abiding by 
what God has commanded in the concept of ḥudūd.96  
 
It is critical to determine how the intended meanings of these verses are related to the 
third category, namely prescribed law and the issue of how to holistically understand 
these concepts. Are these laws only context-related? How do they apply to our times, 
without any mention of a political structure in the Qur‘ān? Is it assumed that the 
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structure is not important? These questions are vital and indeed for a long time it was 
these questions that made the differences in drawing conclusions. If these verses were 
that clear, current debates would not exist. 
 
What has happened within many Muslim political writings is that these three 
categories have been combined, bringing about the misunderstanding that human 
ḥukm is the same as God‘s ḥukm. Further confusion has been as a result of combining 
categories two and three resulting in mixing the general axioms and teachings of the 
Qur‘ān with the prescribed command of punishment. To many, this means that there 
is a connection that comes full circle between God‘s ḥukm, sovereinty, lordship of the 
hereafter, the cosmos and man‘s obedience to this ḥukm. The following diagram will 
help to spell this out:  
 
Diagram 12: Circular Argument of “Islamist” 
 
 
Needless to say, this full circle argument is problematic on two grounds. One is that 
there is an assumption that the messengers of God are themselves placed as political 
judges, yet the Qur‘ānic weltanschauung is full of reminders that the Prophets are sent 
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only to remind people of good tidings or warn them of God‘s wrath.97 Therefore, 
within the Qur‘ānic weltanschauung, Prophets are not seen as either political leaders 
nor do they aim to establish a political order or a system.   
 
The second assumption that breaks this circle is that human action is not seen as 
God‘s action on earth. The actions of human beings themselves are not the same as 
God‘s ḥukm but rather ḥukm is within our own human framework of human 
understanding and human practice. In other words, the problem with this line of 
argument is based on the premise that when one is seeking what is good (or even 
ḥukm as prescribed by God) in using the revelations, one automatically assumes that 
they are acting on behalf of God and thus the action itself becomes that of God. This 
line of thought is problematic, as mentioned earlier because it does not recognise 
human error, misunderstanding, or the context of revelation. Nevertheless, it is not 
new within Muslim thinking. As mentioned in Chapter Three, the Khāriji‘ites were 
the first to make this full circle type of connection.  
 
One fundamental connection made with ḥukm al-insān is the concept of sharīʿa. 
Although commonly translated as ―Islamic law‖, it semantically has a broader 
meaning. The next section examines the Qur‘ānic meaning of sharīʿa.     
 
 
5.4.1 Qur‟ānic Sh rīʿ  
 
Sharīʿa comes from the root word sh-r-ʿ meaning ‗to enter into‘, ‗to begin to do‘, 
‗paths leading to drinking water‘; ‗to make plain or manifest‘; ‗to strip off;‘ ‗to be 
similar‘, ‗to be equal‘; ‗to reach for‘; and ‗a way‘.98 It also refers to a source of water 
that never runs dry. A path towards the source of water is significant as the same word 
is used to mean both ‗path‘ and the ‗source‘. Ali Shariati also uses this meaning of 
sharīʿa as a ‗path leading down to a river, enabling the thirsty to take water‘, sharīʿa 
would mean:  
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a road or a path, leading from clay to God and conveying man from vileness, 
stagnation and ignorance, from lowly life of clay and satanic character, toward 
exaltation, motion, vision, the life of the spirit and divine character.
99
 
 
Regardless to whether Shariati‘s explanation is sound, the Qur‘ān mentions sh-r-ʿ five 
times in four different forms, sharaʿa could be translated as ‗to legislate‘, ‗to lay 
down as part of the faith‘, and ‗to ordain‘ (verses 42:13 and 42:21 are examples of 
this form). Shurraʿan denotes ‗visibly‘ and ‗openly for all to see‘ (this form occurs in 
verse 7:163). Shirʿatan denotes ‗a law‘, ‗legislation from God‘ and ‗divine way of 
religion‘ (for example verse 5:48). Finally, sharīʿatun denotes a ‗clear path‘ (such as 
verse 45:18).
100
  
 
The form sharīʿa as a term is mentioned only once in the Qur‘ān in verse 45:18. 
Again it is interesting how the verse has been translated by Yusuf Ali, Pickthal, 
Thomas Cleary and Abdul Daryabadi just to name a few.   
 
Then We put thee on the (right) Way of Religion: so follow thou that (Way), and 
follow not the desires of those who know not.― (Yusuf Ali)  
 
And now have We set thee (O Muhammad) on a clear road of (Our) commandment; 
so follow it, and follow not the whims of those who know not. (Pickthal) 
 
Then we set you on a sacred law from the divine order; so follow it, and do not 
follow the whims of those who do not know‘ (Thomas Cleary) 
 
And thereafter We have placed thee upon the law of the religion; so follow it thou, 
and follow not the vain desires of those who know not. (Abdul Daryabadi) 
 
There are two interconnected issues here relating to the verse. One is the translation of 
sharīʿatin min al-amr as ‗way of religion‘, ‗law of religion‘, ‗sacred law from the 
divine order‘ and ‗a clear road of commandment‘. The meaning of sharīʿatin is 
consistent with that of ‗the way‘ or ‗path‘. What is interesting is the connotation (the 
premise with which the two words are translated) to be law, religion and 
commandment. Al-amr, in this context, linguistically means ‗issue‘, ‗affair‘ or ‗a 
thing‘; thus, it could be read as ‗Then We have put thee on the clear way (path) of the 
affair‘. The question here is the issue of amr. This is the second connected point at 
which the two previous verses shed light on the context:   
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And assuredly. We vouchsafed Unto the Children of Israel the Book and the wisdom 
and the prophethood, and We provided them with good things and preferred them 
above the worlds. (45:16) And We vouchsafed Unto them evidences of the affair. 
And they differed not except after the knowledge had come Unto them, through spite 
among themselves. Verily thy Lord will decide between them on the Day of 
Judgment concerning that wherein they have been differing. (45:17) 
 
Here the context relates to the children of Israel having been given a clear sign 
(evidence) for their affairs. The word amr is used in verse 45:17. Furthermore, verse 
45:17 connects to verse 16 by giving the people of Israel a list of God‘s favours, 
namely the book, ḥukm and Prophethood, God gave them all that is good and 
preferred them above all peoples. Verse 45:17 continues with ‗and we gave them clear 
signs for their affairs‘, referring to verse 45:16. Again when reading verse 45:18, the 
context relates to speaking to Mohammed in connection with verse 45:16 and that 
God gave Mohammed the clear way for the ‗affair‘ (the same as in verse 45:17) and 
the order that he should follow it. This cannot be translated as ‗law of religion‘, ‗the 
commandments‘ or ‗way of religion‘, because the book mentions ḥukm and 
Prophethood. These three are separate favours of God to the people of Israel. The 
meaning of  ayinātin min al-amr (in verse 45:17) can be understood as the Israelites‘ 
belief being clear in knowing the truth by virtue of having all these favours from God, 
to the point of being favoured over other peoples. Here the meaning of sharīʿa is 
understood to refer to God addressing Mohammed ‗We have also made your affairs a 
clear way (path) and follow not the desires of those who know not‘. This path is about 
avoiding division and acknowledging  ayinātin min al-amr in verse 45:17.  
 
It is interesting that most translations equated sharʿ with ‗law‘ and not with ‗way‘ or 
‗path‘ or to make ‗manifest‘. The Mujmaʿ Mufradāt Alfāḍ alqur’ān (Qur‘ānic lexicon) 
by al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (499/1105-565/1169) explains sharʿ as linguistically 
meaning ‗taking a clear path‘ or ‗a source‘.101 Thus, the Qur‘ānic verse 5:48 may 
indicate two things: (1) what God has bestowed on all mankind in search of the right 
path and (2) following that which has been ordained by God. Furthermore, there is an 
analogy between sharīʿa and the Arabic term for a flowing river, which means that to 
know God‘s way is to be as full as you would be as if you drank the entire river 
water.
102
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Therefore, this study conjures that a better, more accurate translation of the word is ‗a 
way‘ or ‗path‘ rather than ‗law‘; otherwise the translation would be confused with 
context-related particular law rather than a general meaning of law (way or path). In 
fact, one might argue that in popular literature and at times even in academic writing, 
the concept of sharīʿa has been narrowed down to the ‗does and don‘ts‘ of a 
speculative opinion of a jurist. This is not to say that the jurist‘s opinion is not 
important, but it is the belief of this author that the concept of sharʿ is not accurately 
translated in English to mean a general way or path that also includes law (the general 
and the specific). For example, if sharīʿa meant legal law then the translation ‗sharīʿa 
law‘ would be ‗law law‘, which would make no sense. If, however sharīʿa meant 
Islamic law then, as discussed earlier, the law that is known now is discursive in 
nature developed by jurists as new situations arose.
103
  
 
It is clear, however, when looking at early Muslim times to the present, that this 
concept witnessed a semantic shift. Assuming that the framework adopted in this 
study yields constructive results from looking mainly at the Qur‘ānic worldview, it is 
striking to see the post-Qur‘ānic discourse and its evolution in relation to the 
argument presented here. The terms sharīʿa and sharʿ are much looser, wider and 
more general in terms of siyāq, contextuality and the style in which they address the 
reader.    
 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, the root word sh-r-ʿ linguistically means ‗way‘ or 
‗path‘ and if one agrees that the Qur‘ān in essence is not a law book (and law here 
refers to prescribed law) then the sharʿ must be read to mean the general way of 
turning towards God‘s path. This refers to acknowledging the Oneness of God and 
being righteous. And if we read the message as a reminder to mankind this would 
include the reminder of a person‘s accountability in this world and the hereafter.  
 
A further challenge to the Islamist is the description of the role of the Prophets. An 
overwhelming number of verses describe the Prophets (including Mohammed) as 
                                                 
103
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having no power over their people; they are not in charge and unable to protect their 
people; they are not a guarantor - wakῑl.104 They have come only as a guide or to give 
warning to their people, that is—a nadhῑr;105 their message is only to announce 
clearly, eloquently and precisely, that is, to convey a message –  lāghun106 mu ῑn.107 
 
Lastly, the prophet‘s role is as a reminder, as an admonishing to mankind – 
mudhakir.
108
 Note for example, the following verses, among others: 4:80, 5:92, 6:107, 
10:108, 25:43, 39:41, 42:48, 50:45, 88:21-22, 5:92 and 99, 10:2, 7:188 and 184, 11: 
12, 13:7 and 40, 16:35, 64 and 82, 17:105, 18:110, 19:97, 20:2-3, 22:49, 24:54, 25:56, 
27:02, 29:18, 33:35-6, 34:28 and 46, 35:23-24, 36:17, 38:65 and 70, 41:6, 46:9, 48:8, 
67:26. Therefore, this suggests two interconnected themes: (1) that the Qur‘ān should 
not be described as a law book, and (2) that the word sharʿ cannot be read as meaning 
only law but also a path or a way to God. Since the entirety of the Qur‘ān has few 
legal inferences, the meaning of sharīʿa could not only have legal connotations, but 
also mean very generally the path towards God that internalises these inferences.  
 
The framework in which both the discourse and the translation have taken the term 
sharīʿa to mean ‗law‘ is clear. For those that see the Qur‘ān as a law book, the 
translation of sh-r-ʿ would be reflective of that understanding, in particular the 
connotation of sh-r-ʿ with dīn, often translated as religion. This can be seen in verse 
42:13:  
He hath ordained for you that religion which He commended unto Noah, and that 
which We inspire in thee (Muhammad), and that which We commended unto 
Abraham and Moses and Jesus, saying: Establish the religion, and be not divided 
therein. Dreadful for the idolaters is that unto which thou callest them. Allah chooseth 
for Himself whom He will, and guideth unto Himself him who turneth (toward Him). 
 
                                                 
104
 Wakῑl from the root word w-k-l occurs 24 times in the Qur‘ān. See  adawi and Abdel Haleem pp. 
1044-1045.  
105
 The root word being n-dh-r 11 forms occur in hundred and thirty places in the Qur‘ān. Nadhῑr 
occurs 44 times, andhara forty one times and mundhir five times. All of which mean to warn. See 
Badawi & Abdel Haleem, pp. 925-926.    
106
 Blāgh occurs 14 times and ballagha six times are from the root word b-l-gh that has nine forms that 
occur 77 times in the Qur‘ān. See  adawi  Abdel Haleem, pp. 111-112. 
107
 Bayyinatun (occurs 19 times)  ayināt (52 times), mubayyinatun (3 times), mu ayyināt (3 times) and 
mubῑn 119 times) come from the root word b-y-n in the middle, to clarify, to explain, eloquence, 
enlightening and verifying. From the root 14 forms occur 574 times in the Qur‘ān.  See  adawi   
Abdel Haleem, pp. 123-125.    
108
 From the root word dh-k-r has 19 forms and is mentioned 292 times in the Qur‘ān. See  adawi & 
Abdel Haleem, pp. 328-332.     
Theory of Law 
203 
 
Yusuf Ali translates it as ‗The same religion has He established for you…‘, Abdul 
Daryabadi translates it as ‗He hath instituted for you in religion that which He had 
enjoined‘ and Pickthal as ‗He hath ordained for you that religion which He 
commended unto Noah‘, and again in verse 42:21 in a plural form  
 
Yusuf Ali translates sharaʿa as ‗established‘, as does Abdul Daryabadi but in the 
singular form, and interestingly Pickthal translates the term as ‗made lawful‘.109 
Semantically sharaʿa could also denote ‗ordained‘ or ‗way/path‘. This is consistent 
with the meaning of 42:21, 45:18 (discussed above) and, as we will see, in verse 5:48. 
Verses 42:12 and 21 connect the meaning to religion – dῑn – which can mean religion, 
creed, or conviction.
110
 Again, one‘s premise is critical for understanding what dīn 
means. If the understanding of religion is taken to refer to prescribed law (that which 
is lawful and unlawful and the prescribed punishment) then the post-Qur‘ānic 
development of the meaning of sharīʿa to mean sharīʿa law in the narrow sense is 
understandable.  
 
On the other hand, using the methodology of this research, our reading of the verses 
has shown a different focus. That is to say, sharʿ and sharīʿa are taken to mean the 
path or clear way of religion/faith. Therefore, verse 42:13 is manifested as the 
path/way of God‘s religion, which is the same as that described by Noah, Abraham, 
Moses and Jesus. This interpretation is consistent with the siyāq of the verse and 
understanding that Mohammed‘s call is the same call and the same path/way. Dīn is 
also taken to denote a holistic encompassing of the message of the Qur‘ān. The 
messenger‘s purpose is to advise and to warn people. It is to apply and understand the 
moral guide and teachings; the Qur‘ān‘s function is to act as a reminder to 
mankind.
111
 The teachings also, of course, include God‘s ḥukm and ʿadl, but are 
understood in the framework that was explained earlier.          
 
Verse 5:48 is interesting as well: 
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110
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And We have sent down the Book unto thee with truth; and confirming that which 
hath preceded it of the Book, and a guardian thereof. Wherefrom judge thou between 
them by that which Allah hath sent down, and follow thou not away from that which 
hath their desires come to thee of the truth. Unto each of you We appointed law and 
a way. And had Allah listed, He would have made you all a single community, but 
He willed not in order that he may prove you by that which He hath vouchsafed unto 
you. Hasten wherefore to the virtues; unto Allah is the return of you all; then He shall 
declare unto you concerning that wherein ye have been disputing. 
 
The last part sheds further light upon the meaning of shirʿatan wa minhājan, and ‗if 
God willed he would have made you one nation‘. This oneness does not refer to law 
or decree, as the first part of the verse implies (that this message is guarding over it), 
but rather in terms of the way/path of life that people choose to take. After all it 
follows with ‗Hasten wherefore to the virtues; unto Allah is the return of you all; then 
He shall declare unto you concerning that wherein ye have been disputing‘. This 
indicates that it does not refer to any law or scripture but rather to how people choose 
to live their life and that it is essential to perform virtuous acts.   
 
One possible way of understanding the Qur‘ānic sharʿ is to consider Maḥmūd M. 
Ṭāhā‘s book The Second Message of Islam.112 Ṭāhā suggests that there are two 
messages in the Qur‘ān. He postulates that ‗the first message is based on the 
application of the Qur‘an, the second on its principles‘.113 The spiritual dimension of 
faith is the second message revealed first in Mecca and as it was hard for believers to 
practice this message in Medina, God sent particular laws for believers to realise the 
second message of Islam. Ṭāhā‘s major contribution is that in reality the process is to 
realise the second message of the Qur‘ān and hence the Medinan message is 
supplanted and replaced by the Meccan, although not permanently.
114
 This would also 
entail what is known to be ‗sharīʿa‘ as an applied system would be abolished once the 
real internalisation of the Meccan message is realised. For example, inheritance law, 
polygamy, slavery, are all not part of the Meccan message.  
 
Although Ṭāhā‘s argument is interesting, his conclusion however allows one to 
propose that even Ṭāhā was reacting to the political situation of his time when he 
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argues for ‗democratic socialism‘.115 As mentioned earlier, the problematic nature of 
these concepts is that it is imposed on the Qur‘ān mainly because of Western readings 
and understanding of particular concepts and experiences. This is not to say these 
concepts are not important, however, the Qur‘ānic worldview goes beyond these 
concepts when it is connected to eschatology and taqwā.116 This is where this thesis 
departs from Ṭāhā.   
 
What this thesis is emphasising is that the meaning of shrʿ remains consistent 
throughout the five verses. That is referring a clear way or path. Sharīʿa then might be 
best translated as Islamic normativity rather than Islamic law.117  
 
Ṭāhā‘s postulation regarding laws that have mainly been revealed in Medina also 
connects to what commonly known as ḥudūd laws. The following section examines 
the Qur‘ānic ḥudūd.  
 
  
5.4.2 Qur‟ānic Ḥud d  
 
In general, in Muslim writings, as mentioned earlier, ḥudūd law is postulated to 
include verses that have a prescribed punishment (such as theft and homicide). 
However, although the term ḥudūd is mentioned in the Qur‘ān, the verses that contain 
punishment have not been described as ḥudūd. The logic behind the use of this 
terminology by Muslim jurists is that the word ḥudūd means ‗limit‘, or ‗to deter‘ and 
hence the prescribed law is there to keep limits and to deter. Ḥudūd also prescribes 
how one should behave in a situation of worship (such as pilgrimage), in diet, as well 
as in divorce, giving way for the jurist to make an analogy to other verses that speak 
of thefts and homicide.  
 
The common word ḥudūd is mentioned in the Qur‘ān 14 times from the trilateral root 
ḥ-d-d. Of this root, four different forms occur in the Qur‘ān 25 times.118 Ḥudūd 
mainly translates as ‗prescribed limits‘, ‗to put an end to‘, ‗to deter‘, ‗boundaries‘; 
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‗ordinance‘ and ‗decrees‘.119 It is striking when reading verses such as 2:187; 2:229; 
2:230; 4:12-14; 9:97,112; 58:4 and 65:1 that the context is overwhelmingly that of an 
individual covenant of keeping and preserving the limits in the mindfulness of God. In 
most instances, the concept of ḥudūd is paralleled with God and taqwā. This would 
suggest that the context of the verses mentioning ḥudūd is in line with the meaning of 
keeping the boundaries between human being and God and therefore, describing the 
God consciousness (taqwā) of the believers in knowing their limits. What is 
interesting is that none of the fourteen verses mentioning ḥudūd are in the context of 
punishment. Rather they refer to taqwā, particularly in individual practice of worship, 
and in being God-aware in keeping with dietary requirements and pilgrimage 
practices. These are private acts, of which, it might be the case that no one would be 
aware were they not practiced. Seemingly, ḥudūd as a concept could also refer to the 
individual keeping the boundaries rather than as something themselves reinforced by 
a society or a state. That is to say, the emphasis is on the responsibility of the 
individual to keep the covenant without any human witness by the constant 
reinforcement of itaqū allāh from the word taqwā.120  
 
In support, the verse 9:112 shows the manifestation of keeping that covenant and 
boundary with God:  
(Triumphant) are those who turn repentant (to Allah), those who serve (Him), those 
who praise (Him), those who fast, those who bow down, those who fall prostrate (in 
worship), those who enjoin the right and who forbid the wrong and those who keep 
the limits (ordained) of Allah - And give glad tidings to believers!  
 
Keeping those limits willingly, arguably, is the key to understanding the concept of 
ḥudūd. If the meaning were related to the state re-enforcing ḥudūd, then many of the 
verses that mention ḥudūd do not make sense. Take for instance 2:229, 230 and 65:1. 
If the emphasis were upon reinforcing a public notion of ḥudūd, there would be no 
need to reinforce taqwā and the reminder that the boundaries are from God. The 
emphasis here is the account of the husband being truthful in a private setting, of both 
counting the ‗waiting period‘ as well as proving they have committed ‗manifest 
indecency‘. The stress of the verse lies with the trustworthiness of those who keep 
their limits with God in private. For how could anyone know whether the addressee is 
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being truthful if it was not for keeping the boundary of God in private; it is not the act 
itself but that it has been observed in private, without the reinforcement of any 
external body, which makes keeping ḥudūd allāh profound. There is an element of 
choosing not to do something, and hence the verses always emphasise two things, that 
is taqwā and the consequences of transgressing the boundaries. The same applies to 
the verse on fasting, 58:4. It would not be an exaggeration to say that fasting two 
months consecutively could only be done as a private matter between the person and 
God and hence it is difficult for anyone (or any political structure) to actually prove or 
disprove the action.  
 
Another example is verse 2:187. Again the Qur‘ān reminds the addressee that when 
they are fasting they should not approach their wives and that they should keep God‘s 
limits. How would the others know if they did or did not? Keeping God‘s limits, 
therefore, must be a private covenant between the addressee and the addressor. If it 
was intended to be a law that is reinforced by non-individual actors, the khiṭā  in all 
these verses would not make much sense. 
  
This is why the concept of ḥudūd is manifested in these verses as reinforcing a 
relationship with God that cannot be seen or reinforced by anybody other than the 
person her/himself. These boundaries are normative, an ethical/moral covenant 
between the individual and God that should not be transgressed. The reason for the 
reinforcement of the concept of ḥudūd allāh is that it is so easy not to keep the 
covenant as it is a private commitment. This analysis is contrary to the post-Qur‘ānic 
development of the concept, and it is also contrary to the reading of these verses in 
accordance with later historical developments. Most of these laws were reinforced by 
the state very early on, providing the ‗public‘ reading of these verses as well as seeing 
the concept to mean the punishment itself, which needed to be reinforced by a 
legislative body.  
 
If this is the case, then how can one understand prescribed punishment? The section 
bellow provides possible conceptualisation of punishment in the Qur‘ān.  
 
5.4.3 Conceptualising Punishment in the Qur‟ān  
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Although the number of legal verses are contested, some have estimated there to be 
between 80 to 500 verses with legal content out of a total of 6, 346 verses.
121
 From the 
outset, the legal verses appear marginal, which suggests that these verses, though 
important, are not the sole purpose of the revelation. This idea is made even more 
apparent when one reads the overwhelming repetition of the ethico-religious verses in 
both the thematic and literal senses. It is not that the legal verses are unimportant but 
rather that the repetition of both the literal and thematic meanings of the verses need 
to be understood in order to reinforce the high level of importance of these verses.
 
 
This is contrary to what Hallaq has argued; that because the majority of the ethico-
religious verses are repeated this actually renders the legal verses as more 
significant.
122
  
 
Legal verses were introduced in selected matters of ritual practices (including prayer, 
fasting and pilgrimage) as well as related to alms tax, property, marriage, inheritance 
(prescribing the amount of inheritance to which both men and women are entitled), 
treatment of orphans, beggars and by passers. Business laws including prohibiting 
usury and gambling, keeping oaths, dietary rules, adultery, theft and homicide, are 
also included in this legislation; noting that some of these categories also fall under 
rituals.  
 
One may be able to divide these instructions/prescribed duties into those which 
concern the individual (such as the rituals) and those which concern the society (such 
as homicide).  Within uṣūl al-fiqh some of these laws are indeed seen to be private 
and some public – especially those which have been termed ḥudūd laws (those which 
have punishment). It is conceivable, however, that these two categories are 
problematic, fluid and difficult to define. Before getting into further discussion it is 
important here to point out the terms that are usually used when describing these laws. 
Within Muslim literature, sharῑʿa law is generally used to refer to any religious legal 
ruling, which also includes that which is lawful and the unlawful (halāl wa harām) 
and ḥudūd law which generally includes legal rulings that have a form of punishment. 
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As we discussed, earlier these concepts do not accurately reflect the Qur‘ānic 
worldview.  
 
In support, Rahman also maintains that most of the Muslim intellectual tradition has 
failed to make a clear distinction between that which is ethical and that which is legal 
or consists of commands; as a result the two have been constantly confused.
123
 It is 
hoped, through the use of Izutsian and thematic approach, that a clearer and a more 
holistic understanding will be possible of the verses relating to punishment. 
 
 
5.4.4  Jurisprudence as a Human Endeavour in Epistemic Terms  
 
It has been argued by some, such as Wael Hallaq, that ―Islamic law‖ in reality is the 
jurists‘ law ‗not because it happened to have been constructed by jurists, but mainly 
because the jurists are the carriers of the authority that sustained it for over a 
millennium‘.124 The jurist has therefore become the sole agent of ‗legal epistemology 
and hermeneutics‘.125 
 
This is because, as Hallaq explains, they were:  
 
the spiritual and practical guides of the umma...they controlled the entire infra-and 
super- structures of legal education...They collected taxes and improved public 
works; supervised the affairs of the market-place and controlled and ran charitable 
foundations...as guardians of orphans and other unprivileged social groups, 
administering their financial and other affairs.
126
  
 
This meant that as legal interpreters, the jurists possessed a distinctive authority. Their 
authority was, as Hallaq postulates, ‗epistemic in nature -knowing the law and how it 
is to be derived, interpreted and applied were the qualities that conferred epistemic 
authority‘.127  
 
In support, Khan holds that ‗Islamic jurisprudence as a well-defined academic 
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discipline was organised only at the end of the second century of Islam‘.128 What 
―sharīʿa‖ law is in practice is the opinion of a jurist developing a particular 
methodology in extracting law within their own understanding and context. Yet in the 
early Muslim history there were no attempts to codify the law (fiqh), with the 
exception of Ibn al-Muqafaʿ who in the eighth century proposed this to the Umayyad 
caliph.
129
 
 
Notwithstanding, Qamruddin Khan boldly insists that the genre of Islamic law is not 
based on the Qur‘ān. This is because the inferences in the Qur‘ān cannot be defined as 
law in the modern sense, as it is beyond state boundaries, and much of it, such as 
prayer and moral obligations, cannot be reinforced by human courts.
130
  
 
This chapter is also in agreement with Ovamir Anjum‘s point that Islamic law 
developed to become the prime position of Islamic identity, which gave the jurists the 
status of ‗unquestioned guardians of the Islamic doctrine‘. Khan‘s bold statement is 
supported by this investigation.131    
 
Furthermore, the sharīʿa's principles remain a human interpretation based on the 
understanding of the Qur'ān and the sunna.132 Therefore, any understanding of sharīʿa 
is the product of ijtihād (informed reasoning) in that ‗reasoning and reflection by 
human beings are ways of understanding the meaning of the Qur'an and the Sunna of 
the Prophet‘.133 The development of the sharīʿa in a systematic and methodic way 
occurred only in the 2nd and 3rd century of Islam.
134
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Khalid Abou el Fadl puts the distinction differently in observing that Muslim ‗jurists 
have called God's law, in its ideal and abstract form, the Shari'ah (the Way to God), 
and called the attempt to understand and implement the Shari'ah, the fiqh‘.135 
 
This makes fiqh a human endeavour attempting to get as close as possible to the 
abstract ideal but is never able to claim that its understanding is a hundred present. 
Further to this is the flexibility of fiqh itself as the next section shows.  
 
 
5.4.5 The Flexibility of Jurisprudence  
 
Afsaruddin, like Hallaq, also suggests that fiqh is a result of human effort and 
reasoning, referring to both the Qur'ān and the sunna as sources of legal inferences. 
Thus, it is an epistemic endeavour of human effort. The mistake has been in 
conflating sharīʿa with fiqh hence ‗attributing immutability and divine provinces to 
many legal rulings that are rather the product of human deliberation and thus 
contingent‘.136  
 
This diversity in how one should derive law and how to determine its main principles 
may be seen in comparing Al-Shāṭibī (d.790/1388) and Ṭūfī (716/1316). Al-Shāṭibī 
attempted to move beyond the traditional jurisprudential theory of deriving law by 
emphasising maqāṣid (principles of sharīʿa). As for Ṭūfī', his view articulated that the 
purpose of deriving law is in fact maṣlaḥa (public interest).137 
 
Ṭūfī further argued that both the Qur'ān and the sunna were based on maṣlaḥa but it 
has not been articulated in that way by the traditional jurisprudential theory of law. 
The examples above are presented to show the diversity, flexibility and the epistemic 
nature of the process of legal theory. This notion of public interest is formulated by 
Askari as ‗right to security of person, property, freedom of association, freedom of 
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conscience, right to offer equal treatment before law...to protect one's religion‘.138 He 
is not the first to identify the purpose of law in these categories. As these categories 
were identified by the classical jurists, there is no reason why other categories could 
not also be included such as context and environment.  
 
From the outset, it is important to point out that due to the small scale of these 
prescribed punishments, it is arguable that they cannot be the core of the message. 
This is not to say that they are not important, but rather that the revelation is not a law 
book. Therefore, this means that the prescribed punishments must be understood 
within their original historical context and hence it is vital to have an understanding of 
the society in 6
th
 and 7
th
 century Arabia.  
 
Hence, none of these verses have the concept of ḥukm accompanying the command of 
particular punishment and the word ḥudūd is only used in verses that are of private 
concern in obeying God‘s commands such as in dietary requirements and cases of 
fornication, as mentioned earlier.
139
 This is considered significant. This suggests that 
ḥukm, when it does occur, has always been a general concept in tune with a holistic 
understanding of both justice and what is good in the category of ḥukm al-insān.140 
 
Interestingly, Ṭāhā postulates that prohibitions and limitations in terms of their legal 
inferences are there for two reasons. The first is because of the interest of the 
‗community would be preserved by deterring the aggressor himself, as well as 
deterring others‘. The second is ‗the aggressor deepens his sensitivity, by himself 
experiencing the pain he inflicts upon others, and thus realizes the severity of the pain 
and the magnitude of the loss he has caused‘.141 Furthermore, this stage is only a 
transitional one en route to the higher level of truth where one achieves an absolute 
freedom.
142
 Iḥsān143 is superior to ʿadl, so the verses that mention an eye for an eye 
are speaking of the first level (as in verse 42:40) that is the community. In contrast, 
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the verse that mentions iḥsān addresses the second level (as in verse 42:43), which is 
the higher level.
144
 The stage of ultimate islām would require ‗moving out of the law 
for the community as a whole‘ and moving into the law for the individual‘.145 This 
means individuality is only achieved when the law for the community is perfected and 
until the point at which one is able to exercise absolute individual freedom.
146
 Ṭāhā‘s 
perspective is interesting when looking at the purpose of prohibition and limitations, 
which denotes to the idea of particularity and universality of a concept or punishment. 
 
 
5.4.6 The Universal and the Particular 
 
Even the application of the verses that included commands prescribed by the 
companions in the aftermath of the death of the Prophet suggests that these verses 
have two components to them, one of which is eternal and one of which is dynamic.  
 
Fārūqī further describes the prescribed law as a ‗real-existent state‘. For example, he 
argues that the verse that speaks of the cutting off of the hand has values to be 
realised suggesting that: 
this verse seeks to realize…purification through penitence, education through 
example, and retribution...but they do not all stand on the same level.  A cutting off of 
the hand that realizes retribution but violates the other two cannot be deemed 
obligatory.
147
   
 
If committing the punishment goes against the values of the Qur'ān 'it would not only 
be undesirable but would constitute a crime or sin against the higher values, even if its 
realization of the lower were complete.
148
 
 
In line with Fārūqī‘s point, one can, for instance, point towards Abū  akr‘s time when 
the punishment for consumption of alcohol was both reinforced and fixed (to be forty 
lashes) and later changed by ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭāb (634-644) and ʿAlī ibn Abū Ṭālib to 
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eighty lashes.
149
 This indicates two things: (1) the moral component of the laws that 
drinking is harmful does not change, but the punishment does and (2) the punishment 
can change according to the appropriateness of context; the punishment is thus 
contextually based. Another example from early Muslim history is that the authority 
enforced some of the laws including zakāt (giving alms), inheritance and so on, 
whereas in the time of the Prophet, this was not enforced by any kind of entity.  
 
Another example of ʿUmar making ijtihād involves the case for divorce and war 
booty. Although during the Prophet's time the declaration ‗I divorce you‘ spoken three 
times at the same time was seen as rendering a single divorce, ʿUmar declared that 
three utterances of the word divorce would be considered to be three divorces.
150
 The 
reason for this is thought to be the high divorce rate that was affecting the community, 
so by making it count three times, it would accordingly become irrevocable, in the 
hope that men would think more before uttering the words.
151
 
 
In terms of the war booty, in spite of the particular command in verse 8:41 gives 
particular command, ʿUmar decided not to distribute the land of Iraq and Egypt as a 
booty to the army as it would have created large economic inequalities.
152
 This 
indicates that there was a direct understanding of the purpose of verses and their 
moral principles that although it relates to rules, it does not create rules as fixed but 
rather creates them as dynamic, capable of being changed  to ensure and uphold the 
Qur'ānic moral/ethical principles. In support, Rahman postulates that it is: 
beyond any shadow of doubt that our earliest generations looked upon the teaching of 
the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet not as something static but essentially 
as something that moves creatively.
153
 
 
This of course was done to preserve the universal maxim of justice, and if understood 
in that framework one can make the argument that their actions are actually Qur‘ānic, 
based on the principle of adhering to justice as a binding maxim and taking the 
command in the verse as contextual. This idea is not new, but was first proposed by 
al-Shāṭibī when examining the maqāṣid; Fazlur Rahman is also one of the advocates 
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of maqāṣid and later on it was developed intensively as a methodological tool by 
Yahya Mohammed.
154
  
 
Therefore, this research differentiates between the moral law and the command for the 
punishment (for example, the law which states that one should not steal and the 
punishment for stealing). By making this distinction, one can fully realise the 
universal aspect of the verse and the context related to the verse. One may come to 
understand the prescribed command in the Qur‘ān as having a component of moral 
right and wrong (which within the Qur‘ānic framework would entail an objective, 
knowable, generalisable universal maxim) and the punishment prescribed for breaking 
the moral maxim.  
 
Many have used different ways to describe this, which this investigation argues as all 
meaning the same thing. For example, these would include terms like the inner and 
the outer of the verse, the letter and the form, the intended meaning and the prescribed 
law, the written and the unwritten, sharῑʿa and maqāṣid al-sharῑʿa. Furthermore, 
Saeed asserts that ‗the Qur'an does not abrogate the objective of a ruling, but rather 
reinforces that objective by amending the ruling itself‘.155 These categories have all 
been conceived of as a way of reconciling the eternal moral maxim and the specific 
command; it also aimed to reconcile those practices of the early companions that at 
times went against the letter of the verse itself.  
 
It suffices here to say that the verses with particular commands for punishment 
pertaining to public order do not constitute sufficient evidence to argue (albeit in an 
indirect way) that God intended an ―Islamic‖ political system through the indirect 
application of these laws through the state, and that an ―Islamic state‖ is necessary to 
apply these laws. Furthermore, as many have proclaimed, this state necessarily abides 
by ‗sharῑʿa’ law, yet the subsequent development of legal law post-Qur‘ānic era is 
different too. While God's Law in the Qur'ān is eternal and universal, fiqh is 
contextual and temporal by definition.   
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5.5 CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS  
 
Taking what this chapter has suggested, there are serious implications for the common 
appeal by many Muslims to apply what has come to mean sharīʿa law. It remains a 
human endeavour due to its hermeneutical structure. With this in mind, this chapter is 
not arguing that there should be a ―secular‖ law but rather acknowledges the human 
element in any kind of law and therefore its divinity can only be spoken of in terms of 
the intention of the individual applying the law.   
 
The idea of theo-religious administration arose in the 20th century theme. Although 
most Islamist arguments refer to the scripture, upon deeper inspection, verses that 
have been given political significance would appear to possess multiple meanings.
156
 
Once again, this suggests that theo-religious administration is a modern phenomenon 
that arose in reaction towards modern challenges, as suggested in the Introduction and 
in Chapter Three.  
 
Many discussions of this topic and arguments have mixed together both ontological 
and epistemological discussions on God‘s law, thereby leading the reader to believe 
that by examining the concepts of ḥukm one is entering into an ontological discussion. 
Simply put, the assumptions are that questioning the truth of the concept of ḥukm is 
almost synonymous with questioning the meaning of ḥukm. The basic question asked 
is: what does the Qur‘ān mean when it talks about ḥukm (and its derivatives). This has 
also affected the understanding of Western academics studying Muslim political 
thought. 
 
The question regarding the understanding of ḥukm within the third category (ḥukm al-
insān in terms of prescribed punishment) does not only concern Qur‘ānic students but 
is also fundamental to contemporary Western legal theory.  
 
The fundamental dilemma that many modern western legal theorists face is whether 
law and morality are separable or whether law reflects moral right and wrong, i.e. that 
which corresponds to legality and illegality of acts. This modern dilemma is the result 
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of the influence of positivism in general and legal positivism in particular.
157
 This is 
the belief that moral utterances are subjective, immeasurable and hence un-testable, 
and therefore it is in the faculty of desire and not reason and should be abandoned as 
an enquiry in associating ethics with law.
158
  
 
The question that is vital here is whether these commands are private (obedience 
being important from the individual point of view) or should it be the state‘s 
responsibility to apply these commands. Hence, taking the premise that sharīʿa does 
not depend upon any positive law, political decision or state would suggest that 
sharīʿa creates a space parallel to temporal power and to the political sphere. It 
challenges them when required although it may also be manipulated by them as it has 
been in the past. Yet, the possibility of a space that potentially challenges power is 
ignored. In support, An-Na'im distinguishes between sharīʿa as a concept and the 
particular ‗methodology for determining the normative content of Shari'a‘.159  
 
This Chapter argued that the moral principles are however eternal because the 
principles are divine. Put another way, stealing is morally wrong and verse 5:38 not 
only reinforces the wrongness of the act but also offers a deterrence. The deterrence is 
not an expression of morality but simply a punishment to remind and reinforce the 
moral view of the wrongness of theft. Therefore, as discussed earlier, there is a 
difference between the divine principle and the legal punishment. What is abrogated 
at times is not the Law but the punishment. Understood in this way, the decisions 
made by the early companions in governing during the post-Mohammed era are 
consistent with this view. Again for example, in the case of ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭāb, 
when the great famine hit the Arabian Peninsula, he gave orders for people to stop 
contributing towards charity (zakāt) and he allowed mitigating circumstances for 
thieves. This was under the supposition that this famine had created huge poverty in 
Arabia and therefore it would be unjust to expect charitable donations and to punish 
those who stole only to survive. What is interesting is that none of the close 
companions opposed him or even said that he was going against God‘s boundaries- 
ḥudūd allāh, he was in accordance with the Qur‘ān.  
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Bearing this in mind, the worldview of the Qur‘ān then takes a holistic look at 
interconnected concepts, as mentioned earlier in terms of ḥukm, ʿadl and so on. The 
various readings of the Qur‘ān have created a dichotomy in today‘s debates between 
law and its purpose. However, it suggests that there is no dichotomy, that there is 
rather an interaction between the two categories.  
 
This chapter has shown the Qur‘ānic worldview of ḥukm, its conceptual categories 
and its connection to other concepts. The pressing question here is what happened 
within the Muslim tradition that caused the Qur‘ān to be read as a law book so that the 
verses of prescribed command were read as making up the body of sharῑʿa law and 
ḥudūd law was seen as the prescribed punishment that needs to be applied by the 
state. The answer to this question lies in the early political development of the Muslim 
community.  
 
Both the strong interest in the collection of ḥadῑths in a structured and scientific way 
as well as the development of uṣūl al-fiqh to derive a strict and clear ruling could be 
read as  reactions to the political corruption of the post Muʿāwiya era. Even the 
centuries-long debate on whether the Qur‘ān (i.e. word of God) is eternal or created 
can be seen through the same lens - that of the political elite pushing and using a 
particular theological stand for the justification of their own actions or justification of 
their power.
160
 Believing that the word of God is created would consequently mean 
that it is changing and contextual, which would in turn also justify how some (if not 
most) the political leaders at that time failed to abide by a moral framework. And this 
was a moral framework that had been presented to the people in terms of situational 
and not eternal moral value - such as justice. Within this framework, it does not come 
as a surprise that those scholars who did not support state-sponsored theology were 
persecuted, imprisoned, tortured and at times killed. For example, three renowned 
scholars Mālik ibn Anas, Abū  anīfa and Ibn Taymiyya were all imprisoned during 
their lives.  
 
                                                 
160
 See Chapter Two p. 169. 
Theory of Law 
219 
 
Reading between the lines, traditional scholars have realised that this emphasised the 
word of God as being eternal and unchanging. In debates between the Muʿtazilite and 
the Ashʿarite, Qur‘ānic verses were used as well as rational arguments. But the verses 
were not used in a neutral sense to determine what the Qur‘ānic view was; instead the 
verses were used to speak out against the misuse and the exploitation of these ideas by 
the political elite. The same can be said regarding the heated debates between Sunnī 
and Shīʿite. Again, the debates do not seem to be based on the Qur‘ānic worldview 
even though Qur‘ānic verses are used to support their arguments. The immediate aim 
of both groups is to dispute their opponent‘s view, and to delegitimize their premises. 
The canonization of the legal tradition as well as the reading of the Qur‘ān as purely a 
legal book therefore relates strongly to the early political violence that occurred 
during the first Muslim civil war.
161
   
 
The same can be said regarding the collection of ḥadῑth. After the death of the 
Prophet, the companions were known to be careful in narrating what the Prophet did 
say. This was so much the case that when ʿUmar heard that Abu Huraira was 
narrating too much he ordered a lashing as a way of punishing him.
162
 If this were 
true, then it could be taken to mean that the companions were cautious, so that people 
would not mix what the Prophet did and said with what the Qur‘ān dictates, and to 
show that the Qur‘ān takes supremacy. In support of this view, ḥadīth collection 
started near the first civil war, indicating that although there was an emphasis on 
writing the Qur‘ān the sayings of the Prophet were seen as secondary. The move to 
methodically collect ḥadῑth came after the spread of many obscure sayings whose 
authenticity needed to be verified. Moreover, since post Muʿāwiya, what the Prophet 
said and did was to some extent in contradiction to the living memory of some of the 
prominent ṣaḥā a.163 This could explain why later on ḥadῑth was collected and 
particular attention was given to checking authenticity after Mālik.164   
 
These examples are not arbitrary; they suggest that although the Qur‘ānic 
weltanschauung has no direct jurisprudential framework, it developed to protect 
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against misuse. This chapter maintains that this is one explanation for the disparities 
between the Qur‘ānic view of sharῑʿa, ḥukm, ḥudūd and what later developed. 
 
The development of jurisprudence became part of the fabric of Islam to the extent that 
anything different would not even be considered. What aided this framework was the 
tajzi’ῑ mind-set of the majority of jurists that failed to see the entirety of the Qur‘ānic 
worldview and in looking at the concept of ḥukm attempted to connect the dots, as has 
this chapter has aimed to demonstrate. That is, by examining scripture from a verse by 
verse approach, many have failed to look at and read the Qur‘ānic themes and 
concepts as a whole, which are connected to the general worldview. For example, 
many have taken (at a jurisprudential level) the implementation of the ḥudūd law as 
the ultimate point of an ―Islamic state‖ and therefore it has become the ultimate aim 
of both the Muslim believer and the Muslim country. As we have suggested in this 
chapter, ḥudūd had little to do with public limits and more to do with private 
commitment to God.  
 
Furthermore, the nature of this debate is at an epistemological level and not an 
ontological one. This means the debate is not whether or not God actually sent these 
laws or whether or not the Qur‘ān is the word of God, but concerns how to understand 
these verses and their meanings and conditions. As mentioned in the methodology 
section, an enquiry that deals with understanding the Qur‘ān – that is epistemic - is 
inevitably constructive and hence remains on the human level. This has been essential 
when looking at the Qur‘ān as a whole and the verses on ḥukm in particular. Once the 
verses are read by human beings then their divinity is at the human level and not at 
God‘s level. It is a mistake to think that the reader‘s understanding is actually that of 
God.
165
 
 
In addition, this chapter has also addressed two important questions: the first is 
whether establishing a state is a necessary component of achieving God‘s ḥukm. 
Contrary to many Islamists, sharīʿa could be seen as being in apposition to power; as 
its answer, this chapter argued that God‘s ḥukm transcends human ability and that 
within human capacity the ḥukm is a general concept that refers to judging fairly and 
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justly. The second question is whether the role of the state is to enforce prescribed 
commands. It has been shown that the prescribed commands have two components to 
them - one is moral principle which is eternal and universal and unchanging, and the 
other, temporal, contextual and changing with the changes of context.  
 
The silence of the Qur‘ān and the absence in it of any intended particular political 
structure is understandable when applying the moral principles of the Qur‘ān. This is 
not to say the Qur‘ān is apolitical in its outlook, but it is to highlight that mainstream 
discourse does not reflect the Qur‘ānic framework. The absence of a direct 
prescription of the structure of government, a particular way that could be Islamic is 
significant. At the same time, Qur‘ānic injunctions repeatedly addresses concepts of 
social justice, social wellbeing, accountability, rights of others and responsibility.  
 
This then begs the question: what is the Qur‘ānic worldview? The next chapter will 
attempt to note possible Qur‘ānic frameworks of the individual and society and 
examine the foundational premises these concepts rely on. Particular focus is made on 
semantics of the individual and the collective.  
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CHAPTER 6: THOUGHTS ON QUR‟ĀNIC 
WELTANSCHAUUNG OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND 
THE COMMUNITY   
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The previous chapters using both semantic and thematic methodologies have argued 
that the existing ―Islamic political theory‖ as formulated by some Islamists has little 
evidence in the Qur‘ān. The misconception made by thinkers such as  asan al- annā 
and Mawdūdī is that they postulated their understanding of the Qur‘ān by 
implementing a structure that is thought to be ―Islamic‖ (that is binding, eternal and 
ahistorical). They appeared to have made two mistakes by this formulation. Firstly, 
they ignored the agent (the individual), which the Qur‘ān speaks of continuously in 
terms of the foundation of moral/ethical being. By ignoring the individual, they have 
arguably adopted a structuralist approach. This is to say that their argument suggests 
that the structure itself is what determines whether something is ‗Islamic‘ or not. As 
we discussed earlier, the Qur‘ān has no such proposition. Perhaps this is where the 
Qur‘ānic concept of ‗the political lies‘, which ironically exists outside any structure or 
institution. Considering the individual as the key building block of any society or 
institution, this has led to the second misconception, in which one mistakenly thinks 
that a top-down approach (that is implementing a structure) would bring about good 
governance. 
 
Having said that, there are parts of the Qur‘ān that do speak of how one‘s life ought to 
be, connecting the individual to the wider community and by extension to any 
governing body. The themes of the Qur‘ān do include concepts such as justice, 
equality, rights and fairness as important components of a functional or what can be 
termed as ṣāliḥ individual and community.1 Thus, one is justified in arguing that one 
cannot separate the moral/ethical behaviour of the individual from public life.  
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It is no easy task to construct a possible Qur‘ānic worldview by examining how the 
revelation envisions the way human being possibly ought to live within a single 
chapter. The challenge to construct a new set of Qur‘ānic narratives thus cannot be 
overestimated. This is particularly the case given that each concept could be related to 
other concepts and therefore the possibility of expanding the scope of research beyond 
the bounds of what is viable remains an ever-present possibility.
2
 
 
The difficulty ahead of us however should not discourage us from the enquiry, as it is 
nevertheless important to see the interconnectedness of other concepts of the 
individual as well as development of a fuller understanding of this notion from the 
Qur‘ān alone. Nonetheless, the effort may allow one to more closely apprehend to the 
Qur‘ān‘s outlook on the ―ideal community‖. The aim of this chapter is to indicate 
possible narratives for future research.   
 
This chapter is divided into three parts; the first part is a survey of verses that 
semantically connect to the concept of the individual and its related semantic fields. 
The second part examines in detail the concept of taqwā (God-awareness) as the 
notion of self-governance in the Qur‘ān. The reason for this is that thematically taqwā 
is often associated with the individual‘s mission to self-govern and is linked with the 
concept of nafs (self). It is the contention of this author that the Qur‘ān aims to build a 
holistic individual who will be able to act wisely in public sphere, and hence the 
reason for the absence of any overtly prescribed structure. The third part of this 
chapter highlights some of the Qur‘ānic notions of community and its possible 
dialectical and paradoxical relations with the individual.  
 
 
6.2 THE SEMANTIC FIELDS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE QUR‟ĀN  
 
The Qur‘ān at times uses the word nafs (self), at other times insān (human being), 
mar’ (person) and bashar (human being) in addressing the individual. There are also 
other concepts that are more specific referring to the individual such as mu’min 
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(believer) and ʿa d (servant) which builds into the semantic-field of the individual as 
shown in Diagram 13.  
 
 
Diagram 13: The Semantic field of the Individual 
 
 
 
There are also the plural (and general) forms such as nufūs, mu’minūn (believers) and 
ʿi ād (servants/slaves) addressing the people (and groups). Other concepts include 
 anū ādam (people of Adam), nās (people), umam (communities), qawm (people), 
jamʿ (collectives), ḥiz  (group), shaʿ  (nation), fi’a (group), fawj (people/crowd) and 
qa ā’il (tribes).  
 
The semantic field of the individual also overlaps greatly with previous semantic 
fields which have been analysed in different context including its positive and 
negative concepts. On the positive side, shukr (3:145; 31:12), ṣulḥ (6:54), ʿamal, bir 
(2:44), iḥsān and taqwā (2:48; 2 123) are mentioned with nafs, mu’min and ʿabd. The 
concepts on the negative side are fasād and  ulm (such as 3:117; 3:135; 4:64; 4:110; 
10:44; 10:100)
3
. As Diagram 14 illustrates:  
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Diagram 14: The Semantic and the Thematic Field of Nafs 
 
 
The usefulness of Diagram 13 is that it shows the Qur‘ānic semantic usage of related 
words in addressing mankind. Diagram 14 shows the connectivity of the core-
concepts of nafs with other key-concepts that would eventually formulate the 
Qur‘ānic Weltanschauung and not just its linguistic meanings.  
 
Although it is important to look at each semantic field it is also important to bear in 
mind that each concept by itself may be a core concept which overlaps and 
interconnects to other concepts of the Qur‘ān in a web of complex connections that is 
outside the scope of this research. For this reason, these semantic connections are 
looked at in understanding the meanings of nafs and insān.4 
 
 
6.2.1 The Morphology of Nafs 
 
Often the concept of nafs is translated into English as ‗soul‘, ‗self‘, or ‗person‘, such 
as when the nafs is described as muṭma’ina (translated as the ‗satisfied soul‘ or the 
‗tranquil self‘ in Yusuf Ali and Pickthal) or as al-nafs al-lawwāma (translated as the 
‗self-reproachful soul‘ or ‗blaming self‘).5 However, nafs could also come to mean 
‗the psyche‘, ‗discerning faculty‘, ‗person‘ and/or ‗essence‘.6 According to Iṣfahānī 
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nafs denotes ‗breath‘, ‗to breath‘ and ‗to breakout‘.7 Another meaning is ‗to yearn 
for‘, ‗to vie‘, ‗to compete‘; and ‗striving‘.8 Nafs also comes to mean ‗to envy‘, ‗to 
covet‘, ‗to be sparing‘ and ‗to be niggardly‘.9 The trilateral root n-f-s occurs 298 times 
in six forms in the Qur‘ān.10  
 
According to Smith, the majority of Muslim scholars have made no real distinction 
between nafs and rūḥ (spirit).11 In fact, early on in Muslim tradition the two terms 
were used interchangeably.
12
 However, a close examination of the Qur‘ānic definition 
shows that those two concepts may actually be different. In support, verse 17:85 
describes rūḥ as ambiguous entity about which one knows very little. Then, from the 
Qur‘ān we know little about the nature of rūḥ (other than its direct semantic meaning 
of spirit) but the description of nafs is ample. There is an interesting semantic 
connection, however between the two words in that both terms are either derived from 
or connected to the meanings of  air, breathing and life. The verb nafasa means ‗to 
breath‘ and its noun nafas denotes ‗breath‘.13 This might be the reason why these two 
concepts in post-Qur‘ānic literature have been used interchangeably.14 As mentioned 
earlier the Qur‘ān provides descriptions of nafs's psychological state of mind and its 
nature whereas rūḥ is given a more transcendent reality of the unknown in the realm 
of the metaphysics.  
 
The meaning of nafs according to Hanna Kassis also encompasses the meaning of 
‗heart‘, ‗mind‘, ‗own‘, ‗each other‘ and ‗one another‘ (when used in Plural).15 The 
self therefore is made out of several components that put together gives us a fuller 
appreciation of the meaning of nafs (the individual) in the Qur‘ān.   
 
                                                 
7
 In this meaning it occurs once in the Qur‘ān as a verb form tanaffasa. See Al-Iṣfahānī, Abū Al-Qāsm 
Mufradāt alfā  al-Qur’ān, vol. 2, nafs, Dār al-Qalam, Damascus. 
8
 This meaning occurs only once in a plural form as mutanāfisūn. 
9
 This meaning occurs once in the imperfect form of the verb yatanāfas. 
10
 Badawi & Abdel Haleem, Arabic-English Dictionary of Qur’anic Usage, p. 954. 
11
 Smith, J. ‗The Understanding of Nafs and Ruh in Contemporary Muslim Considerations of the 
Nature of Sleep and Death‘, The Muslim World, vol. 69, issue 3, July 1979, p. 152. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 E Homerin, ‗Soul‘, in McAuliffe, J (ed.) Encyclopaedia of the Qur’ān, vol. 5, 2006, p. 81. 
14
 E E Calverley, ‗Doctrine of The Soul (Nafs and Ruh) in Islam‘, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol.III, pp. 
827-30. 
15
 H E Kassis, A Concordance of the Qur’an, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1983, p. 824. 
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The Qur‘ān characterises the nafs to have several stages or mindsets: that which 
commands towards evil act (as in verse 12:53 nafs al-amārah  il sū’), that which is in 
constant turmoil (75:2 nafs al-lawwāma also translated as ‗the blaming self‘); ‗the 
tranquil self‘ (89:27 nafs al-muṭma’ina), and that self that transcends above all of the 
above in becoming the content self (89:28 nafs al-rāḍiyah)    
 
The fact that one of the derivative meanings of nafs in Arabic is to ‗breath‘ relates to 
air indicating the lightness of nafs and it could indicate nafs’s changing in its 
psychological state.
16
 The challenge the Qur‘ān presents to the nafs is to fight its own 
vices and encourage its own virtues, as in verses 91:7-10 
By the Soul, and the proportion and order given to it. And its enlightenment as to its 
wrong and its right. Truly he succeeds that purifies it. And he fails that corrupts it.
17
 
 
Therefore, the Qur‘ān connects the self (the person/individual) with both the notions 
of work (ʿamal) and the non-linguistic field of choice (khiyār). The nafs is also often 
associated with  ulm, in fact one could argue it is paralleled with  ulm al-nafs (self-
inflicted injustice).     
 
What follows in understanding the nafs and its potential free choice is the capacity to 
be the source of justice, corruption and tyranny. It is these concepts that the Qur‘ān 
warns against. The following section discusses the connection between nafs and  ulm.   
 
 
6.2.1.1 The Connection between Nafs and Ẓu m 
 
The Qur'ān takes the ‗self-adequacy of the commercial individualism‘ and arrogance 
as that which is for the human to avoid.
18
 This self-adequacy, arrogance and 
dominance are centred on the repeated concept of  ulm al-nafs (self-oppression). The 
notion of  ulm al-nafs is found in such passages as 2:57, 3:117, 7:160, 177, 9:70, 
10:44, 16:33, 16:116, 20:40, 30:9, 3:135, 4:64, 11:113, 14:45 and 34:19. As discussed 
in the previous chapters, ẓulm denotes the imbalance of the equilibrium of ‗putting 
everything in its appropriate place‘ or the imbalance against oneself. This means that 
                                                 
16
 Al-Iṣfahānī, Mufradāt alfā  al-Qur’ān, vol. 2, nafs,   
17
 Yousuf Ali‘s translation 91:7-10. 
18
 Askari, Society and State in Islam: an Introduction, p. 156. 
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the appropriate balance or state of equilibrium is to be good and to do good in order to 
achieve a state of non- ulm. 19  This state of non- ulm therefore is not achievable with 
any kind of imposed structure or institution, (or an 'Islamic state' for that matter) but is 
rather a state of mind, chosen by the individual.  
 
According to Cragg,  ulm is ‗to wrong‘ in the active sense. Therefore, cases of 
‗injustice, extortion, calumny, tyranny, false witness, bad faith‘ are all cases of  ulm.20 
To deny what is due according to the Qur‘ān as we have discussed earlier is 
something one can do to oneself, which is often described as  ulm al-nafs and  ulm 
against God. Therefore, it is often mentioned that it was not God that made  ulm but 
effectively it was mankind.
21
 The amāna verse discussed in Chapter Three effectively 
reiterates that mankind is ‗ alūman jahūlā‘.  
 
Most translations of the Qur‘ān render  ulm as ‗wrong-doing‘22 and although it has 
element of that, its fullest meanings comes in relation to the concept of nafs (with it 
the other connective concepts) and according to Izutsu also jahl (loosely translates as 
ignorance).
23
 Jāhiliyah is an attitude of typical person that would be:  
hot-blooded impetuous man, who tends to lose his self-control on the slightest 
provocation…act recklessly, driven by an uncontrollable blind passion, without 
reflecting on the disastrous consequence this behaviour might lead to.
24
 
 
The process of placing  ulm on the self is through self-indulgence, pride, ego, greed 
and potential for self-destruction. This makes the individual unstable. The Qur‘ān 
describes this in verses 70:19-22 
Truly man was created, very impatient. Fretful when evil touches him. And niggardly 
when good reaches him. Not so those devoted to Prayer. 
 
There is also a constant link between the nafs that is doing  ulm and its capacity to 
accumulate wealth and greed.
25
  
 
                                                 
19
 Rahman, Major themes in the Quran, p. 25. 
20
 K Cragg, Am I not your Lord? Human meaning in Divine Question, Melisende, London, 2002, p. 51. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 See Pickthal, Yousif Ali and Abdul Daryabadi.  
23
 Izutsu, God and Man, p. 229. 
24Ibid. p. 223. Of course, Izutsu‘s definition of jahili being personal quality and not only a historical 
age (see p. 219) contradicts his earlier over-emphasis on the jahili period in his analysis. 
25
 For further details see the work of C Turner, ‗Wealth as an immortality symbol in the Qur'an: a 
reconsideration of the mal amwal verses‘, Journal of Qur'anic Studies, vol. 8, no. 2, 2006, pp. 58-83. 
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This injustice affects ‗nations, races, systems, structures, ideologies and other 
establishments social and political‘.26 Therefore, the individual is responsible for the 
evil of its surrounding, but the only way to change the state or reinforce it is through 
changing oneself, as in verse 13:11:  
Verily never will Allah change the condition of a people until they change it 
themselves (with their own souls) 
 
It is the view of this author that the frequent mention of  ulm could be significant, not 
only as an antithesis to ʿadl, but also with a meaning that is much more 
comprehensive. Amina Wadud also shares this view when she argues that the 
reoccurrence of  ulm much more than ‗adl must have some indication or meaning.27 
In agreement with this study‘s proposition, Wadud also suggests that as oppression is 
human-made, it necessarily then requires humans to alleviate it.
28
  
 
Bringing together the understanding of the self with  ulm is not a straightforward 
argument. It has a complex structure, a paradox, a struggle within the inner core of 
human nature, and to counter  ulm al-nafs is not a simple personal acquittal in 
isolation, nor is it a mere focus of the self to change what is around oneself 
(commanding the good). It is a balance between taking responsibility for one‘s actions 
(and struggling in changing or diverting one‘s desires) and between building the 
character of the self-vigilant, taqwā-self and governing-self in doing what is right and 
righteous within one‘s capacity.29 This is all accomplished with proactive 
involvement in ʿamal al-ṣālḥ30 without claiming the ‗fruits‘ of righteousness in 
society (as they derive from God) and understanding that doom is inevitably personal 
as in verse 45:15.
31
 
 
This apparent paradox among the individual‘s responsibility (the dynamic structure of 
the nafs and its struggles), one‘s societal responsibility (the combination of having 
faith and actively engaging in good actions) and accepting that personal doom rather 
                                                 
26
Cragg, The Mind of the Qur’ān, p. 100. 
27
 A Wadud, ‗Towards a Qur'anic Hermeneutics of Social Justice: Race, Class and Gender‘, The 
Journal of Law and Religion, vol. 12, no. 1, 1996, p. 44. 
28
 Ibid. p. 46.  
29
 See the section on taqwā p. 242.  
30Ṣālḥ could mean righteousness it can also come to mean making peace, retribution and bring right. 
See p. 237 for further details. 
31
 Also see Cragg, The Mind of the Qur’ān, p. 101. 
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than society itself could be understood by the verse 13:11 ‗God does not change the 
state of people until they change themselves‘.  
 
The complexity of human nature, the interaction of the individual in society and the 
societal influence on the individual are all presented in the Qur‘ān as the constant 
struggle in building, reforming and changing oneself. This reform ultimately aims to 
avoid corruption (fasād). 
 
 
6.2.1.2 The Connection between Nafs and F s d 
 
The trilateral root of f-s-d denotes ‗to corrupt‘, ‗to spoil‘, ‗to decay‘, ‗to fall into 
disorder‘, ‗to be perverted‘, ‗to make trouble‘ and ‗to be wicked‘.32 Five different 
forms occur from the root word f-s-d and it is mentioned 50 times in the Qur‘ān.33 
These forms include fasada, ‗to become corrupt‘, ‗to fall into disorder‘; afsada ‗to act 
corruptly‘, ‗to play havoc‘ and ‗to cause damage‘. Fasād may be defined as 
‗mischief‘, ‗destruction‘, ‗causing corruption‘; and mufsid refers to the person that 
causes or spreads ‗mischief‘, ‗disruption‘ and ‗destruction‘.34 From the meanings 
above, the verses that include f-s-d refer to those people who spread corruption and 
mischief and in one description who will not be the heirs of the earth.  
 
Thus, one of the  ulm al-nafs is to either become corrupt or spread corruption, which 
the Qur‘ān warns against. Verses like 2:205; 5:32, 33 and 64; 8:73; 11:116 (also 
mentions  ulm); 28:77; 28:83 (mentioned taqwā as the winners) significantly 
highlighting the nafs to restrain from corruption. Verse 30:41 could be said to 
summarise the Qur‘ānic worldview about the cause of corruption and mischief:  
Corruption doth appear on land and sea because of (the evil) which men's hands have 
done, that He may make them taste a part of that which they have done, in order that 
they may return.  
 
Fasad is also linked to exorbitant behaviour that in and of itself is a form of 
corruption. These verses show the outward manifestation of corruption that the 
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 Badawi & Abdel Haleem, Arabic-English Dictionary of Qur’anic Usage, pp. 709-710. 
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Qur‘ān warns against and aims to promote radical change by looking inwardly as 
discussed earlier.
 35
  
 
In summary, the concept of nafs and its semantic field is associated with  ulm and 
fasād. The Qur‘ān also refers to concepts such as insān, bashr and mar’ to refer to the 
individual. The following section provides a summary of meaning(s) of these 
concepts.   
 
 
6.2.2 The Qur‟ānic Usage of Ins n, Bashar and Mar' 
 
Insān comes from the root word ‘-n-s that occurs 97 times in eight different forms.36 
The root word denotes ‗to tame‘, ‗affable‘, ‗friendly‘, ‗intimate friend‘, ‗to be 
sociable‘, ‗to detect‘ and ‗to forget‘.37 The eight forms are: ‗ānas (mentioned five 
times meaning ‗to perceive‘, ‗to sight from a distance‘ as in 28:29; ‗to conceive‘ and 
‗to detect‘). Tasta’nis (mentioned once – with the meaning of ‗draw attention to one‘s 
presence‘), ‗ins (mentioned 18 times meaning ‗human kind‘ with the plural noun 
‗unās - meaning ‗a group of people‘ and its mentioned five times), insān denotes 
‗humankind‘ and ‗human being‘, occurring 65 times. The form ‗insī comes to mean ‗a 
member of human race‘ and musta’nis denotes ‗one that is seeking and desiring 
conversation‘.38  
 
Insān as a concept has the general focus of addressing humanity (as in verse 29:8 and 
31:14) and is often described in the Qur‘ān as being unjust and ignorant (as in verse 
33:72  alūman jahūlā), unthankful, ungrateful, impatient, inflected in troubles, in 
anxiety and in constant restlessness as in verses 36:77; 41:49 and 51; 42:48; 43:15; 
70:19-21; 76:3; 89:15-20; 90:4 and 100:6. Furthermore, according to Cragg, the 
description of kabad (toil) refers to a person‘s interior heart, his capacity for evil and 
his love of power and wealth.
39
 It also carries on in verse 96:6-7, which describes the 
                                                 
35
 The description is arḍ –earth- there is constant connection to arḍ see Chapter Four.  
36
 Badawi & Abdel Haleem, Arabic-English Dictionary of Qur‘anic Usage, p. 57. 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 Ibid. pp. 57-8. 
39
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nature of the human being. In all these verses it shows insān to be of a constant 
rebellious nature with verse 95:4-6 explaining why: 
Surely We created man of the best stature (4) Then we reduced him to the lowest of 
the low, (5) Save those who believe and do good works, and theirs is a reward 
unfailing. (6) 
 
The word insān is interestingly tied with other derivatives which also give secondary 
meaning to this concept. The root word ‘-n-s also comes to mean uns (‗sympathy‘ 
‗companionship‘; ‗familiarity‘) and nisyān denotes ‗forgetfulness‘. Often the Qur‘ān 
describes the human as one who forgets both his responsibility and his purpose and 
indulges in vices such as in verse 39:8 and 49. The combination of those meanings 
imbues the concept of insān with the sense of possessing the social capacity to seek 
companionship as well as to be forgetful. 
 
 
6.2.2.1 The Morphology of Bashar 
 
Another concept in the Qur‘ān that refers to the human being and mankind in general 
is bashar. Bashar occurs 36 times in the Qur‘ān from the root word b-sh-r.40 What is 
interesting is that from the root word the meaning also includes ‗good news‘, ‗to give 
good/glad tidings‘ and ‗to be happy/joyful for receiving good news‘ (as in verses 
3:171; 9:111; 10:2; 15:67; 39:17). Often the connection of bashar is in connection 
with the Prophets themselves as being humans and messengers. This includes the 
following verses: 12123; 3:79; 4:165; 6:48; 11:27; 14:10-11; 17:93-4, l05; 18:56, 110; 
21:3; and 23:24. It is interesting that the word insān is not used in all the verses that 
contextually speak of Prophets addressing their people but rather the word bashar is 
used.  
 
Furthermore, what is interesting in the story of the creation of Adam, the word bashar 
is also used rather than insān (in verse 15:28 and 33), yet in the amāna verse, insān is 
mentioned. In addition, this concept is also used when the Virgin Mary speaks of her 
encounter with the angel in the form of a human (19:17-20). This goes hand in hand 
with the meaning of good tidings as opposed to the connected meaning of 
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forgetfulness in the concept of insān. Therefore, one may be able to conclude that the 
description of insān is different from the description of bashar. In support, in verse 
17:9 the Qur‘ān describes itself as giving good news to the believers.      
 
In the description of the individual the concept of mar’ and a more specific 
description of believers and worshipers are also used in the Qur‘ān. The following 
section elaborates on these concepts briefly.   
 
 
6.2.2.2 The Morphology of Mar' 
  
The Qur‘ān also uses the word mar’ and imra’ to mean ‗a human‘, ‗a person‘, ‗a 
man‘, or ‗a woman‘, from the root word m-r-‘. These two forms are found in 11 
verses.
41
 Examples include verses 2:102; 8:24; 78:40; 80:34; 70:38; 74:52 and 80:37.  
 
The use of mar’ seems to be in the neutral sense of the terms ‗person‘, ‗human‘, ‗man 
or ‗woman‘. Whereas both nafs and insān describe the nature of the self in different 
ways (both its vices and its virtues), mar’ seems to be a neutral description of a person 
or a human with a connection to the capacity of kasb (as in verses 24:11 and 52:21). 
    
In summary then, the concept of insān, bashr, and mar' are also other descriptions of 
the individual in the Qur‘ān which indicate a general Qur‘ānic worldview, in which  
the human being, not an external structure, is central. There are also more specific 
concepts used in the Qur‘ān to refer to individuals such as ‗o believers‘ and ‗o 
worshipers‘. The section bellow examines the two concepts mu’min and ʿa d in 
connection to the Qur‘ānic worldview of the individual.   
 
 
6.2.3 Other Qur‟ānic References to the Individual    
 
The Qur‘ān uses the word ʿa d, which derives from the root word ʿ-b-d which 
denotes ‗slave,‘ ‗servant‘, ‗obedience‘, ‗submission‘, ‗to worship‘, ‗to enslave‘, ‗to 
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tan camel hide‘ and ‗to tar a boat‘, of which 11 forms occur 275 times.42 ʿAbada 
(meaning ‗to worship‘ occurs 121 times), ʿabd (singular noun meaning ‗worshiper‘ or 
‗servant‘ in relation to God, a plural form ʿi ād occurs 97 times), ʿā id (‗one who 
worships‘, occurs 97 times), ʿā idūn (plural form) occurs 10 times and the feminine 
plural form is ʿā idāt (occurs once).43  
 
Often the Qur‘ān speaks of lowering one's ego as being a characteristic of those who 
truly worship God- ʿa d, as in verses 2:90 and 186 (in a plural form); 18:1 and 65; 
19:2 and 30; 34:9; 38:41; 39:36, 43:59; 50:8; 53:10; 54:9; 57:9; 72:19.  
 
What concerns us here is the Qur‘ānic usage of ʿa d and mu’min as a description of 
an individual who has chosen to have a relationship with God. The Qur‘ān therefore is 
not using ʿa d to refer to a ‗slave‘ but rather as a worshipper as the person freely 
chooses to worship whereas a slave has been forced to serve against her/his will.  
 
Furthermore, one of the meanings of ʿi ād refers to those who lovingly worship with 
self-surrender to the Will of God as well as to trust God fully.
44
 The concept of trust 
again semantically links to the meaning of mu’min – the one who is trustworthy and 
trusting in God.  
 
 
6.2.3.1 The Morphology of Mu'min 
 
The trilateral root ‘-m-n denotes ‗to be safe,‘ ‗to be secure‘; ‗guard‘, ‗keeper‘; ‗trust‘, 
‗faith‘ and ‗believe‘. From this root word, 19 forms occur 858 times.45 Amina occurs 
20 times with the meaning of ‗to feel safe,‘ as in verse 2:283; ‗āmana occurs 537 with 
the meaning of ‗faith‘ and ‗to make someone safe‘ as in verse 106:4.46 ‗I’tumina 
occurs once with the meaning ‗to be entrusted‘, as in 2:283; ‗āmin occurs 6 times with 
the meaning of ‗safe‘ or ‗secure‘ as in 16:112; ‗āminah is mentioned once as a 
feminine noun and ‗amānāt occurs as a plural form four times with the meaning of 
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‗trust‘ as in verse 33:72; ‗āminūn is mentioned 10 times; ‘amānah is mentioned twice; 
‘amn is mentioned five times denoting ‗safety‘ or ‗security‘ as in verse 24:55.  
 
‘Amanah occurs twice with the meaning of ‗inner calm‘, ‗tranquillity‘, ‗relaxation‘ 
and ‗peace‘ as in verse 3:154; ‘amīn occurs 14 times with the meaning of ‗honest‘ and 
‗trustworthy‘ as in verse 26:193; imān is mentioned 45 times with the meaning of 
‗faith‘; ma’man is mentioned once as ‗a place of safety‘ and ‗a place of security‘ as in 
verse 9:6. Ma’mūn is also mentioned once with the meaning of ‗something 
completely safe‘ as in verse 70:28; mu’min occurs 22 time with the meaning of ‗the 
one who believes‘ as in verse 26:3; mu’minayn in a dual form occurs once; 
mu’minatun is mentioned six times in feminine form and mu’minūn occurs 179 times 
in the plural form; mu’minān also comes in dual form and occurs 22 times.  
 
Although this concept is mentioned in connection with many overlapping fields, it 
would not be an exaggeration that the most associated parallel concept is with ʿamal 
al-ṣāliḥ. This is much so, that the idea of imān in the Qur‘ān has its own Qur‘ānic 
weltanschauung outside its semantic meaning.     
 
6.2.3.1.1 The association of mu’m n with ʿamal al-    ḥ 
 
ʿAmal is emphasised with mu’min over and over again in the Qur'ān. For example the 
parallelism include the following verses 2:25, 28, 277; 3:57; 4:57, 122, 173; 5:9, 
93;7:42, 10:4, 9; 11:23; 13:29; 14:23, 18:30, 88,107; 19:60, 96; 20:82; 
22:14,23,50,56; 25:70; 26:227, 28:67; 28:80; 29:7, 9, 58; 30:15, 45, 31:8, 32:19; 34:4, 
37; 35:7; 38:28; 38:24; 40:58; 41:8; 42:22, 23,26; 45:21, 30; 47:2, 12; 48:29; 65:11; 
84:25, 85:11; 95:6; 98:7; and 103:3. One possible reason for this might be the nature 
of belief that motivates action to do good.  
 
In support, Kaneko asserts that the idea of being a believer is that a person who in his 
outward action aims to do good. Kaneko further suggests:  
one who gives up worldliness as a man engaging in holy orders, has already never 
been a complete believer because he avoids his social responsibilities, even if his 
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spiritual intention has been the attainment of a higher level.
47
  
 
This balance lies between doing good and being motivated by responsibility as in 
verse 45:15. This social responsibility, however, is not institutionalised in the Qur'ān.  
 
Conceivably, the realm of the political remains to be within the sphere of the ʿamal 
al-ṣāliḥ; that is to say, the individual is always aiming for the greater good in society 
and that his belief in God is not of apathy but of ʿamal. In this sense, this study is 
arguing that the Qur‘ān is not apolitical; it is in fact political because of its principles 
of seeking and working towards a greater good in one‘s actions and acknowledging 
one‘s responsibilities.   
 
This apparent viewpoint goes hand in hand with the concept of amr  il maʿrūf wa 
nahī ʿan almunkar, that is, to encourage the good and discourage the wrong. What is 
interesting, maʿrūf semantically means 'what is common', ‗to know‘, ‗recognised 
norms‘, ‗goodness‘ or ‗virtues‘ from the root word ʿ-r-f. 48 In this case it denotes what 
is commonly good in society. This could mean that an action which aims to do good, 
is reinforcing the common good and hence fulfilling this amr  il maʿrūf.49      
 
As seen in Chapter Three there is a wide perception amongst scholars of Islam that 
the status of the human being is that of a vicegerent on earth. This view is accepted 
amongst both Shīʿite scholars such as Ṣadr50 and Sunnī scholars such as Mohammed 
ʿAbduh and Rashīd Riḍā.51 In fact, this idea could go as far as Ibn ʿArabī with his 
notion of insān al-kāmil.52 This is based on three points in verses 2:30-31, as 
discussed in Chapter Three: (1) God describing Adam as khalīfa, (2) Adam being able 
to know the names of all things while the angels were unable to know and (3) the 
angels bowing down to Adam.  
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As Cragg points out ‗[t]his human competence in identifying, naming, and so 
managing phenomena is something the angels have to confess they cannot match or 
attain‘.53 Further to this, Cragg argues that Divine lordship is staked in the human 
role. As discussed earlier this verse is addressing an aspect of Adamic nature; there 
seems to be a silence on the other aspect of the same nature of spreading corruption 
and shedding blood.  This as we have seen might not be a full reading of the Qur‘ān's 
injunctions of human being per se but of a post-Qur'ānic philosophy of the human 
being. Yet, we may, nevertheless, agree with Cragg‘s conclusion that ‗[m]an has no 
sovereignty over the world, except in accountability under God‘.54 It is this point that 
this chapter reiterates.  
 
The Qur'ānic approach to human nature arguably outlines the duality of the human 
being. With this duality, many have done one of two things. They have either taken 
the meaning of Adamic khilāfa and made that into a holistic paradigm on how they 
would read both human nature and the Muslim political entity, or they have seen a 
more gloomy perception of human nature in the Qur‘ān, which again is arguably half 
of the story. 
 
This brief understanding of the meaning of nafs would appear to indicate the 
complexity and changing of the ―self‖.  It also indicates the centrality of the 
individual in the Qur‘ān. Further to this, what is central to the concept of the 
individual is the non-semantic field of choice, which in turn is thematically connected 
to action. The following section elaborates on the centrality of these two concepts.    
 
 
6.3 THE QUR‟ĀNIC NOTION OF FREE CHOICE (KHIYĀR) AND WORK 
(ʿAMAL) 
 
There is a constant emphasis made in the Qur‘ān between nafs, ʿamal and its 
relationship with God, as in verse 3:30, which emphasises the relationship between 
God and individual human beings as well as the consequences of human deeds 
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(ʿamal). 55 There is also the constant semantic association between imān and ʿamal al-
ṣāliḥ as mentioned in the previous section.56 It is also worth noting that those verses 
that mention the self are also saying something about free choice. What runs 
throughout the Qur‘ān is precisely this theme of choice which is vital in determining 
the consequences for the individual. That is to say that there is a choice to restrain 
from those impulses that would spread corruption and a choice to encourage virtue. It 
is this thesis‘ contention that freedom of choice is one of the major non-semantic 
fields of the Qur'ānic weltanschauung, alongside tawḥīd and judgement day. In fact, it 
is necessarily linked to both tawḥīd and eschatology. The notion of choice as one of 
the major non-semantic fields is not only based on the choice of the human but also 
upon the passages alluding to God‘s own assertions that He will not do  ulm to any 
soul.
57
 
 
The Qur‘ān appears to possess a radical approach in tackling the roots of the ills 
found among both individuals and by extension society. It seems to address root 
causes, rendering the individual political, not in the conventional sense but in the 
sense of approaching any change from its root cause. In this case, the root cause of 
conflicts, wars, and corruption lies in the choices man has made himself by neglecting 
his ethical responsibility or at worst neglecting himself entirely (that is, neglecting his 
purpose to do good).
58
 For the person‘s conscious decision to refrain from doing 
wrong to oneself and to others and the Qur‘ān‘s encouragement to do good indicate 
that this individual is also aware of the injustices around him/herself. This 
consciousness and constant awareness of self is the first step towards possessing an 
awareness of others. It follows that this state of awareness also leads to action because 
it would appear that the ethical and the political are inseparable. However, the 
mechanism by which to manifest this awareness is not specified in the Qur‘ān. 
Conceivably the sphere of the political lies not in the sphere of a structure but outside 
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of it, only as a consequence of individuals making choices can one speak of a 
‗political‘ action.         
 
The hierarchy of concepts that this study has put forward indicates that the absence of 
any structure and systems in the Qur‘ān is not arbitrary. The silence could indicate 
that the core issue is not a political structure but rather the actions of humans 
themselves. 
 
In support, Fazlur Rahman argues that the fact that God is mentioned more than 1,000 
times in relation to human beings shows a particular tension. The tension exists within 
human nature between the human‘s innate unruliness, restlessness, un-thankfulness 
and greed, on one hand, and his capacity of aḥsanī taqwīm (the best form) in verses 
17:70 and 91:8 on the other hand. It is precisely the human being that Rahman holds 
to be the central point of revelation that is ‗man, and his behaviour, not God‘.59 
 
When discussing the notion of free choice it is important to bear in mind that our 
enquiry is only looking at the Qur‘ān and not the post-Qur‘ānic debate that took place 
between the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites which reflects a theo-philosophical debate 
that was also been motivated by political events.
60
 As argued earlier this theme is 
based on the notion of accountability. That is to say, it would not be possible to be 
judged without having the choice to obey or to turn away. For example, the following 
verses indicate the consequences of human actions 2:256; 33:72; 53:39-42; 75:13-15; 
75:36; 76:3; 76:29; 79:35; 84:6-12; and 95:4-6.  
 
Maḥmūd Moḥammed Ṭāhā explains further that this ‗individuality is the essence of 
the whole endeavour, as it is the basis of responsibility and honor‘.61 Supporting 
evidence for this argument lies in the fact that the meaning of islām itself is 
‗submission‘, ‗surrender to God‘, suggesting the element of the individual and not the 
community.    
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According to Ṭāhā, freedom in Islam exists at two levels. The first level is a freedom 
that is limited by law, and the second level is that of an absolute freedom that goes 
beyond law.
62
 He goes on to explain that the free person at the first level  
is one who thinks as he wishes, speaks in accordance with his thinking, and acts in 
accordance with his speech, on condition that his exercise of freedom of speech, or 
action, does not interfere with the freedom of others. If he so interferes, then his 
freedom is justly limited by laws which are consistent with the constitution.63 
 
At the second level, a free person also does the above in saying what he thinks and 
acting according to it, but the  
consequence of his exercise of all these freedoms is only goodness, blessings, and 
kindness to all people. The lowest degree of the first level of freedom is fairness, 
while the lowest degree of the second level is forgiveness. A free man at this second 
level holds no ill will, even in his hidden conscience, as he knows that any such ill-
will begins at the level of conscience, before it will be projected into the realm of 
speech, and then finally action.
64
 
 
These two levels are not exclusive to each other but rather overlap. The first level is a 
preparation for the second level. Ṭāhā suggest that the individual reaches the second 
level through his own endeavours to  
observe himself, hold himself to account, and morally educate himself, constantly 
disciplining himself towards perfection and doing good. Self-observation means 
awareness of the constant presence of God, so that all senses refrain from acting in a 
way that displeases God, whether in thought, speech or action. Holding oneself to 
account means a more profound attention, in case some ill will has escaped 
observation.
65
 
 
This choice at the second level would also entail that one must earn one's freedom to 
choose to be at the second level. Ṭāhā is also of the opinion that the developed forms 
of worship and devotion as well as their laws aim to take the individual to that 
absolute freedom (at the second level).
66
 This would also mean that worship and legal 
injunctions are only tools to educate in order to raise communities and individuals 
‗from crudeness and hostility to refinement and humanity. The cruder and less 
sensitive the people, the harsher will their law be‘.67 Ṭāhā argues this in order to 
explain the Muslim legal system. His understanding of freedom is in line with the 
outcome of this research.       
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Consequently, only when one masters self-control does one become absolutely free 
and according to Ṭāhā prohibitions and restrictions disappear. This is the process of 
the individual learning how to control his tongue and master his thoughts. The Islamic 
legislation is conceived to enable ‗individuals to attain‘ this level.68  
 
The reason for certain seemingly 'harsh' penalties such as capital punishment and 
cutting the hands of a thief, according to Ṭāhā, is because with great freedom comes 
great responsibility and therefore ‗responsibility is a personal commitment to 
undertake the consequences of action, whether right or wrong‘.69 This is because the 
first principle is that a person is free ‗until it is shown, in practice, that he or she is 
unable to properly discharge the duty of such freedom. Freedom is a natural right 
corresponding to a duty, namely, its proper exercise‘.70 Hence, a related point to the 
conception of free choice is the notion of accountability. Verses on human 
accountability are also ample such as 2:223, 286; 6:152, 164; 7:42; 17:1; 23:62; 39:7; 
53:38 and 65:7. In these verses the Qur‘ān repeatedly emphasises that no one bears 
someone else‘s burden but himself, suggesting justice and a premise before that, free 
choice.  
 
The vision of a good society is that ‗people are judged according to their intellectual 
and moral character, as reflected in their public and private lives and demonstrated in 
the spirit of public service at all times and through every means‘.71  
 
This research also concurs with Ṭāhā's point that the ‗peak of religion with respect to 
politics is illustrated by the verse: ‗Then remind them, as you are only a reminder. 
You have no domination over them‘ (88:21-22).72  
 
Verse 33:72 is another instance which tells us that the insān has the ability to choose 
and therefore is free. His freedom therefore choice is the core of his being. This 
conception goes hand in hand with the Qur‘ānic weltanschauung of the role of 
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messengers (and thus revelation). The vision of the Qur‘ān cannot be imposed by any 
institution and cannot be a top-bottom imposition nor can it be a bottom-up 
imposition as a pure social movement. Rather it is a worldview that is inner 
(concerning the psyche and the moral framework of the individual) and outer (the 
individual‘s responsibility to the ‗other‘ be it family, neighbours, orphan or the poor). 
It has to be a choice (and therefore freely desired) in wishing to establish, in 
Rahman‘s words, ‗a just, equitable, free and creative social order in harmony and 
unison with laws of God‘.73 This vision necessarily cannot be imposed by a structure 
because of the element of choice. 
 
It might even be possible to make the argument that human free will is a core concept 
in the Qur'ān. This would be the case if one reads into, for example, the five pillars 
(declaration of faith, prayer, charity, fasting and performing the pilgrimage) as overt 
actions of free will in which one chooses to do, to restrain, to give, to worship and to 
affirm. That is to say, the person chooses freely to show God his/her commitment and 
therefore, the fact that it is chosen freely is vital in the Qur‘ānic discourse for 
judgement.  
 
From this point of view then, it is possible to argue that in the heart of any action is 
free will and that verse 2:256 manifests as the ultimate consequence of this free will:  
Let there be no compulsion in religion. Truth stands out clear from Error; whoever 
rejects Evil and believes in Allah hath grasped the most trustworthy hand-hold, that 
never breaks. And Allah heareth and knoweth all things. 
 
To support this view one needs to look no further than the description the Qur'ān 
presents regarding the Prophets. In verses such as 3:20; 5:92 and 99, 13:40; 16:35; 
24:53; 29:18, 36:17; 42: 48 and 64:12, the Qur'ān asserts that its role is only to remind 
and warn. The entire narrative of the Qur'ān emphasises that the  ook exists only as 
guidance and that the role of the Prophets is only to warn, which also follows that 
people either choose to follow or choose to deny. This is the heart of human free will.  
 
This argument is similar to Alī ʿAbdul Rāziq‘s assertion that the Qur‘ān is silent 
towards political structures and therefore Muslims are free to choose their own 
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political systems. However, the argument of this study is not that the Qur‘ān 
provisions for ‗democracy‘ or of ‗liberty‘ in the sense of reconciling it with western 
political notions as ʿAbdul Rāziq attempted. Rather this research is suggesting that the 
silence in the Qur‘ān about any specific political structure and its emphasis upon free 
choice and accountability suggests that any political system is considered acceptable 
as long as morality integrated in the fabric of the individual and hence part of society. 
Conceivably, the weakness of ʿAbdul Rāziq‘s assertion lies in his reaction to 
modernity rather than in examining the actual Qur‘ānic discourse. The process in 
which this internalisation is possible is in the notion of self-vigilance and self-
governing (taqwā) 
 
The description of the notion of nafs is that one should be able to aim at self-purity in 
order to change oneself. This self-purity is described in one notion as the process of 
taqwā. This concept is also important due its association with the concept of 
individual. The following section illustrates this connection.   
 
 
6.4 THE QUR‟ĀNIC NOTION OF SELF-GOVERNANCE (TAQWĀ) 
 
The notion of taqwā is also connected to nafs and the concept of the individual in 
general, which also could highlight the Qur‘ānic worldview of the interconnectedness 
of the purpose of the individual. Translating taqwā as fear of God does not do justice 
to this concept. As Rahman points out, taqwā is one of the most important terms in 
the Qur'an. He further argues that taqwā   
[a]t its highest, it denotes the fully integrated and whole personality of man, the kind 
of ‗stability‘ which is formed after all the positive elements are drawn in.74   
 
This is because to Rahman, imān and islām are connected also to the concept of 
taqwā. To him, those three concepts are the basic semantic meanings of safety, peace 
and integrity. Particularly, one of the derivatives (wiqāya) comes to mean ‗to take 
protection‘ and ‗to be careful‘ (which connects to amān).75      
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The process of taqwā is critical when struggling against vices and encouraging virtues 
(being in the constant process of struggle). This process is about building the inner 
consciousness and awareness of God.  
 
In addition, taqwā according to Izutsu underwent a semantic shift. In pre-Islamic 
period the meaning of taqwā was the ‗self-defensive attitude of a living being, animal 
or man, against some destructive force coming from outside‘.76 The basic meaning of 
this term remains, according to Izutsu, but its overall connectedness to the Qur‘ānic 
weltanschauung has changed. Taqwā comes to connect to the God consciousness, a 
process of ‗pious fear of Divine chastisement on the Day of Judgement‘.77 This is 
because the derivative word of waqā also comes to mean that God protects the moral 
person such as in verses 40:9, 45; 52:27 and 76:11.
78
  
 
The trilateral root w-q-y denotes ‗to protect‘, ‗to shield from‘, ‗to keep safe from‘ 
(such as waqā as in verse 16:81); 79 the form yūqā  denotes ‗to be distanced from‘, ‗to 
be saved from‘ and ‗to be preserved from‘ (such as in verse 64:16). 80 The meaning of 
‗to be conscious of‘, ‗to stay from‘, ‗to guard against‘, ‗to have a thought for‘ and ‗to 
have care for‘ is associated with the form ittaqā as in verses 59:18; 9:115; 39:24; 
73:17; 36:45.
 81
 The form atqā denotes ‗more pious‘ and ‗most mindful‘, as in verse 
49:13.
 82
 The root word in the form of wāqī comes to mean ‗protector‘ or ‗defender‘ 
as in verse 13:34.
 83
 Another form that is also translated as ‗mindful of God‘ or ‗pious‘ 
is taqiyy as in verse 19:18.
 84
 Taqwā (as a noun) is also translated as ‗mindfulness of 
God‘, ‗awareness of God‘ and ‗piety‘ as in verse 91:8 occurring 17 times its plural 
(muttaqūn) occur 49 times. The Qur‘ān uses nine forms of w-q-y in 258 different 
verses.
85
 The sheer number of verses shows the centrality of this concept to the 
Qur‘ānic weltanschauung as well as the difficult task of arriving at a coherent 
conceptualisation of this core-concept.  
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Semantically, Izutsu argues that waqā is a description of that person who when harm 
is approaching uses something in defence of himself (in the meaning of wiqāya).86 
Thus, the meaning indicates ‗to protect‘, ‗to defend‘ and ‗to cover‘. Hence, it is not 
surprisingly translated as ‗fear of God‘.87  
 
Izutsu contends that taqwā initially connected with eschatological concepts and only 
later did this concept took the meaning of piety.
88
 However, taqwā equally has a 
meaning that connects both to eschatology and to this world directly. In fact, one 
could argue that all concepts connect to eschatology and taqwā is no exception.      
 
It is not enough merely to perform good deeds for oneself, there must also be an 
inward struggle for change involving both a constant purification of the heart but also 
a measure of self-restraint in order to develop or raise the nafs towards its higher 
virtues. As 64:16 suggests:  
So fear (itaqū) Allah as much as ye can; listen and obey; and spend in charity for the 
benefit of your own souls: And those saved from the covetousness of their own 
souls― they are the ones that achieve prosperity. 
 
 
Although itaqū is translated as ‗fear‘, Rahman‘s definition of taqwā as ‗a mental state 
of responsibility from which an agent‘s actions proceed but which recognises that the 
criterion of judgement upon them lies outside him‘ is more accurate.89 Similar to 
Rahman, the definition of taqwā is critical for emphasising the inner responsibility. 
Indeed this is the first step in creating an empathetic individual and by extension a 
community, which seeks to achieve virtue. It is the creation of a value system that 
builds a moral responsibility within the individual and that keeps the individual‘s 
autonomy with the emphasis on the ʿamal that would also have a socio-political 
consequences but recognise change and judgement is beyond the individual (as in 
verse 13:11).  
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The Qur‘ān also describes the characteristic of taqwā in 2:177  
It is not righteousness that ye turn your faces towards East or West; but it is 
righteousness―to believe in Allah and the Last Day and the Angels and the  ook and 
the Messengers; to spend of your substance out of love for Him, for your kin, for 
orphans for the needy, for the wayfarer for those who ask and for the ransom of 
slaves; to be steadfast in prayer and practise regular charity; to fulfil the contracts 
which ye have made; and to be firm and patient in pain (or suffering) and adversity 
and throughout all periods of panic. Such are the people of truth the Allah-fearing 
(mutaqūn).  
 
This description of the righteousness goes hand in hand with the higher level of the 
nafs yet it is also possible to fall into the opposite spectrum, which the Qur‘ān warns 
against.  
 
Rahman elaborates on this lower human condition. He holds that because of human:  
native selfishness and narrowness, man is always prone to go to extremes: he is full 
of pride one moment and a helpless prey to hopelessness the next moment; panicky 
under trial and thinking he is all but God when out of trial. The Only way he can 
attain taqwā is to recognise both his powers and the limits God has put upon him as 
his natural condition. He is neither free like God nor helpless like a stone; he is 
neither omnipotent nor impotent; neither omniscient nor ignorant. Only by staying 
within this positive framework can he maximise his moral energy and make progress, 
which is the essence of taqwā.90 
 
This moral energy Rahman is suggesting is also connected to the ability to keep the 
limits (ḥudūd) and boundaries that God has set. The section bellow elaborates this 
connection. 
 
 
6.4.1 The Connection Between T qw  and Ḥud d 
 
Taqwā also connects, as mentioned in Chapter Four, in many verses with the notion of 
ḥudūdū-allāh.91 This is understandable when taqwā denotes ‗self-restraint‘ and ‗self-
control‘. In this context, taqwā connotes ‗to protect one‘s self from one‘s vices‘, ‗to 
restrain oneself from an evil act‘ and ‗to self-govern‘.92 The meaning of ‗fearing God‘ 
in the verses on taqwā comes as being conscious that God is watching (knowing) 
one‘s self and that the process of taqwā or the act of taqwā is not and could not be 
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enforced by anybody other than the person wishes to go through the struggle to reach 
a state of taqwā. This directly links the private sphere between keeping ḥudūd allāh 
and being conscious that God is all-Knowing.  
 
Again, this mindset cannot be reinforced by a state or any other institution or system; 
it can only be ‗reminded‘ as the Qur‘ān suggests. This also gives humankind a huge 
responsibility and accountability to God and no other being simply because no other 
being can fully know one‘s intentions and one‘s attempt to strive towards virtue. This 
also gives the individual freedom. As discussed in Chapter Four, the connection of 
taqwā to ḥudūdū-allāh could indicate that the legalistic element cannot be imposed by 
an institution. Furthermore, cases of what are commonly called ḥudūd laws when 
looked in the Qur‘ān are situations which are arguably private in nature, such as the 
verses concerned with adultery.
93
 Therefore, ḥudūd might have been viewed as a 
private boundary to keep the limits of God as opposed to what ḥudūd has come to 
mean.    
 
As we have observed, for Rahman, the characterisation of God-consciousness (taqwā) 
is seen as an exclusive ethical socio-political action in the world.
94
 More to the point, 
Cragg's words describing the meaning of taqwā may be the most precise description 
of taqwā as he postulates that there is a: 
quality of awareness of the divine prescripts by which man is preserved from, 
cautioned against, and inspired to resist all that contravenes his true being 
under God. The root sense of preservation, of being guarded, is gathered into 
the Qur'anic shaping of a human authenticity through 'the limits of God'.
95
 
 
What is significant here is this human authenticity which proceeds through the ‗limits 
of God‘ – that is ḥudūdu-allāh. He further notes that taqwā is equated with 
‗conscience‘ and that is the full acknowledgement that all guidance is from God.96 It 
is precisely the points Cragg and Rahman raise on the notion of taqwā that this 
section is asserting.  
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In summary, the nafs, this individual that is created with free choice, is thus the centre 
of the Qur‘ānic weltanschauung. It is capable of changing and challenging corruption 
but it is also responsible for causing it. This dynamic being, hence, enters the sphere 
of the political in its possibilities of change and challenge to ―power‖ by looking 
inwardly in a non-structuralist manner. This process takes place through the inward-
outward struggle.    
 
The notion of self-governance which is presented in this chapter is an exploration of 
the Qur‘ānic vision of what ―ought to be‖. The level of taqwā is such that people are 
safe and the restricting of one‘s actions is such so that it does not infringe on others. 
This is only possible if one decides freely to do so. Arguably, no external system is 
able to completely implement true security and safety.  
 
This may seem to be an idealist (or even unachievable) perception of humankind 
whereas, to many, Islam has a realist approach to societal ills.
97
 This is partly true, 
because there are many passages in the Qur‘ān that seem to present a practical 
solution to real problems (such as theft, inheritance, war and so on). However, equally 
there are many passages that speak of virtue and bringing about a good society. The 
task at hand is to be able to identify possible Qur'ānic worldview of an ideal 
community. Cragg makes this point clear when he asserts that:  
[t]here is no power in external relationships to reverse evil and turn men to truth 
without the inward turning of the will itself where the wrong belongs. The battle for 
the good in the world must be won in the heart.
98 
 
This is the notion of self-governance in the Qur‘ānic weltanschauung. It suggests a 
possible vision of the individual, on the part of the Qur'ān, of the individual. 
Arguably, the ―ideal community‖ comes about through an inward/outward paradigm 
rather than a bottom up or top-bottom approach for change. This kind of 
understanding has freedom and choice as a fundamental element in the Qur‘ānic 
weltanschauung. 
 
The paradigm of self-governance begs the question of how then this links to the idea 
of a community in the Qur‘ān. If the result of this study is taken to be significant in 
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arguing that there is no mention of a political theory in the form of government, 
structure or institutionalization in the Qur‘ān (which makes the silence significant and 
indicative of a possible worldview), then how can one understand the concept of the 
community in the Qur‘ān? The next section addresses this question.      
 
 
6.5 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE 
COMMUNITY     
 
The notion of community relates deeply to the choices human beings make and 
reflects the reality of the individuals themselves. The nature of the individual is 
dynamic; his or her core nature is in constant turmoil but desires perfection. With the 
desire for perfection comes the drive towards bettering oneself and one‘s 
surroundings.    
 
It is difficult to argue against the view that the central aim of the Qur‘ān is to establish 
a moral community which caters to the socially disadvantaged, is just and merciful.
99
 
If the individual is the core aim of the Qur'ān, then it also follows that the notion of 
the community or society is also a means of helping that individual, and therefore is 
acting as a facilitator and not to benefit itself.  
 
There is a delicate balance between the individual and his role in the community. It is 
true that taqwā could only have a meaning in a societal setting as Rahman argues;100 
however, the emphasis of the Qur‘ān is on the accountability of the individual towards 
the community. Individuals do not live in a vacuum nor does a society operate in 
isolation. This correlation has sometimes been misunderstood as emphasising society 
alone as a unit, thus ignoring the role of the individual. For example, in the following 
verse 107:2-3; 104:2-3; 96:6; 90:5-6 and 89:15-20 the weight is on the state of the 
individual who connects by implication to wider society. There is a constant emphasis 
in the Qur‘ān, therefore, on the individual‘s dual state of mind. This in turn is linked 
to the third element, that of eschatology.  
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There is a strong non-semantic connection therefore between one‘s action, judgement 
day and in the belief in One True Sustainer (92:3-21). The societal vices that the 
Qur‘ān discusses are many, including economic exploitation of the poor, widespread 
corruption (fasād), oppression of the weak, widespread stealing, lying and killing, 
which is included in the meaning of fasād and fisq.    
 
Arguably, it is difficult to address these inequalities by means of an institution and at 
times it seems that such inequalities are permanently part of the structure. The human 
element (the dynamic structure of human nature and its nafs as described earlier) runs 
throughout the Qur‘ān, reminding the reader that change is possible. This is found 
with the attempt to change oneself both by struggling for virtue from within and by 
holding a dynamic understanding of human nature rather than a deterministic one. 
 
Notwithstanding, it was during the Medinan period that the concept of umma came 
into being.
101
 Watt suggests that Islam possesses a strong emphasis on communal 
solidarity, to the extent that the notion of an umma is its chief ‗contribution…in the 
political sphere‘.102 Umma or community in essence is a group of people that have 
either shared values, language, religion, history or a combination of those that gives 
them a common identity.  
 
It has been argued that this concept began by simply referring to a group of different 
peoples and later acquired a specific meaning referring to the Muslim community. 
Watt takes this position as does Denny.
103
 It is further conceivable that this concept 
consolidated further after Medina considering that the Medinan constitution refers to 
some of the Jewish tribes as part of the umma. On the other hand, the Meccan 
passages refer, as Denny argues, to ‗peoples and religious traditions‘ in general.104 
This gives the notion of umma general meaning.  
 
Denny further maintains that the idea of this Muslim umma also connects to the 
middle way as well as to a moral community that upholds sharīʿa. It is an umma that 
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is formed and virtuous, a community that encourages the common good and 
discourages the bad.
105
 Although Denny suggests a shift in meaning of the word of 
umma from Meccan to Medinan, it remains conceivable that the meaning of the umma 
remains consistent with the idea of ―human collectivity‖ particularly when taking the 
premise that every human collectivity is a group that God created and willed. The 
religious aspect of any concept according to the worldview of the Qur'ān is created by 
the Divine and does not only include Muslims but also includes the people of the past 
that also had Prophets. For example, the following verses: 5:48; 10:19; 11:118; 16:93; 
21:92; 23:52; 42:8 and 43:33 support this assertion. In support, even Denny postulates 
there is no single homogeneous definition of umma, particularly in the Qur'ān as it 
covers many aspects. This would mean that one cannot read the word umma to mean 
the Muslim community exclusively as it often refers to other peoples, past peoples 
and Prophets.
106
 
 
More particularly, Fārūqī suggests that the Qur'ānic vision of the umma is a ‗society 
where actionalism is totalist, not totalitarian, authoritative but not authoritarian‘.107 
From this observation, one can see how the concept of the umma has been 
misunderstood as authoritarian rather than authoritative. Furthermore, for a 
community to be authoritative the individuals need to internalised the moral message 
and elevate to the higher level of nafs al-muṭma'ina as the Qur'ān describes it. Having 
said that, Fārūqī goes further, arguing for an ―Islamic state‖. He postulates that it is  
God Who instituted the state and the political order, and participation in the political 
process is therefore a religious duty. The ruler is to execute the law of God; and the 
ruled is to obey the law, and to advise the ruler and help him in upholding the law.
108
  
 
His point is valid in principle, however, as this study has suggested, once one asks 
what is God's law the answer is far from clear. As discussed in Chapter Four 'law' 
with lower case refers to prohibition and commands available in the Qur'ān, which are 
few, suggesting that God's Law (with upper case) cannot be implemented by a state 
but by the conviction of the individual; therein lies the idea of self-governance that 
this research is suggesting. 
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The social dimension of taqwā is therefore the process of encouraging the good and 
forbidding the evil (3:104, 110; 9:71). In support, Rahman maintains that the opposite 
of taqwā is moral apathy.109 Thus, it may be apathy that the Qur‘ān warns against.   
 
Rahman argues that the community described within the Qur‘ān essentially has a 
commitment to morality and once it loses this status – that is taqwā- it ceases to exist 
as an envisioned community. Without this component of imān and taqwā, such an 
ideal community is unthinkable and indeed impossible within the vision of the 
Qur‘ān. This is because as Rahman himself argues 
Islam aims necessarily and centrally...at the creation of a world order wherein its 
imperatives and principles will be embodied in such a way that the ―earth shall be 
formed‖.110 
 
Furthermore, Askari states that this relationship between religion and society is 
common to all religions and of all societies What makes one society different from 
another and what makes one religion different from another is the 'mode' of 'identity' 
between religion and society.
111
 By mode of identity, Askari means a specific 
relationship between the specific religion and its religious context and the socio-
political content. He argues that ‗[t]his mode is another way of becoming conscious of 
the actual challenges to which a religion is a response‘.112 
 
Askari observes the relationship between religion and society as that which  
swings from one emphasis to another, from meaning to function, or from function to 
meaning. If meaning is the centre of emphasis, religion is then a critical content of 
society; and if function is the centre of emphasis, society turns religion into one 
among many of its functions.
113
  
 
Religion can also take on complex forms. For example, according to Askari, Islam 
aims to unify both function and meaning, to the point that they are so interrelated that 
neither overpowers the other and neither can exist without the other.
114
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This unity of meaning and function also operates within a paradoxical relationship or 
more accurately, a dialectical one in terms of looking at society and history.
115
 
Askari‘s point might be the most accurate description of the Qur'ānic worldview of 
community and history as an entity. None of these concepts of community has a 
prescription of a particular structure in the Qur‘ān. The vital question for us here is 
how would this relationship of meaning and the function look once it becomes 
contingent and temporal. 
 
The answer provided by some ―Islamists‖ was the confusion of the contingent and the 
temporal with the unity of meaning and function that was present in the first Muslim 
generation after the death of the Prophet.  
 
In support, Rahman suggests ―fundamentalist movements‖ in the Muslim world make 
the mistake of attempting to establish political power without the social order, 
thinking that by being in power the society will achieve the Islamic vision of a moral 
community. With this kind of approach, Rahman asserts, ‗their Islam proves to be no 
more than a broken reed‘.116 
 
The Qur'ān seeks to encourage human beings to reach a level of consciousness in 
which human kind fully realize their absolute dependence upon God, believing in God 
truly. With this in mind, every concept reflects this ultimate understanding. This 
political theory in its essence encompasses one‘s emancipation from wants of the 
world, the realisation of the true authorship of our actions and ultimately challenging 
power and oppression itself. 
 
With this definition, Askari rightly clarifies the nature of oppression and connects it to 
eschatology. He suggest that the  
Qur'anic discourses regarding oppression have different levels of abstraction related 
to different levels of perception, sometimes purely psychological, sometimes 
sociological and at other times historical, but all through them runs a unity of 
approach that is basically spiritual and eschatological.
117
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This in turn would lead to a realm of order which exists on the basis of the principle 
of the individual being the centre of the paradigm encouraged to realise his/her 
essence of ʿamal –good work. This would also mean that the totality of the social 
order is assumed wherein both with the oppressed and the oppressors are responsible 
for the continuation of injustice and oppression.
118
  
 
Shariati puts this duality in terms of human beings, who are always compelled 
towards motion.  The Human self is a ‗stage for a battle between two forces that 
results in a continuous evolution toward perfection‘.119 Shariati further describes this 
battle as ‗an infinite migration, a migration within himself, from clay to God; he is a 
migrant within his own soul‘.120 
 
There is a tension or paradox between being an individual and belonging to the 
collective and between living in the mundane but believing in the sacred. This tension 
(or paradox) could be solved by means of a constant relationship between refining 
oneself (looking inward) and projecting outward with the taqwā that is developed. It 
is this kind of tension that scholars such as Rahman and Shariati speak of.  
 
The paradox in developing an ‗Islamic‘ political theory is the denial of the politics as 
it is, Askari postulates it is about ‗transforming the political man into the natural man 
in harmony with his genuine existence‘, that is, to be a true worshiper of God.121  
 
 
6.6 THE NOTION OF THE SELF AND THE COMMUNITY: THE DUALITY 
OF HUMANKIND    
 
Within the above narrative, the concepts of free will regarding human understanding, 
choice, and accountability, doing the right thing (both iṣlāḥ and iḥsān) are rooted 
deeply in the hierarchy or paradigm of the vision of an elevated community. This is a 
vision that reinforces community co-operation, not for the sake of the community but  
instead for the sake of the moral principle of responsibility and accountability. The 
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Qur‘ānic individual is not understood as fashioned by a structure but by choice. Self-
governing oneself from vices such as anger, greed, stealing, excessive consumption 
and reinforcing virtues such as forgiveness, mercy, rights and justice constitute this 
worldview. The structure is open and undefined. 
 
At this point, bearing all that this study has presented, it is useful to look at examples 
of application of such vision. One well known example is ʿUmar bin al-Khaṭāb who 
when he was appointed, was noted to have said that ‗the weak among you shall be 
strong in my eyes until I will secure his right, and the strong shall be weak in my eyes 
until I wrest the right from him‘.122  
 
Similarly one reads in ʿAlī ibn abī Ṭālib‘s lengthy letter to Mālik Al-Ashtar when 
Ṭālib appointed  Mālik as a governor : 
[…] You must know that a good and virtuous man is known and recognized by the 
good that is said about him and the praise which Allah has destined him to receive 
from others. Therefore, make your mind the source and fountain-head of good 
thoughts, good intentions and good deeds. This can only be attained by keeping a 
strict control on your desires and yearnings, however much they may try to incite and 
coerce you. Remember that the best way to do justice to your inner self and to keep it 
out of harm is to restrain it from vice and from things which the 'self' inordinately and 
irrationally desires. 
[…] Mālik! You must create in your mind kindness, compassion and love for your 
subjects. Do not behave towards them as if you are a voracious and ravenous beast 
and as if your success lies in devouring them. 
Remember, Mālik, that amongst your subjects there are two kinds of people: those 
who have the same religion as you have; they are brothers to you, and those who have 
religions other than that of yours, they are human beings like you. Men of either 
category suffer from the same weaknesses and disabilities that human beings are 
inclined to, they commit sins, indulge in vices either intentionally or foolishly and 
unintentionally without realizing the enormity of their deeds. Let your mercy and 
compassion come to their rescue and help in the same way and to the same extent that 
you expect Allah to show mercy and forgiveness to you. 
[…]  e fair, impartial and just in your dealings with all, individually and collectively 
and be careful not to make your person, position and favours act as sources of malice. 
[…] Select honest, truthful and pious people as your companions. Train them not to 
flatter you and not to seek your favour by false praises because flattery and false 
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praises create vanity and conceit and they make a man lose sight of his real self and 
ignore his duties.
123
 
These passages, although lengthy, reflect, if anything, the role of internalising these 
moral principles. From as early as the 1
st
 Muslim century the emphasis of change has 
been internal when, for example ʿAlī says ‗make your mind the source and fountain-
head of good thoughts, good intentions and good deeds‘. One loses sight of one‘s real 
self if one has the wrong companionships. Ibn Abī Ṭālib advises Mālik to train his 
companions not to praise him as it creates ‗vanity and conceit and they make a man 
lose sight of his real self and ignore his duties‘. However, when both structure and 
principles have been merged together, that which is temporal, historical and 
contextual loses its particularity and becomes universal, sacred and ahistorical.  
 
The description of the Qur‘ān of nafs, insān and ʿa d and their semantic connection to 
concepts such as taqwā on one hand, and  ulm, fasād on the other highlights this 
duality of man. Thus the way to escape these two extreme is by building a taqwā 
oriented mind set, which develops a self-governed individual based upon a high moral 
imperative. This also means, according to Rahman, that God bestows meaningfulness 
upon human beings and integrates them into a moral order.
124
  
 
The duality also includes the fact that the human being could either be reckless, 
haughty, boastful and independent or desperate and hopeless. The solution lies in the 
delicate balance between having hope in God‘s mercy and having humility. As a 
result, when a man achieves goodness he then shares it with the less advantaged so 
that they might learn self-control of the nafs and have hope. The aim, as Rahman 
advocates, is to develop a moral life which seeks to achieve a balance between 
‗certain antithetical poles which constitute the ―tensions‖‘ of man‘s moral life.125 The 
balance that the Qur‘ān brings about could only be seen as that of a state of self-
control (taqwā) and trust (imān) as discussed above. Rahman summarises this 
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dialectical movement when he says ‗man actively gropes, God gives perception; man 
searches, God grants discovery; man prays…God brings result‘.126 
 
The process of self-reflection ensures that self-control or self-governing takes place 
which in turn would protect the individual (‗be shielded‘ using Qur‘ānic language) 
from self-destruction, (which lead to fasād) or self-righteousness (which would lead 
to  ulm al-nafs).  oth of these are societal ills which the Qur‘ān repeatedly warns 
against. While this study argues against the macro politics as part of development of 
individual Muslim, it is essential to point out here that the individual‘s development 
through the axiomatic approach is essentialised in the Qur‘ān in reinforcing concepts 
such as iḥsān, taqwā, justice, equality, ḥaqq and so on as the essential axes through 
which a micro-foundational development is considered with the objective of 
developing and reaching eschatological success.  
 
 
 
6.7 CONCLUSION  
 
Considering the findings of this investigation that the Qur‘ān seems uninterested in 
structures and institutions in the political sense, yet emphasizes change and self-
purification in the sense of self-restraint, one could wonder if the Qur‘ān‘s vision  
actually empowers human beings to reach their full potential by doing good but not 
within a particular structure. Instead, it might do so by emphasising the accountability 
of human action in linking together the physical and the metaphysical, particularly by 
emphasising the eschatological consequences. 
 
Starting from the individual as the basic unit of analysis, the Qur‘ān describes the 
condition and nature of the human being in an attempt to construct a moral individual. 
Such a construction would have a ripple affect upon the development of a society 
based on taqwā, which is in turn based on self-governance, motivated to serve that 
which is good (ʿamal) and would lead to the process of iḥsān and iṣlāḥ. This process 
ensures that the individual would not fall into the extremes that the Qur‘ān warns 
against. This is the Qur‘ānic notion of self-governance. Fundamentally the notion of  
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human free choice ensuring accountability and responsibility is essential but is also 
the social responsibility of the human towards his fellow human beings.  
 
The central discourse of the Qur‘ān is that the individual is a free agent in history and 
that history, although posessing its own sunan (laws), is based upon the dynamic of 
human agency. Human agency, as the Qurān sees it, possesses a duality and within 
the center of this duality lies free will. 
 
The Qur‘ānic weltanschauung‘s recognition of human nature and its proposition of 
possible solutions to the state of insān, however, connect strongly with its 
eschatological worldview.  
 
The premise on which this study is based on is that the Qur‘ān does not set out a 
political system but rather an ethical/moral system that encompasses the individual 
and community. Again, similar to ‗Alī ‗Abdul Rāziq, this investigation postulates that 
there is no clear prescribed political blueprint in the Qur‘ān. This study departs 
however from Abdul Rāziq as mentioned earlier in that it is not advocating the 
adoption of a western democratic model or western notions of democracy. It seems 
the approach of the Qur‘ān is neither bottom-up nor top-bottom, but is rather an 
‗inward outward‘ paradigm as discussed earlier. Once the focus is upon the self, the 
Qur‘ān suggests that the society will move towards the state of virtue (with iḥsān 
being seen as one of the states of virtue).  
 
The description of the Qur‘ān of the nafs, insān, mu’min and ʿabd refers to human-to-
human conduct that moves away from the western definition of the political as power-
centric and moves towards the foundation of the political in ethics or Qur‘ānic moral 
theory on how a person ought to be and therefore how a community ought to be in 
general sense and not in a structuralist sense. With it comes a multiplicity of concepts 
of accountability and responsibility.  
 
The Qur‘ān radically moves away from such a structuralist approach towards a 
paradoxically individualistic (humanistic) against systemic approaches. This means 
that the Qur‘ān is not concerned with the position of power in a structure ―power‖ per 
se but rather the concern is for the wellbeing of the human, virtue, justice, rights, 
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equality and the greater good in society. Thus, the political is conceivably not equated 
with ―power‖ but rather challenges power and the status quo without seeking ―power‖ 
itself. 
Conclusion 
260 
 
THESIS CONCLUSION 
 
A civilized man does not confuse ends with means, and he does not sacrifice 
ends for the sake of means. He is a man of principles and of moral values, one 
who has achieved a complete intellectual and emotional life.
1
 
 
It is only fair to begin the introduction of the conclusion of this study with Ṭāhā‘s 
words as it reflects the Qur‘ānic outlook of the moral imperative. Our journey into the 
tentative meanings of verses that deal with the human being in particular and 
community at large is closely linked with human development so that the ends are 
neither confused with means nor are they compromised. This research suggests that 
the Qur‘ānic worldview of an ideal political affair lies in the journey of a human 
being who struggles towards righteousness with a strong connection of purpose of 
being. Society itself becomes the means by which the individual is enriched and not 
the end by itself. This study does not argue that there are no political concepts present 
in the Qur‘ān. Rather it claims that what appears to be a political theory therein is in 
fact a moral ―theory‖ that has political implications. 
 
This thesis has demonstrated in agreement with the hypothesis in the Introduction that 
there was no clear prescription for a unique system of government in the Qur‘ān 
whether in terms of an ―Islamic state‖ or in terms of a political system or government.  
 
Although the assertion above is not new, most arguments arise from a secularist point 
of view that promotes and encourages a democratic political system. The study has 
argued that from the Qur‘ānic point of view, no political system is unique. No 
political theory is encouraged; one is merely charged to be righteous in all one‘s 
dealings by being good and fair, to be just and to have an outward commitment for the 
betterment of society as a whole and to be a responsible and conscious person to all of 
humanity. Of course there are many discussions and questions that can rise from this 
position, a few of which are related to definition of concepts such as what does it 
mean to be righteous, good, just, conscience and so on. However, from the Qur‘ānic 
point of view the definitions seem to be taken for granted. That is to say, it is assumed 
that the reader would understand what good, right, wrong, thinking, pondering, justice 
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and righteousness all mean.  In some cases, there are more specific descriptions of 
what it means to be a good person. For instance, in some cases the characteristics of a 
believer (mu’min) is defined as those who give charity and are honest, the same is the 
case with taqwā.  
 
The debates and discussions themselves are sufficient indications that there is no clear 
prescribed theory in the Qur'ān. At the same time, this is not to say there was no 
political discussions, but that they might not be a clear as some have suggested. 
 
It is vital to bear in mind that this study has not argued that there is no political 
thought in Muslim history, or that Muslims should not engage in political life. It 
rather highlights that although there were fundamental principles of rights, justice and 
equality reinforced within the Qur‘ānic message, the mechanism with which to 
achieve this ideal society has not been prescribed. What Muslims inherited from the 
early Muslim community could not be substantiated as ‗binding‘ and therefore the 
question of its universality, applicability in all times for all places in all circumstances 
is questionable.  
 
This study demonstrated that as early as the Umayyads, the concept of khalīfa in the 
Qur‘ān became manipulated to be equated with the historical caliphate system. The 
idea of a state system being equivalent to a caliphate system has been challenged. 
Further confusion arose when Abū  akr was given the title of khalīfa. Both the 
Qur‘ānic khalīfa and the title Abū  akr inherited had the sense of ‗replacing‘, 
‗inhabiting‘ and ‗succeeding‘ rather than connoting a caliphate system or a caliphate 
theory, as postulated by some modern writers. The notion of khalīfatullah, however 
did not take precedence amongst the classical and medieval Sunnī scholars.   
   
One interesting observation this thesis came across is that it seems that the concept 
khilāfa or khalīfa used by the classical and medieval Sunnī scholars is categorically 
different from modern/contemporary usage and the meaning that has been attached to 
it. Contemporary usage may instead be the result of the early Orientalist writing since 
the early 18
th
 and later in the 19
th
 century, in which the word khilāfa  was interpreted 
not as ―replacing‖ or ―succeeding‖ but a categorically an ―Islamic‖ entity or system. 
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This would in turn lead to the idea of a ―Sunnī caliphate theory‖ and that the caliphate 
system is unique, a position which would be adopted by a generation of writers. 
 
Furthermore, the Qur‘ānic ḥukm, ḥudūd and sharīʿa acquired additional meaning in 
post-Qur‘ānic period. There was also a distinction made between the object of the 
punishment and the punishment itself.    
  
It was further argued that the Qur‘ān does not possess apolitical understanding of the 
individual or society. This research has suggested that within the Qur‘ānic framework 
there is a vision of society that calls for increased accountability, justice and 
individual responsibility, which are political by their nature. Encouraging what is 
good in society and discouraging what is evil, the Qur‘ān seems to be speaking of 
general concepts of freedom and accountability, not of a particular political structure. 
Unfortunately, some Muslim thinkers have interpreted past events in such a way that 
what was a temporary situation becomes elevated into a trans-historical sacred fact. 
This, the thesis argues, has been one reason for the incorrect view that a clearly 
delineated ―Islamic‖ political system and theory exists in the Qur'ān defended as 
‗ordained by God‘.  
 
Remarkably, throughout Muslim history there is an incessant search for a clearly 
prescribed political theory, indicating that the search for a clear answer is far from 
evident. This study has suggested that such a search in and of itself is an indication of 
uncertainty amongst early scholars. In support, other religious issues are not disputed , 
such as the number of prayers a believer is supposed to perform each day, even 
though the exact number of prayers is not been mentioned explicitly in the Qur'ān. 
This example illustrates that if the issue of governship were clear there would have 
been reliable and unquestionable method concerning it about which early Muslims 
would have not disagreed. 
 
This research has shown that verses which are usually quoted to be a clear evidence 
for a prescribed form of government in fact possess more tentative meanings. It 
suggests that the initial Muslim political writings arose in reaction to an absence of 
anything clearly prescribed. Strikingly, the possible success in keeping the integrity of 
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the ideal (the moral values) occurred despite the early bloody history. This is close to 
Mohammed Iqbal‘s point  
the ideal and the real are not two opposing forces which cannot be reconciled. The 
life of the ideal consists, not in a total breach with the real which would tend to 
shatter the organic wholeness of life into painful oppositions, but in the perpetual 
endeavour of the ideal to appropriate the real with a view eventually to absorb it, to 
convert it into itself and to illuminate its whole being.
2
  
 
In order to show just how tentative the meanings of the verses are, and that no one 
verse stands in isolation from a whole message, a combination of semantic and 
thematic approaches was adopted. It involved gathering all the verses that mention a 
concept itself, its derivatives, its parallels, and its associations to draw a more 
complete picture of the meaning(s) of the concept in its own right. Such methods 
make this study a linguistic investigation.  
 
For instance, the concept of ḥukm arose within early Muslim political theology 
particularly by the Khāraji‘ite. The word was examined from its roots, its derivatives, 
its parallel and its associations. The frequency of the concept and its relation to other 
concepts was also noted.  
 
One fundamental assumption of this methodology was to acknowledge Izutsu‘s point 
that language conveys a weltanschauung. This worldview is expressed both 
semantically and non-semantically. In order to understand the Qur‘ānic worldview 
then, this research also looked at the non-semantic associations the Qur‘ān makes 
with each Qur‘ānic concept such as the oneness of God (tawḥīd), the last day 
(‗ākhira), which connects to accountability (ḥisā ), action (ʿamal) and free choice 
(khiyār). Given that the different concepts in the Qur‘ān vary in their frequency, one 
may be justified in assuming that the differences in frequency are not arbitrary, but 
rather suggest a hierarchy of concepts. This hierarchy is important in examining the 
Qur‘ānic worldview and understanding it. The hierarchy of concepts has also helped 
in examining values in the Qur‘ān and with respect to their hierarchy.    
 
As this study seeks to determine whether there is any kind of political theory within 
the Qur‘ān, this research has focussed upon analysing the Qur‘ān as a primary source, 
                                                 
2
 M Iqbāl, The reconstruction of religious thought in Islam, Ashraf, Lahore, 1954, p. 9. 
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with the aid of exegetical works,  an Arabic English dictionary of Qur‘ānic usage, and 
early semanticists such as al-Iṣfahānī. This study is thus a predominantly 
epistemological endeavour.  
 
This study highlighted the importance of the early political events for the 
development of Muslim political theology. The first Muslim civil war in 35-40/656-
661 resulted in particular kinds of question which demanded specific answers. At that 
time, it was not only the development of questions that framed the debate, but also the 
distinctive groups that were formed in an attempt to make sense of the bloody events 
of that period. The questions that arose included: what constitutes a leader, who has 
the right to rulership, what constitutes good rulership and when would it be obligatory 
to rebel. The questions of the boundaries of belief were also raised as a response to 
the killing of ʿUthmān bin ʿAffān.  
 
The shift from the early Muslim history to the medieval period was filled with 
polemical discussions arising from the first Muslim civil war among a clearly 
demarcated set of sects. Although writers such as Māwardī, Ghazālī and Ibn 
Taymiyya are often referenced as the earliest thinkers who developed Muslim 
political theory, this study has argued that their work was a response to the polemical 
discussions between the Shīʿites (the Ismāʿilite particularly), the Muʿtazilites and the 
Kkāraji‘ites, making the medieval writings highly polemical.   
 
This study also suggested that the general orientation of the modern period, insofar as 
Muslim political thought is concerned, is characterised by a reaction against colonial 
experiences, the fall of the Ottoman Empire and decolonization that led to the 
formation of the nation-state, something relatively new to Muslim experience. The 
study concludes that the development of ―political Islam‖, ―Islamism‖ and the entire 
Muslim theo-political thought is in fact an attempt to deal with the absence of a clear 
prescribed way of governing in the Qur‘ān and the sunna. The disagreement between 
sects, if anything, suggests just how much uncertainty there exists as to what the 
Qur‘ān says about political governship. 
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The Contribution of This Research 
 
This research contributes by using a combination of Qur‘ānic hermeneutical methods 
to showing that verses related to political concepts are pluralistic in nature.  
 
Adopting Izutsian semantic-field analysis with its thematic approach helped make it 
possible to examine the Qur‘ānic worldview independent of any post-Qur‘ānic 
theology. Thus, this study had to detach itself from two extremes: (1) the obsessive 
attempt to reconcile Islam with democratic thought, linked with those who hold that 
the Qur‘ān does not possess any political theory and (2) the theo-philosophical lenses 
of the medieval scholars. Furthermore, this analysis attempts to bring into light the 
Qur‘ānic narrative independent of the Muslim post-enlightenment reaction to 
modernity.    
 
From an examination of the themes in the Qur‘ān also arises the idea of a hierarchy of 
concepts based on their frequency of occurrence, which could potentially indicate a 
hierarchy of values in the Qur‘ān. This makes it quite clear that single verses do not 
stand in isolation, independent of the entirety of the Qur‘ān itself.  
 
With a predominant focus upon the Qur‘ān, it is much easier to see how greatly there 
has been a shift in emphasis of a given Qur‘ānic theme in comparison to post-
Qur‘ānic literature that developed in relation to that theme. The existing orthodox 
understanding of ḥukm, sharīʿa, fiqh and ḥudūd, for example, might require an 
epistemological paradigm shift as Thomas Kuhn termed it.
3
 The paradigm is not a 
theory but rather a worldview. Although Kuhn specifically referred to scientific 
paradigms as opposed to the social science and the humanities, the same argument 
seems to apply to religious orthodoxies. A particular kind of understanding becomes 
an orthodoxy marginalising particular aspects, as discussed above. These aspects are 
not dismissed as anomalies as Kuhn terms it, but as ‗dangerous‘ arguments.  
 
                                                 
3
 See his valuable work T Kuhn, The structure of scientific revolutions, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1996. 
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For example, law was not codified by the companions after the death of the Prophet 
nor were there jurists in the sense of fuqahā’ as we know them today, although there 
were judges to judge between people.
4
 The companions of the Prophet also seemed 
disinterested in codifying and documenting historiography, and in some accounts 
made sure that those that narrated ḥadīth did not do so excessively and expressed 
serious concern about the chain of narration (sanad) even before the ḥadīth was 
documented in writing.
5
 This example highlights the shift of emphasis.  
 
 
The Challenges Faced 
 
Given the nature of this investigation and the formation of its leading question, it 
could be claimed that the investigation itself is in fact a modern reaction to the highly 
polemical debate in modern Muslim political theology. Without denying that there is 
some measure of truth to this claim, it must be reiterated that the methodology was 
itself developed with as much of a holistic outlook as possible. No question arises in a 
vacuum; the main concern of this investigation was to identify the Qur‘ānic 
worldview independent of post-Qur‘ānic influences with respect to theo-philosophical 
and the jurisprudential premises.    
 
This project however, proved even more complex and time-consuming than 
anticipated due to the intricacies of the analysis, thus showing the need for such kind 
of analysis. Due to the novelty of the research methodology, it took much trial and 
error on the part of the researcher to test and develop it. Even at the end, the 
researcher is still aware of its tentative nature. In addition, two clear anomalies arose 
in the course of this research.  
 
The first is the concept of qa ā’il, denoting a plural form of ‗tribe‘.6 However, this 
form is mentioned once, whereas its root word is mentioned 313 times. Were the 
methodology applied to this concept, one would mistakenly assume that the concept 
                                                 
4
 A point that Ovamir Anjum makes in his book Politics, Law and Community in Islamic Thought: The 
Taymiyyan Moment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012. 
5
 See Y Muḥammad, Mushkilat al-ḥadīth,Mu assasat al-Intishār al- Arabī,  eirut, 2007. 
6
 See Badawi & Abdel Haleem, Arabic-English Dictionary of Qur’anic Usage, pp. 733-5. 
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of tribe is central to the Qur‘ānic worldview, whereas the word also comes to mean 
‗before‘ in the form of qabl that is mentioned 261 times.  
 
Another anomaly is the concept of jumuʿa, which is mentioned only once in the 
Qur‘ān in this form. It does not mean, however, that the Friday prayer is not 
prescribed or central to Muslim life. The root word is mentioned 129 times also 
meaning jamīʿ and ajmaʿīn  
 
With the methodology introduced in this study the interpretation of these two notions 
would be misleading. However, by recognising these anomalies and by reiterating that 
this study remains work in progress, one could still substantiate the findings of this 
study.   
 
 
Future Research  
 
Contemporary Muslim intellectuals and thinkers need to develop into ethicist thinkers 
to avoid both the atomistic approach to the Qur‘ān and the overly legalistic 
understanding of the Qur‘ān. The idea of the hierarchy of values may provide a 
stepping-stone for identifying Qur‘ānic values independent of theo-philosophies 
developed in the medieval period. Further research in this field is important. A related 
point here is development of a Qur‘ānic moral theory that moves away from the 
Muʿtazilite-Ashʿarite debates towards moral imperatives such as hal jazā’ū al-Iḥsān 
ilā al-Iḥsān (55:60) ,which would have an implication on the political. 
 
Further research needs to be conducted at a conceptual level on how one reads the 
sunna. It depends on how one takes the nature of revelation in relation to other 
spheres of knowledge, such as human experience, intuition, consciousness. These 
questions are very important and further conceptual study is required to shed further 
light upon them. Although the question of the normativity of the sunna and its 
authority is a very important one, it remains outside the scope of this study. This is 
due to the sheer amount of research involved in analyzing history, methodology and 
the questions of authenticity in seeking a political theory. Nevertheless, future 
research is necessary to investigate the role of the sunna. 
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The significant emphasis on the moral accountability highlights the critical need to 
return to a holistic understanding of our surroundings especially with the conditions of 
our world. Moral imperatives have been divorced largely from science, economics, 
law, politics and our general environment with the consequence of neglecting serious 
world poverty, social inequalities and the terrible destruction of our planet due to this 
‗modern‘ project, which includes the state‘s apparatus. Writers such as Alasdair 
MacIntyre, Charles Taylor and Charles Larmore argue for this comprehensiveness of 
moral attitude to all aspect of the modern life. This is what the Qur‘an indicates in 
terms of accountability and the rights of others. Muslim scholars are encouraged to 
investigate the defects of this ‗modern project‘ and to move away from the 
Eurocentric notions that the modern project has produced. This is the strength of 
Muslim proposition of moral economy, moral science, moral environment and moral 
politics.  
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